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ABSTRACT
The dissertation is a comparative study of three multilateral development banks (MDB s)-the
World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and European
Investment Bank (EIB)-and their struggles to operationalize and implement relatively new
environmental mandates. MDBs are increasingly being relied upon to address environmental
issues in their activities, while at the same time facing criticism for allegedly promoting
serious environmental degradation in borrowing countries. The dissertation focuses on the
activities of these banks in Central and Eastern Europe, where the fall of the Iron Curtain
revealed the most polluted countries in Europe, and where these MDBs are among the top
donors. There is significant variation in the degree to which these MDBs have incorporated
environmental goals into their work. The World Bank has played an important role in
providing policy support for environmental reform in the region, while financing the largest
scope of "green" projects of the three banks. The EIB has responded to its environmental
goals in minimal ways, and the EBRD has an intermediate position between the other two. I
argue that external pressure from major shareholder countries, usually supported or pushed
by NGOs, is a key factor determining the depth of an MDB's commitment to new mandates,
such as the environment. However, shareholder commitment is a necessary but not
sufficient condition in explaining the banks' environmental behavior. Governance structures
for all three banks are diffuse, and, as a result, institutional design and incentive systems play
critical roles in how environmental objectives are translated into activities. In all three cases,
the banks' internal incentive systems are poorly aligned with their environmental goals, and
even where institutional variables are structured to promote greater awareness of
environmental issues within the banks, they do not always work as envisioned.
Theoretically, the dissertation argues that different causal variables matter at different stages
of the policy process. Neorealist approaches have the most explanatory power in accounting
for how environmental ideas are brought to the MDBs, but are insufficient in explaining
outcomes. Approaches drawn from institutionalist and organizational theories, in turn,
provide guidance in analyzing the mechanisms by which environmental objectives are
translated into practice. The argument calls for a better integration of international relations
theories emphasizing the importance of shareholder politics with theories that focus on how
institutional arrangements shape behavior.
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In the post Cold-War era, the absence of a dominant state willing to lead the new
international order has resulted in a re-examination of international organizations (IOs) and
their role in promoting collective solutions to global and regional problems. The expansion
of NATO as a tool for addressing European security issues, the heightened power of the
World Trade Organization to settle trade disputes among member states, and the increased
use of United Nations peacekeeping forces in the last decade are all examples of this
phenomenon. One result of the attention placed on IOs is that these organizations have been
asked to take on additional issues, many of which did not exist when the institutions were
created. The promotion of environmental protection goals, or "environmentally sustainable
development" is one of these issues. 1 As concern for environmental protection has grown
among advanced industrial countries, many IOs have been called upon by member states to
address environmental issues in their activities, both as a way of promoting transnational
cooperation to help solve transboundary problems, and as a way for richer countries to
provide financial resources to poorer countries to encourage environmental improvement.
This dissertation investigates the adoption of new environmental policies by an
important set of IOs- multilateral development banks (MDBs)- and the extent to which these
policies make a difference to project formation, implementation, and environmental
1Definitions of "sustainable development" tend to suffer from vagueness. The most commonly cited definition
comes from the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development Report, Our Common Future,
also known as the Brundtland Commission report. It defines sustainable development as development that
meets "the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs." World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1987), p. 43.
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improvement in recipient countries. The central questions of the research project are: what
factors accountfor the ability of MDBs to incorporate and successfully apply new
environmental mandates? To what extent have the new mandates altered the banks'
operational procedures and consequently shaped lending portfolios and other activities?
Whatfactors constrain or enhance their ability to engage in effective assistance strategies?
Put more generally: what happens when an institution is told to do something new, and that
new task may conflict with its traditional role? This dissertation is a comparative study of
three MDBs-the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD), and the European Investment Bank (EIB)-that examines common sources of
inertia and varying attempts at innovation in their efforts to "green" their portfolios. I
examine the activities of these three MDBs in a common geographical region-Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE)-over the same time period (1990-1996). The political and
institutional mechanisms that shape the ways in which MDBs address environmental issues
in their work in CEE countries are also generalizable, and help to explain more broadly how
(mostly) old international institutions may take on and implement new mandates.
The ability of MDBs to incorporate environmental goals into their work is important for
four reasons. First, MDBs continue to have a substantial impact on recipient countries,
through their policy dialogues with recipient governments, their lending in key economic
sectors, and their role as a catalyst for encouraging private sector investment. The degree to
which MDBs can address local, regional and global environmental problems through their
work thus has important implications on promoting solutions to these problems. This is
particularly important in CEE, where the fall of the Iron Curtain revealed the most polluted
countries in Europe, and where the three MDBs are among the largest donors in the region,
together providing $24.9 billion, mainly in loans, between 1990-96.
Second, given the many trade-offs between economic growth and environmental
protection, the ways in which MDBs attempt to connect diverse mandates offer insights on
how ideas of "sustainable development" can be turned into practice. Third, the dramatic
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increase of private capital flows to developing countries in the past six years has forced
MDBs to begin rethinking their comparative advantages in a world where private banks are
increasingly able to compete with international financial institutions in financing economic
development. 2 One result has been a trend by MDBs to focus more closely on linking
lending to policy reform, while devising innovative financial mechanisms to undertake their
work. The ability of MDBs to cope with environmental issues sheds light on the extent to
which they have been able to adapt to new issues more generally amidst a changing global
context for their work. The issue of the environment is particularly important as well,
because it is the only new policy issue that all MDBs have been seeking to address in recent
years, and it has received the most publicity and the most scrutiny from outside actors
evaluating MDB performance. 3
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is widespread concern that MDBs have
not done an adequate job in addressing environmental and other new tasks they have taken on
over time, and as a result, must be reformed or restructured. Indeed, the recent fiftieth
anniversary of the Bretton Woods conference, which gave birth to the World Bank and its
sister institution, the IMF, has prompted extensive debates within the policy community on
whether and how to reform these institutions. 4 In terms of environmental issues in
20nly five years ago, official capital flows to developing countries exceeded private flows. Now, private
flows are more than five times larger than public flows. They now stand at around $240 billion, or six times
their 1990 levels. The vast majority of these flows to developing countries is accounted for by a dozen
countries, which means that MDBs remain significant actors in most parts of the world. Nonetheless, the
surge in private flows has prompted MDBs to develop new strategies for working with the private sector. For
data on private flows versus public flows, see World Bank, Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries:
The Road to Financial Iltegration (New York: Oxford University Press. 1997).
3 Some MDBs, such as the World Bank, have taken on a variety of other issues over the years, ranging from
judicial reform to the promotion of gender equality. Others, such as the EIB, have not. Yet, even for the
World Bank, the environmental mandate has received the most attention, and the most emphasis in the Bank's
budget.
4 For an example of work praising the Bretton Woods institutions, see Henry Owen, "The World Bank: Is 50
Years Enough?" Foreign Affairs 73, no. 5 (September/October 1994): 97-108. For an example of work
arguing for a vastly more limited World Bank, or even the closure of the Bank, see Kevin Danaher, ed., Fifty
Yeat-s is Enough (Boston: South End Press, 1994). In the center are other attempts to propose reforms. such
as the Bretton Woods Commission Report, which recommends ways in which the IMF and WB can refocus
their energies; see Bretton Woods Commission, Bretton Woods: Looking to the Future (Washington DC:
July 1994). Slightly more critical, and focusing solely on the Bank. is World Wildlife Fund, Lending
Credibility: New Mandates and Partnlerships for the World Bank (Washington DC: 1996).
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particular, at the same time MDBs have been given increasing responsibility for dealing with
global and regional environmental issues, they have faced constant criticism from
environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for causing serious environmental
degradation and generally doing a poor job in implementing their environmental policies and
procedures.
For example, one conclusion of the June 1992 UN Conference on the Environment and
Development (UNCED, also known as the Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro) was that
billions of dollars of increased funding were necessary to help developing countries pursue
environmentally sustainable economic growth, and the MDBs should be an important source
of this funding. 5 Three years before Rio, the World Bank was asked to design and become
the main implementing agency for the new Global Environmental Facility (GEF), to help
poor countries address global environmental problems. At the Earth Summit, the GEF was
selected to be the interim funding mechanism for the Framework Convention on Climate
Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity, the two conventions signed there. The
Bank also manages the Montreal Protocol's Multilateral Fund, which finances the incremental
costs developing countries face in phasing out ozone depleting substances under the Montreal
Protocol. The Bank has been praised by Maurice Strong, who was UNCED's Secretary
General, as being at "the center of the movement towards a more sustainable way of life on
our planet for which the agreements reached at the Earth Summit provide the basic
blueprint," 6 and by political scientists Ernst Haas and Peter Haas as one of two IOs that have
"fully learned to integrate environmental considerations into their traditional
responsibilities."7
5 The UNCED secretariat estimated the cost of implementing Agenda 21, the guiding document produced at
UNCED, to be around $125 billion a year. See Michael Grubb et. al.. The 'Earth Smlllnit' .4ir'ccllt'lrs: A
Guide and Assessmlent (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 1993).
6 At the time Strong made this declaration, he was a senior advisor to World Bank president James
Wolfensohn. "Environment Matters: Annual Review," (Washington DC: World Bank. 1996). p. I.
7 Peter M. Haas and Ernst B. Haas, "Learning to Learn: Impro\ving International Go\vernance.' Global
Governance 1 (1995), p. 266. The other institution is UNEP. Haas and Haas examined a set of I IOs. of
which the World Bank was the only MDB.
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Yet, during this same period of time the World Bank has faced extensive criticism by
environmentalists, who argued that it promoted extensive environmental degradation in
developing countries, that it has done a poor job in following its own policies, and that it is
"intellectually corrupt and institutionally debased." 8 "If it is true as Maurice Strong says, that
the Bank is 'clearly at the center of the movement toward a more sustainable way of life on
our planet'...we are in deep trouble as a planet and a species," wrote Lisa Jordan, director of
the Washington DC-based NGO, the Bank Information Center. "The Bank has failed to
introduce policies which will implement sustainable development, principally because the
development paradigm within which it operates has not changed. "9 Which view is correct?
Are MDBs like the World Bank part of the problem or part of the solution? Are they making
great strides in integrating environmental considerations into their work, or are they engaging
in "green" window dressing? The answers are important in helping guide member states
toward more productive governance.
I find significant variation in the extent to which the three MDBs have attached
environmental considerations onto pre-existing structures and general operating procedures
("add-on"), versus showing signs of innovation in the ways they address these issues by
more fully integrating them into project identification and development ("build-in"). While
the three banks share the same basic stated environmental objectives of seeking to fund
projects with major environmental components or goals, as well as to address and mitigate
potentially adverse environmental impacts in their broader project portfolios, they have
adopted distinctly different strategies in the ways in which they have chosen to operationalize
and implement their environmental policy goals, even within the same geographical region of
CEE. The examination and explanation of these difference are central goals of the
dissertation.
8 Bruce Rich, Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment, and the Crisis of
Development (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), p. 281.
9Lisa Jordan, "Sustainable Rhetoric vs. Sustainable Development: The Retreat from Sustainability in World
Bank Development Policy," (Washington DC: Bank Information Center, 1997), p. 16.
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The dissertation will show how the World Bank is undertaking the largest number of
projects with primary environmental goals or significant environmental components, and is
involved in or leads the most agenda-setting, policy-oriented activities of the three, which
have helped CEE governments develop new environmental policies and institutions. The
EIB, by contrast, has responded to its environmental goals in relatively minimal ways,
mainly by following European environmental regulations in the infrastructure-type of projects
it normally funds. The EBRD has an intermediate position between the other two, lacking
the breadth of environmentally-related work undertaken by the World Bank, but also moving
beyond the narrow range of environmental activities undertaken by the EIB.
Overall, the World Bank has played an important role in providing intellectual and
policy support for environmental reform in the region, and its policy activities have been
complemented by the largest set of "green" projects of the three banks. The EBRD is less
involved in policy work, and has defined its environmental projects mainly as those
undertaken by its municipal development and energy efficiency units. The EIB has
undertaken virtually no policy work and has financed the fewest environmental projects.
These projects mainly reflect recipient demand or the EIB's role as co-financier in projects
one of the other two MDBs designed. Projects with primary environmental components or
significant environmental objectives in the period 1990-96 total $1.2 billion for the World
Bank, $809 million for the EBRD, and around $406 for the EIB.10 These figures, however,
do not include financing for technical assistance, agenda-setting exercises and other non-loan
activities, which further reflect the greater depth and scope of the World Bank's activities,
followed by the EBRD.
These findings are somewhat counterintuitive, since environmental non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) have been most critical of the World BHank's environmental behavior in
developing countries, and have not even scrutinized-until very recently-the portfolio of the
10The World Bank has also been responsible for carrying out an additional $67 million in projects through
the Global Environmental Facility, which involves the Bank, UNDP and UNEP. It operates with grant
financing, and is not directly comparable to work undertaken by the other two MDBs.
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EIB. In addition, it is somewhat puzzling that the two European-based banks are relatively
less active in financing environmentally-related activities in CEE, because some of the
region's environmental problems are transboundary in nature, and thus affect Western
Europe. The two European MDBs are also becoming increasingly involved in helping many
of the CEE countries prepare for accession into the European Union, which will involve
these countries adopting EU environmental standards.
In seeking to explain these differences, it is important to realize there is a considerable
body of (mostly critical) articles and a few books on the World Bank's environmental
behavior, but virtually nothing written on the other two banks. This is less surprising in the
case of the EBRD, because it is a relatively new institution, established in 1991. However,
the dearth of literature on the EIB is curious, because it is hardly a new institution (set up in
1958), and because it now lends more each year than the World Bank. 11l To date, there are
only two published NGO reports on the EIB's environmental activity, and no political
analysis of its overall behavior in any major political science or public policy journal. The
NGOs have historically paid least attention to the EIB, although it has the least developed
environmental policies of the three MDBs. In Central and Eastern Europe, the EIB will one
day be the most important MDB of the three; it will become a more central player for
countries acceding to the European Union, and as the transition process matures and the other
MDBs pull out of the region, the EIB will remain as Europe's multilateral bank.
This dissertation has three main arguments. The first argument concerns the
explanation of this variation. I argue that variation in the banks' environmental behavior
reflects two important factors. The first is the degree of shareholder commitment to
environmental issues. The dissertation shows that external pressure from major shareholder
countries, usually supported or pushed by environmental NGOs, has been a key factor
determining the depth of an MDB's commitment to addressing environmental issues, as seen
1 EIB lending surpassed World Bank lending in 1992, 1994, 1995 and 1996. In 1996, for example, the EIB
lent $26.8 billion. compared with $21.5 biilion for the World Bank.
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in its stated policy goals and strategies. I find that there is relatively stronger shareholder
commitment to environmental issues in the cases of the World Bank and EBRD, and a weak
commitment on the part of the EIB, and that this offers a partial explanation for the
composition of their "environmental" activities in CEE.
However, I also argue that shareholder commitment is a necessary but not sufficient
condition to explain the three banks' environmental behavior. MDB shareholders set the
basic rules and design of the institution and play an important role on a strategic level, but
their control is limited by diffuse governance structures, and the fact that new mandates do
not always fit well with existing institutional design and incentive systems. As a result, even
in cases where shareholders have expressed a desire for the bank to address environmental
issues, institutional design and incentive systems nonetheless play critical roles in
determining how each bank's environmental objectives are translated into their activities. In
all three cases, the banks' internal incentive systems are not well aligned with their
environmental goals, and even where institutional variables are structured to promote greater
awareness of environmental issues within the banks, they do not always work as envisioned.
Given the banks' weak governance structures, I argue that the most important variable
in determining how an MDB respond to new policy goals is how demand-driven, or "bank-
like" it has been designed to be. All MDBs are designed to behave in some ways like
financial institutions and in some ways like development agencies that seek to promote a
variety of mandates that shape policy reform in recipient countries. They resemble private
banks in the sense that their primary function is to make loans to creditworthy governments
or private sector actors for projects that, at minimum, fulfill the banks' criteria on economic,
technical and legal viability. At the same time, MDBs have something grafted onto them that
is not found among commercial banks: that is, government functions. As development
institutions, MDBs are asked to elaborate, incorporate into their lending, and implement a
variety of mandates given to them by their shareholders, to help shape policy reform in
recipient countries. Development institutions, such as bilateral aid agencies, are almost
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entirely grant-based, and tend to emphasize policy reform in areas that include promoting
democratization, supporting social groups, improving he quality of life, legislative
development, and so on.
MDBs differ in the degree to which they emphasize their banking goals or their non-
banking goals. An MDB that seeks to behavc more like a financial institution than a
development agency will be relatively more driven by client demands ("demand-driven") for
specific types of projects, and will contain fewer incentives for staff to situate projects within
broader policy contexts and goals, such as the environment. By contrast, a less "bank-like"
MDB will be more conscious of its role to promote the interests of its major shareholder
countries, and thus behave more like a development agency. In such an institution, there will
be more incentives for staff to seek to influence recipient governments to accept particular
investments linked to various policy goals, including environmental management and reform.
While a less "bank-like" MDB is still shaped by its character as a financial institution and will
still seek out creditworthy, bankable projects to invest in, it will also pay more attention to
how its projects complement broader policy goals and analyses.
At the same time, a less "bank-like" MDB faces greater challenges in juggling and
trying to harmonize potentially conflicting goals and incentives. Environmental policy
objectives and activities do not always fit well with other economic development or banking
goals that are an MDB's main activities, although there is a sub-set of projects where the two
goals clearly overlap, i.e., projects that are financially viable, promote economic development
or reform, and also have positive environmental benefits. These include energy
modernization projects that reduce the emission of harmful pollutants, or municipal waste
water and water supply projects that clean up water pollution or provide clean drinking water.
An MDB can always point toward these projects in arguing that it is paying attention to its
environmental mandate, which may be true, but it may not entail any innovations on the part
of the bank as a result of the explicit adoption of a new "environmental" mandate. A less
"bank-like" MDB may also face a greater challenge in selling its projects to recipient countries
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that may have access to alternative sources of financing with fewer non-financial policy
conditionality strings attached.
I argue that the World Bank's relatively "greener" portfolio in CEE reflects both strong
shareholder commitment to a full range of environmental activities, as well as the Bank's
position as the least "bank-like" of the three MDBs. At the same time, the Bank now has the
least leverage In the CEE countries furthest along the transition process, because these
countries can now more easily find financing without conditionality attached. The EIB's
activities, in turn, reflect weak shareholder commitment further heightened by an institutional
design that is the most demand-driven of the three MDBs. The EBRD occupies an
intermediate position. Like the World Bank, it has a strong set of stated environmental
objectives; however, its private-sector emphasis reduces its scope to pursue this commitment
through specific investment projects.
Theoretically, the study argues for the importance of analyzing the ways in which
shareholder commitment, organizational dynamics and recipient demand come together, in
order to better determine the sources of inertia and innovation in an institution's response to
new policies. The second main argument, then, is that analysis of how an IO takes on a new
policy issue requires an analytical framework that addresses three stages of policymaking:
policy objectives, policy process, and policy outcomes, each of which may be a source of
institutional inertia or innovation. Policy objectives are the MDB's stated environmental
goals; policy process is defined as the ways in which these goals are institutionalized into
decisionmaking processes and institutional design; and policy outcomes refer to the
composition of the MDB's portfolio and whether its activities are carried out as planned. Put
differently, an institution's environmental behavior depends on the interaction between the
ways it seeks to supply environment outputs and the demand by recipient countries for those
outputs. The "supply" of environmental outputs depends on the strength of the institution's
environmental objectives and the ways in which those objectives are institutionalized. The
"demand" for those outputs, in turn, reflects the political negotiations between the banks and
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recipient countries that determine which types of projects and programs are undertaken, and
how deeply environmental considerations can be built into them.
An institution can essentially get stuck at any one of these stages of the policy process.
For example, in cases where donor commitment to the environment is weak, we would not
expect to see any strong attempts to institutionalize environmental objectives, or much change
in the institution's outputs. But even a strong policy objective can run into obstacles if it is
not well integrated into institutional design and incentive systems. Finally, even in cases
where institutions have made consistent attempts to institutionalize new objectives, they can
still face difficulty at the third stage, if recipient governments or private sector actors do not
have incentives to agree to specific projects. What happens during project implementation is
also very important in assessing MDB behavior, since a well-designed project is of little use
if it is not carried out properly.
The final argument, which stems from this analytical framework, is that different causal
variables matter at different stages of this process. I will show how neo-realist approaches
emphasizing shareholder politics and preferences work best in explaining how environmental
policy goals are brought inside the MDBs, and in understanding the depth and scope of an
MDB's environmental commitment. However, approaches drawn from institutional and
organizational theory provide some guidance in analyzing the ways in which features of
institutional design and incentive-systems play a crucial role in how the environmental
objectives of each bank are translated into practice, and why there is sometimes a mis-match
between an MDB's environmental commitment and the institution's capacity to carry this out
in practice. Finally, as noted above, the degree to which an MDB is designed to be demand-
driven is particularly important in shaping its ability to sell a set of activities to recipient
governments, and therefore the leverage it has to influence the borrower's choice of projects
and programs.
The arguments hert. highlight some weaknesses in current ways of theorizing about the
behavior of international institutions. Most of the scholarly literatures on institutional
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behavior focus on one of these three stages, while much of the policy literature on MDB
environmental behavior meanders across all three stages with no precise accounting of
causality. For example, neo-realist approaches emphasizing shareholder politics and
preferences as driving institutional behavior have the most to say about why new IOs are set
up and what their mandates are. Yet, these theories tend to be static, and are not well
equipped to address situations when institutions are given conflicting demands by their
shareholders, or where there is a mis-match between donor desires and organizational
capacity and incentives systems.12
The ways in which an MDB's character as more or less demand-driven drives its
project and program work supports the findings of a variety of "institutionalist" theories that
examine the ways in which different organizational designs and incentive systems shape
policy outcomes. 13 Yet the arguments made here also serve as a critique for some
constructivist approaches that posit the way new mandates "infect" an organization reflects
the actions of epistemic communities. 14 If this were the case, we would expect the actions of
epistemic communities promoting greater environmental accountability at MDBs to influence
the actions at all three banks, and therefore we would see less variation in the banks' attempts
to address environmental actions in their work. These approaches also do not address the
ways in which institutional mechanisms can help or hinder the ways in which new
knowledge gets translated into actions. I argue for the need to strengthen our understanding
of the linkages between the three stages of the policy process, in order to find better ways of
connecting political and institutional factors as a means of more precisely explaining
institutional behavior and change. My approach therefore calls for a better integration of
1 2For a recent explication of the neo-realist approach, see John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of
International Institutions," International Security, Winter (1994/95): 5-49.
13 For a rational choice institutionalist argument, see for example, Mark A. Pollack, "Delegation, Agency,
and agenda setting in the European Community," International Organization 51, no. 1 (1997): 99-134. For a
historical institutionalist argument that looks more at gaps in member state control without going into great
depth into institutional design and incentive systems, see Paul Pierson, "The Path to European Integration,"
Comparative Political Studies 29, no. 2 (April 1996): 123-163. Both authors happen to focus on the
European Commission. Virtually no work in this area has been done on MDBs.
14For example, Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination," International Organization 46, no. 1 (1992): 1-36.
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organizational and institutional theories with international relations theories. This theoretical
argument is situated in a more comprehensive review of the literature in Chapter 2.
Ultimately, all three MDBs struggle to implement their environmental mandates because
the new policies are filtered through boards of directors with diffuse preferences that are not
uniformly able to direct the implementation of new ideas; because the new mandates do not fit
well with existing patterns of institutional design and incentives; and because it is difficult to
sell environmental projects or environmental conditionality to recipient countries. The
MDBs' environmental behavior, and their ability to change this behavior, is shaped by the
interaction between external political factors, internal policy and institutional design. My goal
is to explain the causal mechanisms at work that reveal how and when each set of factors
matters in shaping the banks' enviroilnental performance, and what implications the
differences among the banks have on environmental policy development and reform in
recipient countries. While it is not particularly puzzling to comparativists that different
institutions perform differently, what matters is what these differences are and what impact
they have on the re/:ipient country's environmental conditions and policy development.
Indeed, there are real policy trade-offs to both the MDB and the loan recipient in terms
of whether an MDB behaves relatively more like a financial institution or a development
agency. An MDB conforming more to the "Bank-as-bank" model has a narrow range of
activities and less conflicting incentives, but it also more hindered in its ability to effectively
address issues such as the environment in more than minimal ways. A less demand-driven
MDB, in turn, can more effectively use lending to encourage various policy reforms in
recipient countries, but only in countries where it has leverage and does not compete with
easier sources of financing. This type of institution, layered with multiple mandates, also
faces criticisms of too much bureaucracy and too many rules. Ironically, many policy
prescriptions call for the World Bank to simplify its goals, essentially becoming more like the
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EIB, while others call for the EIB to better address development issues, which would require
it to act more like the World Bank.
The remainder of this introductory chapter presents an overview of the main issues and
themes underlying the dissertation, the research design and methodology, concepts that frame
the work, and the organization of subsequent chapters.
Major Themes
The arguments made in this dissertation are neatly encapsulated by the story of a loan
proposed by the EBRD in 1995. While the controversy generated by this particular loan may
not be typical, the issues it raises do reflect my main arguments and themes. These include:
1) the inherent tension MDBs face in general in balancing their roles as financial institutions
and development agencies; 2) the particular struggle by MDBs to reconcile the promotion of
economic growth with the additional goal of promoting environmental protection and
development; and 3) the complex politics and dynamics of how a mandate given to an
international institution by its state shareholders is actually institutionalized into a set of
policies and procedures.
In the spring of 1995, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD), a multilateral development bank (MDB) whose major shareholders are the U.S.,
European Union (EU) countries, and other G-7 countries, prepared to make a decision on the
biggest loan in its four-year history. The proposed 412.5 million Deutsche Mark loan would
fund the completion of units 1 and 2 of the Mochovce nuclear plant in Slovakia, which was
90% built by the Soviets. The Bank's contemplation of this loan stirred enormous
controversy. Opponents of the loan, including environmental groups, the Austrian
government, the U.S. Executive Director of the EBRD, and some officials within the
European Commission and even the EBRD, argued that it is impossible to guarantee the
safety of a largely Soviet-built model with basic design flaws, even if the loan would be used
to bring in sophisticated Western technology. They also feared that passage of this loan
would open the door to similar bank financing of other unsafe nuclear reactors in Central and
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Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 15 Indeed, Austria threatened to withdraw its
membership from the Bank if the loan were approved.
Opponents of the loan also argued that the Bank's own economic justification of the
loan as a "least cost option" was highly ambiguous, and thus the loan should be dropped as
not meeting the Bank's own environmental and lending conditions. The Bank's "least cost
study," showing that the completion of Mochovce was cheaper than building a combined-
cycle gas turbine plant, was criticized as basing its conclusion on unrealistically high gas
price forecasts and discounting rates for decommissioning. 16 Curiously, one critic of this
study was a sister development bank of the EBRD's, the EIB, which not only shares most of
the same major donors as the EBRD, but is itself a shareholder of the EBRD. 1 7
Proponents of the loan included France, home to a pro-nuclear lobby led by Electricit6
de France, which would be the primary beneficiary of the loan. They also included the
EBRD's senior management, who argued that the project would promote nuclear safety, and
added that one of the conditions of the loan would be that Slovakia close down a dangerous,
older nuclear reactor in Bohunice. Finally, the Slovaks threw a wrench in the debate in a
way that strengthened the EBRD's arguments, by deciding to bypass the Bank and seek
funding on their own from Russia and a Czech firm to complete the plant for one-third of the
cost proposed by the EBRD. Thus, not only did the EBRD fail to get the Slovaks to agree to
its proposed loan, but the absence of the EBRD loan is expected to result in an potentially
more dangerous completed Mochovce and the continuing functioning of the Bohunice
reactor. In June, 1998, Slovakia activated a reactor at Mochovce.
The proposed Mochovce loan illustrates how contentious the choices can be when an
MDB confronts potentially conflicting objectives. Following is an explication of the three
themes mentioned above, and the ways in which they are reflected in the Mochovce example.
15 Jane Martinson, "EBRD criticized on N-plant loan," Financial Times, February 15 1995, 2.
16 Oko-Institute, "Statement Concerning the Least Cost Study for the Public Participation Programme
Related to the Project 'Completion of the Mochovce NPP (Slovak Republic)'," (Freiburg, Germany: Institute
fiir Angewandte Okologie, 1995).
17 Emma Tucker, "Bank prepares to bite nuclear bullet," Financial Times, April 12 1995, 2.
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MDBs as "banks" vs. development agencies
MDBs are unique among international organizations created to promote the interests of
major industrialized countries (the major donors or shareholders) in developing or former
socialist (recipient) countries because they are given billions of dollars of resources to
undertake their actions, and these activities have an enormous impact on the economies and
policies of the borrowers. They are banks in the sense that their primary function is to make
loans to governments or private sector actors; projects must be "bankable," in the sense of
fulfilling the banks' criteria on economic, financial, technical and legal viability.
Yet MDBs also differ from commercial banks in a number of important ways. 18 First,
their charters explicitly prohibit them from providing resources that can be made available
elsewhere on favorable terms. This is meant to encourage them to complement rather than
subsume private sector lending, although in practice it is often difficult to determine whether
or not a project would have been undertaken without the MDB's involvement. 19 This is
particularly ambiguous when MDBs are able to make private sector loans, and it is unlikely
they would be willing to take on significantly more risk than a private sector bank. Second,
most MDB loans are granted to government bodies and require sovereign guarantees. This
affects a recipient's incentives on whether or not to agree to an MDB loan. Since recipients'
budgets can limit the amount of such guarantees that can be authorized each year, these
guarantees are likely to be used for priority investments. On the other hand, MDB loans
offer longer maturities and grace periods, as well as lower interest rates than commercial
18 In the summer of 1944, when the World Bank was conceived, the Commission II (International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development) wrote to the Executive Plenary Session (United Nations Monetary and
Financial Conference): "The creation of the Bank was an entirely new venture....So novel was it, that no
name could be found for it. Insofar as we can talk of capital subscriptions, loans, guarantees, issue of bonds,
the new financial institutions may have some apparent claim to the name of Bank. But the type of
shareholders, the exclusion of all deposits and short-term loans, the non-profit basis, are quite foreign to the
accepted nature of a Bank. However, it was accidentally born with the name Bank, and Bank it remains,
mainly because no satisfactory name could be found in the dictionary for this unprecedented institution." In
World Bank, Annual Report, (Washington DC: 1994), p. 12.
19In practice, there are many instances where the banks find themselves competing with private sector lenders.
In December 1995, for example, the World Bank's private lending arm, the International Finance Corporation
(IFC), set up new guidelines to prevent it from competing with private sector banks in privatization and
securities underwriting. See George Graham, "IFC to leave privatization to banks," Financial Times,
December 8 1995, p. 4.
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loans, which can enhance their attractiveness. Third, MDBs will finance projects that may be
seen as too risky to private sector banks, but at the same time, the MDBs tend to be more
risk-averse than private sector banks. This seeming contradiction is explained by the
sovereign guarantees public sector MDB loans take on-what the MDB chooses to finance is
backed by the government. 20
Fourth, and perhaps most important, as noted above, MDBs have something grafted
onto them not found among commercial banks: government functions. To varying degrees,
MDBs are asked to elaborate, incorporate into their lending, and implement a variety of
mandates given to them by their major shareholders. Some of these mandates move far afield
from the banks' principal function of promoting economic development and growth. For
example, the oldest and largest MDB, the World Bank, began its life in 1944 to make loans
to help reconstruct post-war Europe. Over time, its mandate shifted to focus on developing
countries, and it has been widened to include such diverse areas as rural development,
policy-based lending, human resources (health and education), women, poverty reduction,
population, and the environment.
These mandates of all MDBs are linked to policy advice to the government, and loans
regularly incorporate a variety of policy changes (such as macroeconomic, legal and
environmental stipulations) that borrowers must agree to in order to receive the loan. This
"conditionality" is used by MDBs to promote policy change in a recipient country. Thus,
when making public sector loans, the MDBs are often making governmental policy. The
policy changes can be very simple, such as requiring specific municipalities to raise their
tariffs, or they can involve more far-reaching changes in national policy, such as the removal
of coal subsidies. If the "cost" of conditionality outweighs the benefits of longer maturities,
grace periods and lower interest rates, countries creditworthy enough to have access to
international capital markets have less incentive to take out loans from the MDBs. However,
20 The EIB, in many ways the most "bank-like" of the three MDBs studied here, also happens to be the most
risk-averse. In its work in many parts of the world, it uses "double guarantees," which means its loans can be
backed by a government as well as the European Commission.
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at the same time, the MDB's country analysis also provides it with a role as a "rating agency"
for private banks, which may influence their own willingness to lend.21
Some of the tensions inherent in the MDBs' often-conflicting roles as banks and
government agencies are reflected in their struggle to implement their relatively new
environmental mandates. As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, these mandates require the
banks to incorporate environmental considerations and due diligence procedures into all of
their loans, as well as to make specific "environmental" loans. They thus push MDBs to
look beyond traditional areas of lending, to rethink the types of projects they have historically
lent to, as well as how projects are developed and implemented. As noted above, there is
significant variation in the extent to which and MDB emphasizes its role as a lending
institution versus its role as a development institution. What should an MDB do when a loan
attractive on economic grounds is more ambiguous on environmental grounds?
In the case of the proposed Mochovce loan, there was great disagreement over the
environmental merits of the loan, although it was financially attractive to the Bank. The
EBRD argued the loan made economic sense, and stressed the fact that the conditions of the
loan required the Slovak government to close another, more dangerous, nuclear reactor. Yet
some critics believed completing a Soviet nuclear plant risked the possibility of another
Chemobyl, and clashed with Article 2 (1) (vii) of the Bank's founding articles, which
commits it "to promote in the full range of its activities environmentally sound and
sustainable development." 22 Because the Slovaks did not accept the EBRD's conditionality,
they circumvented the Bank altogether and pushed ahead with the project on their own, thus
removing any leverage the Bank may have had on influencing the country's policies towards
its aging nuclear reactors. While environmentalists considered the fact that the EBRD did not
pursue this loan as a successful outcome, in fact it is likely that the loan would have had a
21 Gustav Ranis, "Defining the Mission of the World Bank Group," in Bretton Woods: Looking to the
Future (Washington DC: Bretton Woods Commission, July 1994): C-73-82.
22 EBRD, "Articles Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development," (EBRD: London,
1990).
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more beneficial environmental impact than the resulting outcome, of Slovakia going ahead on
its own to complete Mochovce with no conditionality.
Promoting environmentally sustainable development: translating policies into action
The second issue illustrated by the Mochovce example, is the particular challenge
MDBs face in reconciling their goals of promoting economic growth and development with
newer objectives of improving environmental protection and management. The struggle
faced by the EBRD in deciding whether it should have proceeded with the Mochovce loan,
and how it would have justified this strategic choice, reflects the struggle by MDBs in general
to harmonize their dual personalities and often conflicting mandates. Clearly, there are some
areas where the two mandates overlap; that is, projects that happily meet the dual objectives
of environmental improvement and economic development. This may include projects that
seek to modernize or build more efficient energy facilities, or sectoral restructuring and
structural adjustment work that calls for a reduction in energy subsidies, and hence results in
reduced demand for energy.
Yet it is easy to find examples where the promotion of economic growth and
development and the promotion of environmental protection and management clash. The
promotion of the former, the principal objective of the MDBs, obviously puts pressure on the
environment, since it involves some amount of land clearing, oil drilling, river damming,
increasing use of energy resources, and so on. Indeed, the World Bank has noted that
"significant environmental implications" are the rule and not the exception in most of its
sectors of lending: in agriculture, transportation, energy, industry and urban development.
The only sectors where projects have relatively minor environmental effects are areas such as
education and telecommunications. 23 Even structural adjustment lending (SAL), a tool used
by the World Bank that differs from project lending in its linkage to macroeconomic policy
reform, is a double-edged sword. Structural adjustment lending can contain conditionality
that liberalizes energy, water or raw materials subsidies, which reduces pollution by lowering
2 3 Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank Inspections Panel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 139.
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demand for the commodity. Yet SAL also results in trade liberalization that can have negative
impacts on the environment by increasing exports and thus natural resource depletion. SAL
also often results in budget cutting exercises, which can reduce environmental spending. 24
Indeed, despite their efforts to develop new environmental policies, projects and
procedures, the MDBs have been widely accused of funding environmentally destructive
projects and inadequately addressing environmental issues in their work. MDBs are
criticized, for example, for investing in new, massive power projects that sometimes force
resettlement of local populations, destroy nearby forests, and usually focus on expensive
supply side investments rather than end-use efficiency investments that are often a fraction cf
the cost.
Translating Ideas into Policy
New mandates tend to be given to the MDBs through the powerful countries that are
their main shareholders. But the process of institutionalizing a new set of policy directives
can run up against a wide array of political pressures and organizational constraints. For
example, donors themselves may not agree on the importance of individual mandates, which
creates a great deal of ambiguity in terms of how much incentive management has to try and
carry out the new policy. Likewise, bank management, with its vast expertise in banking
and/or development, may play a decisive role in influencing how the institution's enormous
financial resources are deployed. Finally, the recipient countries can stymie the output of
new policy directives from the MDBs by refusing to accept or being lax in implementing the
conditionality.
The Mochovce example highlights how diffuse the relationship among principals and
between principals and agents can be. In this example, we see that the shareholder countries
were split over whether or not the Bank should make the loan, in part due to environmental
implications, while the Bank's senior management strongly supported it. In fact, even
24 World Bank, "The World Bank and the Environment in Central and Eastern Europe: 1990-95,"
(Washington DC: The World Bank, 1995), p. 5.
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government agencies and actors within specific shareholder countries did not always present
a unified position. The U.S. government, for example, was at one point officially undecided
on which way it would vote, while its Executive Director at the EBRD, former U.S.
congressman Jim Scheuer, made clear his own opposition to the proposed loan.2 5 Senior
Bank management, in turn, lined up behind the proposed loan, and went on a "road show" to
shareholder capitals to plead their case and lobby member states to support it. In the end, the
Bank did support the loan, Put was not able to influence the recipient country to agree to the
Bank's conditionality.
The translation of mandates into policy is also shaped by the organization's capacity to
implement new ideas. The evidence from the dissertation shows there is a mismatch between
the environmental mandates given to MDBs and their institutional capacity to translate them
and implement them. In many respects, the MDBs' existing institutioial missions,
repertoires of behavior and financial mechanisms constrain their ability to respond to new
environmental concerns. In other words, new mandates are often attached to pre-existing
bank objectives or must be addressed by pre-existing sets of financial lending mechanisms.
The result is a certain degree of institutional inertia vis-a-vis environmental issues.26 Yet at
the same time, the banks have developed environmental assessment procedures and other
policy exercises focusing on environmental issues that may help them address these issues
more directly. One important goal of the dissertation is to determine whether new
environmental mandates have resulted in what critics call "green window dressing" or
"green-washing," or whether they have resulted in real and significant changes in MDB
lending portfolios and operational procedures.
Controversy over the Mochovce loan illustrates some of these issues. Critics argue that
the loan is an example of how the EBRD jettisons its environmental procedures when they
25 S Treasury officials and EBRD officials, interviews with the author, March 1995.
2 6 Barbara Connolly, Tamar Gutner, and Hildegard Bedarff, "Organizational Inertia and Environmental
Assistance to Eastern Europe," in Institutions for Environmental Aid: Pitfalls and Promise, ed. Robert O.
Keohane and Marc A. Levy (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), 281-323.
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conflict with the Bank's desire to pursue attractive lending opportunities. 2 7 In essence, one
can argue that the EBRD behaved more like a merchant bank than a development institution in
this case, and thus had more incentives to follow its financial and economic goals than its
environmental goals. Yet, the Bank did produce a loan proposal that would have had
positive environmental benefits as well, since it presumably would have resulted in a safer
Mochovce, the closing of Bohunice, and a significant increase in Slovakia's electricity prices,
which would reduce demand for energy.
Research Design and Methodology
This dissertation examines the ways in which three MDBs-the World Bank, EBRD,
and EIB-have operationalized their relatively new environmental mandates and implemented
them in the same geographical region: Central and Eastern Europe. I analyze the banks'
activities in this region over the same time period (1990-96).28 Environmental mandate is
defined here as the authority given to the banks by their shareholding countries to perform
specific, new tasks whose goals are to make the banks more environmentally accountable.
These banks have been chosen as cases for three reasons. First, they have a similar set of
dominant shareholders, as Table 1.1 shows. The European Union (EU) countries are the
majority bloc of shareholders in the EBRD, the only shareholders of the EIB, and comprise a
healthy 26.3% of the World Bank's voting power. In fact, Germany, the UK, France and
Italy, which have the greatest share of voting power vis-a-vis other EU countries in the
EBRD and EIB, are the third to sixth largest shareholders in the World Bank, behind the US
and Japan. The US, meanwhile, is the single largest shareholder in both the World Bank and
the EBRD.
2 7 Donald M. Goldberg et. al., "The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: An Environmental
Progress Report," (Washington, DC: CIEL, 1995).
2 8The World Bank usually refers to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and
the International Development Association (IDA). IDA is an affiliate that provides low-interest loans to the
poorest countries; in CEE, Albania is the only eligible country. In addition, the bank has two other affiliates:
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC),
which is the World Bank's private sector lending arm. The IBRD, IDA, MIGA and IFC are often referred to as
the World Bank Group.
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29 Data for IBRD only. World Bank, Annual Report (Washington DC: World Bank, 1996).
30 EBRD, Annual Report (London: EBRD, 1996). Actual voting power is sometimes less than shares. For
example, there have been times when the US could not exercise all of its voting rights because its payments
to the EBRD were in arrears.
3 1EIB, Annual Report (Luxembourg: EIB, 1996).
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Second, the MDBs have broadly similar environmental mandates, which are compared
in depth in Chapter 3. On the project level, all three banks are supposed to fund projects with
explicit "environmental" goals, such as cleaning up a major river, or a municipality's water
supply, or modernizing a power plant to sharply reduce emissions of sulfur dioxide. On the
policy level, the banks have developed environmental due diligence procedures to use when
appraising all projects, as a means of avoiding or mitigating potentially adverse
environmental impacts. Finally, as noted above, the three MDBs are the major international
financial institutions operating in CEE countries.32 While net private capital flows to the
region now exceed net flows from MDBs, the MDBs remain significant actors, since they are
involved in helping countries liberalize their economies as a means to attract the pi ivate
flows, while they also leverage investor risk through co-financing. 3 3
The focus on the banks' activities in CEE countries was chosen for three important
reasons. First, following the collapse of communism in the region, the banks had to devise
strategies for economic and environmental assistance to this region. Thus, the dissertation
compares the activities of the banks in one region, during one time period. Second, the
countries in this region are undertaking broadly comparable economic and environmental
reforms, and face broadly similar problems in doing so. They also face a broadly similar set
of environmental problems, namely airborne dust and sulfur dioxide, and lead found in air
and soil.34 The largest sources of particulate air pollution, one of the worst health threats in
3 2 This is an indicative figure, since it consists of commitments and not disbursements. As noted in Chapter
5, the largest single donor to the region is Germany, which committed $19.2 billion to CEE and NIS
countries, in mostly grants, between 1990-1996. Following Germany is the U.S. SEED (Support for East
European Democracy) program, which provided a total of $2.7 billion to CEE in 1990-96, and the EU's
PHARE program, which provided around 5.4 billion ECU to Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former
Soviet Union. "SEED Act Implementation Report" Fiscal Year 1997, U.S. Department of State, February
1998, Table 1.
33 Net private capital flows to Central and Eastern Europe stood at $17 billion in the period 1990-95 and $45
billion in the period 1990-1996, according to Institute for International Finance data. Countries included in
this data are Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. See Institute for
International Finance, "Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies: Update" (Washington DC, September
11, 1997). For the same set of countries, this compares with net MDB lending of $7.3 billion during 1990-
95. See individual country data in World Bank, "Global Development Finance: Volume II," (Washington
DC: World Bank, 1997).
3 4 For the most thorough description and analysis of the region's environmental problems, see the World
Bank-led report: "Environmental Action Programme for Central and Eastern Europe," Document submitted to
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the region, are low stack emissions from domestic heating and small- and medium-sized
enterprises, which rely on low quality lignite, characterized by high sulfur and ash content.
Water pollution is another serious problem, reflecting inadequate drinking water processing
systems and sewage treatment, and unmonitored municipal and industrial discharges, among
other factors. Third, CEE is an area where both economic restructuring and environmental
clean-up and reform needs are most acute. As noted above, the collapse of the communist
regimes in CEE revealed the most polluted countries in Europe. It is therefore a region that
most challenges an MDB's ability to harmonize economic and environmental strategies. Case
selection thus (at least partly) controls for major institutional and national differences
The dissertation adopts a commonly used definition of CEE countries as Central
European countries and the three Baltic states. Thus, in this dissertation, the term "Central
and Eastern European countries" generally refers to: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.3 5 Lending to most of these countries
began earlier than lending to other countries in the region, such as the largest former Soviet
republics, and there is thus a greater body of MDB activities to compare in the former group.
However, it must be noted that recipient countries all three MDBs have in common constitute
a smaller set of countries. While the EBRD and World Bank also lend to the former Soviet
Union (and include those countries in their definition of CEE), the EIB's lending to former
Soviet countries is limited to the Baltic states. The EIB has also not extended lending to
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia or Macedonia/FYR to date.
Defining Environmental Behavior
the Ministerial Conference in Lucerne, Switzerland, (28-30 April, 1993). This document, which was endorsed
by IO officials and environmental ministers from East and West, contains an agreed-upon list that prioritizes
the region's short-, medium-, and long-term environmental problems, and lists the regional "hot spots" where
these problems are most acute.
35 Curiously, while the EBRD was set up specifically to promote economic reconstruction in former
Communist countries, the EIB is the only one of the three banks that can lend money to eastern Germany.
Germany's GDP is much too high for it to qualify for World Bank loans, and the EBRD doesn't allow for part
of a country's territory to qualify for recipient status.
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How does one define an MDB's "environmental behavior?" In fact, this is an
extremely difficult conceptual exercise for several reasons. The issue is discussed in Chapter
5, but will also be touched upon here. One can emphasize specific activities with primary
environmental goals. However, specific environmental financing obviously presents only a
part of the picture of the banks' environmental behavior. For example, a bank may have
relatively more stand-alone environmental projects, but it is important to know whether they
are simultaneously undertaking a number of potentially environmentally harmful projects.
Likewise, a bank may have few "environmental" projects, but the bulk of its portfolio may
not be environmentally damaging, e.g., educational or telecommunications projects. Or, a
bank may have few "environmental" projects, but it may make many adjustments in its wider
portfolio of projects to avoid or alleviate environmental damage. It is also important to know
if the bank's "environmental" projects bear any relationship to the region or country's most
pressing environmental problems. Moreover, to what extent is the size of a project
important? There is no way to know how the loan amount correlates with environmental
benefits of a project. There is evidence that some of the smaller projects the MDBs fund are
the most effective in terms of their environmental benefit. It is also difficult to quantify how
much of a project loan is being used for environmentally-related components. Equally
important, data on a bank's portfolio does not tell us anything about how these projects have
been implemented. A bank may say it is adopting high environmental standards, but how do
we know if they are carried out in practice?
The point is that there is no obvious or simple way to define and measure an MDB's
environmental behavior. Indeed, the MDBs do not share similar definitions of what their
"environmental" work is, and sometimes even within one MDB there are different definitions
of what should or should not be included. The different definitions are discussed in Chapter
3. Any definition also implicitly brings in normative values about what environmental
behavior "should be."
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Table 1.2 shows a continuum of MDB environmental objectives, and this can be used
to analyze both the MDB's level of commitment, and with one important modification, also
its specific activities. On the left end of the continuum is a minimal degree of commitment or
activity, where the MDB seeks to guarantee that its projects are not environmentally harmful,
in the sense that it seeks to avoid or alleviate the potential to promote degradation of a
country's natural resource base, or biodiversity loss. Obviously, exactly where the line is
crossed between environmentally hamffrl and acceptable is often a grey area viewed
differently among different actors. The point is that the MDBs may largely do the same types
of activities they have always done, but they show signs of positive environmental behavior
if they make sure that these projects are properly appraised to ensure that environmental
problems are averted. This mitigation exercise is usually carried out through the MDB's
environmental assessment procedures and its rules about what types of environmental
standards to follow in its work.
Moving toward the right end of the continuum, policy objectives start to include
actively seeking projects with significant environmental objectives or components. In
starting to be more active in explicitly addressing environmental issues, the MDB may also
more broadly consider natural resource management issues in its work, and engage in
measures that shape environmental policy development. This involves explicit attempts by
the MDB to influence the recipient government's environmental policy. As Nelson and
Eglinton note, techniques of IO influence of recipient policies can include persuasion,
technical and financial support to build domestic capacity to design and implement reforms,
and pressure through more explicit conditionality, where financial assistance is linked to
specific policy conditions. 36 On the right end of the spectrum we see the "darkest green"
behavior, where the MDB finances projects with primary environmental goals and attempts to
integrate environmental thinking into the broader set of strategic goals it develops for each
3 6 Joan M. Nelson and Stephanie J. Eglinton, Global Goals, Contentious Means: Issues of Multiple Aid
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recipient. In other words, rightward movement reflects attempts by the institutions to
innovate in ways that transcend their traditional actions. The movement along this continuum
is additive. As this dissertation will show, the EIB clearly is situated toward the "minimal,"
"light green" end of the spectrum, the World Bank toward the "darker green" end, and the
EBRD somewhere in the middle. Yet, if we take a longer, historical view, we would see that
the World Bank began its life on the left end of the spectrum, and has moved rightward over
time. The EBRD has also moved rightward over time, but not to the same degree as the
World Bank. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss in greater depth the ways in which the three banks'
environmental behavior has (or has not) evolved over time.
As Chapter 5 will discuss, in assessing how an MDB's actual projects might be placed
along the continuum, it is important to distinguish between the project's intentions and its
implementation. As a result, the continuum should contain an additional point when
assessing implementation; that point would be where projects cause environmental harm.
Conceptualizizg the Dependent Variable
I propose a framework for conceptualizing and comparing MDB environmental
policymaking. As noted in the introduction, I argue that MDB environmental policymaking
must be analyzed along three stages:
a) Policy Objectives: This is simply the bank's stated environmental policy goals. In
other words, does the bank have a set of clear environmental objectives, or a vaguer
commitment to lofty aims, such as promoting sustainable development? If an MDB has
vague policy goals to begin with, or its policies are based on purely symbolic politics among
shareholders, it is no surprise if the process and outcome factors turn out to be very weak.
If, however, the bank has clear, pragmatic goals, and the commitment of its shareholders,
and it fails to carry out these goals, one must look within the other two stages to find the
source of blockage. As Wilson has noted:
There is a tendency among us all to complain about how far the performance of an
agency differs from its goals and to speculate about the bureaucratic pathologies that
may account for this inadequate performance. But that only makes sense if the goals
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are sufficiently clear that reasonable people can agree on what they mean, and
whether the agency has the freedom of action...to achieve them."3 7
Analysis of the policy objectives also tells us whether the MDB is taking a "business as
usual" approach-that is re-classifying relevant, traditional infrastructure projects as
"environmental" projects, or whether it is attempting to push the definition forward to better
address other types of issues as well. Analysis of the politics of how the banks were given
environmental mandates reveals how strong the stated commitment is, from the perspective
of both shareholder countries and bank management, as well as the degree to which state,
institutional, or non-governmental actors were important in bringing a new set of policy goals
inside the institution.
b) Policy Process: This refers to the ways in which environmental considerations are
institutionalized and inserted into bank decisionmaking, or put differently, what the banks
actually do with their designated powers. This entails examining both the policies and
procedures developed by the bank in its attempts to institutionalize its overall environmental
objectives, as well as analyzing whether the institutional design provides the right incentives
for staff to follow these policies and procedures. For example, the existence of an
environmental office that is supposed to ensure that environmental safeguards are taken into
account in each bank project is of little use if that office only receives project material at the
final stage of project preparation, after the most important project decisions have been made.
This was the case with the World Bank's first environmental office, the Office of
Environmental and Scientific Affairs.38 We must determine whether the banks have
produced appropriate institutional responses to their environmental mandates.
c) Policy Outcomes: This refers to two different levels of analysis: the composition of
the banks' portfolio of activities, and how well this portfolio is implemented:
3 7 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic
Books, Inc., 1989), p. 34.
3 8 Rich, Mortgaging the Earth, p. 112.
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i) In terms of project decisions, this category compares the banks' overall portfolios of
activities, to analyze how environmental issues are addressed in lending and non-lending
activities, and where projects can be situated along the continuum.
ii) Policy outcome must also address the issue of implementation, to the extent
possible--that is, to what extent are banks' activities carried out as planned? An MDB may
have a beautifully crafted project proposal that addresses all the relevant environmental issues
and proposes ways of mitigating them, but that does not tell us whether or not these actions
are undertaken in the field. Indeed, many environmentalists criticize the MDBs for doing a
poor job of translating process into action.
The three banks show considerable variation along each of these dimensions. The
description, analysis and explanation of this variation is the topic of the empirical chapters of
this book. Evidence supporting my central arguments is therefore drawn from a focused
comparison of the three banks at the three stages of policymaking. In effect, I trace the
process by which new environmental mandates appear in the banks, are institutionalized, and
are translated into specific sets of activities in CEE. While an in-depth analysis of the
implementation of all 500 plus MDB projects in CEE is beyond the scope of this dissertation,
I will examine available evidence which shows some of the difficulties the banks have in
translating project ideas into practice, and in measuring precisely the "environmental impact"
of a project.3 9 In analyzing the observable implications of different theories and arguments
seeking to explain MDB behavior at each stage of the policy process, the research design
increases the number of observation points for investigation in comparing the three banks'
environmental behavior.
Dissertation Outline
39 Available evidence includes primary MDB documents, as well as material from government agencies and
watchdog groups. I also conducted extensive research on MDB implementation issues in Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland and Hungary, where I visited MDB projects in the water and energy sectors and interviewed
relevant actors, including: task managers, project leaders, environmentalists, ministry officials, municipal
officials, and consultants.
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The dissertation is structured along the three stages of analysis outlined above-policy
objectives, process, and outcomes. Chapter 2 situates the overall arguments within the
existing social scientific and policy literatures that offer different approaches to explaining
MDB environmental behavior. I argue that most of the relevant academic debates tend to
focus on discrete stages of the policy process, emphasizing either external political variables
or institutional design-related variables, without adequately linking the two. The more
specific policy literature on MDB environmental behavior, in turn, is World Bank-centered,
and tends to offer a range of explanatory variables that run the gamut of political and design
factors. These are difficult to rank in terms of their importance and are largely untested vis-a-
vis the other two banks.
Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to policy objectives and process. Chapter 3 analyzes the
three banks' environmental policy objectives in the context of the bargaining and negotiation
surrounding their adoption, and compares the degree of donor commitment among the three
banks. How is it that each bank was asked to, or decided to, address environmental issues in
its activities? What exactly are the bank's environmental policy goals? How committed are
the bank's major shareholders to this process? The chapter describes the main
characteristics, interests, and goals of the three banks, and within that context, the politics
that resulted in their decision to address environmental issues. It then lays out and compares
the evolution of the banks' environmental policy objectives, as well as how these are
translated in the context of their activities in CEE. Finally, it also examines and compares
each bank's definition of what its "environmental" activities are.
Chapter 4 addresses the policy process, to analyze the ways in which the MDBs'
environmental objectives are "hard-wired" into their institutional design and incentive
systems. It shows the ways in which the MDBs' governance structures are diffuse,
characterized by weak sets of collective principals. Given that constant, it then argues that
the most important institutional variable influencing variation in the ways MDBs respond to
new environmental goals is how demand-driven or "bank-like" the MDBs are designed to be.
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It supports this argument by analyzing a number of indicators of this variable, and also
addresses the policy trade-offs resulting from each bank's position. The chapter highlights
some of the limits of neorealist explanations for institutional behavior, by showing how
important the organizational environment can be in shaping incentives and actions. The
chapter ends with a set of hypotheses on what types of outcomes we might expect to see in
the banks' portfolios in CEE.
Chapters 5 is devoted to policy outcomes, analyzing how environmental issues are
addressed in the banks' lending and non-lending activities in CEE. Analysis of the three
banks' portfolios provides evidence confirming the hypotheses set forth in Chapter 4. The
chapter shows the ways in which the World Bank is undertaking the widest scope of projects
with primary or significant environmental components, followed by the EBRD, with the EIB
trailing behind. It also highlights the ways in which the environmental character of the
banks' portfolios explicitly reflects the activities and outputs of "green bankers," or MDB
staff whose job is to identify or appraise environmental projects. The least bank-like the
NMDB, the more "green bankers" exist. Chapter 5 also examines the role that recipient
demand plays in influencing what the MDBs are able to finance, as well as some of the issues
facing the three banks in project implementation. Chapter 6 is a brief conclusion that




This chapter situates the arguments made in Chapter 1 within the broader literature that
addresses the question of what factors drive the behavior of international institutions. The
analysis of sources of behavior within international institutions has been an important area of
scholarship within the field of international relations in recent years, while the study of
domestic political institutions has also been emphasized within the field of comparative
politics. Sociologists and economists, among others, have also taken a fresh look at the role
and impact of institutions in order to understand their origins, evolution and impact on
political and economic policy strategies and outcomes. The chapter surveys the arguments
made in both the broader academic literature on institutional behavior and the narrower, more
policy-oriented literature that specifically addresses MDB environmental behavior. It argues
that, in the scholarly realm, there is often a gap between arguments emphasizing the
importance of external political or ideational factors and those emphasizing internal
institutional factors in explaining IO behavior. At the same time, the specific literature on
MDB environmental behavior offers a variety of explanations that, while compelling, are
generally unsupported by rigorous analysis and are not methodologically sophisticated.
Subsequent chapters will attempt to fill this theoretical gap by showing the ways in which
variables derived from "competing" neorealist and institutionalist literatures help explain
institutional behavior at different stages of the policy process.
To some degree, the arguments and conclusions of this bank-centric literature parallel
the broader scholarly literature on factors that account for variation in international
institutional behavior. Yet the fit is not perfect; the policy literature presents some
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explanations not well addressed in broader theoretical debates about istitutional behavior,
while the latter also points out important variables not addressed by the former. This
literature review will begin by addressing how the first group-the policy literature-
characterizes MDB environmental behavior. I then turn to the explanations raised in this
literature, and compare them with the broader theoretical debates on institutional behavior.
Finally, I will analyze and synthesize the ideas generated by these different debates, in order
to identify causal variables that may be generalizable among the three banks, as well as
determining ways in which commonly-shared variables may help explain behavior among
banks.
In general, writers analyzing MDBs and the environment are highly critical of the
banks' ability to effectively tackle environmental issues in their policy and project work.
Most of these articles lay out an argument or series of arguments that are backed by selective
illustrations. While generally methodologically weak, this literature does address the issues
at the heart of the dissertation, and it proposes candidate explanations that find parallels in the
broader institutional literature.
This work is generally produced by policy analysts and environmentalists, as well as a
few political scientists. What is interesting about this work is that it is overwhelniingly
preoccupied with the World Bank., where there are over a dozen recent articles and a few
books analyzing the Bank's environmental behavior. By contrast, there are a handful of
articles and reports analyzing the EBRD, and even fewer on the EIB and its environmental
behavior.l
It is not surprising that so much more critical attention is focused on the World Bank.
The Bank is the oldest MDB, with the broadest (global) membership and scope of activities.
1On the EBRD, see Don Goldberg, et. al, "The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: an
Environmental Progress Report;" Chris A. Wold and Durwood Zaelke, "Promoting Sustainable Development
and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: The Role of the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development," American University Journal of International Law and Policy (1992). On the EIB, see
Marianne Wenning, "Greening the European Investment Bank," (Switzerland: WWF International, December
1992); Sheila Lewenhak, The Role of the European Investment Bank (London: Croom Helm, 1982); and Carl
Lankowski, "Environmental Impact Review in the European Investment Bank," (Washington, DC: School of
International Service, American University, May 1984).
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It is a leading actor in global thinking and research about development issues. There is a vast
literature on the Bank and its role, activities, and ideas in promoting development in the Third
World. From an environmental perspective, the Bank also has had a series of spectacularly
disastrous projects, which sparked a major campaign by NGOs in the 1980s to force the
Bank to reform its environmental practices. 2
Finally, the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Bretton Woods institutions-the
World Bank and the IMF-inspired a flurry of assessments on the roles of the two
institutions and the steps that should be taken to help them better adapt to the challenges of
the 21st century.3 The institutions themselves contributed their own assessment of how they
should face the challenges of a changing world.4 The G-7 major industrialized countries
also called for a reassessment of MDBs, in ways that encourage them to invest more in
people, public participation, and the environment. 5 A group of environmental,
development, human-rights and other NGOs, in turn, launched a "Fifty Years is Enough"
campaign, calling for far-reaching changes in both institutions in the areas of public
accountability, the emphasis of lending programs, and the way environmental problems are
addressed.
One could hardly expect the same amount of debate to surround the EBRD, which was
only established in 1991, and with its focus on former Communist countries does not tap into
many of the broader, often prickly North-South issues that touch the World Bank. Yet, as
noted above, it is curious to discover the dearth of literature on the EIB and its environmental
behavior, given the bank's age (created in 1957) and its large lending volume. While 90% of
the EIB's lending is in Western Europe, the Bank is still active on a global scale, and even its
projects within Europe obviously have an impact on the environment.
2The Polonoroeste and Sardar Sarovar projects are described below. For details of a number of these failed
projects, see Rich, Mortgaging the Earth.
3 See footnote 4 in Chapter 1.
4Development Committee Task Force on Multilateral Development Banks, "Serving a Changing World,"
(Washington DC: March 15, 1996).
"Graham Bowley, "MDBs under investigation," Financial Times, September 27, 1996, XXI.
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The next section will survey perspectives of the World Bank's environmental behavior
and also note the few documents that have something to say about the EBRD and EIB. I then
examine the arguments behind these views and link each argument to debates in the broader
literature on institutions. I focus primarily on the arguments themselves, saving broader
discussion of the history and details of the banks' environmental behavior and policies for
Chapter 3. The arguments presented in this work focus on what is wrong (or in a few rare
instance, what is right) with an individtal MDB's environmental behavior.
The MDBs' environmental behavior
In a sea of criticism of the World Bank's environmental behavior, a few brave souls
(outside the Bank) stand out for praising the Bank. This work, however, tends to describe
changes in the Bank's policies and procedures, rather than looking at outcomes, or what
happens with these new policies and procedures in project design and implementation.
Political scientists Haas and Haas, for example, in analyzing the response of 13 IOs to the
"environmental problematique," found the World Bank and UNEP to be the only ones that
exhibited traits of "learning" in the ways in which they integrate environmental issues into
their work.6 Learning is defined as a cognitive evolution, where consensual knowledge is
used to define and solve problems. They argue that it is rare for learning to take place in IOs;
instead, most organizations merely "adapt," by changing procedures or routines without a
deeper examination of underlying values.
As evidence of the World Bank's learning, they describe the growth in the Bank's
environmental procedures, activities and staff that has taken place since 1989. In particular,
they stress the importance of the growth in the number of environmental specialists within the
Bank, who have been placed inside the operational (lending) divisions. Epistemic
communities seem to be a driving force in prompting institutional learning, and the authors
list various institutional characteristics that explain why these communities are better able to
6 They define "problematique" as "a given set of interdependent problems, places, acts, and policies--such as
those associated with sustainable development." Haas and Haas, "Learning to Learn: Improving International
Governance," p. 257. The EBRD and EIB were not among the institutions included in this study.
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penetrate some IOs rather than others. Characteristics of "learning institutions" include an
open flow of information from scientific communities or non-government organizations
(NGOs), relatively autonomous secretariats, and influential shareholders from countries
possessing democratic cultures.
While I agree with the broad conclusions of this work-that is, that the World Bank
has indeed exhibited evidence of learning, what is missing from the Haas' argument is an
examination of what impact the learning has had on the Bank's actual behavior-that is, what
it does in the field, in terms of how it implements its projects and procedures. Changes in the
World Bank's procedures, policies, and personnel may have an important impact on portfolio
composition and project design, but one must determine how that impact is manifested.
Indeed, critics of the Bank's environmental behavior tend to discount the evolution of
policies and procedures, arguing that they have made little difference in terms of what the
Bank actually does. These writers criticize the Bank for funding projects that have caused
enormous environmental degradation, for having weak environmental policies, and for
failing to follow the policies it has developed. The Bank itself is aware of its poor record in
implementation and has sought to strengthen its monitoring mechanisms. In addition, this
type of epistemic argument does not well account for the mechanisms by which the new ideas
"infect" an institution, and as a result, the types of institutional factors that may in fact thwart
the impact of new ideas.
Perhaps the most strident critic of the Bank's environmental behavior is Bruce Rich, an
attorney at the Washington, DC-based Environmental Defense Fund. In his 1994 book,
Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment, and the Crisis of
Development, Rich highlighted case after case of World Bank projects he argued were
environmental debacles, which destroyed coastal ecosystems, promoted (directly or
indirectly) enormous deforestation, exhausted soils, and displaced thousands of people.7
Among the more publicized failures was the huge Polonoroeste project in Brazil, in which the
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7Rich, Mortgaging the Earth.
Bank provided over $450 million in loans in the early 1980s to promote agricultural
colonization and road-building in the state of Rond6nia. According to Rich arid others, the
project encouraged a massive migration of colonists that overwhelmed support efforts,
resulted in slash and burn agriculture, and ultimately was responsible for enormous
deforestation, among myriad other problems.8
Despite the Bank's adoption of a wide range of new environmental policies, guidelines
and procedures beginning in the late 1980s, it continued to fund environmentally destructive
projects, and critics pointed out numerous cases of where they argued the Bank was not
following its own internal policies. One of the most contentious projects of the 1990s, for
example, was the Sardar Sarovar dam projects in India, which provoked enormous outcry
from environmentalists. 9 After criticism of the projects spread to include US congressmen,
senators, as well as legislators from Japan, Finland and Sweden, World Bank President
Barber Conable asked former US congressman and former director of UNDP Bradford
Morse to undertake an independent study. l 0 The 1992 report confirmed earlier criticisms. It
found that the projects were poorly appraised, and that the Bank was not enforcing its own
policies on resettlement or environment. The involuntary resettlement resulting from the
projects, said the report, "offends recognized norms of human rights." 1 1
8Rich writes, "Polonoroeste transformed Rondonia-an area approximately the size of Oregon or Great
Britain-into a region with one of the highest rates of forest destruction in the Brazilian Amazon, increasing
its deforested area from 1.7 percent in 1978 to 16.1 percent in 1991. By the mid-1980s, the burning of
Rondonia's forests became a major focus of NASA research as the single largest, most rapid human-caused
change on earth readily visible from space." Rich, Mortgaging the Earth, p. 28. Also see Robert Wade,
"Greening the Bank: The Struggle over the Environment, 1970-95," in The World Bank: Its First Half
Century, ed. Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis, and Richard Webb (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution,
1997), 611-736.
9The Sardar Sarovar projects, one the largest water resources projects ever planned, involved the construction
of a dam, major canal, and irrigation network along India's Narmada River. The projects' goals were to
provide more irrigable land, to bring more drinking water to a drought-prone region, and to create a major
source of power. At least 100,000 people lived in the villages that would be submerged. Environmentalists
argued that the affected populations were not properly consulted and would not be properly resettled, that the
Bank supported the project even when it became clear that the borrower was not meeting the loan conditions,
and that the environmental impacts of the project were not properly addressed. Sardar Sarovar: Report of the
Independent Review, Bradford Morse, chairman; Thomas Berger, Deputy Chairman. (Ottawa, Canada:
Resources Future International Inc. 1992), p. 4. (This was also known as the Morse Commission Report).
1 0Rich, Mortgaging the Earth, p. 250.
1 1Sardar Sarovar, p. xx.
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With respect to the environment, the report was highly critical. "The history of the
environmental aspects of Sardar Sarovar is a history of non-compliance, " it said. 12 "There
appears to have been an institutional numbness at the Bank and in India to environmental
matters," it continued. "The tendency seems to have been to justify rather than to analyze; to
react rather than anticipate." 13 Despite the report's recommendation that the Bank withdraw
from the project, and despite the fact that the U.S., Germany, Japan, Canada, Australia and
the Nordic countries (with 42% of the vote) were in favor of suspension, the board of
directors voted to continue. 14 A year later, when it looked like a majority of the board
favored canceling the loan, the government of India decided not to ask for additional Bank
funding of the project, which Rich explains was a face-saving effort for both the Indian
government and the Bank. 15
While this project generated a great deal of negative publicity and criticism of the
Bank's environmental behavior, it was not the only one. A number of other projects have
been criticized by environmental groups for ignoring the bank's environmental policies.
These include the criticism of the controversial Arun m hydroelectric dam project in Nepal,
which was ultimately canceled by World Bank president James Wolfensohn in 1994.16 The
Bank's forestry projects and energy projects have also been attacked for failing to follow the
Bank's own policies.1 7
12Ibid., p, xxi.
13Ibid., p. 226.
14 Wade, "Greening the Bank: The Struggle over the Environment, 1970-95," p. 704.
1 5Rich, Mortgaging the Earth, p. 302.
1 6The Arun III dam project was criticized by NGOs as being too costly, thus using funding that might be
better allocated elsewhere; for being too big, when a smaller, cheaper dams might be more appropriate; for
producing much more electricity than the country needed, meaning that much of it would be exported to India;
for not contributing to poverty alleviation in the country. Thus, while environmental groups again lead
criticism of the project, their complaints were not directly tied to environmental issues. For one view on the
Arun case, see Bruce Rich, 1997, "Epilogue: The Gorbachav of the World Bank?" Environmental Defense
Fund. Photocopy.
17 For analysis of the mixed outcomes of the World Bank's forestry policies, see Michael Ross,
"Conditionality and Logging Reform in the Tropics," in Institutions for Environmental Aid, 167-197. On
energy policy, see "Power Failure: A Review of the World Bank's Implementation of its New Energy
Policy," (Washington DC: Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council, March 1994).
The EDF/NRDC report, for example, reviewed all of the Bank's power loans that were being prepared during
the first half of 1993, and compared them to the Bank's new energy policies. In general, the majority of the
Bank's power loans were found to be weak in their compliance to the Bank's policies.
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Going beyond purely environmental debates, but certainly affecting them, was the 1992
in-house report commissioned by former World Bank President Lewis Preston to review the
quality of the Bank's portfolio. The Bank's review team, lead by Willi Wapenhans,
Preston's special advisor and a Bank vice president, found that the Bank's portfolio had
steadily deteriorated over the years. Projects with "major problems" increased from 1 1%o to
20% between fiscal 1981 to fiscal 1991. Citing the Bank's Operations and Evaluations
Department, the report said the number of "unsatisfactory" completed projects increased from
15% of the sample reviewed in fiscal 1981 to 37.5% in fiscal 1991.18 Project completion on
average was almost two years over predictions. Borrowers' compliance with the legal
convenants written into the loan agreements was "startlingly low." "Loan agreements," said
the report, "do not induce the behavior expected and their credibility as binding documents
has suffered." 19
Other critics focus not on individual projects of the Bank, but rather on the Bank's
overall emphasis on free-market policies, particularly through its structural adjustment
lending (SAL), which calls for the promotion of conservative fiscal and monetary policies to
help developing countries correct often deeply rooted domestic economic distortions. Critics
of the Bank's environmental behavior argue that these loans, by liberalizing trade, promote
exploitation of natural resources for export. They also argue that SALs do not address their
environmental impact. 20
To summarize, criticism of the World Bank's environmental behavior has tended to
focus on a set of disastrous or potentially disastrous projects, other examples where the Bank
does not follow its own policies, the negative side-effects of SALs, and evidence of poor
project implementation, generally. It should be noted that none of these criticisms are
watertight. Indeed, there is no analytical work outside the Bank that looks at a larger sample
18 Effective Implementation: Ke)' to Development Impact. Portfolio Management Task Force. Confidential
Report of the World Bank (Washington DC, September 22, 1991) p. ii.
19Ibid.
20 David Reed, ed., Structural Adjustment and the Environment (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).
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of projects, to determine what percentage of the overall portfolio is environmentally
problematic. Are the problem projects the exception or the rule? Nor is there much work,
outside the Bank, that seeks to determine the extent to which change has taken place in the
Bank's environmental behavior since it adopted a series of new environmental policies
beginning in the late 1980s.21 Finally, it is not clear that SALs are unilaterally negative with
respect to the environment, since research on this topic has produced mixed results.2 2
The Bank's own evaluative work, in turn, does critically analyze environmental impact,
but there are still no aggregate data to identify the percentage of projects that are "successful"
or "unsuccessful," using specified environmental criteria. The Bank's Operations
Evaluations Department, for example, takes a sample of completed projects each year, and
analyzes them with respect to broad performance criteria.23 A subset of projects that has
environmental goals are analyzed as well. The OED reports provide examples of projects that
have resulted in dramatic environmental improvement, but identify others where weak project
design and preparation resulted in negative environmental impacts.2 4
The environmental behavior of the EBRD and EIB has also been criticized by
environmental groups, but on a far smaller scale. In general, both banls have been attacked
for doing a poor job of adhering to environmental procedures that the NGOs argue are
already weak. In its 1992 report on the EIB's environmental behavior, the only published
21 One important exception is Wade, "Greening the Bank: The Struggle over the Environment, 1970-95."
The Bank, meanwhile, has generated quite a library of publications to inform the public on its growing
interest in and attention to environmental issues. It now has annual reports on its environmental activities, as
well as an annual conference on environmentally sustainable development.
2 2 Berg and Sherk, for example, point out examples where export crops result in less soil erosion than food
crops. See Elliot Berg, Don Sherk, "The World Bank and its Environmentalist Critics," i Bretton Woods:
Looking to the Future (Washington DC: Bretton Woods Commission, 1994), p. C-316. The World Bank's
own work on SALs and the environment has concluded that SALs produce positive environmental benefits
where environmental policies are already in place. Otherwise, the results were mixed. Currency devaluations,
for example, generally raise farmgate prices, but the impact on the environment depended on which crops were
encouraged as a result. See David W. Pearce and Jeremy J. Warford, World Without End: Economics,
Environment, and Sustainable Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 316.
23 Operations Evaluation Department, "1992 Evaluation Results," (Washington DC: The World Bank 1994),
p. 4. Projects are evaluated by comparing outcomes with objectives, while factoring in any major changes
that occurred during implementation. Evaluation re-estimates the project's economic rate of return, and
analyzes the relevance of the project to the country and sector priorities, economic, environmental and
institutional justification, and expected costs, among other criteria.
24 Ibid.
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report to date on that topic, WWF International argued that the bank's environmental
procedures are informal and subjective, with no well-defined framework for outlining
conditions for lending. 25 The Center for International Environmental Law, in turn, has
criticized the EBRD for lacking an "overarching policy or criteria to guide its project
lending," and for not adequately following its own procedures in some of its projects, such
as the proposed Mochovce loan.26 Environmentalists were particularly disappointed with the
EBRD since it was the first MDB with the goal of promoting sustainable development built
into its founding articles. To date, however, neither the EBRD nor the EIB has been accused
of being involved in Polonoroeste-type debacles.27
Explaining MDB environmental behavior
The policy literature on MDB environmental behavior offers a vast number of
explanations of why such behavior has occurred. In terms of the World Bank, some writers
focus on a single factor, such as corporate culture, or the role of the Bank's president, or the
Bank's emphasis on structural adjustment lending. Yet more often, existing explanations
blame the Bank's struggle to implement its environmental policies on a host of factors, and it
is difficult to untangle one potential cause from another, or to determine the importance of
one factor versus another. The bulk of these explanations tend to fall into three categories:
governance, incentives, and what Naim calls "goal congestion."2 8 In fact, often these three
main categories overlap, with arrows leading from any one of the categories to each of the
other two, although causality is rarely specified. Many, but not all, of the debates raised in
the policy literature are reflected in the broader theoretical debates on institutional behavior,
which add depth and offer additional arguments to the former.
Governance:
2 5 Marianne Wenning, "Greening the European Investment Bank," WWF International Discussion Paper,
December 1992.
26 Goldberg, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: An Environmental Progress Report."
2 7 See, for example, Reed, Structural Adjustment and the Environment.
28 Moises Naim, "The World Bank: Its Role, Governance and Organizational Culture," in Bretton Woods:
Looking to the Future (Washington DC: Bretton Woods Commission, July 1994), C-276.
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While some earlier work on the World Bank argues that it is essentially the creature of
the developed capitalist countries (particularly the U.S.) to promote their own political and
economic interests, 2 9 much of the more recent work makes the argument that governance is
in fact quite weak. The general argument is that the Bank's 24 Executive Directors represent
over 170 countries, and do not have real control over the Bank's projects and policies.
Board weakness is thought to be a result, in part, of structural and design-related variables:
that is, there is high turnover, with directors appointed for renewable two-year periods,
staying, on average, for three years; and most directors represept a nmrnber of countries (up
to 25), which dilutes their ability to act on country preferences. The fact that the board brings
together countries who are capital providers, and those who are capital users also creates a
situation where country preferences often differ, which provides disincentives to cooperation
on divisive issues. In an example of "bloc loyalty," borrower countries tend not to vote
against loans for each other. Some critics, such as Rich, argue that the Board is weak by
choice, that is as the political outcome of a tacit agreement between countries of the North,
who seek to use the Bank as a way to address North-South relations, and a way to avoid
dealing seriously with debt relief; and countries of the South, who are "addicted" to the
Bank's loans.30
No matter what the cause is of board weakness, this view continues on to argue that the
result is a relatively autonomous bank management and staff that lack incentive to be
accountable to the board. As Naim, a former executive director of the WB, argues:
A divided board of overwhelmed directors, many of whom cannot afford to irritate
the Bank's management, and usually leave by the time they begin to be more
effective, is no match for a usually brilliant group of professionals with decades of
experience at the Bank.31
2 9 Payer argues that the U.S. has "always been able to control the direction" of World Bank lending, and cites
numerous examples of the U.S. imposing its wishes on Bank lending. See Cheryl Payer, The World Bank: A
Critical Analysis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982).
3 0 Rich, Mortgaging the Earth, p. 305.
31 Naim, "TIhe World Bank: Its Role, Governance and Organizational Culture," p. C-28 1.
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A more extreme view of this argument is that the Bank has become a bureaucracy gone
wild, a sort of "World Bankenstein" lacking accountability to shareholder countries.32
George and Sabelli, in turn, call the World Bank a "total social phenomenon, a Thing,"
comparable to the medieval Church with "a doctrine, a rigidly structured hierarchy of
preaching and imposing this doctrine and a quasi-religious mode of self-justification."3 3
Other executive directors of the World Bank have been quoted as saying (in frustration over
the Sardar Sarovar dam projects) that the Bank has shown "a profound lack of accountability
to its shareholders" and has suppressed "information on controversial projects." 3 4
Therefore, even if major shareholders push for the Bank to better address environmental
issues in its work, according to this argument, Bank management and staff can easily ignore
the pressure.
The degree to which MDB management and staff are accountable or not to the bank's
shareholders reflects broader academic debates about the sources of behavior within IOs.
IOs can easily be expressed as a classic principal-agent relationship; they are created by states
as a means of overcoming collective action problems, promoting cooperation, and creating
advantages by delegating agents with the responsibility of carrying out their interests.3 5 Yet
in any principal-agent relationship there are opportunities for agency opportunism, since the
fact that both the principals and the agents seek opportunities to maximize their interests
creates an inherent tension between the two. This tension is likely to be intensified in
organizations like MDBs, where principals have multiple and often ambiguous preferences,
while the institution itself is responsible for distributing billions of dollars of resources.
3 2 Inspired by Greenpeace, "World Bankenstein: a monstrous institution." Greenpeace: October-December
1994, vol. 3, n. 4, p. 2 (1).
33 George and Sabelli, Faith and Credit: The World Bank's Secular Empire.
3 4 This is cited in U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans
and Environment, Committee on Foreign Relations, Statement of Bruce M. Rich on Behalf of
Environmental Defense Fund, Friends of the Earth, National Audubon Society, National Wildlife Federation,
Sierra Club Concerning Public International Financial Institutions: Environmental Performance and
Management, March 3, 1994. Rich attributes the quote to minutes from oral statements of the World Bank's
Executive Directors, held 23 October 1992.
35 D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the
Appropriations Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), Chapter 2.
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The debates over who drives institutional behavior-principals or agents-are often
presented as debates over how much autonomy agents exhibit when they carry out the
activities delegated to them by their principals. The above view that bank management and
staff are largely autonomous would be readily accepted by many neo-liberal international
relations scholars or comparativists writing under the rubric of "Historical Institutionalism,"
who argue that IOs, once established, can "take on a life of their own and develop their own
internal dynamics," or emphasize unintended consequences or path dependence in analyzing
institutional development. 3 6 They will also argue that IOs transform state preferences. 37
Some scholars using principal-agent frameworks to analyze regulatory politics also subscribe
to the "runaway bureaucracy thesis," or situations where lax principals allow regulatory
bureaucracies to pursue their own goals.3 8 Yet, scholars analyzing institutional autonomy are
also aware that shareholding countries have the legal ability to reduce agency slack, or "rein"
in the agents, if they choose to.
Structural realist international relations theorists, on the other hand, would strongly
disagree with the weak governance argument above. Agents may have meaningful "slack,"
but this is a reflection of them doing their job; using their expertise to carry out what they
believe the principals want them to do. Common opportunities for agent opportunism, such
as hidden information and hidden action are dealt with through contract design, monitoring
mechanisms and institutional checks. 3 9 This is one way to depict the views of structural
realists, who argue that LOs are essentially the passive instruments of states, and that IOs
have power and agency only to the extent that this is tolerated by their owners. 40
3 6 Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, The Anatomy ofInfluence: Decision Making in International
Organization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 7. On historical institutionalism and other
institutionalisms, see Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three
Institutionalisms," Political Studies 44 (1996): 952-973.
3 7 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it: the Social Construction of Power Politics,"
International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425.
3 8Mark A. Pollack, "Delegation, Agency, and agenda setting in the European Community," International
Organization 51, no. 1 (1997), p. 109.
3 9 Kiewiet and McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation, Chapter 2.
4 0 Susan Strange, "Cave! hic dragones: a critique of regime analysis," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen
Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983): 337-354; also, Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of
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Modified structural realists and neoliberal institutionalists argue that international
institutions do more than simply reflect powerful state interests; they also provide important
functions that transcend the simple Prisoner's Dilemma problem and encourage international
cooperation. In Keohane's classic statement of this functionalist view, institutions establish
patterns of legal liability, provide more symmetrical information and reduce transaction
costs-the costs of bargaining, side payments, and reaching agreement on common issues.
They do so by providing fora where states can repeatedly meet, which facilitates negotiations
and thus promotes cooperation.4 1 Nonetheless, while modified realists admit that institutions
may be more than passive actors, they do not believe institutions have the ability to make
authoritative decisions to bind states.
More recently, scholars have begun to look more closely at different organizational
structures and forms, as a way of determining how a chosen form helped member states
achieve their interests. Less attention is paid, however, to the impact different organizational
forms themselves ultimately have on policy outcomes, or how existing institutions adapt to
new policy mandates. 42
I argue that both the weak governance argument and the structural/neo-realist arguments
fall short in explaining MDB environmental behavior. A state-centered perspective appears to
have some explanatory power, since there is a strong correlation between the presence of the
pro-environment U.S. on the bank's board and the degree to which the bank attempts to
tackle environmental issues. Such an explanation may also account for why the EIB, where
the capital providers are the capital users for 90% of the Bank's lending, does not face
pressure to pursue environmental conditionality in its work. Stated differently, why would
Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization 42
(1988): 485-507.
4 1 Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984).
42 Also, on the importance of institutional form, see John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of
an Institution," in Multilateralism Matters, ed. John Gerard Ruggie (New York: Columbia University Press,
1993), 3-47. Also in this category are transaction cost theories of organizational structure. See Oliver
Williamson, "The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach," American Journal of
Sociology 87, no. 3 (1981): 548-577.
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its shareholders want their bank to tell them what to do?43 In addition, there are clearly
examples when shareholder countries have "reined" in the banks, when agency slack became
uncomfortable. For example, in response to controversy over the Sardar Sarovar projects,
major donors like the U.S. pushed the World Bank to set up an independent Inspection Panel
to increase accountability by investigating complaints from people affected by the Bank's
projects. The EBRD board, in turn, fired the Bank's first president, Jacques Attali, due to
disappointment over his performance.
However, these explanations do not account for many important differences among the
banks. In general, realist and neo-realist debates revolve around analysis of when and how
states cooperate, in this case through multilateral fora. As a result, these scholars have the
most to say about factors in the inter-state bargaining and negotiations process that lead to
regime or IO formation and changes, but pay less attention to what happens after the IO
agents have received their delegated responsibility, how their actual policy actions reflect or
do not reflect these responsibilities, and what other factors may have an impact on how these
are carried out. Realists would not see these aspect, of the policy process as important as
long as outcomes reflect the general tasks the agents are supposed to do. Yet, as we will see
in Chapters 4-5, agents must often struggle with conflicting mandates, while institutional
design and incentive systems greatly impact on the depth and scope of an MDB's response.
There are also examples where the creation of policy activities undertaken by the World Bank
that have changed the ways its major donors shape their own bilateral assistance to CEE.44
In addition, Chapter 4 will show how the governance structures of the MDBs makes it
difficult for any state shareholder to translate its power into influence, i.e., that weak
governance is a characteristic of the World Bank, as well as the other two banks, and that it
does have an impact on institutional incentives. Thus, it is important to show when and how
4 3 By contrast, at the other two banks the richer shareholder countries, which provide the bulk of the banks'
capital, have more say on the conditionality of loans going to poorer recipients, which are also shareholders.
44I refer here to the Environmental Action Programme for Central and Eastern Europe, mainly designed by
the World Bank. It is discussed in Chapter 5.
56
shareholders exert influence on the bank's environmental behavior, and when and how they
do not. This approach echoes some current work by historical institutionalists and other
scholars examining the ways in which preferences shape institutions and vice-versa.4 5 This
focus has been evident in current scholarship on European integration, particularly among
scholars exploring the relationship between European institutions and domestic policy and the
conditions under which institutions pursue their own preferences versus following the
wishes of their shareholding countries.4 6
In one incisive attempt to show how when and how each actor matters, Pierson argues
that realist perspectives can explain political bargains at specific points in time, while an
analysis of evolving processes reveals that institutions can function in ways not anticipated
by their designers.4 7 While member states are still the central decisionmakers in the process
of European integration, their control is limited by a number of factors that create gaps in
member state control, which gives other actors the ability to influence the integration process.
These gaps are caused by factors such as: member states must allow EC organizations to
have a degree of autonomy to complete their increasingly complex tasks; decisionmakers
have short time horizons, which means that they often do not anticipate the long-term
consequences of institutional design and reform, which also is one cause of unintended
consequences of institutional behavior; and finally, member state policy preferences do shift
over time, which can result in the institutional arrangements diverging from member states'
original intentions. Pollack, in turn, argues that EC institutions are characterized by varying
patterns of autonomy, since the efficacy and credibility of member state control mechanisms
vary across institution, issue area, and over time.4 8
4 5 For a succinct discussion of preference-driven models versus institutional-driven models in explaining
public policy formation, see Peter Alexis Gourevitch, "Squaring the Circle: the Domestic Sources of
International Cooperation," International Organization 50, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 349-373.
4 6 See, for example, Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Revisiting the European Court of Justice,"
International Organization52, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 177-209.
47 Paul Pierson, "The Path to European Integration," Comparative Political Studies 29, no. 2 (April 1996):
123-163.
48 Mark A. Pollack, "Delegation, Agency, and agenda setting in the European Community," International
Organization 51, no. 1 (1997): 99-134.
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While many of these observations resonate with the case of MDBs, they are not
sufficient in explaining the evolution of and variation in the banks' environmental behavior.
This is because all three banks have relatively weak boards, and all three banks have a
significant amount of autonomy to shape the way they carry out their environmental policy
goals. Thus, we find that board weakness is a constant among the three banks. In order to
determine why it is they carry out their environmental goals quite differently, we have to look
beyond board politics and more deeply inside the institutions themselves.
Other Institutional Incentives:
The second set of explanations arising in the policy literature focuses on how
institutional interests are shaped by institutional design, rules and rule-making procedures,
through their impact on incentives facing bank staff. This view is usually presented as
parallel to, and not dependent on, the weak board argument. Rich, for example, emphasizes
lending pressure as the primary incentive faced by Bank staff, which discourages close
attention to environmental issues. The pressure to make loans is attributed to specific lending
targets that were initiated under Robert McNamara's stewardship of the World Bank (1968-
1981), demand for loans from developing countries, and the always-present pressure for
staff to find financially attractive, "bankable" projects. This has been a particularly important
issue for the World Bank since the late 1980s when it began receiving more payments from
LDCs than it was making in new loans to them. 4 9 The pressure to get loans out, writes
Rich, is far stronger than any pressure for staff to be accountable for how those loans are
implemented. Indeed, he argues that loan repayment has no connection to the quality of
project implementation, since countries must repay the Bank whether or not the project is
well implemented.
The Wapenhans Report, in explaining why the Bank's portfolio was performing so
poorly, concurred, pointing its finger at "the Bank's pervasive preoccupation with new
4 9 This is called the "negative transfer" problem. See Rich, Mortgaging the Earth, p. 183.
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lending" which it noted some have dubbed an "approval culture." 50 Quantity, it is argued,
has become more important than project quality in the Bank's history. As Horberry has
noted, Bank staff will resist new policy demands, such as environmental mandates, if they
conflict with internal institutional interests, such as the need to move money. 51
Other analysts turn attention to the issue raised earlier in this chapter of the tension
NMDBs face in pursuing their banking objectives versus their development objectives.
Korten, for example, studying the negative impact of an Asian Development Bank loan for
Philippines forestry projects, argued that the banking prerogatives can by themselves be
environmentally destructive. Loans made by MDBs must be repaid in foreign exchange,
which can create pressure for recipient countries to exnort natural resources. 52
The arguments focusing on the impact of institutional incentives can be situated in a
number of literatures that argue that what happens inside an institution, particularly rules and
rule-making processes, and general institutional repertoires of behavior, are important in
explaining institutional behavior. This focus can be found in branches of public choice
institutionalism, such as the work of Shepsle, which shows how frameworks of rules,
procedures and arrangements constrain and mediate individual preferences to shape
outcomes.53 Scholars applying principal-agent frameworks to understanding institutional
behavior often base arguments about autonomy on analysis of how control mechanisms
(admin`;trative and oversight procedures) affect the degree of agency independence. 5 4 This
focus is not unique to rational choice theory. Sociological organization theories and theories
5 0 Wapenhans Report, p. iii.
51 John Horberry, "The Accountability of Development Assistance Agencies: The Case of Environmental
Policy," Ecology Law Quarterly 12 (1985): p. 824.
5 2 Frances F. Korten, "The High Costs of Environmental Loans," Asia Pacific Issues: Analysis from the
East-West Center, no. 9 (1993): pp. 1-8.
53 Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," Journal
of Theoretical Politics 1, no. 2 (1989): pp. 131-147. The public choice movement overall places much
emphasis on how institutional arrangements explain collective choice. See James Buchanan and Gordon
Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962).
5 4Kiewiet and McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation; also see Pollack, "Obedient Servant or Runaway
Eurocracy?"
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of bureaucratic politics also look inside the black box of the organization to explain
behavior. 55
Rational choice arguments tend to differ from the latter group in their underlying
assumptions that institutions reflect aggregations of individual choice, versus the
sociologists' view that institutions are embedded in cognitive, cultural, or political
foundations. They also differ in their views on whether preferences are fixed and
exogenous, or as March and Simon have argued, rationality is "bounded" by a lack of
information, a great deal of uncertainty, and in general, people's limited ability to process
information and solve problems. 56
The debates relevant to the central questions of this dissertation would suggest that the
ways in which environmental mandates are "hard-wired" into the MDBs, through rules,
decisionmaking procedures, and other control mechanisms, should be explored to determine
what role they play in explaining the banks' environmental behavior. Certainly, it provides a
way of analyzing what the MDBs do with their delegated responsibility. While the vast
majority of work by organizational theorists apply to the behavior of all organizations, or
focus specifically on domestic government organizations or firms, recently there has been
attention by international relations scholars on how some lessons or causal variables offered
by organizational theory might apply to the study of international institutional behavior.
Interestingly, much of this work has been prompted by growing analytical attention to the
way international institutions have responded to global environmental issues.
In his analysis of global environmental governance, for example, Oran Young has
argued that it is important to look at decision procedures, compliance mechanisms and
5 5 The most relevant sociological organization theory works include James G. March and Herbert A. Simon,
Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958); James G. March and Johan P. Olsen,
Rediscovering institutions: the organizational basis ofpolitics (New York: The Free Press, 1989); and Walter
W. Powell, Paul J. DiMaggio eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991). On bureaucratic politics, see Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of
Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957). On the importance of decisionmaking procedures, see Graham
Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
5 6James G. March, "Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice," Bell Journal of
Economics 9, no. Autumn (1978): 587-608.
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sources of revenue in determining the effectiveness of international institutions. 57 He
contrasts these endogenous variables with exogenous variables that include the broad array of
"physical, biological and social" conditions that make up the environment in which IOs
operate. Some of the case studies highlighted in an edited volume by Keohane and Levy
focus on the ways institutional design variables govern the extent to which financial
mechanisms for environmental aid have either been effective or --more often--in effective in
promoting environmental changes in poorer countries. Within this project, Connolly, Gutner
and Bedarff, for example, have shown how environmental aid by the largest western donors
to Central and Eastern Europe followed Cohen, March and Olsen's "garbage can" model,
where new environmental protection goals were tacked onto pre-existing institutional
objectives. Solutions have not necessarily fit the problems, and the result has been the neglect
of certain priority problems in the region, duplication of assistance efforts, and failures in aid
coordination. 58
Ultimately, this area of research requires more empirical work to test and compare
which design- and rule-related variables have the greatest impact on institutional behavior,
and to determine how they do so. I find that design and rule-related variables are extremely
important in shaping institutional incentives and explaining variation among the three banks
in their efforts to carry out environmental objectives in their work. In particular, as Chapters
4-5 will show, variation in how "bank-like" or demand-driven an MDB is designed to be has
an important impact on staff incentives, capacity and resources. For example, a less "bank-
like" MDB will have more "green" bankers, people whose job is to actively search out and
design environmentally-oriented projects. Where environmental staff are responsible for
identifying environmental loans and designing projects at the early stages-that is, where
they essentially act as environmentally-oriented bankers-, the MDB will produce more
5 7 0ran Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1994), p. 154.
58 Connolly, Gutner, Bedarff, "Organizational Inertia and Environmental Assistance to Eastern Europe," p.
282. On the garbage can model, see Michael D. Cohen, James G. March et al., "A Garbage Can Model of
Organizational Choice," Administrative Science Quarterly 17 (1972): 1-25.
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stand-alone environmental projects. Where there is a separate environmental appraisal unit
with power to change the shape of a loan as it is being designed, the MDB will be more
proactive in its environmental work. Environmental research done by the MDBs in turn, is
less closely linked to project outcomes.
Recipient country incentives
Curiously, analyses of MDB environmental behavior do not pay much attention to
incentives from the perspective of the recipient country; that is loan recipients may have little
or no interest in caring about the environmental components of loans, or stand-alone
environmental projects, and may thus block the bank's ability to implement its environmental
policies. The fact that recipient country political support may affect what is perceived as the
bank's environmental behavior is occasionally touched upon. For example, Rich and
Aufderheide noted in a 1988 article:
Even (World Bank) bureaucrats with the best intentions often have their hands tied.
The policies they implement are frequently shaped by political pressures that these
functionaries are generally powerless to confront or alter....even well-intentioned
forestry experts within the World Bank may be thwarted in their efforts by their
counterparts in recipient countries, since national forestry agencies are often staffed
by individuals who profit from deforestation. 59
George and Sabelli have also noted that the World Bank often has a difficult time in
convincing recipient countries to accept environmental conditionality. "Borrower
governments," they wrote, "read environmental protection clauses in loan agreements as code
for 'this project is going to cost us a lot more and will include completely superfluous but
mandatory components we'll have to pay for."' 60 Indeed, ministers of 41 developing
countries declared their opposition to environmental conditionality in a June 1991 preparatory
meeting ahead of the 1992 UNCED conference.61
5 9 Pat Aufderheide and Bruce Rich, "Environmental Reform and the Multilateral Development Banks," World
Policy Journal 5 (Spring 1988), p. 306.
6 0 George, Sabelli, Faith and Credit, p. 169.
6 1 Cited in Nelson and Eglinton, Global Goals, Contentious Means, p. 24.
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These issues are not well explored in the policy literature on MDBs and the
environment, most likely because many of the author-advocates are more intent on producing
changes at the bank level, with a focus on institutional design, governance, and performance
issues. In other words, many of the policy advocates focus on the supply of environmental
projects and policies by MDBs rather than the demand for such projects and policies.
However, the interests of recipient countries and their impact on the ability of IOs to carry out
their work is addressed in the broader policy literature on MDB conditionality, and aid
effectiveness, which provides some hypotheses that are examined in this study.
Studies focusing on the implementation of donor policies and projects in recipient
countries highlight three key variables that appear to explain how incentives at the recipient's
level influence the effectiveness of project implementation. First, and not surprisingly, is the
argument that donor policy goals are unlikely to be met unless they intersect with the
recipient's own priorities.6 2 This can either occur through the existence of a set of mutually
agreeable policy goals, or more likely as a result of bargaining between the two sides.
Mosley, Harrigan and Toye, analyzing the efficacy of World Bank policy-based lending (or
structural adjustment loans), show how conditionality is a bargaining game, where the
donors are interested in seeing their policy choices carried out, while the recipients resist any
conditions that differ from their own policy preferences.63 The outcome of bargaining
between the two cannot be pre-determined; it depends on the actors' strategies, as well as the
external environment Recipients or donors may have stronger bargaining positions in some
cases versus others. Studies of project effectiveness also conclude that aid conditionality is
most likely to make inroads in cases where it strengthens domestic interest groups, or the
political authority of officials committed to the same goals.64
6 2 Barbara Connolly, "Increments for the Earth: The Politics of Environmental Aid," in Institutions for
Environmental Aid, p. 328. For an excellent analysis of the ways in which lessons from the economic
development literature are salient to environmental aid, see David Fairman and Michael Ross, "Old Fads, New
Lessons: Learning from Economic Development Assistance," in Institutions for Environmental Aid, pp. 29-
51.
6 3 Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan, and John Toye, Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-based Lending, 2
vols., vol. 1 (New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 69.
64 Ross, "Conditionality and Logging Reform in the Tropics," p. 189.
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Since economic restructuring is a primary goal of Central and Eastern European
governments, we would expect to see donors making more inroads on environmental issues
in their public sector lending where the policy changes desired also contribute to economic
restructuring, which is clearly the priority of governments in the region. In other words,
recipients will be more accepting of projects or policies with environmental components
where these projects also have important economic benefits. A key example of this is the call
by most MDBs for governments to reduce price subsidies on energy. The removal of
subsidies is an important step toward economic liberalization and away from price distortion.
On the environmental side, it would reduce air pollution by reducing demand for energy, and
also would encourage more efficient use of energy. Reducing subsidies on coal, the primary
source of energy for many countries in CEE, also increases the attractiveness of alternative,
cleaner sources of energy, such as gas.
In the case of MDB activity in CEE, what is interesting is that the set of MDB projects
that benefit the economy and the environment also happen to be the same set of projects that
do not necessarily require new behavior from the banks. In other words, these are activities
where it is the banks' economic and environmental mandates may already overlap. The
lessons from these observations focus attention on the need to analyze the MDBs' portfolios
to determine: 1) if they have evolved in the ways loans are designed in areas where traditional
economic criteria overlap with new environmental criteria in order to better address relevant
environmental issues; and 2) if they attempt to push beyond the joint set of activities most
preferred by recipients on economic grounds, as a way to better tackle local, regional or
global environmental problems.
The second variable of key importance in determining project success is the
administrative capacity of the recipient at the national, sub-national, or even firm level (in the
case of private sector loans), to help carry out implementation.65 The best-designed projects
6 5 For an excellent explication on different forms of capacity, see Connolly, "Increments for the Earth: The
Politics of Environmental Aid," p. 345.
64
will fail if the recipient does not have the ability to help implement them and maintain them,
once funding ceases. 66 On one hand, this variable is not likely to point to significant
variation among the banks. Projects from all three banks are likely to suffer more in
countries with weak administrative capacity, and have a greater chance of success in
countries with stronger domestic capacity. On the other hand, we can still compare portfolios
to determine how capacity issues are dealt with in project design. MDBs paying greater
attention to building domestic capacity in cases where it is weak may have better luck in
implementing the environmental components of their work.
The third variable important in determining effective project implementation is the way
donors manage potential principal/agent problems to insure that implementing agents carry
out projects as planned. This refers to the accountability system set up by the MDBs, which,
in addition to rules embodied in loan covenants, includes systems of reporting, monitoring,
and evaluating projects. MDB projects can be compared at this level to see the extent to
which the banks follow through with their work once the loan agreements have been signed
and money has been disbursed. Such comparison is important in revealing the degree of
"slippage" that occurs in the implementation of bank projects.
Goal Congestion:
Some analysts argue that the key factor inhibiting the World Bank from being more
effective in fulfilling its policy goals is the fact that the sheer number of goals has
mushroomed to a level that makes it virtually impossible for the institution to meet them all,
which results in what Naim calls "goal congestion" and "mission ambiguity." 67 This
proliferation is the result of a diverseness of views among donor countries, recipient
countries and bank staff and management about what the primary priorities of the institution
should be, along with the Bank's inability to shed old goals as it moved to adopt new ones.
As Naim notes:
6 6 Ibid., p. 328.
6 7Naim, "The World Bank: Its Role, Governance and Organizational Culture," p. C-276.
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In the case of the World Bank, the lack of consensus about its basic mission,
limitations in its governance system, and other conditions have led to a proliferation
of goals--which in turn has had important organizational
repercussions....Organizations like the Bank--large, complex, relatively autonomous,
and with a significant capacity to influence its environment--can postpone, or even
avoid, the difficult decisions required to minimize incongruities between strategy and
internal organization. 6 8
From a slightly different angle, other analysts argue that it is not necessarily the number
of competing ideas and proliferating goals that matters, but rather the existence of too many
parties to which the Bank must be accountable. Horberry's argument is essentially that too
many cooks spoil the broth. International agencies, he argued, are accountable to donor
governments, recipient governments, funding sources, and other actors involved in the
process of planning and implementing development aid. As a result, the agencies are "unable
to achieve every objective or satisfy all of the interested parties."6 9 In the face of conflicting
demands, the agencies "tend to pay lip service to the general objectives of new policies
without dramatically changing the actual management of their programs." 70
In some ways, this argument offers a challenge to the "weak governance explanation."
In this case, the argument implies that the institution is struggling to be accountable to a
plethora of policies and sources, while the former argument implies that the institution
chooses not to be accountable to its owners. Yet, the outcome of both arguments are the
same; the result of either source of ambiguity increases the autonomy of the Bank's staff and
its ability to shape the Bank's strategies and policies.71
Curiously, this vein of argument has no direct parallels in the broader institutional
literatures, although it clearly bolsters arguments by neo-liberal and comparativist scholars
68 Ibid., p. C-273.
6 9 Horberry, "The Accountability of Development Assistance Agencies: the Case of Environmental Policy,"
p. 818. For another statement of this view, see the article by a former Vice President and Treasurer of the
World Bank. Eugene H. Rotberg, "Financial Operations of the World Bank," in Bretton Woods: Looking to
the Future (Washington DC: Bretton Woods Commission, July 1994): C-185-214.
7 0 Horberry, "The Accountability of Development Assistance Agencies: the Case of Environmental Policy,"
p. 833. Also see Judith Tendler, Inside Foreign Aid (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975). Rich
also offers a similar argument; Rich, Mortgaging the Earth, p. 191.
71 William Ascher, "New Development Approaches and the Adaptability of International Agencies: the Case
of the World Bank," International Organization 37, no. 3 (Summer 1983), p. 437.
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who stress the importance of path dependency and unintended consequences. It is an
argument that requires greater exploration through empirical research. On one hand, it
appears to have little explanatory power vis-a-vis the Bank's environmental behavior, in
terms of portfolio development. This is because the World Bank clearly has more goals and
mandates to juggle than the other two MDBs, yet I will argue that this has not appeared to
hurt the World Bank relative to the others in its planned environmental activities in Central
and Eastern Europe. Indeed, the World Bank appears to be significantly more active than the
other two in marrying environmental and economic project and policy goals, despite its
higher degree of "goal congestion." On the other hand, the plethora of policy goals facing
the Bank appears to be a factor that makes well-designed projects difficult to actually
implement. In other words, while goal congestion has not stopped the World Bank from
developing a respectable project portfolio, and engaging in a number of other environmental
policy activities in CEE, it may contribute to a gap between the environmental considerations
built into project designs and the extent to which they are carried out in practice, as well as
the speed at which projects can be implemented. The findings of this dissertation show that it
is not the "congestion" that matters per se, as the existence of conflicting objectives. A small
number of conflicting objectives, such as those that faced the EBRD in the proposed
Mochovce loan, are sufficient to create difficulties in an MDB's ability to implement its
policies.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown the ways in which the MDB-centric literature and the broader
scholarly literature intersect and also diverge in their emphases and arguments. More
importantly, in examining the explanations offered by each, I argue for the importance of
linking explanations that seek to explain how donor preferences and institutional variables
interact in explaining institutional behavior. Single variable explanations may explain a piece
of the picture, but are not sufficient to address the complexity of how donor politics and
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Bargaining and Delegation: The Birth of Environmental Mandates
Multilateral development banks, traditionally most comfortable with making loans to
creditworthy counterparts for projects that combine the expertise of economists and engineers
to promote economic development, are now bending over backwards to show how "green"
they have become. In recent years, attention to environmental issues has become an
important goal for the World Bank, EBRD and EIB-at least in rhetoric. The changes are
most evident at the World Bank, where there has been an explosion of environmental policy
activity and lending over the past decade. The EBRD, the youngest of the three, has an
environmental mandate built into its charter, which requires it to promote "environmentally
sound and sustainable development" in its activities. The EIB, in turn, points out that
financing environmental projects is "a major activity of the Bank," and that "the
environmental issues of project financing" are "a major concern."1 At a broad level of
analysis, the three banks share the same two basic environmental objectives: they seek to
address and mitigate potentially adverse environmental impacts in their projects, and they
seek to fund projects with major environmental components or goals. Yet, as is shown
throughout the dissertation, the ways the banks define these two goals and seek to carry them
out differ considerably. Moreover, there is variation in the degree to which they move
beyond these broad objectives to develop more comprehensive strategies for addressing
environmental issues.
1EIB, Environmental Policy Statement, 1996, p. 4.
69
In analyzing the sources and impacts of these differences, the first step is to determine
how and why it was that these banks came to take on new environmental policy goals. This
chapter examines the political and ideational forces that resulted in the banks' adoption of
explicit environmental policy goals, and then lays out what those goals now are. What does
such an exercise teld us? The determination of how new policy issues find their way onto the
MDB policy agendas reveals the strength of each bank's apparent commitment to
environmental issues; it also says something about the clarity of the commitment. We see
what types of forces crive the MDBs to take on a new set of issues, and what the banks say
they hope to do in addressing these issues in their work.
Recalling the continuum presented in Table 1.2, with respect to MDB commitment to
environmental issues, if an MDB starts out with a minimal commitment, we should expect it
to label as "environmental" the types of MDB projects it has always done that may also have
a positive impact on the environment. These are projects that benefit both economic
development and environmental management. For an MDB with a minimal commitment, it
would not be surprising to see little change in its standard operating procedures and portfolio
of activities. Alternatively, if an MDB has a strong commitment to addressing environmental
issues in its work, then we should expect to see its activities move beyond its traditional set
of projects, as well as to see some accommodating shift in its procedures, design, and
incentives systems so that it can fulfill this commitment. In other words, by determining the
source and depth of the Bank's commitment, we can see whether the bank's intention is
simply to attach new environmental goals onto pre-existing economic development objectives
or to actually change the way it goes about its business. Chapter 4 examines this translation
process, and highlights the sources of gaps that occur between commitment and policy
actions.
This chapter argues that pressure from major shareholder countries, usually supported
or pushed by environmental NGOs, is a key factor in determining how seriously an MDB
will decide to address environmental issues in its work. The preferences of powerful
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principals are central variables in determining the depth and scope of an MDB's
environmental commitment. While environmental policy goals can initially be generated by
bank actors, these tend to languish and atrophy when not backed by external support or
pressure. A strong show of environmental commitment was therefore not initially,
spontaneously generated by bank staff, although once a bank's internal environmental actors
are in place they can play a critical role in the evolution of these goals.
Where there is evidence of major shareholder pressure for change, it has been prompted
by pressing problems, or what Kingdon calls "focusing events" that capture the attention of
major shareholders. The chapter shows that for the World Bank, the existence of several
projects publicized by NGOs as environmental disasters gave these organizations ammunition
to successfully heighten Congressional awareness of the Bank's weak environmental
accountability, and unleash U.S. pressure on the Bank to revise its environmental goals. In
the case of the EBRD, donor awareness of the enormous environmental problems facing
former Communist countries seeking to embark upon economic reform put environmental
issues high on the agenda of those negotiating the new Bank's articles of agreement. Again,
U.S. influence, backed by NGO support, was quite visible. For the EIB, the absence of
such a "focusing event" is one important reason why there has never been strong shareholder
pressure on the Bank to be more ambitious in its environmental objectives. The absence of
the environmentally-activist U.S. on the EIB's board is also part of the explanation for that
Bank's relatively quiet environmental stance.
My argument thus partially draws on John Kingdon's model of policy formation. In
analyzing agenda-setting processes in the U.S. federal government, Kingdon sets out a
revised version of the Cohen, March and Olsen "garbage can" model of organizational
decisionmaking. He argues that important policy changes occur when independent process
streams of problems, policy options and politics join together at a "critical juncture," most
often when a "policy window" opens due to a compelling problem or changes in political
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factors such as interest group pressure. 2 For the World Bank and EBRD, the problems are
the above-mentioned environmental "focusing events," while the politics includes U.S.
pressure, bolstered in the case of the EBRD by support from other "pro-environmental"
shareholders, and in neither case hindered by any major opposition from others. The basic
policy options considered at these junctures include a commitment to conduct environmental
due diligence for all projects, and to seek out stand-alone "environmental" projects, although
how these actually work has evolved over time.
This chapter shows the role shareholder politics and preferences have played in shaping
each MDB's environmental objectives. It argues that the EIB is the "lightest green" of the
three MDBs, with the most minimal set of environmental objectives, while the World Bank
has moved along the continuum throughout its lifetime from a "light green" position to a
more comprehensive, integrative set of policy goals. The EBRD lies between the two.
Unlike the other two MDBs, the EIB does not make special efforts to identify projects that go
beyond its traditional lending areas. It also follows EU public participation rules, but as we
will see in the next chapter, these rules are not easily translatable in Central and Eastern
Europe.
The remainder of this chapter examines the politics of how and why each bank decided
to address environmental issues in its work, and describes and compares each bank's basic
environmental policy goals. It discusses each bank separately, beginning with a brief,
introductory section of the institution that sets out its primary characteristics and mission.
Next, it analyzes the politics of how each bank decided to develop its environmental policies.
Finally, the chapter describes each bank's environmental policies, and shows how differently
they each define what they consider to be "environmental."
2 John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984),
particularly Chapter 8. The Cohen-March-Olsen model has four streams (problems, solutions, participants,
and choice opportunities), compared to Kingdon's three streams. Kingdon's model also emphasizes patterns
and structure in the linking of these processes, where as the earlier model takes a more anarchical view. On
the garbage can model, see Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model
of Organizational Choice," Administrative Science Quarterly 17 (1972): 1-25.
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The MDBs and their Environmental Mandates
The World Bank:
Basic Mission and Lending Policy
The World Bank is the biggest single creditor for developing countries and countries in
transition, now lending over $20 billion annually. It is the oldest MDB, and the only one
with a truly global scope. 3 With an expert staff of over 10,000, it is a major source of policy
advice and technical assistance for borrowers. The Bank, along with its sister institution, the
IMF, was born in 1944 at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, before World War II had ended,
when representatives of 44 countries met to lay the foundation for the post-war economic
order.4
The Bretton Woods institutions, which opened their doors in 1946, were created to
promote economic cooperation, growth and stability, thus avoiding any return to the beggar-
thy-neighbor trade practices from the pre-war years. While both multilateral institutions
would be owned and run by national governments, their governance was clearly dominated
by the U.S. The U.S. both proposed the initial concept of the Bank, and played a leading
role in its design. Indeed, as Gwin notes, there has been a "strong and enduring American
imprint on all aspects of the Bank, including its structure, general policy direction, and forms
of lending. 5 With the U.S. providing most of the money to start the Bank, its delegation
3In addition to the EBRD and EIB, the World Bank's sister regional MDBs include the Inter American
Development Bank, established in 1959; the African Development Bank, established in 1964; and the Asian
Development Bank, established in 1966. The EIB, does not tend to think of itself as an MDB. However, as a
multilateral institution owned by state shareholders with a goal of promoting regional development in
Western Europe, which also operates globally, for the purposes of this dissertation, the EIB clearly can be
defined as an MDB.
4 For histories of the World Bank, see: Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis, and Richard Webb, eds., The World
Bank: Its First Half Century, 2 vols. (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1997); Edward S. Mason
and Robert E. Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution,
1973); Catherine Gwin, U.S. Relations with the World Bank, (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution,
1994); Jochen Kraske, William H. Becker, William Diamond et al., Ban:kers with a Mission: The Presidents
of the World Bank, 1946-91 (Washington DC: Oxford University Press, 1996); Susan George and Fabrizio
Sabelli, Faith and Credit: The World Bank's Secular Empire (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); Bruce Rich,
Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment, and the Crisis of Development
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1994).
5 Catherine Gwin, U.S. Relations with the World Bank, p. 3.
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was also able to ensure that the Bank would be located in Washington DC. From the
beginning the president of the WB has been American, while the head of the IMF is
European.
According to the Bank's Articles of Agreement, it would operate by guaranteeing or
making loans for projects for reconstruction or development. In practice, the Bank focused
on direct government lending, backed by sovereign guarantees, since governments preferred
to borrow directly from the Bank, rather than guarantee private sector lending by the Bank.
The Bank would be owned by its shareholder governments, and voting power was
determined by the size of each country's capital subscription to the Bank.6 The U.S. began
with a 34.9% stake in the Bank. 7 Although that stake has declined over the years, (reaching
17.2% by fiscal 1996), the U.S. has remained the Bank's single largest shareholder and
most influential board member. Beginning with authorized capital of $10 billion, out of
which members subscribed $7.5 billion, the Bank committed itself to conducting its activities
"with due attention to considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to
political or other non-economic influences or considerations."8 Loans and guarantees would
be funded by the shareholders' capital subscriptions, plus principal and interest payments on
loans, and later (and most importantly), funds raised from international capital markets.
Over the years, the ways in which the World Bank has chosen to promote development
in its lending assistance have evolved considerably. The Bank is no stranger to shifts in its
institutional goals and missions. Its formal name, the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD), reflected the dual-emphasis desired by its founders. In the Bank's
first year or so, the financing of post-war reconstruction was its primary function, but any
possible tensions between the two different priorities were soon displaced by the Marshall
6Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays and Lectures, vol. II (Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), p. 7.
7World Bank Articles of Agreement, in Mason and Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods, p. 779.
8Article III, Section 5 (b).
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Plan. 9 The Bank's early emphasis was on promoting big, public sector, capital infrastructure
projects, such as railways, roads, ports, power plants, and communications equipment, as a
way to create a foundation for private sector investment, and hence economic growth. As
Mason and Asher note in their seminal history, the early years were characterized by a
narrow conception of development, and an overall "lack of attention to development
analysis."1 0
In the 1950s and 60s, as the Bank's focus shifted toward addressing the challenges
facing developing countries, its view of development widened and the methods it used to
achieve its goal of promoting economic development also evolved. 11 Over the next decade
two of its three affiliates were created. The International Finance Corporation (IFC),
established in 1956, as the Bank's private sector lending arm, with the ability to lend without
government guarantees; and the International Development Association (IDA), was
established four years later to provide highly concessional financial resources to the poor
countries unable to qualify for regular Bank loans. 12 The Bank began to extend its activities
in agriculture, industry and even in education lending. During Robert McNamara's 13-year
tenure (1968-81), the Bank's central mission shifted from "closing the gap between industrial
and developing countries to alleviating world poverty," and its staff and lending volume
increased sharply. 13
The emphasis on poverty alleviation and the advancement of basic human needs
resulted in expanded programs for rural and urban development, later criticized as in fact
9 Nonetheless, the Bank's first four loans were to France, the Netherlands, Denmark and Luxembourg, to help
with reconstruction purposes.
10 Mason and Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods, p. 467.
1 lFor an excellent and critical account of the Bank's interactions with and contributions to the field of
development economics, see Nicholas Stern and Francisco Ferreira, "The World Bank as "Intellectual Actor","
in The World Bank: Its Fir-st Half Century, ed. Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis, and Richard Webb (Washington
DC: The Brookings Institution, 1997), 523-610.
12 The Bank's third affiliate, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, was set up in 1988 to insure
private sector investors against non-commercial (political) risks in LDCs. Together these institutions
comprise The World Bank Group. "The World Bank," in fact, tends to refer to the IBRD and IDA.
13 During McNamara's tenure, the Bank's staff size more than tripled, from 1,600 to 5,700, and its lending
shot up to over $13 billion from around $1 billion. Kraske et al., Bankers with a Mission, pp. 179, 213.
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resulting in few benefits for the poor. In the early 1980s, among other changes, the Bank
embarked upon the controversial non-project, structural adjustment lending (SALs), or
lending to support macroeconomic policy changes. The list of policy objectives continues,
and includes a much greater emphasis on private sector development, work on the promotion
of opportunities for women, energy conservation, governance reform, trade liberalization,
and, of course, the environment. During the 1990s, poverty alleviation remained one of the
Bank's central development objectives, while "sustainable development" moved up as the
second major plank.
Of the three MDBs studied here, the World Bank is the least "bank-like," as Chapter 4
will show in greater depth. It undertakes the most in-depth profile and assessment of each
borrower's economic situation, prospects and salient issues, as the basis on which it
communicates with recipient countries. It also develops country assistance strategies, where
it sets out the critical issues it will address in the country, with varying degrees of input from
the borrower, and until recently, little if any input from the Bank's own board of directors.
The IBRD's lending is aimed at government agencies and requires sovereign guarantees.
Structural adjustment lending, in particular, is conditioned on macroeconomic policy
reforms. The Bank also invests in sectors not addressed by the other two MDBs, such as
education, primary health care, and even family planning. The Bank is also a major source
of policy advice and technical assistance to borrowing countries. More than the other two
MDBs (indeed, any other MDB), the World Bank has an intellectual life, and a vast research
arm, with a research budget that is now around $25 million a year. 14 At times, the Bank has
been on the cutting edge of research in areas such as country analysis, and the functioning of
rural markets. Indeed, some of the data it collects, such as the World Development Report
14Nicholas Stem, Francisco Ferreira, "The World Bank as 'Intellectual Actor,"' p. 523.
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data tables, have been seen by development economists as "profoundly influential" in the
their field. 15
Birth and Evolution of the Environmental Initiative
There are two distinct periods in the history of the Bank's environmental thinking. The
first period, 1970-87, marks the birth of an explicit environmental initiative. This period
established the Bank as a pioneer among multilateral institutions in thinking about how to
address environmental issues in its work. However, the rhetoric was poorly translated into
action, and the weak way in which this initiative was institutionalized offered very limited
results. The second period, 1987 to the present, has been a period of significant change in
the ways in which the Bank has acted upon environmental issues in its work and policy
advice, and a notable evolution in the Bank's environmental policies and procedures.
What is most striking about the World Bank is the extent to which its environmental
activities and thinking have evolved in just the past decade. Environmental policy behavior at
the Bank is hardly static, and the biggest challenge facing the Bank is in how to successfully
institutionalize the evolving ideas it produces. It has evolved from an institution with a tiny
environmental office seeking to analyze the environmental implications of Bank projects at a
late stage of the project cycle when changes to project design were hard to implement, to an
institution that was by 1996 financing $11.5 billion dollars of projects with primary
environmental objectives, including pollution reduction, natural resource management, and
institutional capacity building for national and local institutions. It is also the leading
implementing agency of the Global Environmental Facility, and the Montreal Protocol's
Multilateral Fund, through which it funds projects promoting biodiversity,
15Ibid. Stem, who later became the chief economist at the EBRD, has interacted with the Bank for over 20
years. He pointed out the Bank's leading role in analyzing China's economy in the 1980s, and said the Bank's
work in agriculture has been important over the years in producing new ideas. In other areas, where the Bank
may not be on the cutting edge of research, it does play a role in bringing together ideas, and research results.
The Bank publishes two journals--the World Bank Economic Review and World Bank Research Observer. It
also holds numerous conferences. In addition, its Economic Development Institute, set up in 1956, trains
senior government officials.
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renewable energy projects, and investments to help the phaseout of ozone-depleting
substances, among other areas. The story of the evolution of the Bank's environmental
policy goals owes much to the entry of significant U.S. pressure in the late 1980s-from
Congress and from the Treasury, which was strongly aided, supported, and pushed by a
group of environmental NGOs.
1970.8716
The Bank's first explicit foray into addressing environmental issues originated with
Robert McNamara in 1970. That year, McNamara announced that development institutions
faced the challenge of helping LDCs "avoid or mitigate some of the damage economic
development can do to the environment, without at the same time slowing down the pace of
economic progress." 17 He set up a new unit in the Bank to address this issue: the Office of
Environmental and Health Affairs, which soon became the Office of Environmental Affairs
(OEA). 18
A few important factors account for the timing of this decision. First, the 1960s gave
birth to active environmental movements in the West, reflecting a sharp increase in popular
concern about environment issues. 19 Rachel Carson's best-selling 1962 book, Silent
Spring, on the impact of pesticides on human health, is often referred to as catalyzing the
16 This section draws on two detailed histories of the Bank's environmental policies. See Robert Wade,
"Greening the Bank: The Struggle over the Environment, 1970-95," in The World Bank: Its First Half
Century, ed. Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis, and Richard Webb, pp. 611-736; Philippe G. Le Prestre, The
World Bank and the Environmental Challenge (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1989).
17 in defining the Bank's goals for the decade, McNamara called for continued attention to be given to issues
such as population planning, education, and agriculture, and argued for a more active Bank role in addressing
the interrelated problems of unemployment, urbanization, and industrialization. See Robert McNamara, "To
the Board of Governors, Washington, DC, 29 September 1969." In The McNamara Years at the World Bank:
Major Policy Address of Robert S. McNamara 1968-1971 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1981), pp. 69-74. His comments on the environment were made during a speech at a session of the United
Nations Economic and Social Council. Cited in Le Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental
Challenge, p. 19.
18 By the early 1980s, the name had changed once more, to the Office of Environmental and Scientific
Affairs.
19 For most LDCs at the time, economic growth was the overwhelming priority and environmental worries
were thought to be a rich country problem. For more in-depth analyses of the rise of environmentalism and
global environmental concerns, see Lynton Keith Caldwell, International Environmental Policy: Emergence
and Dimensions, 2nd rev. ed. (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1990), and Tony Brenton,
The Greening of Machiavelli (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994).
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new environmental consciousness. In the early 70s, countries around the world were
preparing for the first United Nations theme conference, the 1972 United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment (UNCHE, or the Stockholm Conference), which publicized
global environmental issues, and gave birth to the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP). 20 The conference's main organizer, Maurice Strong, called on the World Bank to
help define the issues that would be discussed at the conference. Robert Wade pointed out
that the "Declaration, Principles and Recommendations" produced by the conference was
based on an early document (the Founex Report), which was "largely drafted" by a small
group of World Bank officials.21 Furthermore, McNamara himself gave the conference's
keynote speech.
Other intellectual and political factors also shaped McNamara's decision. Le Prestre
and others have pointed out the "direct influence" of McNamara's close friend, Barbara
Ward, who pushed for the World Bank to be active in addressing environmental issues.22
Ward, who later established the International Institute for Environment and Development,
also co-wrote a "conceptual framework" commissioned for the Stockholm conference. 2 3
Finally, the U.S. was interested in a greater examination of environmental issues, and
supported movement by the Bank on this front. In 1969, the U.S. Congress passed the
National Environmental Policy Act, which obligated federal agencies to prepare
Environmental Impact Statements on proposed programs that might have a significant impact
on the environment.24 As Le Prestre notes, the Bank closely watches the actions of its
2 0The Soviets and Eastern Europeans dropped out of the preparatory process and UNCHE (also known as the
Stockholm Conference), with a view that pollution was a problem of capitalist countries. On the role of the
United Nations in advancing global environmental issues, see Peter S. Thatcher, "The Role of the United
Nations," in The International Politics of the Environment, ed. Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 183-211.
2 1Wade, "Greening the Bank," p. 623.
2 2Le Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Challenge, p. 23.
2 3Brenton, The Greening of Machiavelli, p. 36. See Barbara Ward and Rene Dubos, Only One Earth
(Harmondswortlh: Penguin, 1972).
24 See Serge Taylor, Making Bureaucracies Think: the Environmental Impact Statement Strategy of
Administrative Reform (Stanford: University of California Press, 1984).
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largest shareholder. At the same time, there was no great show of environmental support
from the other major Executive Directors. 25
While OEA's creation was an important move at the time, its performance was
uninspiring. Indeed, the initial momentum behind its creation appeared to fizzle out in
subsequent years. Politically, the momentum had few long-term supporters. The U.S., for
example, turned its attention to other issues during the 1970s, notably the oil crisis, while its
relations with the World Bank soured over a number of disputes. 26 Recipient countries, in
turn, did not include environmental improvement among their list of priorities, and indeed,
generally viewed environmental protection as a luxury for developed countries to address.
NGOs, before the mid-1980s, were not paying close attention to the Bank's environmental
behavior. Bank staff, meanwhile, viewed the OEA skeptically, and were resistant to the
OEA's scrutiny of Bank projects.
Ultimately, McNamara's policy decision to strengthen the Bank's environmental
scrutiny was undermined by the fact that the OEA ultimately had insufficient power or
resources to do much. The job of the environment office was to screen Bank projects with
an eye toward reducing potentially harmful environmental affects. The environmental team,
in turn, mainly saw projects in the latest stages of the project preparation cycle, which
reduced its ability to introduce significant modifications. The OEA had a tiny staff-only
three specialists by 1983, and five by 1987-at a time when Bank lending had grown to over
200 projects a year. It also had no veto power to block projects from moving forward for
Board approval. The Bank did issue a set of environmental guidelines in 1984, but these
were easily ignored, since they left compliance to the discretion of the task managers. 2 7
2 5Le Prestre writes that West Germany and Japan were "reticent," while France was "largely indifferent." Le
Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Challenge, p. 21.
2 6 The Treasury, in particular, was opposed to the sharp growth in World Bank lending during the 70s, while
McNamara believed that the decline in economic growth resulting from higher oil prices necessitated greater
lending. See Gwin, U.S. Relations with the World Bank, pp. 20-25.
2 7Wade, "Greening the Bank," p. 635.
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During this period of time, the Bank's understanding of what constituted environmental
issues was never explicitly defined. Indeed the environmental office was envisioned to be a
trouble-shooter, a group that would try to fix potentially troublesome project components.
Its emphasis, in practice, tended to be on public health issues, and more specifically disease
prevention, such as water-born disease resulting from irrigation and hydroelectric projects.
This was the area of expertise of the Bank's Environmental Advisor, James Lee. 28 There
was also attention to "brown" issues, such as industrial pollution, as well as the use of
pesticides. 29 As Wade concluded:
...what the Bank did under the label "the environment" included residual things like
the relocating of a power line so as not to spoil the view from a game lodge, matters
that no one else wanted to deal with. Otherwise, the Bank's environmental activities
at that time focused more on public health than on the biophysical system, in part
because health groups had been the most critical of the Bank and because Lee's own
expertise was in public health and occupational health and safety.30
Le Prestre has added that early in Alden Clausen's tenure as World Bank president
(1981-86), "central" environmental issues included energy conservation and family planning;
however these and health issues were superseded by 1986 by "pollution, management of
natural resources, and protection of mankind's aesthetic and cultural heritage."31 Ultimately,
the lack of strong political initiative from shareholders, plus weak institutional incentives
inside the Bank, thwarted the possibility of serious attention to or definition of environmental
issues throughout the Bank during this period.
1987-96
In 1987, the Bank launched a period of significant change in the ways it would address ·
environmental issues when World Bank President Barber Conable admitted the Bank had in
fact been "part of the (environmental) problem" and announced an important set of
organizational changes. In a speech to the World Resources Institute in May 1997, Conable
2 8Lee headed the environmental office from its creation until 1987. Wade, "Greening the Bank," p. 620.
2 9 Le Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Challenge, p. 31.
3 0 Wade, "Greening the Bank," p. 621.
3 1 Le Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Challenge , p. 26.
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admitted that, "in measuring the influence of the World Bank against the environmental
challenge, I see how long a road there is to travel from awakened environmental
consciousness to effective environmental action." 32
He announced the creation of a central Environmental Department, which would
develop environmental policies, planning and research, and "take the lead in developing
strategies to integrate environmental considerations into our overall lending and policy
activities." In addition, he announced that new environmental offices would be established
in the Bank's four regional technical departments (called regional Environmental Divisions,
or REDs), which would work as "environmental watchdogs" over the Bank's projects.3 3
The REDs would have the ability to review and sign-off on projects, which allowed them to
influence lending, and created what Wade calls "in-house environmental champions." 3 4 By
the end of the year, around 50 new environmental jobs had been created in the Bank.
The institutional and policy changes relating to the environment that have taken place
within the World Bank since 1987 have been extensive. In the decade since Conable's 1987
announcement the Bank has: expanded its work in developing environmental policies and
procedures for all projects as a means of reducing potential environmental harm; sharply
increased its research work on environmental issues and practices; created a new Vice-
Presidency for Environmentally Sustainable Development (ESD), which is the umbrella over
the Environment Department, the Transport, Urban and Water Department, and the
Agriculture and Natural Resources Department; developed sectoral strategies and assisted
recipient countries in the development of national strategies (known as National
Environmental Action Plans, or NEAPs); and become a global and regional leader in a
number of multinational environmental initiatives, including its role as an implementing
3 2 Barber B. Conable, "To the Worlid Resources Institute, Washington, D.C., May 5, 1987," in The Conable
Years at the World Bank: Major Policy Addresses of Barber B. Conable, 1986-91 (Washington, DC: The
World Bank, 1991), p. 22.
3 3 Ibid., p. 23.
3 4 Wade, "Greening the Bank," pp. 674-75
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agency for the GEF and the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund, and lead organizer and
author of the Environmental Action Programme for Central and Eastern Europe (EAP). As
noted above, by mid-1996, the Bank was lending more than $11 billion for projects aimed
specifically at strengthening environmental management in the areas of pollution
management, natural resources management and national institution building. 35 According to
the Bank, around 300 Bank staff and long-term consultants work on environmental issues,
but this number is more of a rough guideline, rather than a precise figure.36
On the surface, at least, the Bank now looks quite different than it did a decade ago.
How these changes play themselves out in the Bank's activities in Central and Eastern
Europe will be examined in each of the subsequent chapters. Analysis of how each of these
changes has impacted the Bank's global environmental behavior is beyond the scope of this
dissertation, but there is a growing body of analysis on a number of these initiatives. 37
The numerous changes initiated in 1987 were triggered by external criticism of the
Bank by environmental NGOs coupled with strong U.S. pressure for change from Congress
and the U.S. Treasury. An NGO campaign to force the Bank to change its environmental
ways took its ammunition from the existence of a handful of Bank projects that were causing
enormous environmental degradation (particularly the Polonoroeste project and also the
Indonesian Transmigration Program). 3 8 The campaign effectively built support within
3 5 This figure excludes Bank projects financed through GEF.
3 6 The staff of the Bank's Environmental Department includes, for example, people who work on financial,
procurement, and business analysis. It is also difficult to know when to classify a sociologist or dam
engineer, or fisheries economist as "environmental" or not. I am grateful for Alex Mukendi of the Bank's
Environmental Department for this insight.
3 7 0n the GEF, see David Fairman and Michael Ross, "Old Fads, New Lessons: Learning from Economic
Development Assistance," in Institutions for Environmental Aid: Pitfalls and Promise, ed. Robert 0.
Keohane and Marc A. Levy (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996): 29-51; on the Montreal Protocol's
Multilateral Fund, see Elizabeth R. DeSombre and Joanne Kaufmann, "The Montreal Protocol Multilateral
Fund: Partial Success Story," also in Keohane and Levy, eds. Institutions for Environmental Aid: 89-126; on
the EAP, see Barbara Connolly and Tamar Gutner, "Organizational Inertia and Innovation: Environmental
Aid to Central and Eastern Europe," (Washington, DC: Paper delivered at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association).
3 8 See description of the Polnoroeste project in Chapter 2. The Indonesian Transmigration project was
criticized as a disaster from environmental and social grounds, as was Polonoroeste. The goal of the project
was to relocate millions of people from Indonesia's inner islands to its less populated outer islands. The
project was criticized as being politically motivated; resulting in the clearing of enormous tracts of tropical
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Congress at a time when the U.S. was negotiating over how much its contribution to IDA
should be.
Capital replenishments have become a key way for shareholders to lobby for policy
changes within MDBs. In the case of the World Bank, the fact that IDA requires regular
replenishments has given its more active shareholders, primarily the U.S. Congress, the
ability to use the power of the purse strings to become active in influencing Bank policy.40
Since a number of congressional committees are involved in U.S. policy toward the World
Bank, NGOs and other interest groups have a number of ways to focus their lobbying
efforts. 41
The NGO campaign for environmental reform at the World Bank was launched by the
Natural Resources Defense Fund (NRDC), the Environmental Policy Institute (which later
merged with Friends of the Earth), and the National Wildlife Federation (NWF), while many
other groups quickly joined in. These NGOs began investigating the Bank's environmental
behavior in 1983, and were deeply unimpressed with their findings. Bruce Rich, then at the
NRDC, was one of campaign's leaders. He was highly critical of the ability of the bank
environmental office's small staff to effectively evaluate projects, and believed that the
Bank's procedures and guidelines were essentially worthless:
The Bank vaunted its publicly available environmental guidelines, checklists, and
procedures, bound in two thick blue volumes. Indeed scores of dust-covered sets sat
in piles inside the offices of the environmental staff, available to anyone from the
outside for the asking. In an institution that zealously kept its most trivial working
documents secret, this was no anomaly: not only were the Bank's other 6,000
employees not required to use the guidelines in preparing projects, most of them were
not aware or their existence. Indeed, it would have been senseless to require most
Bank staff to use them, since the guidelines focused on industrial and processing
project was criticized as being politically motivated; resulting in the clearing of enormous tracts of tropical
forest, which resulted in rapid deforestation; and with little sign of alleviating poverty. See Rich, Mortgaging
the Earth, pp. 34-38.
4 0 IDA was established in 1960 as a soft-loan window for the world's poorest countries. IDA's funds are
replenished on a three-year cycle. IBRD capital increases occur less often.
4 1 Gwin, U.S. Relations with the World Bank, pp. 18-19.
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activities, a small part of Bank lending in comparison to agriculture, irrigation, dams,
and roads--for which there were no guidelines whatsoever. 4 2
The environmentalists chose the World Bank as the focus of their campaign not
necessarily because its environmental record was worse than other MDBs, but because it was
the best known, it was based in their own city of Washington DC, and because they felt they
could influence the Bank's policies through Congress, hoping that Congress would attach
environmental conditions to pledges of increased funding.4 3 The campaign operated by
focusing attention on a few of the Bank's projects that were environmentally and socially
disastrous, particularly the Polosio-oeste project and the Indonesian Transmigration Program.
In 1983, the NGOs convinced the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs
Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance to hold oversight
hearings on MDBs. These were the first of over 20 hearings on MDB performance held
before six Congressional subcommittees between 1983-1987.44 The NGOs brought in their
own advocates, consultants who had worked on disastrous projects, and representatives of
indigenous people's rights organizations, who detailed the degree of social and
environmental harm caused by some of the Bank's projects. Congress reacted by
developing, with the assistance of the NGOs, a number of recommendations for
environmental reform of the MDBs. These recommendations directed the U.S. to urge
MDBs to increase their environmental staffs, to consult with NGOs and environmental and
health ministries in project preparation, and to fund more small, environmentally-beneficial
projects.
The Bank's limp response to 1984 hearings triggered the intervention of Senator Robert
Kasten, a conservative Republican from Wisconsin, who chaired the powerful Senate
Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, which could influence U.S.
4 2 Rich, Mortgaging the Earth, p. 112.
4 3 Wade, "Greening the Bank," p. 658.
4 4 Rich, Mortgaging the Earth, p. 138. Incidentally, one of these House subcommittees was chaired by
Democrat James Scheuer, who would later become the U.S. Executive Director at the EBRD, where he was a
leading actor pushing the Bank to promote energy efficiency.
85
participation in the Bank. Kasten was annoyed by the Bank's "cavalier" response to the
NGOs, who made his displeasure known to Conable as well as U.S. Treasury Secretary
Donald Regan. 4 5 One result of the intervention of Kasten and the environmentalists was the
Bank's decision to suspend disbursements for the Polonoereste project in March 1985.
By 1986, the campaign had grown, with a number of European and developing country
NGOs involved, as well as support from other major shareholders, including Germany,
Sweden, the Netherlands and Austria.46 As important, the U.S. Treasury, the Bank's
official U.S. shareholder, began increasing pressure on the Bank to reform its environmental
practices. In 1987, Congress would decide on its participation in IDA's eight replenishment,
as well as a more rare IBRD capital replenishment. 4 7 Given the degree of Congress's
frustration with the Bank's environmental behavior, Treasury realized that an increase in the
U.S. contribution to IBRD or IDA would be difficult in the absence of environmental reform.
"There was no doubt," wrote Rich, "that the environment had become the Bank's most
prickly public relations problem."4 8
Barber Conable, who became president of the Bank in July 1986, had been a
Republican congressman for more than 20 years. He was sympathetic to the
environmentalists' concerns, and well understood the obstacles faced in Congress to
increased U.S. funding. The result was his May 1987 speech, announcing a set of
environmental reforms for the Bank.
Since 1987, the Bank's environmental approach has continued to evolve, with changes
reflecting policy development by staff, but also several initiatives that can be traced to
external pressure and shareholder initiative. During the IDA-9 replenishment negotiations in
1988, Congress pushed the Bank, through Treasury, to propose environmental impact
assessment procedures. In this venture, they had support from some Bank officials, which
4 5 See Wade, "Greening the Bank," p. 664; Rich, Mortgaging the Earth, pp. 123-24.
4 6Rich, Mortgaging the Earth, p. 137.
4 7Wade, "Greening the Bank," discusses this in greater depth on p. 668.
4 8 Rich, Mortgaging the Earth, p. 145.
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included two experts on environmental impacts assessments within the Bank's REDs. These
men had developed EA procedures for their respective regions, and enlisted the help of a
third colleague to work on a Bank-wide policy. In 1989, some 26 drafts later, an operational
directive on environmental assessment was completed, despite clear opposition from a
number of Bank officials. Conable, the U.S. Executive Director, and some EDs from other
main shareholders supported the changes.
Three other important initiatives worth noting are the Global Environmental Facility
(GEF), the Montreal Protocol's Multilateral Fund and the Bank's Inspections Panel. In
1989, developed country governments asked the Bank to design what would become the
GEF, which would provide grants to help poor countries address four global environmental
problems: global warming, biodiversity, ozone layer depletion, and the pollution of
international waters. The Bank is the main implementing agency of the GEF (its partners are
UNDP and UNEP), which was restructured in 1994 and replenished with more than $2
billion. It has become the interim funding mechanism of the Framework Convention on
Climate Change, and the Convention on Biological Diversity. Donor countries have also
asked the Bank, along with UNDP and UNEP, to manage the Montreal Protocol's
Multilateral Fund, which finances the incremental costs developing countries face in phasing
out ozone depleting substances under the Montreal Protocol. 49
Finally, in 1993, the World Bank established an Inspections Panel, a three-member
commission charged with investigating complaints against Bank activities by private entities
and groups who feel that Bank has not followed its own policies and procedures. While this
evolution in Bank policy is not directly linked to environmental issues per se, criticisms of
the Bank's lack of accountability did stem, in part, from environmental issues and grcups.
The Bank's own sponsored Wapenhans Report, which argued for more attention to project
4 9 The Fund was established with $160 in capital but quickly rose to $240 million when India and China
joined, during the 91-93 period. In 1993, the interim fund was converted to a permanent fund, and its capital
was increased to $510 million for the three year period through 1996. For details, see Shihata, The World
Bank in a Changing World, pp. 229-30; and DeSombre and Kaufmann, "The Montreal Protocol Multilateral.
Fund: Partial Success Story."
87
performance, as well as the controversy over the Narmada dam projects, had sparked debate
over how to make the Bank more accountable and resulted in several different proposals for
an independent Inspections Panel. 50 Once again, the U.S. was a leading shareholder
pushing for change, although it was supported by several other shareholders; in addition,
U.S. NGOs lobbied strongly for change. Again, negotiations about IDA replenishments
helped donors supporting the creation of an independent panel to win their case. In this case,
U.S. NGOs urged Congress to withhold a portion of U.S. funding for IDA-10, unless the
Bank created some type of commission to hear complaints against the Bank's work. A
modified version of the NGO proposal entered U.S. appropriations legislation. 51 The
accountability issue was clearly of importance to the U.S., which was also pushing the Bank
to adopt a new information disclosure policy, which the Bank instituted in 1994.52
General Environmental Policy Objectives and Definitions
Currently, the Bank's main environmental goals are:
· Building capacity for environmental management, by helping countries strengthen
environmental management capacity. This involves assistance with policy development in
natural resource management.
-"Mainstreaming" environmental issues into its programs and projects. The Bank
emphasizes its goal to finance projects with primary or significant environmental goals, as
well as to use environmental assessment (EA) processes to ensure all projects address
environmental issues.
· Building partnerships with NGOs, other MDBs, UN agencies and bilateral donors to
bring together coalitions of relevant actors to address environmental issues, both globally,
and in individual countries.
Most broadly, the Bank's main approaches to the environment are to develop
procedures and policies to ensure that its projects are not environmentally harmful, and to
look for opportunities to fund projects with primary or significant environmental
5 0 See Chapter 2, footnote 9, for description of these issues.
5 1 Bruce Rich, for example, made a statement on behalf of the Environmental Defense Fund, National Wildlife
Federation and Natural Resources Defense Council before the Subcommittee on International Development,
Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy of the Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee, U.S. House of
Representatives on 5 May 1993. For a description of this campaign, see Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World
Bank Inspections Panel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 22-124.
5 2The new policy made more Bank documents available to the public and created a new Public Information
Center.
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components. Of the three MDBs, the World Bank has the most comprehensive set of policy
goals, and these have evolved considerably over time. Whereas the other two MDBs have
specific "environmental policy" documents one can turn to for a summary of the Bank's
policy goals, the World Bank has produced a plethora of documents, including an annual
report on the environment, initiated in the early 1990s, and later merged with its quarterly
"Environment Matters" bulletin, as well as the influential 1992 World Development Report
on environment and development.
On the policy side, the Bank's work on minimizing potentially negative environmental
impacts of its work has expanded beyond its environmental impact assessment procedures to
include the development of policies for sectoral ending in forestry, agriculture, water
resources, energy and transport, pest management, and natural habitats, among other areas.
It often takes the lead in initiating national and regional programs (NEAPs or REAPs) that
seek to prioritize environmental problems, discuss policy options for solving them, and
increasingly, link these studies to specific investments. The Bank has also sought to
incorporate environmental issues into its country policy work and country assistance
strategies that guide lending, as a means of helping recipient countries develop programs and
institutions for more sound environmental management. In addition, the World Bank
undertakes a significant amount of research on a broad scope of environmental issues, from
specific natural resource issues, to the complex interaction between environment, economic
growth and poverty, to the development of methodologies to estimate environmental or health
benefits of different policy options.
Whereas the other two MDBs tend to define environment in an ex post facto manner, so
that "environment" largely describes some of the infrastructure projects they undertake, the
World Bank has made a much more explicit effort to define what it means by environment,
and to produce research that examines the relationship between growth, poverty reduction
and environment. Environment is now used to describe projects focusing on three
categories: pollution and urban environmental management, which includes direct investment
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in pollution prevention or abatement, and support for improved environmental management
policies; natural resources and rural environmental management, which includes biodiversity
conservation, forest management, land and water resource projects; and environmental
institution building projects, which focus on developing national and local environmental
management capacity.
While many of these issue areas push the boundaries away from traditional types of
infrastructure projects that may have environmental benefits, the Bank has at the same time
made sure that its definition of environment does emphasize things that MDBs are able easily
to address. For example, the 1992 World Development Report, an important Bank statement
on the relationship between environment and development, stressed the importance of
"brown" projects, or projects that emphasize clean-up or abatement, over "green" projects, or
issues that include conservation or ecosystem preservation. The rationale is the report's
emphasis on environmental priorities defined as those that "directly affect the welfare of large
numbers of people," which are issues such as sanitation, clean water, urban air pollution,
and land degradatin. 53 Biodiversity is even defined as important because it its impact on
human health, since a loss of biodiversity can result in a loss of potential new drugs. 54 The
report also emphasized the Bank's definition of "win-win" policies, as policies that benefit
the environment and development while resulting in poverty reduction.
More specifically, in seeking to define what an "environmental project" is, in the early
1990s the Bank began distinguishing projects with "primary environmental objectives" from
projects with "major environmental components." The former are projects where the cost of
environmental protection or environmental benefits exceeds 50% of total project costs or
benefits. The latter, in turn, defines projects where environmental costs or benefits are more
than 10% of total project costs or benefits, but less than 50%. While this is an attempt to




better clarify categories, it is also clear that the exact calculation of these costs or benefits is
not a straightforward science.
Yet despite the Bank's concerted attempts to define what it means by environmental
assistance, it is still difficult for the Bank, as well as other MDBs, to provide a concise
breakdown of what is or is not "environmental assistance," which makes comparison among
the MDBs indicative rather than precise, an issue discussed in greater depth in Chapter 5. In
many ways, "environment" or "sustainable development" appears to be a new, transectoral
term for "development." As Ismail Serageldin, the Bank's Vice President for
Environmentally Sustainable Development, noted, "What is sustainable development other
than sound economic management, rationality, respect for the rights of others, and concern
for future generations?" 55
To illustrate, with respect to the case of Central and Eastern Europe, several different
Bank documents put different figures on what the Bank's environmental assistance total to
the region. Just focusing on the year of 1994, the Bank's annual report that year listed only
one loan ($18 million) in the environmental sector for the region for the period 1990-94.56
Another publication it produced added two other projects to the category of projects with
"primary environmental objectives," totaling $184 million. 57 Still other Bank documents
include certain structural adjustment loans that contain energy or environmental components,
which push the total up by another $1 billion. 58 More recently, a 1995 document listed a
total of six stand-alone environmental projects for the period 1990-94, totaling $1 billion.
Projects with environmental components or objectives in the same period add an addition
$517 million to the total, and do not include the environmental components of SALs.
5 5 World Bank, Environment Matters, Fall 1996, p. 5.
5 6 World Bank. Annual Report (Washington DC: World Bank, 1994) p. 102.
5 7 World Bank. Making Development Sustainable (Washington DC: World Bank, 1994), pp. 217-18. One
project was a $38.4 million district heating rehabilitation project in Estonia, which was listed as a an oil and
gas project in the annual report; and the other was a $146 million forest development project in Poland, which
was not clearly categorized in the annual report.
5 8 World Bank, "Central Europe Department Projects Related to Energy/Environment." Department
Document. August/September 1992.
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It is important to note that the difficulty of defining "environment" is not a problem that
afflicts MDBs alone. As Skolnikoff and Kay noted with foresight in 1972, before the
"attach-on" strategy of addressing environmental issues in many multilateral and bilateral
government agencies began evolving toward a more "build-in" approach:
"Environment" as an issue area has no simple bounds. To be concerned with
assessing the impact of scientific and technological developments on the environment
requires being concerned with the full array of issues affecting civilization, from
disposal of waste to population growth, from the methods and amount of food
production to the wise use of resources, from the transfer and control of technology
to the calculation of the real costs of economic growth. This is thus not a concern
with a new problem for societies but with the oldest and most central of all problems-
the allocation of values within and between polities. Inevitably, as international
institutions develop their concern and capacity of analyzing environmental impact
issues, they will find themselves involved in many questions touching on major
political, economic, and social problems. 59
Of the three banks, the World Bank has faced the strongest external pressure to address
environmental issues in its work, and as a result, has made a the greatest strides in how it
does so. The evolution of the Bank's thinking was spurred by political pressure from its
major shareholding countries, supported by an NGO campaign. The existence of a number
of controversial projects provided ammunition for the pressure to translate into action by the
Bank. External political pressure therefore has given the World Bank a strong commitment
to address environmental issues in its work, but as we will see in subsequent chapters, this
commitment does not easily transform itself into deep changes in the incentive systems facing
bank staff and management.
EBRD
Basic Mission and lending policy
The London-based EBRD is the first post-cold war international institution, established
in May 1990 with 10 billion ECU (around $13 billion) in capital. It was a European initiative
created to help post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe build market
5 9 David A. Kay and Eugene B. Skolnikoff, "International Institutions and the Environmental Crisis: A Look
Ahead," in World Eco-Crisis: International Organizations in Response, ed. David A. Kay and Eugene B.
Skolnikoff (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972), p. 308.
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economies and pluralist democracies. 6 0 The actual proposal was put forward by French
President Francois Mitterand at the European Parliament in October 1989, and was discussed
by EC leaders in Paris and Strasbourg meetings over the next two months.6 1 As communist
regimes began collapsing across the East, there was a growing sense among major Western
nations that aid and capital flows to CEE needed to be dramatically increased to assist the
nascent democracies with their unprecedented process of economic and political transition.
The French proposal was fleshed out by Mitterand's advisor, Jacques Attali, who envisioned
an institution with a limited role for non-European countries. European leaders meeting in
Strasbourg modified the French proposal to include a larger role for the U.S., Japan,
Canada, and other non-European countries.
A number of countries, including the U.S., West Germany, Italy and the Netherlands
were skeptical of the need to create a new institution. 62 From the U.S. perspective, the
World Bank and the IFC already financed the types of activities envisioned for the new bank.
U.S. officials were also unenthusiastic about possible Soviet participation in a new
international institution, with a number of conservative Republicans arguing that the Soviet
Union was not yet a democracy working toward creating a market economy. 6 3 Some
European as well as U.S. officials, in turn, observed that the EIB could also perform the
activities envisioned for the EBRD. The counterarguments included French pressure for a
specifically European institution, and one that was more politically aggressive than the EIB.
A European-led institution would not only signal Western Europe's support for its Eastern
neighbors, but would also play a role in diluting the prospects of German economic
60For an excellent analysis of the politics surrounding the creation of the EBRD, see Steven Weber, "Origins
of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development," International Organization 48, no. 1 (Winter
1994): 1-38. For an examination of the EBRD's Articles of Agreement, and comparing them to those of other
MDBs, see Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, The European Bankfor Reconstruction and Development: A Comparative
Analysis of the Constituent Agreement (London: Graham & Trotman/Martin Nijhoff, 1990).
6 1 George Graham, "France to Press Proposals for European Development Bank," Financial Times, Friday,
December 1 1989, 4.
6 2Ibid.
63 Tamar Gutner, "Bankrolling Eastern Europe," Prodigy News Service December 1990.
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dominance in the formnner East Bloc.6 4 Those backing the creation of a new institution also
argued that Central Eastern European and former Soviet countries could not sit on the board
of the EIB, since the latter was exclusively an EC institution.6 5 The EfIB, in turn, was not
particularly excited about accepting responsibility to lead a Western aid initiative in CEEC and
FSU.66
After several more negotiating meetings over subsequent months, a deal was finally
hammered out, and on 29 May 1990, the negotiating governments, along with the EC and the
EIB, signed agreements establishing the EBRD. It was remarkable that a new international
institution with billions of dollars in capital could be proposed and created in less than a year.
It took a greater period of time-an additional 11 months-for the Articles to come into
force, and the new Bank opened its doors in April 1991.
The aim of the EBRD was to "foster the transition towards open market-economies and
to promote private and entrepreneurial initiative in the Central and Eastern European countries
committed to and applying the principles of multiparty democracy, pluralism, and market
economics" 6 7 The EBRD has sought to fulfill its mission by emphasizing projects in
privatization and economic restructuring, by promoting foreign investment (in part by
investing in joint ventures with foreign companies); by co-financing with the other MDBs;
and increasingly, by focusing on the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises.
The Bank was distinctive in having an explicit political mandate, which emphasized its
commitment to the principles of multiparty democracy, market economies, human rights, and
the rule of law. This was in sharp contrast to charters of other MDBs, which prohibit them
6 4 Stephan Haggard and Andrew Moravcsik, "The Political Economy of Financial Assistance to Eastern
Europe, 1989-1991," in After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-
1991, ed. Robert 0. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1993), pp. 246-85.
6 5According to journalist George Graham, the view of French officials was that "there can be no question of
the Soviet Union...sitting on (the EIB) board and deciding on whether to fund projects in, say, Portugal."
Graham, "France to Press Proposals for European Development Bank," p. 4.
6 6Emst-Giinther Br6der, interview with the author, March 26, 1997. Br6der was EIB president at the time of
the EBRD's birth. He added that the EIB was very active in helping set up the EBRD, including assisting
with the organization of its Treasury Department.
6 7EBRD. "Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development," Ad. .
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from being influenced by political decisions. It was also distinctive among MDBs in its
focus on the private sector. The Bank was directed to target at least 60% of its loans,
guarantees and equity investments to the private sector, with the remaining 40% going to
public sector projects. This gave the Bank the character of being part-merchant bank and
part-development bank. With its emphasis on the birth and growth of the region's private
sectors, it saw itself having a more decentralized, "bottom-up," approach, versus the World
Bank's "top- down," public lending approach. Finally, the EBRD was the first MDB to have
an environmental mrlndate built into its Articles of Agreement; Article 2 (1) (vii) commits the
bank "to promote in the full range of its activities environmentally sound and sustainable
development."
Membership in the EBRD was structured similarly to that of the World Bank in the
sense that a country's shareholding stake translated to its percentage of votes. A distinct
difference between the two is that in addition to member countries, the EBRD's board also
included two other institutions: the European Cc mmission, and the EIB. (Likewise, the
Commission is on the board of the EIB). The U.S. was given the single largest stake, of
10%, while the 12 EC nations, as well as the Commission and EIB held a majority of 51% of
the votes. The Soviet Union was allowed to join under the proviso that did not borrow more
than its contribution to the Bank's capital-a small $125 million, but this restriction was
gradually eased once the Soviet Union collapsed soon after the Bank's inauguration. The
Bank's "countries of operation" held around 12% of the shares. By 1996, the Bank's
members included 58 countries (of which 26 were recipient countries in CEE and FSU), as
well as the two EC institutions. Germany, Britain, France, the UK, Japan and Italy are the
next largest shareholders after the U.S., with 8.5% each. Jacques Attali, one of the key
intellectual forces arguing for the creation of the Bank, was appointed its first president.
In the Bank's short life span, its central mission has not changed as dramatically as the
World Bank's did during its 50 years of existence. Indeed, the EBRD's main struggle
during the first few years was to jumpstart its operations, no easy task when its staff sought
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to find private sector projects to fund in countries where no private sector existed. The
slowness of disbursement, together with criticism of Attali's management style and lavish
spending resulted in Attali's resignation in 1993.68 His replacement was Jacques de
Larosiere, former managing director of the IMF and chairman of the Bank of France. Under
de Larosiere, the Bank's basic mission remained the same, with shifts taking place in terms
of the countries of emphasis, strategies for promoting private sector development, and the
types of financial tools used to do so.69 For example, the Bank shifted its focus eastward, to
pay more attention to the less reform-minded, more difficult states in the region. It has
turned more toward the use of financial intermediaries as a way to promote private sector
development. Its tool-kit of financial instruments has expanded to place more emphasis on
equity products versus loan finance, and it increased its own activities in buying stakes in
financial institutions in the region.
Birth of Environmental Initiative
The EBRD is the first MDB to be born with an environmental mandate, which was seen
by NGOs as a strongly positive move, even if the mandate itself was broad. The goal of
promoting "environmentally sound and sustainable development" found its way into the
Bank's founding articles as a result of a consensus among major donor countries on the
importance of the issue. An NGO campaign was also launched to encourage the new Bank's
charter to include an environmental mandate, and its efforts fell on receptive ears.
The U.S. was particularly forceful in pushing for the inclusion of the sustainable
development language in the charter. "With respect to the environment, there is no
controversy," wrote U.S. Treasury Secretary Nick Brady during the negotiations on the
EBRD, "All of the participants in the negotiations recognize the need to improve the
6 8 0f the 2.1 billion ECU in financing approved in 1993, for example, only 409 million ECU was disbursed.
News that in 1992 the Bank spent twice as much on outfitting its offices as it disbursed in loans did not help
the its reputation, and increased pressure for Attali's resignation. See Robert Preston and Jimmy Bums,
"EBRD spends more on itself than it hands out in loans," Financial Times, April 13 1993, 1.
6 9 See, for example, Richard Lambert and David Marsh, "Credit where it is due: The new president of the
EBRD has brought prudence rather than vision to the bank," Financial Times, December 29 1994, 9.
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environment in Eastern Europe; and there appears to be a broad consensus among them for
strong and effective action. The U.S. negotiators have strongly supported the inclusion (of
the language in Article 2(vii))...and will insist that it be included in the final version of (the
Bank's) charter."7 0 Yet the U.S. was also aware that the language of the environmental
mandate was ambiguous, and argued for the rapid introduction of specific regulations and
guidelines as a way to translate the mandate into "strong, effective operational practices." 7 1
This environmental policy initiative was aided by the fact that environmental issues
were high on the policy agendas of donor agencies as well as recipient countries in the
region. The fall of the Iron Curtain revealed the most polluted countries in Europe, and
environmental groups in the East Bloc were among the actors pushing to dismantle the
communist regimes. 7 2 Indeed, the U.S. aid and assistance initiative for Eastern Europe, the
Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, identified environment as one of
the key sectors in need of immediate assistance and long-term strategies in the region due to
the extent of environmental degradation throughout CEE and its impact on human health.
Also that year, President George Bush announced an East European Environmental Initiative,
which included the establishment of the Budapest-based Regional Environmental Center
(REC), a non-profit organization set up to increase environmental awareness in the region,
whose charter members included other major Western donors as well as the EC. 73
7 0 Nicholas Brady to William K. Reilly, 22 February 1990. Among other major donor countries, Japan was
passive toward the initiative, but not critical of it. See, for example, Dennis T. Yasutomo, The New
Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 173-74.
7 Statement by the Honorable David C. Mulford, Under Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans
and the Environment, 22 March 1990.
72 CEE's environmental plight is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. It is important to note that the strong CEE
constituencies pushing for environmental reform before the regime changes disappeared quite rapidly when the
overwhelming challenges related to economic restructuring made environmental improvement a lower priority.
7 3The REC's work was aimed at supporting NGOs. Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway and the EC joined the U.S. as charter countries, along with the recipient countries in the
region: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia. Eastern European membership
now includes all the countries in the region. The donor countries donated around $15 million in start-up
funds.
97
In Western Europe, meanwhile, the EC set up its PMARE program of assistance to
Eastern Europe in 1989 to coordinate assistance by the G-24 countries (the OECD nations) to
East Central European governments in the "high priority" sectors of agriculture, industry,
energy, privatization, environmental protection, and financial services. 74 Environment was
chosen as an issue due to the EC's concern about the extent of environmental degradation in
CEE, the lack of resources available to the region's governments, the EC's desire to create a
"level playing field" for trade between the EC and CEE, and the transboundary nature of
much of the pollution in CEE 75 Because coordination proved to be to difficult given
differing assistance agendas among G-24 states, and U.S. discomfort with the EC
Commission as coordinator, PHARE quickly became the EC's own vehicle for assistance to
the region. Bilateral European donors also included environmental components in their aid
agendas.
Lobbying by NGOs certainly helped promote the environmental issue in the EBRD
negotiations, although unlike the case of the World Bank, they did not necessarily play a
seminal role in putting the issue on the table. The U.S. offices of NGOs such as World
Wildlife Fund (W-WF), Friends of the Earth (FOE), and the Center for International
Environmental Law (CIEL) already had allies in the U.S. Treasury, the EPA, and the State
Department, who agreed with their aims. Indeed, it was a Treasury official who approached
his NGO friends with the idea of promoting the concept of sustainable development in the
EBRD's founding articles. 76 NGOs from West and East were also able to meet with Attali
in November 1990 to discuss their policy goals. Attali, said one NGO activist, was receptive
to the idea of environmental considerations being an integral part of Bank policy, but at the
same time he was most interested in creating a Bank that was fast-acting and non-
7 4 The name is the French acronym for "Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring Economies," but
the program was quickly extended to include Czechoslovakia and other countries in the region.
7 5
"Environment Sector Strategy for Central and Eastern Europe," PHARE internal strategy paper, 1991.
7 6 Durwood Zaelke, CIEL, interview with the author, August 1995.
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bureaucratic. As a result, some of the NGO demands-such as time for public comment on
projects, would not be attractive to Attali, since they would slow down the project cycle.7 7
Several other countries on the EBRD's board have also been strongly supportive of
making sure the Bank sought to prioritize the environment in its work; these included
Germany, Austria, the Netherlaids, and the Scandinavian countries-all countries with
relatively strong domestic environmental movements. Another set of countries was more
neutral; while they were not indifferent to the Bank's environmental policies and goals, other
priorities ranked higher. These included Canada, the U.K., France, and Italy. The countries
of operation, in turn, were most cautious and were also generally neutral about addressing
these issues, since environmental issues receded as a political priority shortly after the regime
changes.
General Environmental Policy Objectives and Definitions
During its first year, the EBRD developed a set of environmental "policy priorities,"
which were published in early 1992. In Environmental Management: The Bank's Policy
Approach, the EBRD outlined its intent to place "environmental issues at the forefront of its
efforts to promote sustainable economic growth," and listed six priorities to allow it to play a
"leadership role in environmental recovery of the region."78 They were to:
· help countries develop environmental policy, including assisting development of
legislation, appropriate emissions standards, and institutional capacity to monitor and enforce
policies;
*promote market-based and other economic techniques to address causes of
environmental degradation;
· encourage development of environmental goods and service industries, investments in
environmental technologies, and fund environmental infrastructure projects;
-initiate or support studies and programs that address regional and national
environmental problems;
-adopt "adequate environmental assessment, management planning, audit and
monitoring procedures" in all of its activities
· promote adoption of procedures for "provision of information to, and consultation
with, all levels of government and the general public-especially potentially affected
parties-concerning environmental matters."
7 7 Alex Hittle, Friends of the Earth, interview with the author, November 1992.
7 8EBRD, "Environmental Management: the Bank's Policy Approach, " (EBRD: London, 1992), p. 1.
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Among the three vNIDBs, these are the most clearly stated set of policy goals. The basic
components, of emphasizing environmental procedure, funding for specific environmental
projects, and some environmental policy work, are broadly similar to the basic components
of the World Bank's environmental policy. Unfortunately, as we will see in Chapter 5, the
EBRD's ability to fulfill most of those goals was quite modest, particularly the first, third and
fourth. Donor enthusiasm over the rhetoric of environment was not unanimously translated
into interest in action. As important, the Bank's private sector, demand-driven emphasis, did
notprovide many incentives for its bankers to produce environmental projects, with the
exception of its municipal environmental unit and its relatively new energy efficiency unit. At
the sale time, the Bank has made a number of advances in its environmental activities over
the past two years, as it has learned how to improve the fit between its policies and mission,
and as it has taken steps to revise its policies and procedures. This is discussed in detail in
the following chapter.
In late 1996, the Bank announced a revised environmental policy, fashioned as a result
of debate and discussion among the board directors, the Bank's environmental appraisal unit,
and other senior Bank officials, as well as several NGOs. Some shareholders, such as the
U.S. and the Netherlands, were strongly in favor of strengthening the Bank's use of specific
environmental standards in its work, such as national standards, or EU standards. In the
past, the use of standards was more "ad hoc," with the appraisal unit deciding whether local
standards or some other set of standards would be most appropriate in a project. Some Bank
staff argued that using EU standards, for example, was "silly" as well as potentially highly
costly for countries in the region that were not prospective members of the EU. The
argument was that high standards in some cases might be too difficult or too costly to
implement, while lower standards could still result in an outcome that was a vast
improvement to the pre-project scenario.
For example, in the case of emissions of air pollutants, there is often a space between
existing emissions and future emissions under EU standards. Thus, a power plant
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rehabilitation that could vastly improve energy efficiency and lower emissions at a similar
level of energy production, might be too expensive to undertake if higher standards meant the
purchase of very expensive equipment, such as flue gas desulphurization (FGD) technology.
The pro- higher-standard coalition on the board, in turn, argued that an ad hoc approach to
standards was not acceptable. The resulting compromise, five drafts later, is that the new
policy stated the Bank would make sure its loans follow national or EU environmental
standards, or where there are no EU standards, it would follow World Bank standards. The
idea was to use EU standards as a common reference point, but keep the flexibility to use
other standards where EU standards are nonexistent or did not make sense for the country.
The new policy continued to emphasize the importance of the environmental appraisal
process, as well as the EBRD's intention to "realize additional environmental benefits
through its operations, particularly if they also provide economic benefits." 79 In particular, it
would seek to play a role in financing projects that alleviated "severe environmental
problems."80
The Bank's environmental strategy had a number of components. It aimed to describe
the environmental implications of its work in the strategies it developed for individual
recipient countries and sector work. In this area, the EBRD would draw on work done other
institutions, such as the World Bank's National Environmental Action Programs. It also
emphasized its appraisal procedures as a way of determining whether a project should be
financed or not, and if it is, how environmental issues should be incorporated into its design.
In its strategy of promoting environmental projects, the EBRD did not explicitly define
what it meant by "environment," but provided examples of the types of "environmentally-
oriented operations" it sought to fund. These included water supply systems, waste water
management, solid and hazardous waste management, district heating, energy efficiency
projects, renewable energy, and urban transport. The Bank also noted that it would
79 EBRD, "Revised Environmental Procedures," BDS96-23, March 1996.
80Ibid.
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participate in the development of legal, economic, and policy frameworks that underlie
environmentally sound investments, through its technical assistance work, often undertaken
with other donor institutions. It contributed to international and regional environmental
initiatives, from the global climate change convention to the Baltic Sea program. The Bank
also reported on its environmental work through its Transition Report, through its quarterly
"Environments in Transition" periodical, and through publicly available Project Summary
documents.
Like the World Bank, the EBRD focused on environmental concerns as a result of
pressure from major shareholder countries along with major NGOs. The main difference
between the two is that the EBRD was "born" with a stated commitment to addressing
sustainable development issues, and did not gain its policies as a result of past mistakes.
How this commitment has been institutionalized by the Bank is discussed in Chapter 4.
EIB
Basic Mission and Lending Policy
The EIB was created to be the EC's long-term lending institution by the 1957 Treaty of
Rome establishing the European Community. The six founding EC states were keen on
providing financial assistance to the poorer regions, which at the time was focused on Italy's
inezzogionzo region. 81 The Marshall Plan had ended in 1951, and European governments
were still interested in stimulating capital investment. The EIB's job was to "contribute to the
balanced and steady development of the Common Market in the interest of the
Community." 82 With an initial capital of a modest $1 billion, the Bank would raise money
on international capital markets to finance projects in less developed regions of tJo
Community, with the broad goal of undertaking projects "called for by the progressive
establishment of the common market," or projects of "common interest" to several member
8 1This included the regions of Abruzzi and Molise, Campania, Apulia, Basilicata and Calabria, and Sicily.
Indeed, in its first 5 years, 70% of the EIB's 67 projects were in Italy. See various EIB Annual Reports.
8 2Treaty of Rome, Article 130, which has become Article 198 E under the Maastricht Treaty. Historians
might be interested to note that during the EIB's first few years, one member of its Board of Directors was a
World Bank official. Also, the EIB and EBRD co-financed a few projects together in Italy.
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states, which could not entirely be financed by means available to individual countries.83
The Bank would lend money to public sector bodies or large industrial companies to finance
projects, although beginning in the late 1960s, it also began to make loans to financial
intermediaries for on-lending to small-scale projects.
Article 18 of the Bank's statute, in turn, gave the Bank the possibility of lending
outside of the EC, in situations where directed to do so by its shareholders.8 4 The Bank
began its operations in 1958 in Brassels, but subsequently moved to Luxembourg, where it
is across the street from its more famous colleague, the European Court of Justice.
The EIB is owned by its EC members states, which since the EC's enlargement in 1994
includes 15 countries. Like the other two MDBs, members subscribe to the EIB's capital,
and most of the Bank's financial resources are raised on international capital markets, where
the EIB is the world's biggest borrower and lender in ECU. Of the three MDBs, the EIB is
the only bank that lends most of its rnoney to the countries that are its major shareholders.
This means that the distinction between "donor" and "borrower" so visible at the other two
MDBs is much less distinct here. Indeed, for at least the past decade, on average around
90% of the Bank's loans were made to Western Europe, although, as we will see, the Bank
is now a global player.
The Bank's Board of Governors is composed of member state Finance Ministers, and
its Board of Directors represent member states as well as the European Commission. While
capital subscription accounts for voting share at the other two MDBs, the link is slightly less
direct at the EIB. In this case, the level of country subscription accounts for how many
directors a country has, and decisions are taken by a simple majority. Thus the most
powerful countries on the EIB's board are Germany, France, Italy and the U.K., which each
subscribe 17.7% of the Bank's capital, and each have three directors. Spain has two
83 Ibid.
84 Specifically, when authorized by the Board of Governors, acting unanimously on a Board proposal. EIB
Statute, Article 18.
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directors, and the rest of the member states have one each. The European Commission also
has a director on the EIB's board, although it does not subscribe to the Bank's capital.8 5
While governance issues are discussed in depth in Chapter 4, it is worth noting here
that the EIB is the most autonomous of the three MDBs. The EIB has the odd distinction of
being both a legal entity independent of other Community institutions, but it is also an
instrument of the Community. It is thus responsible for carrying out Community policy,
although we will see in the subsequent chapter that how the institution actually does this is
often op'en to interpretation. 8 6 Where capital replenishment times have been a way for donors
to exert influence at the World Bank, as well as the EBRD, the EIB has only had six capital
increases in its lifetime.8 7 The Bank's unusual character-having its major lending and
borrowing countries be the same countries, being legally independent, but also being an
instrument of the Community, has shaped its behavior in some important ways.
It has preferred throughout most of its history to act as much like a non-political lending
institution as possible, while at the same time it must take on new policy mandates given to it
by the Commission or the Council, as well as to ensure that it is following Community law.
The EIB has not had a policy voice like the other two MDBs. This makes sense when one
considers that its shareholders would have little incentive to create an institution that tells
them what to do. As a result, the EIB has no separate policy research arm or country lending
strategies, and it does not directly promote a particular set of its own policy ideas, or
innovative types of loan conditionality. 8 8 "Brainwork," said one senior EIB official, "is
done elsewhere." 89
8 5 The board of directors' alternates can also take part in board meetings, although they cannot vote unless
they are replacing a director. Germany, France, Italy, and the U.K. each have two alternates; Denmark, Greece
and Ireland share one alternate; the Benelux countries share one alternate; Spain and Portugal share one
alternate; and the Commission has its own alternate.
8 6The 1992 Maastricht Treaty reaffirmed the Bank's autonomy and important role in promoting the European
Union and implementing the Community's policies toward outsider countries. It also enhanced cooperation
between the Bank and the Commission on different development funds.
8 7Capital was also boosted by the accession of new member countries in 1973 and 1981, 1986.
88 The EIB does Directorate for Economics and Information, with a small "Economic and Financial Studies"
office under the Bank's Chief Economist. However, the research undertaken by this office is more related to
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Lacking a policy voice, and preferring to be "demand-driven," the EIB has the lowest
profile among the three MDBs, and has for most of its life astutely avoided a political role or
personality of its own. It prefers not to think of itself as a "development" institution.9 0 The
Bank has historically been quiet and lean, although it has begun to assert itself more under its
current president, Sir Brian Unwin. Certainly, its political profile does not match its lending
prowess. While the EIB has an EBRD-sized staff of under 900, less than 1/10th the World
Bank's staff, the EIB now lends more each year than the World Bank--over $26 billion in
fiscal 1996, compared with $21.5 billion for the World bank. 91 The Bank's capital has
increased significantly over the years, doubling from 29 billion to almost 58 billion ECU in
1991. Its capital was increased again, to 62 billion ECU, when new EU member states
Austria, Sweden and Finland contributed their subscribed capital to the EIB in 1995.
While the EIB has not evolved as dramatically as the World Bank has during its
lifetime, it has seen a considerable expansion in its geographical scope, lending program, and
lending volume. While the bulk of its loans are made to Western European countries, the
EIB is a global actor, operating in 70 African and the Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP), 12
Mediterranean countries, and other countries that have signed cooperation or association
agreements with the Community. 92 (In the Mediterranean, the EIB has one of its few
the overall strategic positioning of the Bank, rather than more proactive policy work that might impact
project design. Alfred Steinherr, Chief Economist, interview with the author, 27 June 1996.
8 9 Senior EIB official, interview with the author, 19 June 1996.
90 1n interviews with EIB staff, I was repeatedly reminded that the word "development" is not in the Bank's
name.
91 Books on European Community institutions surveyed for this dissertation never contain a chapter, or
analytical section on the EIB. In some books, such as Sbragia's edited volume on European institutions and
policymaking, the EIB is not mentioned at all, and not included in a section describing principal EC
institutions. Some books contain brief, descriptive sections on the EIB, based largely on information found in
EIB documents. Alberta M. Sbragia, ed., Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policynking in the "New" European
Conmmunity (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1992).
9 2 The Bank's involvement in ACP countries, which began in 1963, grew out initial provision in the Treaty
of Rome for member state colonies and territories, which were mainly in Africa. The EIB's activities in the
Mediterranean also dates back to the early 1960, and stems from cooperation and association agreements aimed
at developing closer relations between the EC and those neighboring countries. In addition to offering loans or
subsidized loans from its own resources, the EIB also manages "risk capital" under the Lom Convention and
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"environmental" activities-the Environmental Programme for the Mediterranean, drawn up
jointly with the World Bank).9 3
Since 1993, the EIB has been authorized to fund projects in Asian and Latin American
countries that have signed agreements with the Community, and it now also works in South
Africa as well as the Middle East. The Bank entered the Central and Eastern Europe arena
when its Board of Governors authorized it in 1989 and 1991 to loan 1.7 billion ECU for
projects in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and what is now the Czech Republic and
Slovakia. An additional 3 billion ECU in lending was authorized for the 1994-96 period, and
the countries covered expanded to include the three Baltics states, and Albania. Lending for
the 1997-2000 period totaled 3.5 billion ECU, and is supplemented by an additional 3.5
billion ECU pre-accession lending facility for CEE countries and Cyprus to help to help these
countries prepare for integration into the EU.
Curiously, the EIB's first loans to Eastern Europe were made before the EBRD even
existed. The geographical scope of the EIB's lending reflects its position as a player in the
Community's development policy, and the Community's interest in providing assistance to
countries that are considered to be of "more direct economic significance" to the
Community.9 4
The lending program of the Bank has also grown over the years, with the addition of
new member states, but the scope of projects it funds looks remarkably similar over the
years. From its early days onward, within the Community the Bank has focused on
infrastructure development, particularly in the areas of transport, energy supply,
telecommunications, and drinking water and waste water treatment. Like the EBRD, the EIB
Mediterranean Financial Protocols. These are funds from member state budgets that the EIB uses to fund
conditional loans or equity participation.
93 Under the Programme is the Mediterranean Environmental Technical Assistance Program (METAP),
jointly funded by the two banks along with the UNDP and the Commission. METAP provides technical
assistance to prepare projects, that are funded by the World Bank and EIB.
94 Commission of the European Communities, "Report on EIB Operations Outside the Community,"
(Brussels: 1991), p. 6.
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does not fund social infrastructure projects, such as health or education. Since 1992, at the
behest of European heads of state, the EIB was given a more public mandate and (with
additional lending facilities attached) to accelerate its lending activities in trans-European
networks (TENs), or infrastructure projects in railways, roads, ports, airports,
telecommunications and energy transmission and distribution, which would establish better
and more efficient links between member states. More than half of the Bank's loans go to
Greece, Spain, Ireland Portugal, southern Italy and eastern Germany.
The EIB's lending policies are broadly more flexible than those of its two counterparts,
in the sense that it can lend money to either the public or private sector, with no explicit rule
on what share either sector should receive. Like the other two MDBs its statutes stipulate that
it is not supposed to compete with the private sector, but EIB staff acknowledge that is
difficult to avoid in practice. It can contribute up to 50% of a project's cost, and can lend to
smaller projects (under 25 million ECU) through financial intermediaries.
Birth and Evolution of Environmental Initiative
In contrast with the other two MDBs, the EIB has never faced strong pressure to
change the ways it takes environmental issues into account. No single shareholder launched
a major campaign to push the Bank in new directions. Nor has there been any noisy negative
publicity about EIB projects that would spark such a campaign. The EIB first produced a
very modest internal environmental "policy" document in 1984, which broadly echoed the
basic policies of the other two MDBs by stressing the importance of considering
environmental impacts of projects, and financing activities to protect the environment, in
areas defined under Treaty article 130. Some observers, and even Bank officials, would not
refer to the document as a "policy" since it reflected the Bank's commitment to follow
European Community policies, rather than developing its own, or showing more explicitly
how it would translate Community goals into its own internal rules.
Nonetheless, the EIB did produce a document on its environmental goals, and it did so
in the absence of any NGO campaign, or evidence of public pressure to do so. It did so in
107
the absence of any concerted effort by the Bank's shareholders to push it in a greener
direction. Indeed, given the absence of direct pressure on the Bank to change or reshape its
actions, it is unsurprising that the result was a policy document with basic goals that were
neither a departure from existing Bank practice, nor accompanied by any major changes in
the instituticn's structure, procedures, or the way it carried out its basic activities.
According to Bank officials, the new policy was an initiative of Hellmuth Bergmann,
the head of the Bank's Technical Advisory Service, home of the Bank's engineers, who
appraise the technical aspects of the Bank's projects. 95 Bergmann, a German agricultural
engineer, was responsible for general environmental issues at the Bank, and felt the EIB
should be more active in addressing these issues.9 6 Bergmann was supported in his efforts
particularly by the German and Dutch directors, while other member countries were more or
less neutral toward the issue.9 7 The Board of Directors tco.? lip the issue and developed the
ideas proposed by the Bank's staff. The Board recommended that the Bank "continue to
95 Jean-Jacques Schul, interview with the author, 7 March 1995; Emst-Gunther Br6der, interview with the
author, 25 March 1997.
9 6 He was, for example, behind an effort for the Bank to join CIDIE, the Committee of International
Development Institutions on the Environment. CIDIE was created in 1980 to supervise MDB
implementation of the February 1980 Declaration of Environmental Policies and Procedures Relating to
Economic Development. The Declaration was a product of cooperation between the World Bank and UNEP,
with the aim of encouraging MDBs to adopt sound environmental lending guidelines. Le Prestre notes that
the World Bank wanted to create a level playing field, first, so that its own work on the environment could
not be easily undercut by other MDB activities; and second, so that the additional expenditures the Bank made
for environmental purposes would not make Bank loans less attractive or competitive vis-a-vis those of other
MDBs. CIDIE was never an important actor, however, and it was disbanded in 1995. See Le Prestre, The
WZorld Bank and the Environmental Challenge, pp. 134-35.
9 7 Various EIB officials, interviews with the author. Johnson and Corcelle informally categorize EC
countries as falling into three categories with respect to interest in environmental protection, when the EC
first adopted environmental policies in the mid-70s. These categories are often repeated by member states, and
seem to hold true even now, even if "environmental" is not formally defined or measured. Johnson and
Corcelle note that Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark have been the most "advanced" with respect to
environmental policy development and awareness, and they often favor stricter environmental measures within
the Community. I would add that they have been joined by Sweden. "Neutral" countries include France,
Luxembourg, Italy and Belgium, which have tended to accept Commission proposals without great
enthusiasm, but are not openly critical. Johnson and Corcelle have characterized Britain and Ireland as
showing a "certain reticence" to "over-restrictive and over-harmonized Community solutions to environmental
matters." The remaining countries--Greece, Spain and Portugal, have often had a difficult time implementing
Community policy and seek EC funding to help them meet the cost of doing so. The four EFTA countries
which joined the EC in 1995 are generally "pro" environment, with many of their national rules already
providing a higher level of environmental protection than Community rules. Stanley P. Johnson and Guy
Corcelle, The Environmental Policy of the European Communities, Second ed. (Boston: Kluwer Law
International, 1995), pp. 8-9.
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adopt a cautious and pragmatic approach," with respect to its environmental activities, "by,
on the one hand, financing economically viable projects furthering the struggle against
pollution and, on the other, exercising close vigilance over the projects that it does finance, to
monitor their potential effects on the environment." 9 8
The policy largely emphasized what was already implicit in the Bank's work; that it
would enforce European Community and national regulations on the environment, as it was
supposed to do in all of its work. Where there were no binding regulations, the Bank would
consider the "overall impact on the environment when assessing the economic viability of a
project," and make "a concerted effort to raise awareness of environmental problems among
promoters with the aim of getting them to adopt the least polluting design they can afford
without compromising the economic return on the project." This also reflected previous
actions, since the Technical Advisory Unit had been assessing the environmental impact of
projects since 1972.
The policy also called for the Bank to finance activities that would protect the
environment, in areas defined under Treaty article 130, which we have seen is quite broad.
In addition, the Bank would be able to provide additional financing of up to 10% of a
project's cost if the project installed anti-pollution equipment offering greater protection than
required under existing standards. For projects outside the Community, the policy said the
Bank "should refrain" from financing projects that "seriously transgress internationally
accepted standards." 99
In its basic outline, the EIB's environmental policy document had the same fundamental
goals as those of the other two banks: to minimize the environmental impact of all projects,
and to fund some projects specifically aimed at protecting the environment. However, the
EIB's policy goals were the least aggressive of the three, lying on the left of Table 1.2's
9 8 EIB, Document 84/4, "Board of Governors: Bank Activity," Report by the Board of Directors, 4 June,
1984, p. 8.
9 9 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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continuum. Its emphasis is similar to that of the early World Bank goals-to focus on
mitigating potential environmental harm, in this case by following national or EC standards.
The EIB also often becomes involved in projects in the later stages of their development,
which can make it difficult and costly for its technical team to introduce modifications. 100
While the policy called for the EIB to fund "environmental projects," this again
reflected what the Bank was already doing. Indeed, the EIB has been actively involved in
funding the types of infrastructure projects that MDBs have historically undertaken for
economic development purposes, which also have environmental benefits, such as water
supply, waste water treatment, energy projects that use air pollution control equipment (such
as FGD equipment for coal or lignite-fired plants), waste management and urban transport
(such as metro or tram expansion, and suburban rail service improvement). Between 1991-
95, for example, the Bank lent around 22 billion ECU for these types of projects. 10 1
Ultimately, the EIB's environmental policy document was not a forward looking statement
aimed at moving beyond standard operating procedures and habits common among MDBs.
The strengthening of European environmental policies in the 1980s and 1990s has
impacted the Bank mainly in giving it more regulations and directives to follow, but to date it
has not appeared to have a significant impact in how it goes about its business, which is
discussed in Chapter 4.102 Environmental concerns achieved a big boost in Europe in 1986,
when the Single European Act (SEA) incorporated environmental policy into its amendment
10 0 The head of the EIB's Project Directorate admitted the difficulty of making significant changes late in the
project cycle, although he emphasized that the technical staff could still refuse to finance the project if they
thought environmental issues had not been dealt with properly. See Herbert Christie, "The European
Investment Bank: Finance for Environmental Protection in Europe," Speech presented at the Earth
Summit/United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, p. 3.
101 EIB, Information. No. 88, Second Quarter 1996, p. 9.
10 2 European environmental policy is based on over 200 directives as well as regulations and five
"Environmental Action Programmes." The directives, which allow national authorities to determine the
forms and methods of application, have been the most common tool of European environmental policy to
date, but are criticized as weak policy instruments, because member nations often 'side-step' their obligations
by, for example, contesting the scientific basis for decisions. For an analysis, see Juliet Lodge, ed., The
European Community and the Challenge of the Future (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). Regulations
are directly applicable to national law, and are rarely used for environmental purposes. The action
programmes present proposals for legislation that the Commission may pursue, and also provides a forum to
discuss future directions. Member states have no legal obligation to adopt the action programmes.
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of the Treaty of Rome, thus making environmental policy a formal competence of the
Community.10 2 The 1992 Maastricht Treaty, in turn, made explicit the task of promoting
sustainable growth respecting the environment in its Article 2, and called for environmental
protection requirements to be integrated into other Community policies. 103
General Environmental Policy Objectives and Definitions
The EIB produced a revised environmental policy document in 1996, which is again a
minimalist policy. It reiterates that funding projects "where the main objective of the
investment is environmental" is "a major activity of the Bank." 104 It also notes the
importance of considering environmental issues in its appraisal of all projects, with a goal of
conforming to European Community and/or national legislation. It emphasized, like the old
policy document, that projects must rely, at minimum on EU environmental standards, while
in its work outside the EU, it may take a more flexible approach, with a goal of ensuring
"good environmental practice at affordable costs." For countries aiming to joint the EU, EU
standards guide the Bank's work. Most of the remainder of the policy document describes
the Bank's project and appraisal procedures, which I analyze in the subsequent chapter.
Compared with the other two MDBs' policy goals, this Bank has no ambitions to be involved
in policy development issues or to broadly assess a country's environmental situation in
analyzing its lending portfolio.
Environmental projects are defined as those that produce benefits including:
1021987 was also declared European Year of the Environment, by the Council, and was also the year when
the Commission's Fourth Environmental Action Programme was adopted. The SEA contains an entire section
on environmental policy, establishing basic objectives, principles and conditions of EC environmental action,
without explicitly defining "environment." The objectives include a commitment "to preserve, protect and
improve the quality of the environment," "to contribute toward protecting human health," and "to ensure a
productive and rational utilization of national resources." The principles focus on preventive action, such as
the polluter pays principle, and also stress that environmental protection should be integrated into other
Community policies. Johnson and Corcelle, The Environmental Policy of the European Communities, p.
489.
10 3 For an analysis on the effectiveness of EC environmental policy see RUidiger Wurzel, "Environmental
Policy," in The European Community and the Challenge bf the Future, ed. Juliet Lodge (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1993), 178-199.
10 4 EIB, Environmental Policy Statement, 1996.
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...improvernent in drinking water supplies and waste water treatment; the introduction
of environmentally sound techniques to process solid, in some cases toxic, waste; a
reduction of atmospheric pollution, especially from power stations and industrial
plant (sic); the promotion of environmentally sound industrial processes and
products; and the protection of the environment and the improvement of the quality of
life in urban areas. 106
Curiously the policy document does not mention some types of projects that the Bank
has funded in the past, such as reforestation work it has undertaken in Italy, Spain, the U.K.
and Portugal. There is no distinction between projects that may have significant
environmental goals, versus projects with some environmental components. These are
simply traditional MDB projects that happen to have a positive impact on reducing emissions,
or using resources more efficiently. The Bank did note in the early 1980s that it does not
make broader political choices, such as whether a country should invest in roads or rail, or
nuclear power versus other sources of power, a policy that seems to remain constant. 1 07 The
overwhelming majority of projects labeled as "environmental" are projects the Bank has
always undertaken, projects that utilize the Bank's comparative advantage in having a corps
of skilled engineers who undertake "bankable" projects to existing, creditworthy
counterparts.
Conclusion
This chapter highlights the ways in which pressure from major shareholders is a
determining factor in the depth of an MDB's initial commitment to addressing environmental
issues in its work. U.S. pressure was particularly important in explaining the stronger
environmental commitments of the World Bank and the EBRD, relative to the EIB. The
existence of a set of environmental problems that attracted the attention of NGOs and
policymakers provided the window of opportunity for pressure to be translated into bank
goals. These findings have important policy implications for actors such as NGOs who are
seeking to influence MDB environmental behavior. The main lesson is that pressure is best
10 6 Ibid.
107 EIB, Information. No. 30, May 1982, p. 2.
112
focused on actors outside the banks, and particularly where there is a set of environmental
problems or issues can capture policy attention. NGOs may build up contacts and share
ideas with bank officials, but this is not what will drive fundamental changes in bank policy.
Alternatively, the EIB's weak environmental policy goals can be explained by the
absence of any environmental champions on its board, and the lack of any environmental
disaster or particular issues that might be publicized by NGOs. As a result of its weak
environmental mandate, one should not have high expectations regarding the
institutionalization of this mandate in ways that provide bank staff incentives to pursue it.
We would expect, then, to find few incentives for staff to address environmental issues
beyond a "light green" criteria, and a project portfolio that reflects traditional MDB emphasis
on infrastructure projects. In other words, in the three-stage analytical framework discussed
in Chapter 1, the EIB effectively gets "stuck" at the policy objective stage. "Environment"
projects at the EIB will largely be old wine poured into new bottles.
The findings of this chapter also disprove hypotheses that might focus on the age or
size of an MDB as determining factors that shape its environmental behavior. The youngest
of the three MDBs has a weaker environmental commitment than the oldest, but a stronger
one than its other older colleague. The EIB and World Bank lend similar amounts each year,
while the EIB and EBRD have a similar number of employees. These factors clearly do not
correlate with the strength of an MDB's environmental commitment.
Turning now to the next stage of the policy process, we will see how institutional




Policy Process: Institutionalizing Environmental Objectives
This chapter examines why external pressure for change is a necessary but not
sufficient factor in explaining how the MDBs respond to their delegated authority. The
chapter turns to an analysis of the policy process to determine the ways in which
environmental mandates are institutionalized, or "hard-wired" into institutional design and
procedures at each of the three banks. I find that all three MDBs have diffuse governance
structures, characterized by weak sets of collective principals; as a result, I argue that
institutional variables play an important role in determining the capacity of an MDB to pursue
its environmental goals. Shareholders set the basic rules and design of the institutions, play
an important role on the strategic level (such as agreeing to new mandates), and ultimately
must approve all loans, but their control is nonetheless limited by the banks' relative
autonomy and the fact that new mandates do not always fit well with existing institutional
design and incentives. Donor preferences on new mandates, as a result, are not sufficient in
determining which activities and projects the bank is able to offer recipient countries. In the
language of principal-agent theory, there is considerable "agency slack" in all three MDBs.
I hypothesize that given the weak governance structures of the banks, the most
important variable determining how the MDBs respond to their policy goals is how demand-
driven or "bank-like" they are designed to be. As noted in Chapter 1, all MDBs are designed
to behave in some ways like financial institutions and in some ways like development
agencies that seek to promote a variety of mandates that shape policy reform in recipient
countries. However, they differ in the degree to which they emphasize their banking goals or
their non-banking goals. An MDB designed to operate more like a financial institution than a
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development agency will be more driven by client demands than broader policy interests. In
what Naim calls the "Bank-as-bank" model, the dominant goal of an MDB would be to focus
most on its long-term financial integrity and fiduciary responsibility to its shareholders. 1
This is, however, hypothetical since no MDB is without some "development" goals.
Further, as Chapter 1 noted, MDBs tend to finance projects that private sector banks might
find too risky, while at the same time they impose more conditionality in their loans than a
typical private sector bank. The issue is which goals the MDB emphasizes and how it
juggles activities where goals conflict or do not complement each other. The more an MDB
conforms to the "Bank-as-bank," model, the less important is the objective of promoting far-
reaching policy changes in the recipient country. As a result, from this perspective, there are
also likely to be fewer incentives for such an MDB's staff to proactively identify and design
projects with primary environmental goals or even significant environmental components
unless these are actively sought out by the recipient.
By contrast, a less "bank-like" MDB will likely contain more incentives for staff to link
loans to broader policy goals, such as en vironmental protection and reform. However, this
chapter also argues that the less bank-like and demand-driven an MDB is, the more it must
struggle to harmonize conflicting goals and incentives. Environmental policy objectives and
activities do not always fit well with other economic development or banking goals, as noted
in Chapter 1. For example, project managers seeking to bring creditworthy, bankable
projects to their boards of directors in a timely fashion may balk at the requirements of
various environmental assessment procedures, which can add delays to projects, or require
costly changes in their design. Therefore, even where the right institutional variables exist to
promote greater awareness of environmental issues, they do not always work as envisioned.
While shareholders may shape the way an institution is designed, there are often gaps
between how they have designed the institution and what they ask it to do. As a result,
"hardwiring" must not just be described and behavior then inferred; it must be analyzed as
1 Moises Naim, "The World Bank: Its Role, Governance and Organizational Culture," in Bretton Woods:
Looking to the Future (Washington DC: Bretton Woods Commission, July 1994), p. C-274.
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well to point out how it shapes behavior.2 While it is commonly accepted in the
environmental policy community that MDB (particularly World Bank) environmental action
cannot be understood by examining the institution's stated rules, it is less clear how exactly
institutional factors actually shape environmental behavior.
In addition, the effect of such mismatched incentives is that each MDB contains staff
who do try to pursue environmental goals in their work, and staff who do not. "Green
bankers" in each MDB, or bank staff whose job it is to identify or appraise environmental
projects, will make more of a point to pursue environmental goals in their lending or policy
work than their colleagues. These are the people who have particular incentives or training to
give environmental issues more prominence in their work, and for whom concern about
environmental issues is embedded in their thinking. The composition and location of these
"green bankers" ultimately play an important role in determining how an MDB's portfolio of
project and other activities will reflect its environmental goals.
Variation in the types of activities the World Bank, EBRD and EIB are likely to pursue
can also best be explained by examining how each MDB responds to its dual personality as
financial institution and development agency. This chapter shows the extent to which the
World Bank most emphasizes its role as a development agency, but has more points of
struggle in its attempts to harmonize multiple mandates. The EIB is most bank-like and
demand-driven, thereby sticking to a narrower range of more traditional MDB lending
activities, and facing fewer conflicting incentives in its work. The EBRD is between the two,
since it was set up to focus mainly on private sector development, but its design and incentive
systems have also included components that encourage its staff to address particular policy
issues in greater depth than a private bank would do. In the case of the EIB, because of a
weak donor commitment to environmental issues, we would not expect the institution's
2 This is a lesson of recent work by "new institutionalists" who have shown how the "old institutionalist"
configurative studies of legal and administrative structures were often static affairs that did not attempt to
explain or compare actual policy outcomes. For an example of the old legal-formalist approach, see G.D.H.
Cole and Margaret Cole, A Guide to Modem Politics, vol. Book III (New York: Knopf, 1934). On new
institutionalist ideas, see Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three
Institutionalisms," Political Studie: 44 (1996): 952-973.
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design, rules or procedures to be shaped in such a way as to particularly encourage any
identification and design of projects with primary environmental goals. We would expect to
see more institutional incentives to do so in the World Bank and EBRD.
This chapter begins with a comparison of the governance structures of the three banks,
in order to highlight the ways in which the banks are relatively autonomous from the
governments that own them. This section shows that agency slack is a constant variable
among the three banks. In the subsequent three sections on each MDB, I examine the
empirical evidence for how "bank-like" each MDB is-that is the extent to which is
emphasizes its character as a financial institution or development agency- and how this
influences staff incentives on environmental -issues. There are a number of indicators that
provide evidence about the degree to which an MDB emphasizes its dual character. These
indicators ultimately shape the incentives of bank staff to seek to finance environmental
projects or to consider environmental issues in their work. The four most important
indicators are: institutional mission, structure, financial tools, and procedures. Mission
clearly refers to the institution's overall aims. This not only determines the major issue s an
MDB seeks to address, but also the types of actors (state or private sector) with whom it is
supplying financial resources and advice. The more demand-driven an MDB is, the more it
is responding to client interests, and the less it seeks to impose its own policy prescriptions
or reforms in its loans or other activities. By structure, I refer to operational design factors,
as well as staff composition and placement. 3 The less demand-driven an MDB is, the more
likely it will contain units or staff whose job is specifically to address non-banking policy
issues in their work, eog., pockets of "green bankers." The financial tools determine what
types of projects the bank can fund and also who the recipients are, and is a variable not well
explored in the literature on international assistance. 4 Procedures specify how the bank
3Constitutional design factors are also a part of an MDB's structure, but in this chapter I address governance
structures separately. This is due to the fact that I hold them constant, in arguing that the governance
structures of all three MDBs are limited in their ability to influence the banks.
40ne important exception is Robert 0. Keohane and Marc A. Levy, Institutionsfor Environmental Aid:
Pitfalls and Promise (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996).
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intends to pursue its various goals. Procedures most relevant to the bank's environmental
behavior include overall project cycle processes and environmental procedures. 5 Another
important variable under this category is what can be termed the porousness of the MDB to
outside scrutiny and pressure. This refers to the ways in which the bank seeks to open itself
to relationships with outside actors who seek to influence its policies and projects, which is
an indicator of the MDB's transparency to the outside world and can affect the ways in which
it considers environmental issues.6 MDBs that seek to behave most like private sector banks
will be more attached to rules of confidentiality and less open to involvement by non-recipient
actors.
It is important to note that while it helps to separate these different variables
analytically, in practice they are clearly entangled and interact in complex ways. For
example, an MDB's mission shapes its policies and procedures, as well as the way it is
structured and the types of financial tools it uses. Staff composition shapes procedures (e.g.,
environmental appraisal procedures are likely to be more developed where there are
environmental staff to design and implement them). However, the fact that these variables
are to some degree entwined does not detract from the importance of analytical attention to the
ways they affect how demand-driven the institution is, and how they impact on the incentives
facing bank staff. The chapter concludes by hypothesizing how variation in the ways the
MDBs juggle with their dual personalities may affect their activities in Central and Eastern
Europe.
5 Other significant procedures that also have an impact on the incentives facing Bank staff include monitoring
and evaluation procedures and procurement procedures. I do not examine monitoring and evaluation procedures
in depth here, because I am focusing more on the incentives facing staff in project design and development
rather than implementation, although one can argue that staff expectations of weak monitoring might move
them to include lofty environmental aims no one expects to be achieved. Procurement, in turn, is an under-
researched area of study, for which there is little available data. While analysis of the relationship between
procurement and staff incentives to address environmental issues is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is
an important area for future investigation and analysis.
6 For more on the ways in which a policymaking institution's openness to outside advice affects its ability to
implement new ideas and programs, see Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol, "State Structures and the
Possibilities for 'Keynesian' Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain and the United States," in
Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 107-63.
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Diffuse Governance
All three MDBs have similar basic governance structures-a three-tiered structure
comprised of a Board of Governors, a Board of Directors, and some type of management
operations committee. The Boards of Governors is generally are composed of finance
ministers or other ministerial level officials from all of the bank's member states, and meet
once a year.7 The governors of countries belonging to all three MDBs tend to be the same
officials. Their job is to lay down the overall directives for the MDBs, including decisions
on capital increases, approving the annual report and other financial statements, new
membership, and so on. The presidents of the banks, in turn, are the banks' chiefs of staff,
and they participate in the meetings of the Boards of Governors and chair the Board of
Directors meetings.
Shareholder countries are represented at the banks through their Boards of Directors, to
which the Governors delegate much of their power. The Board of Directors is the body
responsible for an MDB's general operations, and is solely responsible for approving all
loans as well as major bank policies. It is the primary channel through which the shareholder
nation state principals are involved in the MDBs activities. In effect, the "principals," who
run the MDBs- that is their boards of governors and directors- are themselves a diffuse set
of "agents" representing their home governments. Finally, each bank has some type of
management committee that, in turn, is responsible for its day-to-day business. These
committees are the main gatekeepers that decide which loans and programs go to the board
for approval. 8 The following section describes important characteristics of the Board of
Directors' composition, representation, and activities and shows how these attributes result in
a weak set of collective principals with diffuse preferences for all three MDBs.
7 The finance ministers on the boards of governors may also meet outside of these annual meetings. For
example, G-7 finance ministers meet more often. EIB governors meet at ECOFIN meetings. A sb-set of
World Bank governors are also members of the IMF-World Bank Development Committee, which meets each
spring. The Development Committee, set up in 1974, has 24 members, who are usually ministers of finance
or development, and they advise the Boards of Governors of both the Bank and Fund on broad policy issues.
8
"Board" refers to the Board of Directors.
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Composition and Representation9
The World Bank's Board of Directors contains 24 Executive Directors (EDs)
representing 180 countries and the EBRD's contains 23, representing 58 countries and two
international institutions.l 0 In each bank, only a handful of the directors represents one
country. At the World Bank, the U.S., France, Germany, Japan, and the U.K. have their
own directors, as do Saudi Arabia, China and Russia. In the case of the EBRD, the U.S.,
France, Germany, Japan, the U.K., Italy, and the Netherlands have their own EDs, as do the
EIB and European Commission. Beyond this group, all the other countries are grouped into
constituencies. At both banks, recipients are often grouped together, such as the EBRD's ED
office for Hungary/Czech Republic/Slovak Republic/Croatia. However, the ED constituency
offices representing Central and Eastern European countries at the World Bank are a mix,
with a donor country providing the director.1 1 Some constituencies at the World Bank
consist of over 25 countries. Sometimes members of the constituency have opposing
interests and it is up to the ED to determine how to vote. In both banks, voting power is
related to the share of a country's contribution to the MIDB's capital.
Given these characteristics, it is clear that most of the countries belonging to these two
MDBs do not have a direct voice or vote. Many are not really represented at all at times,
since the staff of a multi-constituency ED office is not large enough to accommodate a
representative from each country of its constituency. 12 Major donors therefore have a louder
9 This section draws from secondary sources as well as author interviews with the following officials:
executive director officials at the EBRD included the U.S., France, Switzerland, Britain, the European
Commission, the EIB, Japan, and Germany, interviewed in April 1995 and June 1996. At the World Bank, I
interviewed officials who represented the ED offices of the U.S., Britain, Germany, and the multi-constituency
office headed by the Netherlands, in May 1996 and April 1997. Interviews at the EIB included two members
of the management committee, the EIB's former president, and members of the European Commissions DGII,
interviewed in June-July 1996, and April 1997. 1 also interviewed treasury ministry officials in the U.S. and
Britain, in February 1995, July 1995 and July 1996.
10 World Bank membership data is as of March 1997. IDA's membership is slightly smaller, at 159.
1 For example, there is a Swiss ED for the group containing Switzerland, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic,
Poland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
12The typical EBRD ED office now has an ED, an alternate and a secretary. A multi-constituency ED office
at the World Bank may have a few assistants, but not enough to represent each country in its group.
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voice at the World Bank and EBRD not just because they have a greater voting share, but
also because they have single-constituency offices. 13
The case of the EIB is difitrent in the sense that it has no multi-constituency offices.
The larger European Union (EU) countries have more directors than other EU countries, and
each director has one vote. Germany, France, Italy, and the U.K. each have three directors,
while Spain has two, and the remaining countries have one each. The European Commission
also appoints its own director to the EIB. The size of the EIB's board currently stands at 22,
with 12 alternates. This however, does not necessarily give member states more control over
running the Bank; the EIB's relative autonomy is augmented by the fact that its board is non-
resident. While the resident boards of the other two banks meet twice a week (World Bank)
or twice a month (EBRD), the EIB's board travels to Luxembourg to meet around 10 times a
year. 14
Who is actually represented by the board? In the case of the World Bank and EBRD,
the diffusion of shareholder preferences is enhanced by the fact that the EDs themselves are
agents, representing a variety of home government ministries. Even for ED offices
representing only one country there are varying degrees of contact with home ministries, with
many countries giving the ED office a great deal of discretion in the ways that it votes.
In the case of the G-7, for example, the U.S. is widely acknowledged to have the most
proactive home ministry (Treasury), which gives U.S. EDs relatively more precise
instructions in what to push for and how to vote on the boards of MDBs where the U.S. is a
member.15 While the EDs at the World Bank and EBRD are presidential appointees, their
13 Some of the single constituency offices of major World Bank donors (namely France and the U.K.) also
cover the IMF. They are joint offices that sit on the boards of both institutions.
14 Meibers of the boards of the World Bank and EBRD often meet informally in smaller groups. For
example, at the EBRD assistants to the EU countries' executive directors meet a week before board meetings
to discuss projects. There are also occasional board workshops on particular topics, such as the Mochovce
loan, or the creation of an Energy Efficiency Unit at the EBRD.
15Treasury has been the dominant agency responsible for instructing U.S. EDs at the Bank since the late
1960s, when it eclipsed the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial policies
(NAC), which then became an advisory group. NAC is chaired by the treasury secretary, and also includes
leading officials from the Federal Reserve System, the Export-Import Bank, State, and Commerce. For a
history and analysis of U.S. participation at the World Bank, see Lars Schoultz, "Politics, Economics, and
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alternate directors are from the Treasury, and the ED offices receive guidance from the
Treasury, through its MDB office with a staff of around 20. The U.S. Governor of both
MDBs is the Treasury Secretary.
The U.S. ED offices have instructions on issues they should push in the board, as well
as mandatory voting positions on a number of issues. Instructions are for issues such as
promoting energy conservation and end use efficiency, or for opposing loans that would
support the export of surplus commodities that would hurt U.S. producers.16 Legislatively
mandated voting includes issues such as human rights (the U.S. must vote "no" or abstain
from voting on loans to countries that violate human rights unless the assistance is for basic
human needs); or terrorism (the U.S. must vote "no" on loans to countries that the Secretary
of State determines support international terrorism). 1 7 For environmental issues alone, there
is an environmental review unit within the Treasury's MDB office whose job is to assess
environmental implications of proposed projects. Much of the advice from Treasury is in the
form of instructions on individual projects. Treasury and ED office officials note, however,
that the process is often consultative, and that ED offices have input on the decisions. Other
U.S. government agencies may also provide their input on specific projects or policies,
although where there is disagreement, Treasury has the final say. 18
EDs of other G-7 countries report to their finance or treasury ministries or to their
development ministries. Germany's ED at the World Bank, for example, represents its
Ministry of Development Cooperation (BMZ), while its alternate comes from the Ministry of
Finance. At the EBRD, the German ED is from the Ministry of Finance, while his alternates
U.S. Participation in Multilateral Development Banks," International Organization 36, no. 3 (1982): 537-
574.
1 6U.S. f oard members admit, off the record, that the latter is clearly a protectionist policy.
17In Richard Gerster, "Accountability of Executive Directors in the Bretton Woods Institutions," Journal of
World Trade 27, no. 6 (1993), p. 115.
18 For analysis on how Congress influences the Treasury's MDB policies, see Jonathan Earl Sanford, "U.S.
Policy Toward the Multilateral Development Banks: The Role of Congress," The George Washington Journal
of International Law and Economics 22, no. 1 (1988): 1-115. Sanford also shows that Congress has generally
been a more active participant with respect to MDB policy, relative to countries with parliamentary or
executive-dominated political systems.
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have been from both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
The British ED at the World Bank is from the Treasury, while the alternate represents
Britain's aid agency, the Department for International Development (DfID).1 9 At the EBRD,
the converse is true; Britain's ED is from DfID, and the alternate comes from Treasury.
Occasionally other ministries are also represented. The current Canadian ED at the World
Bank, for example, is from Canada's environment ministry.
Members of G-7 ED offices report that it is not uncommon for different agencies
representing one shareholder country in the ED offices to have disagreements among
themselves over policy directions. This is unsurprising, given the different portfolios of
finance and development ministries, but it further illustrates how diffuse sharehold:
instruction or preferences can be.
Consultation with home ministries varies among countries, and also with respect to the
types of decisions being made. As Gerster noted, for some countries, such as Italy and
France, specific voting instructions are rare at the World Bank and generally arise with
respect to controversial projects. German and Canadian ED offices, in turn, receive more
guidance from home ministries.2 0 Interviews with members of G-7 ED offices at the MDBs
and officials in their home ministries highlight the fact that the relationship between the two is
often flexible and consultative. Often, the ED offices make their own decisions. British ED
office officials, for example, note that guidance on project votes is less common than
guidance on policy discussions. For projects, the World Bank ED office, for example, will
often make decisions on its own, unless they oppose some aspect of a project. In that case,
they will try to clear their opposition in advance with the DfID. In the case of policy
decisions, the ED office will receive instructions from London, although it still may take the
lead in developing the UK position, with clearance from London.21 UK and other ED office
19 Formerly the Overseas Development Agency, under the Foreign Office, in May 1997, the DfID was
upgraded to become a government department, with its own Cabinet Minister.
2 0 Gerster, "Accountability of Executive Directors in the Bretton Woods Institutions," p. 89.
2 1 Assistant to the UK Executive Director, World Bank and IMF, interview with the author, May 12, 1997.
UK Director's Assistant, EBRD, interview with the author, February 1995.
123
officials note that a two-week turnaround time from when they receive project documents to
the day of a board vote is often insufficient for their home ministries to produce thorough
briefings.
An official in the German ED office at the EBRD, in turn, stressed that while strict
instructions come from the Ministry of Finance, the ED office has a great deal of flexibility in
its actions. There are no mandated votes for Germany and most other countries, as is the
case with the U.S. All officials interviewed stressed the importance of personal contacts
within ministries.
The Executive Director to the EBRD from the European Commission and EIB have
even greater discretion in how they vote. While they are representatives of the Commission's
Directorate General (DG) II, the EDs do not ask for instruction on many issues. In cases
where instruction is sought, it comes from relevant DGs in the Commission. In some
instances, different DGs disagree on what instruction should be offered.
The fact that different EDs seek different levels of guidance from home ministries is not
necessarily indicative of agency slack. The EDs may be doing their job as agents,
interpreting the wishes of the home ministries without needing direct advice. It is also true
that as an ED office gains expertise over time, its director and alternate director know how
they are supposed to vote without seeking confirmation. Yet the relative flexibility that many
of these offices have does highlight a situation of diffuse oversight by member states, where
it is unclear how responsive ED offices are to their home governments, or vice-versa.
"Politics on the board," said an official in an EBRD ED office, "seems more based on
personalities than nationalities." Indeed, ED staff commonly-note that the "power of
personality" is one reason why a country's power to influence the board is not always equal
to its official voting share.
The case of the EIB differs from the other two banks in ways that increase its relative
autonomy. On one hand, some members of the board are high ranking treasury or central
bank officials in their own country, versus the more "middleman" position of EDs at the
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other two banks, who are lower ranking officials representing their home ministries. In the
past several years, for example, the EIB's Irish directors have been the Governor of the
Central Bank and the Second Secretary of the Ministry of Finance's Finance Division. Two
of Germany's three directors are high ranking officials in the Ministry of Economics and
Ministry of Finance. In many cases, the EIB board directors are literally the bosses of the
board directors from the same countries at the other two banks. Interestingly, for countries
with more than one director on the EIB board, representatives may also come from outside
government ministries, and include private sector actors. The 1995 board, for example,
included an economics professor from a Greek university, the head of the board of
Germany's public sector bank. Kreditanstalt fr Wiederaufbau, and an official from a
London-based merchant bank, Barclays de Zoete Wedd.2 2 A non-resident board, for whom
EIB board membership is clearly not their only responsibility, would be expected to take a
relatively more hands-off approach, as it does.
Another aspect of board composition that is a potential source of board weakness is the
relatively short tenure of board directors. At the World Bank, directors have two-year,
renewable appointments. While some directors stay for many years, Naim has estimated that
approximately 65% of board members leave after serving less than three years.2 3 There is a
similar degree of turnover at the other two banks. Board appointments are for five years at
the EIB, and three years at the EBRD. While board tenures are also renewable at these two
banks, high turnover is still evident. Turnover at both the EIB and the EBRD, for example,
has averaged around one-third of the board each year between 1994--96.24
One result of this situation of diffuse governance is that the MDB presidents are often
powerful actors in their own right, playing a significant role in directing the activities of the
banks. Robert McNamara, for example, was clearly the driving force in the 1970s in
2 2 EIB, Annual Report (Luxembourg: EIB, 1995).
2 3 Naim, "The World Bank: Its Role, Governance and Organizational Culture", p. C-280. Naim was an
Executive Director at the Bank from 1990-1992.
2 4 EBRD and EIB annual reports 1994-96.
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expanding the World Bank's lending and defining its mission to put poverty alleviation as its
highest priority, despite opposition from senior U.S. treasury officials that the Bank was
growing too quickly and not responding to donor criticism. 2 5 More recently, while James
Wolfensohn has been pushed by donors to make the World Bank leaner and more
competitive, it is his vision of the Bank's evolving role in the international economy that has
determined much of the content of the reorganization. 2 6 The same power can be attributed to
some of the presidents of the other two banks, although there is also evidence that if a
president strays too far from donor interests, he is not indispensable. This was the case with
the EBRD's founding president, Jacques Attali, who was a major intellectual force behind the
creation of the bank but was forced to resign amid donor displeasure over his management
style.
Activity
In addition to issues of composition and representation, other factors contribute to
generally diffuse governance structures among the three MDBs. One particularly important
factor is the way in which the boards conduct their activities. This creates space for greater
autonomy of the MDBs' management and staff, particularly with respect to the boards' ability
to influence project development. In terms of loan approval, one of the most important
activities of an MDB's board, most board members learn about most loans at the end of the
project cycle, when loans are presented to boards for approval. In the case of the EBRD and
World Bank, this is usually less true for directors representing recipient countries, since they
have greater links to and more communication with bank staff involved in 5eveloping
projects in their countries.2 7
Nevertheless, many board members will not have in-depth knowledge of a loan until
they receive the board documents two weeks before the board meeting. At this stage, after a
2 5 Catherine Gwin, "U.S. Relations with the World Bank," p. 25.
2 6 For analysis of the contributions of World Bank presidents, see Jochen Kraske, William H. Becker,
William Diamond et al.. Bankers with a Mission: The Presidents of the World Bank, 1946-91.
27 Directors from donor countries may also become involved with projects if their countries have bilateral
funds that may aid in project development, e.g., in the hiring of consultants to do appraisal work.
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project may have been developing for well over a year, it is typically difficult for any changes
to be made. It is also not always clear how "in-depth" the board's information is. The
boards receive shortened, summary versions of the project documents. NGOs often argue
that it is easy for bank management to leave controversial issues out of the reports. Bruce
Rich, for instance, has criticized what he calls an "official culture of secretness" at the World
Bank, arguing that the board of directors had no access to management's files, and was not
allowed to scrutinize draft project documents. 2 8 At the World Bank until recently, the board
did not even get some crucial information. For example, the Country Assistance Report
(CAS), the main strategy document between the Bank and a borrower where the Bank's
assistance levels and goals are laid out, was not even available to the board until the mid-
1990s.29 While new information disclosure policies at the Bank have improved this situation
since 1994, EDs and their staff sometimes still bridle at their sense that management can call
the shots when it wants to. At the same time, board members at all three MDBs sometimes
do hear about problem projects-or even good projects-in advance. The more active board
members will also be in touch with project managers, who will try, to varying degrees, to
accommodate board questions and concerns.
Board voting procedures at all three MDBs encourage an atmosphere of consensus. At
all three banks directors rarely have formal votes. The only time a director will "vote" is if he
or she wants to go on the record as saying "no." It is rare for board meetings to have "no"
votes, and even rarer for sufficient board opposition to prevent a project from being
approved. Management can also reduce the odds of disagreement and conflict at board
meetings by withdrawing controversial loans before they get to the board. The norm within
the MDB boards is consensus. In addition, no one country has sufficient voting power to
block a project without support from other shareholders.
2 8 Rich, Mortgaging the Earth, p. 70.
2 9 According to the author's interview with Treasury officials in October 1994, the fact that donors can now
see CAS reports was a result of a lobbying effort by major donor countries in the context of the IDA-9
negotiations.
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At the World Bank, procedures have been streamlined so that some projects no longer
even come up for a formal vote. Projects worth a discussion include those occurring in a
new World Bank member country, or projects with innovative or problematic components.
Where no ED has any matters to discuss, projects are automatically approved. Given the
heavy volume of projects going through the World Bank, ED officials say that there is no
way they can carefully go through the details of each project. The World Bank, for example,
approved an average of 270 projects a year between its fiscal 1994-96. This compared with
around 120 at the EBRn and 357 at the EIB.3 0
Ultimately, MDB executive directors have more power in setting policies and changing
institutional design, but less control over the types of projects ultimately identified by bank
staff, and the ways in which these projects are designed and implemented. Board members
are influential on an ad hoc basis, and generally have the most influence on MDB policy at
times of capital replenishment, which has occurred rarely at the EIB and once to date at the
EBRD. Leading shareholder countries have had the most opportunities to influence policy
changes at the World Bank, where its IDA arm must be replenished every three years. The
U.S. has been the most active among major shareholders in pushing environmental ideas and
other policy changes into the World Bank and EBRD3 1, and it is often supported in these
efforts by countries such as Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Several other
major countries-including Japan, France, and Italy-are often more passive or neutral on
environmental issues. However, the alliances of board members supportive, critical, or
neutral to new policy overtures depends on the particular issue at hand.
Every large organization, both public sector and private sector, faces the challenge of
balancing the power of its management versus its board. This is the essence of the
scholarship on principal-agent relationships. The challenge is to avoid the extreme situations
where either the president and management are completely autonomous from the shareholder-
3 0 Data from 1994-96 annual reports. EIB data includes lending 'or global loans.
31 Some of the major non-environmental policy changes pushed by the U.S. include new information
policies at the World Bank and EBRD, and the World Bank's Inspections Panel.
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owners, or where the shareholder-owners micromanage every decision and action of the
institution without utilizing the inherent advantages of agency delegation. These situations do
not exist at any of the MDBs, while their governance structures do allow for a great deal of
institutional autonomy. The next sections of this chapter show how environmental policy
goals emanating from the banks' boards of directors are institutionalized, or "hard-wired"
into the three banks, and where the translation process can strengthen or weaken the bank's
ability to address environmental issues. These sections examine indicators of how demand-
driven an MDB is, and this evidence shows more clearly what incentives there are for MDB
staff to identify and design projects with significant environmental goals or components, and
the challenges and obstacles that arise in cases where they try to do so.
Institutionalizing Environmental Policy Goals
World Bank
Of the three MDBs, the World Bank has the broadest mission, the largest number of
environmental staff-of which many are directly involved in operations-the most
comprehensive set of policies and guidelines, the greatest emphasis on evaluating project
implementation, and the most openness to building relations with outside interest groups,
such as NGOs. As an institution, it is the least bank-like of the three MDBs and as a result
its staff has had the most incentives to identify environmental projects, to offer them to
recipient countries, to address environmental issues in all of their projects, and to help
recipients reform their own environmental policies. However, the plethora of rules and
procedures set up to promote the environment do not always work that well at the World
Bank, revealing gaps where policy ideas are-not well translated into action by Bank staff.
Ultimately, the Bank's character as a development agency clashes with important incentives
arising from its character as a financial institution, which has historically encouraged project
quantity over quality. The emphasis has traditionally been on staff bringing creditworthy
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projects to the board in a timely fashion, and the project cycle has emphasized the pre-
implementation stages. 32
Mission
As noted in Chapter 3, the primary mission of the World Bank has evolved
considerably over the years, moving it increasingly away frorn the "Bank-as-bank" model.
Of the three MDBs, the World Bank is most like a development agency, seeking to fund
projects that meet various programmatic criteria with social, developmental, environmental,
or other goals that move beyond the traditional types of bankable MDB projects. It is the
only one of the three MDBs that funds projects focusing on education, health, or nutrition,
for example. It also tends to have the most sophisticated types of conditionality attached to
its loans, with more examples of less-traditional forms of (non-economic) conditionality and
other types of policy influence than tends to be the product of the other two MDBs.33
Throughout its life, the Bank has carried out its goals primarily through its dialogue with
borrower country governments, from whom agreement and cooperation is necessary for any
loan signed (all of which must have a sovereign guarantee, except for IFC projects) or any
program signed.
In some important ways, then, the World Bank's broader mission, carried out primarily
through Bank-government dialogue, sets the scene for the institution to have more leeway to
promote projects and policies that go beyond traditional infrastructure activities. In providing
expertise and advice, the Bank is hardly driven simply by recipient country demands. An
environmental mandate in an institution with such a mission would appear to have more of a
3 2 See, for example, William J. Nagle and Sanjoy Ghose, "Beneficiary Participation in some World Bank
Supported Projects," Prepared for the International Economic Relations Division of the Strategic Planning and
Review Department, World Bank, 1989, cited in Paul J. Nelson, The World Bank and Non-Governmental
Organizations (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 91.
3 3 For an interesting example of how the Bank promotes judicial reform through its loans and studies, see
Chapter 3 in Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank i a Changing World: Selected Essays and Lectures, vol.
II (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995). He discusses loan components that include funding for the
publication of legal information, for he drafting of various legislation, and even for the financing of judicial
reform.
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chance to take root than in an institution that is more driven by a more traditional set of
development banking goals.
The Bank's broad landscape of goals has both positive and negative impacts on the
incentives of its staff to carry out environmental objectives. On one hand the Bank's goal of
promoting environmentally sustainable development has resulted in a considerable increase in
the resources devoted to pursuing it, including the number of staff working on environmental
issues, as well as the number of procedures and policies devised to ensure environmental
issues are taken into account n project identification and development. On the other hand, as
mentioned in Chapter 2, there is concern among analysts of the World Bank that the sheer
number of institutional goals creates a situation where the institution faces an ambiguity of
mission, giving staff the ability to avoid decisiveness on the issues where strategy conflicts
with organizational incentives, or where the multiple strategies themselves come into conflict
with each other. 34
An important recent example of this is World Bank President James Woifensohn's
goals of making the Bank more demand-driven, by increasing client-orientation and
strengthening the role played by the IFC, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA), which insures private sector investors against political risks in developing
countries. The goal of client orientation is to better customize country assistance strategies
and to build more local ownership of World Bank projects and programs. The goal of
strengthening the private sector components of the Bank is to use more Bank capital to
guarantee private sector investment, versus direct projects or programs.
3 4 Naim, "The World Bank: Its Role, Governance and Organizational Culture," p. C-273. Wapenhans added
the argument that there is also ambiguity in the way new missions are defined, which makes their operational
purposes imprecise. "The need for long-term, sensitive, natural resources management has added the concern
for sustainable development," argued Wapenhans. However, "the content of this phrase remains operationally
undefined, rendering it vulnerable to the same fate of oblivion that befell such grand schemes as integrated
rural development." The result, he posited, is that interpretation can be so wide as to "defy institutional
accountability." Willi A. Wapenhans, "Efficiency and Effectiveness: Is the World Bank Group Well Prepared
for the Task Ahead," in Bretton Woods: Looking to the Future (Washington DC: Bretton Woods
Commission, 1994), p. C-292.
131
These goals have the potential to clash with the Bank's environmental goals. First, the
growing emphasis on client responsiveness may greatly reduce the Bank's abi'itv to push for
environmental projects, or to build environmental considerations into other projects.
Environmental pressure from the Bank is likely to be reduced in countries where
environmental issues are not a policy priority. Second, the IFC and MIGA are widely
perceived as doing a poorer job than the IBRD in building environmental features into their
work. The prospect of the Bank emphasizing guarantees may turn it into more of a demand-
driven institution like the other two MDBs, with less ability to take the initiative on project
identification.
On balance, however, the World Bank's mission has more positive than negative
impacts on the incentives of lending and policy staff to be aware of environmental issues and
to pursue environmental considerations in their work. The more demand-driven EBRD and
EIB depend to a greater extent than the World Bank on prospective borrowers coming to
them with loan ideas, which gives them somewhat less flexibility to push for certain types of
projects.
Structure
The World Bank is by far the largest MDB, with a staff of more 10,000.3 5 The most
important thing to note about the Bank's structure is that it is far from static, and has
undergone numerous reorganizations over the years. For example, the period covered by
this dissertation was affected by three major reorganizations, as well as other smaller
changes. The first occurred in 1987, when Barber Conable split staff between those who
undertook operational (lending) activities, and those who undertook policy research and
planning activities. New "Country Departments" were set up within each operational region,
combining the separate projects and program departments that existed previously. Operations
was put under its own senior vice presidency, and covered five regions, which were
3 5 As Frances Seymour points out, the World Bank is the third largest employer in Washington DC, behind
the federal and district governments. Francis Seymour, "Overview," Lending Credibility: New Mandates and
Partnerships for the World Bank (1996), p. 23.
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increased to six when Europe and Central Asia (ECA) was added in 1991.36 In 1993-94,
under the presidency of Louis Preston, three central, thematic vice presidencies were created
to strengthen the Bank's expertise in Human Resources and Operational Policy,
Environmentally Sustainable Development, and Finance and Private Sector Development.
Facing pressure from major shareholders to reduce staff and budget, Preston also merged a
number of divisions and reduced the number of division chiefs.
James Wolfensohn, who took over the presidency of the World Bank in 1995,
launched in mid-1997 another extensive restructuring of the Bank, dubbed the "Strategic
Compact," in an effort to make the Bank leaner and more efficient, as well as to help it be
able to better compete with private sector actors, given the large increase in private sector
investment to developing countries. Wolfensohn's goal was to make the Bank more flexible
and client-oriented, and less bureaucratic. The two important structural changes resulting
front this restructuring were the reorganization of the Bank's operational divisions, and a
move to decentralize the Bank's Washington-heavy presence by placing more country staff
into the field.
In the old Bank, whose basic form was in place since Conable's 1987 restructuring,
country departments could contain over 100 people. These departments were broken down
into different sectoral divisions, where task managers focused on developing projects in areas
such as agriculture, environment, trade, infrastructure, and human resources. Sectoral
experts could also be found in the four regional technical departments, whose job was to
work on specific technical issues associated with projects. These technical departments also
contained sectoral divisions, staffed by experts in each area. Under Conable's 1987
restructuring, environmental offices (regional environmental divisions, or REDs) were placed
in these technical departments to help operations staff design environmental components of
projects, as well as to review projects' adherence to the Bank's environmental policies. In
36 Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays and Lectures, pp. 16-17.
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having a review role, the RED division chiefs had the power to stop projects from moving
forward in the project cycle if they had any concerns.
The major effect of the changes under Wolfensohn was to create vastly streamlined
country departments who staff individual projects by choosing consultants from the broader
pool of Bank staff, or from the outside. Under the new Bank, the country directors have a
tiny staff--a handful of people-and these directors control their own budgets. These
country teams do not undertake projects themselves, but rather advise the country director on
broader strategies for the country. The rest of the people from the old country and technical
departments are grouped into sector groups for each region. For each project undertaken in a
country, the country director will dip into his or her regional sector group or look elsewhere
in the Bank, or even outside the Bank, to hire the expertise sought. The reorganization cut
the layer of bureaucracy previously staffed by division chiefs, and left many managers
without jobs. It also resulted in the departure of bank staff who found they were not being
hired by country directors for projects.
To use the case of Central and Eastern Europe as an illustration, before the 1997
restructuring, the Bank's work in CEE was undertaken in the ECA office. Within ECA,
there were four country departments (ECA I-IV), each covering 6-8 countries in CEE and the
former Soviet Union, as well as Turkey. As a result of the 1997 reorganization, there are
more than 10 country departments in ECA, each containing a country director responsible for
one to four countries. The directors and their small country teams develop projects with four
new sector management units, which contain departments that work on issues such as the
environment, private and finance sector development, agriculture and energy. 37
Within the World Bank, the task manager has been the central operational actor-
essentially, the Bank's banker. As a result of Wolfensohn's restructuring, task managers
were renamed team leaders, and were located in the regional, sectoral divisions, although in
practice it does not appear that the content of the job has changed significantly, since these
37 "The World Bank Streamlines its Strategy for Transition Economies," Transition (Washington DC: The
World Bank, February 1997), p. 3.
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people will still be responsible for shepherding projects through the project cycle. It is the
task manager's job to identify projects for the Bank, based on his or her understanding of a
country's development plan or ideas, as well as the Bank's economic and sector work, its
CAS, and other relevant documents. The task manager develops the project idea and takes
the project through the project cycle, preferably past board approval and into implementation.
In the process, he or she is responsible to make sure the Bank's various policy criteria are
incorporated. Before the 1997 restructuring, task managers were generally located in specific
divisions within the country departments, although sometimes staff in the technical or central
departments also initiated projects.
Location of Environmental Staff
Of the three MDBs, the World Bank has the greatest number of staff whose job is
specifically to address environmental issues. For much of the period examined by this
dissertation, there were three primary locations for these "green bankers" in the Bank: within
the central environmental department, where work emphasized research, policy development
and operations support; within the regional technical departments; and within the country
departments themselves, where there were individual task managers responsible for
identifying projects with primary or significant environmental components. The existence of
these "environmental" task managers integrated into country teams is unique to the World
Bank, and is evidence that environmental staff have penetrated its structure more deeply than
at the other two MDBs.
Under the most recent organizational changes, the environmental sectoral divisions
combined the task managers formerly in the country departments, as well as staff from the
regional technical units. For ECA, at least through mid- 1997, there were around 30 people
who work on environment in some way or another, plus an additional handful in the central
environmental department. 38 In addition, the Bank's Central Environment Department was
reduced in size, and turned its attention more toward global issues.
3 8Estimate by Helmut Schreiber, World Bank, interview with the author, July 1997.
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Analysis
The structure of the Bank has characteristics that have both encouraged and inhibited its
ability to address environmental issues in its work. The most important factor encouraging
the Bank to be proactive in identifying environmental projects includes the fact that team
leaders looking for such projects are well integrated into operations work at the Bank.
Environmental specialists in other areas of the Bank also develop projects and programs.
Generally, task nanagers at the World Bank have strong incentives to get projects to
the board in a timely fashion, which has led many critics of the Bank to argue that project
quality can be pushed aside. This is what Wapenhans noted has bzen labeled as the
"approval culture" at the Bank, reflecting the fact that task managers have tended to be judged
more on project preparation and appraisal versus implementation. 39 In addition, given the
fact that a project can take years from start to finish, quite often a project's task manager will
have changed jobs, or moved within the Bank before a project is complete. The incentives
that create pressure to lend are often not explicit, and management in recent years has
emphasized the importance of project quality over lending targets. Still, in practice, task
managers will be more attracted to relatively large projects that are relatively easier to
undertake, with as few complex issues as possible to slow them down. The lower a
project's transaction costs the better, which means that task managers are generally not in
favor of large, expensive, in-depth environmental assessments that may require significant
changes in project design. Yet, task managers who have the specific goal to seek out projects
that address a country's priority environmental problems clearly have more incentive than
others to do so. This has resulted in an overall World Bank portfolio that contains many
projects not traditional even to other development banks, such as environmental management
capacity building, natural resources management programs, coastal pollution control, and
community forestry, to name some.
39 Wapenhans, "Efficiency and Effectiveness: Is the World Bank Group Well Prepared for the Task Ahead,"
pp. C-289-304. Willi A. Wapenhans, Effective Implementation: Key to Development Impact. Portfolio
Management Task Force. Confidential Report of the World Bank (Washington DC, September 22, 1991) p.
111.
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Task managers also design projects under the auspices of the Global Environmental
Facility (GEF), which provides grants to developing countries to address four global
environmental problems: ozone depletion, biological diversity, climate change, and the
protection of international waters. The GEF portfolio at the Bank thus contains projects that
go well beyond typical MDB infrastructure projects, and covers topics such as wetlands
management, biodiversity conservation, and the phaseout of ozone-depleting substances.
Another major structural characteristic shaping the Bank's environmental activities is
the existence of the central environmental department, which along with the regional
environmental departments, has been responsible for an enormous amount of research on a
wide variety of topics related to sustainable development, and has contributed to the Bank's
emerging global role as intellectual leader on environmental issues. As noted in Chapter 3,
this research includes sectoral policies as well as "best practice" guides for Bank work on the
management of different types of natural resources and sources of pollution. It also includes
the Bank's work on national and regional environmental programs for recipient countries, the
development of least-cost, "green" accounting, and environmental impact assessment
methodologies, as well as research on global issues such as climate change and ozone
depletion. Central environmental department staff also make contributions to individual
projects, and help to appraise them at the invitation of the RED, or on their own initiative.
Both the technical and central environmental departments have increasingly been transformed
into quasi-internal consulting firms within the Bank, with their staff "hired" to provide
project supponrt on anything from project identification to appraisal.
The existence of "environmental" task managers and specific departments to address
environmental issues in all projects as well as to focus on environmental research and policy
development has given the World Bank a stronger ability to emphasize environmental issues
than the other two MDBs. Environmental specialists have now deeply penetrated the Bank,
and their work is no long considered marginal. Yet at the same time, this structure still has
negative aspects that can make it more difficult for the Bank to meet its goals.
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First, in many of the Bank's structural iterations, the links between the role of
operations and research have been murky, and not well integrated. Several critics of the
Bank have argued that the research and policy arms of the Bank are poorly connected to
operations. Bruce Rich, for example, argued that the 1987 reorganization created a central
department that "inhabited a world of paper...while the lending juggernaut lumbered ahead
on a separate planet called Operations," and the regional environmental staff were "all but
powerless to stop ambitious country directors from riding roughshod over Bank policies. " 40
In fact, this assessment is overly pessimistic, since central environmental staff end up
spending more than half of their time supporting country departments, and regional
environmental staff have been able to stop projects from moving forward, on environmental
grounds. 4 1 Yet, there is much evidence that the policy work and research undertaken by the
Bank are often poorly translated into actions by operations. We see this below, in the
sections on environmental procedures and monitoring. Some people inside and outside the
Bank are highly critical of the Bank's policy research, calling it "vanity publishing" that can
exist in a vacuum from project work.42 At the same time, government officials in recipient
countries have also praised this research as very useful in their own conceptualization of
relevant policies issues and priorities, even if the research is not connected to specific lending
activities. 43
Second, the new decentralized structure of the Bank, with its emphasis on client '
responsiveness, may make it more difficult for the Bank to build conditionality (political,
economic, or environment) into its loans. In the past, environmental staff in the Bank could
visit countries and look around for potential enviror..nental projects. If they saw something
that matched a country's environmental priorities, they could "raise interest" within the
4 0Rich, Mortgaging the Earth, p. 183.
41 Robert Wade, "Greening the Bank: The Struggle over the Environment, 1970-95," in The World Bank: Its
First Half Century, ed. Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis, and Richard Webb (Washington DC: The Brookings
Institution, 1997), p. 717.
4 2Quote from author interview with G-7 ED official at World Bank, 25 March 1997.
4 3Environment ministry officials in Hungary, Poland, interviews with the author, October 1997.
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government. 44 In cases where a country's project ideas were seen by the Bank as low
priority issues, the Bank would refuse to finance them. Under the new system, country
directors working with recipient governments on formulating their lending priorities are likely
to find environmental issues are relatively lower priorities for the latter than they are for the
Bank's major shareholders. As a result, country directors may find themselves calling less
often on the environmental task managers to design "green" projects. This can eventually
result in an increased gap between issues major Bank shareholders think are important for the
Bank to pursue, and issues preferred by recipient countries.
Finrncial Tools
The financial tools available io an MDB are also an indicator of how "bank-like" it is
and what types of projects MDB staff can identify as suitable for bank funding. The financial
tools determine who the client may be, and what types of activities may be financed. The fact
that the IBRD is limited in its lending to government bodies has reinforced the Bank's
interaction with policymakers, and its emphasis on developing loans that have an impact on a
country's broader policy priorities. 4 5 Sovereign-guaranteed loans are not only for individual
investment projects, but for the more policy-oriented structural adjustment lending or sector
lending as well. In the Bank's portfolio for individual countries, discrete investment
projects, such as those that build infrastructure, will appear hand-in-hand with projects aimed
at restructuring an entire sector, or developing new legal or regulatory frameworks.
While there is no set minimum loan amount at the World Bank, its projects tend to be
larger than the EBRD or EIB's. In Central and Eastern Europe, for example, there is a large
number of World Bank projects between $100-$150 million, and the average project size is
just under $100 million. This compares with an average size project of just under 20 million
ECU at the EBRD and about 50 million ECU at the EIB. Given the Bank's "top-down"
44 World Bank environmental Task Manager, ECA department, interview with the author, July 15, 1997.
4 5 The World Bank Group's IFC is a private sector lending institution that has a different set of clientele, and
is largely demand driven, more like the EBRD. However, since it is somewhat separate from the IBRD, and
since it is a relatively small player in Central and Eastern Europe, I do not count it among my MDB cases.
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approach, and its ability to undertake broad sectoral restructuring, the Bank has greater
possibilities than more "bottom-up," demand-driven MDBs to shape policy dialogues with
recipient countries, and to bring in environmental objectives if it believes they are important.
Its tools are thus amenable to pursuing environmental activities, at least from the "supply
side" of what the Bank can offer to a country.
In addition, World Bank staff have access to in-house sources of grant funds that can
be used to finance background research, feasibility studies, technical assistance, training and
project preparation. This can give task mangers the possibility of exploring more innovative
types of projects or looking at particular issues in greater depth than they would be able to do
otherwise. 46
The next chapter will show in greater depth how the shape of an MDB's financial tools
affects the demand for its projects by recipient country actors. In the case of Central and
Eastern Europe, the World Bank now faces more competition with private sector banks, and
its fellow MDBs. Therefore, there is a risk that the Bank's emphasis on policy
conditionalities and reforms in relatively more wealthy countries can backfire, if recipients
turn more readily to alternative sources of finance that have fewer strings attached. In sum,
the World Bank is well positioned to sell environmental projects and policy ideas to recipient
government, but faces an increasingly competitive environment for doing so in more highly
developed clients.
Procedures
Much of the literature on organizational theory begins with the assumption that
organizational behavior is strongly shaped by the rules and standard operating procedures
organizations must follow. Yet organizations also struggle with the fact that these rules and
4 6The amounts are not insignificant. In fiscal 1997, for example, trust fund disbursements totaled $1.3
billion. Trust funds consist of contributions from developed country donors, and vary in terms of the extent to
which they are a form of tied-aid. In fiscal 1997, the largest contributors were Japan ($210 million), the
Netherlands, ($207 million), Denmark ($72 million), Norway ($66 million), and Sweden ($60 million). The
Bank itself contributed an additional $653 million to trust funds out of the IBRD's income. World Bank,
Annual Report, (Washington DC: World Bank, 1997). The EBRD also has "technical cooperation funds"
used for project preparation and implementation, but the amounts are smaller. Commitments totaled around
400 million ECU for 1991-1996, for example. EBRD, Annual Report (London: EBRD, 1996), p. 46.
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procedures are not implemented as envisioned by the organization's designers. Rules may be
revised and refined, as the institution seeks to adapt to these challenges or learn new ways of
addressing them. Or, the gap between what they are supposed to do and what they are able
to do may remain, without adjustment. An analysis of the relevant procedures and rules of
each MDB provides evidence on the extent to which the MDB is designed to encourage
greater attention to environmental issues. However, a description of various rules and
procedures is irrelevant without analysis of how they shape or what challenges they pose to
institutional incentives. In the case of the World Bank, the existence of numbers of rules and
procedures for addressing environmental issues provide further evidence of its development
agency character vis-a-vis the other two MDBs. However, there is also evidence that the
World Bank faces a greater challenge in harmonizing these rules and procedures with its
other development and banking goals.
The World Bank is famous for having an inordinate number of rules and procedures,
so that many of its more recent presidents have sought ways of cutting back on the
paperwork and layers of bureaucracy. Indeed, the Bank itself recognizes that its "overly
bureaucratic process" has reduced its ability to respond quickly in a changing external
environment. 47 By the early 1990s there were over 200 different tasks that managers had to
carry out in their work. These tasks, then called "Operational Directives," or "ODs" covered
everything from environmental impact assessment procedures to the Bank's policy on
resettlement.4 8 Task managers, noted Wade, complained of being "ODed (overdosed) on
ODs."4 9 Interviews with Bank staff revealed that they rarely pay attention to some of these
ODs, because it is simply impossible to follow them all. Several ODs have been seen as
weak or as failures, and have been revised over time.50 By 1993, the Bank began to move to
4 7World Bank, "The Strategic Compact: A Summary Note, " www.worldbank.org, 7/12/97.
4 8ODs, in turn, evolved from Operational Manual Statements (OMS) and Operational Policy Notes (OPN),
both written instructions from management for staff to follow. These OMS and OPN were revised into the
ODs beginning in 1989, and supplemented a few years later by Operational Policy Statements, Bank
Procedures, and Good Practice statements. Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World, pp. 546-47.
4 9 Wade, "Greening the Bank: The Struggle over the Environment, 1970-95," p. 729.
5 0 0ne example is the Bank's Resettlement Policy, which was issued in 1980 and revised a few times. NGOs
are highly critical of it. See Rich, Mortgaging the Earth, p. 156.
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reissue some of the major ODs as simpler, non-binding "operational policies," prompting
debates on whether these would encourage greater laxness among project designers, or in
fact would allow them to make projects less complicated and more easily implementable.
Clearly the answer depends on which of the policies are being watered down and what
impact a looser interpretation has in a specific project context.
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to describe and analyze all of any MDB's
rules and procedures. Instead, my analysis of each bank will focus on the major rules and
procedures that impact the incentives of MDB staff to address environmental issues in their
work. These consist of: its overall strategies toward individual countries; its environmental
impact assessment procedures; and rules governing the its transparency and accountability.
In each case, I describe how these rules are supposed to work, and how they tend to affect
the incentives of bank staff to address environmental issues in practice.
Overall country strategies
The project cycle is the overall framework that determines how an MDB is supposed to
design projects and make loans, and each of its components contains its own rules and
procedures. All MDBs have similar project cycle processes. These basically consist of:
project identification; project preparation, where the Bank and the borrower flesh out the
details and specific conditions necessary to achieve the project's goals; project appraisal,
where the banks' undertake a technical, economic, financial and sometimes environmental
review of the project to ensure it is soundly designed; negotiations between the Bank and
borrower agreeing to the specific loan conditions, including the economic, political,
environmental, and other covenants built into the loan agreements; and implementation and
supervision, where the borrower is responsible for implementing the project, while the bank
makes sure it does so as agreed.51
51 For more details on each stage of the project cycle, see: Warren C. Baum, The Project Cycle (Washington
DC: The World Bank, 1982); and Philippe G. Le Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Challenge
pp. 47-59.
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The World Bank's project cycle differs from those of the other two MDBs in the extent
to which it situates individual projects within in-depth analyses it periodically undertakes of a
country's economy. This provides the basis for developing the Country Assistance Strategy
(CAS), a key document between Bank and borrower that defines the Bank's framework of
lending for the latter. The CAS is an important indicator of the Bank's non-banking goals-
that is, its desire to build a portfolio of projects out of an overall analysis of a country's
economic and also political context. Bank staff discuss CAS with recipient countries, but are
not obligated to change its conclusions in areas where there is disagreement. 5 2 The CAS
document analyzes the country's economic and political position, lays out its development
and economic objectives and prospects, and sets out the Bank's own strategy for the country
along with the specific details of past and proposed assistance programs. For many years
these documents were secretive, and not seen even by the Bank's board. Critics of the Bank
argued that this allowed management to avoid scrutiny of its country strategies, while the
Bank pointed out that many of its borrowers resisted more public knowledge of their
economies and policies. Since the mid 1990s, however, as a result of the board pressure on
the Bank and the Bank's overall movement toward greater openness, CAS preparation has
become more open, with more active consultation with borrower countries, and board
consideration of CAS reports. In August 1998, the Bank's board amended Bank policy on
CAS to allow the reports to be made publicly available, but only if the country agrees.
In theory, the CAS reports present an important opportunity for a country's
environmental context to be discussed. The Bank's decision to integrate environmental
considerations into its CAS reports is therefore a significant change in its overall policy. If
the Bank concludes that some natural resource or pollution issues should be among its
priorities, it can then begin a dialogue with the country on the topic and seek to identify these
issues in the CAS as something deserving attention. This gives Bank staff the ability to flag
environmental issues at the beginning of the basic policy negotiation process with recipient
5 2Author interviews with Bank staff, 25 July 1995.
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countries. Indeed, the National Environmental Action Plans (NEAPs) that the Bank has
required for IDA borrower and suggested for IBRD borrowers are supposed to inform and
be integrated into the CAS reports. 53 These NEAPs describe and analyze a country's major
environmental problems and offer policy solutions and other actions for addressing them.
Nonetheless, in practice, the CAS reports have not consistently integrated
environmental issues into their conclusions. According to a 1996 internal World Bank
review of 25 CAS reports, the links between a country's macro economic situation and its
environmental issues were "not articulated." 54 The report criticized CAS reports for not
addressing the impact of different development strategies on issues such as sound
environmental and natural resource management. One possible reason for this is that the
CAS reports must focus on a handful of development priorities, and environmental priorities
may not be as competitive with respect to other macroeconomic issues in many countries.
The 1996 report recommended "some improvement in the Bank's organizational and
incentive structure...to encourage wider and more effective consultation among experts, to
reward team spirit, and to ensure collective accountability, so that a CAS can concisely state,
for a country with multiple development goals, what are the key environmental challenges
and how to design appropriate strategies, policies and action plans." 55 More recently, the
Bank has asked environmental consultants and other outside groups to make
recommendations on CAS methodology, and to be involved in CAS discussions in particular
countries, although it is too early to analyze the results of this strategy. 56
EA procedures and NEAPs
5 3 While NEAPs have been required for IDA borrowers since the late 1980s, many countries have yet to
undertake them. The Bank encourages IBRD membors also to complete NEAPs, but this is not a
requirement. Operations Evaluation Department, 'Effectiveness of Environmental Assessments and National
Environmental Action Plans: A Process Study," Operations Evaluation Department Report 15835, June 28,
1996, p. 3.
54 Office of the Senior Vice President, Development Economics, "Integrating Environmental Issues into
Country Assistance Strategy," February 1, 1996, pp. v, 14, cited in Wade, "Greening the Bank: The Struggle
over the Environment, 1970-95," p. 721.
5 5 Ibid., p. 722.
5 6 Bank Information Center, "Tuesday Group-Report," (Washington DC: Bank Information Center, February
1998).
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"There is no question that the Bank's (environmental) procedures are exemplary,"
wrote the World Wildlife Fund's Katrina Brandon, "What is controversial is how well it
follows them."57 Indeed, the World Bank has a comprehensive set of rules for the ways in
which individual projects must address environmental issues. These rules were the model on
which the EBRD's own environmental assessment (EA) procedures were developed (in fact,
by some of the same people), as well as those for some of the other regional development
banks. They clearly distinguish the World Bank from private sector banks, and theoretically
can greatly shape project design. Compared with other MDBs, the World Bank's EA
procedures have received the most scrutiny and have undergone the most revisions. They are
also the most transparent, and encourage the highest degree of public participation. Yet,
integration of these rules into projects still remains patchy, and the Bank continues to search
for more ways to increase the effectiveness of EAs.
EA procedures, brought into the Bank with the help of pressure from major
shareholders as well as Conable, were codified in 1989 as an annex to Operational Directive
4.0, and later revised in 1991 as OD 4.01. The EA directive requires that all loans be
screened for their potential environmental impacts.5 8 The purpose of the EA is to assess
ways of preventing, mitigating, or minimizing possible adverse environmental impacts. EAs
can be produced at the individual project level, as well as the regional and sectoral level. EAs
are formally the responsibility of the borrowing country, but Bank staff from both the central
and regional environmental departments usually assist in their preparation as well as monitor
them.
There are four main steps in the EA process. The first step is called screening, and
occurs in the project identification stage. At this stage, the task manager (with assistance
from the central and regional environmental departments) identifies the magnitude of the
project's environmental impact, and assigns the project one of three categories. Those in
5 7 Katrina Brandon, "Environment and Development at the Bretton Woods Institutions," in Bretton Woods:
Looking to the Future (Washington DC: Bretton Woods Commission, 1994), p. C-137.
5 8This is for the IBRD and IDA; the IFC has its own set of environmental procedures.
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Category A may have a significant impact on the environment and require a full EA.
Examples of Category A projects include dams, power plants, large industrial plants, land
clearance, and rural roads. Those in Category B have less significant impacts and require a
partial EA. Examples include small-scale irrigation and drainage, renewable energy, and
tourism. Projects in Category C have no apparent environmental impact and do not require
any EA, and can include projects in education, nutrition, and telecommunications.
In the scoping period, which occurs during the project preparation stage, the project's
likely environmental impacts are further defined, and the task manager develops terms of
reference for undertaking the EA. This is a point in the project cycle when local communities
and NGOs are supposed to receive information about the project, and become involved in
consultations on it. In the third stage, an EA report is prepared and is reviewed during the
Bank's appraisal. This report: lays out the basic facts on the project; identifies its positive
and negative environmental impacts; provides an analysis of alternative actions that can be
taken to reduce the environmental impacts; and presents a plan that specifies measures to
address the environmental issues. Finally, during the project implementation stage, the
borrower is responsible for carrying out the recommendations of the EA report, and the Bank
is responsible for supervising this implementation.
The Bank's EA procedures have evolved in several ways since they were first
introduced, in part as a result of critical evaluations produced by the Bank's own reviews of
EAs. For example, among the important changes distinguishing the 1991 version from the
1989 version are greater specification on requirements for public consultation, such as
making draft EAs available to relevant groups; and a definition of environmental mitigation
plans, which became part of the criteria for Category A and B EAs.
In theory, these procedures seek to ensure that the World Bank fills a basic condition of
its environmental mandate-to try to avoid or mitigate environmental harm by controlling the
environmentally destructive effects of its activities. However, EAs can have more far-
reaching effects as well. They force all task mangers to think more carefully about the
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environmental implications of current (and future) projects; they can have a fundamental
impact on the design of the Bank's projects; they encourage thinking and research on the risk
assessment methodologies; they can contribute to scientific knowledge on the flora, fauna
and general environmental conditions of a country; and they can build environmental
management capacity in recipient countries, as well as encourage public participation in parts
of the world unaccustomed to such trappings of civil society. EA procedures can thus be an
important source of institutional change within the organization, while also having an impact
on broader development issues.
Nonetheless, the Bank's EA procedures have been criticized, even by analysts within
the Bank itself, for not quite reaching their goals. An internal 1996 World Bank report
assessing the Bank's EA procedures concluded that while staff generally comply with the
procedures themselves, "very few EAs actually ifluence project design."59 With regard to
Category A project in particular, the report was stinging:
The approach to environmental assessments used in the Category A projects reviewed
by this study often generated massive documents that are of little use in project design
and during implementation. Data collection efforts for EAs have not been adequately
focused, which has added to the borrowers' costs without significantly improving the
documents' usefulness. Bank terms of reference for EAs often required prediction and
evaluation of too many impacts, obscuring the focus on relevant, key impacts.60
One of the main factors contributing to this problem is that the timing of EA preparation
often does not fit well with the overall project cycle. An EA can often take more than a year
to complete, which often means that by the time its conclusions are finalized, the project
design itself is often also finalized, "thus precluding meaningful consideration of
alternatives," according to the report. This is even more likely to occur in cases where task
managers see the EA as a "pro-forma ritual."6 1 The report also criticized Category A EAs for
only superficially considering alternative designs and technologies, as required in the OD.
59 Operations Evaluation Department, "Effectiveness of Environmental Assessments and National
Environmental Action Plans," p. 24. This study is based on research conducted in 8 countries, of which one
(Poland) was in the CEE region.
60 Ibid., p. 6.
61Ibid., p. 26.
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Even EAs that did consider alternatives "often explore weak, superficial or easily dismissed
options," it said. Another serious problem is the fact that often EAs were not properly
implemented, often because project implementation staff did not understand the EAs, and in a
number of cases, because the EA itself was not even available to the project office.62
Some of these problems are more easily correctable than others. Making EAs available
to project offices is relatively easy, for example, while harmonizing the EA process with the
broader project cycle process might be more difficult. EAs that seriously consider alternative
issues may be more thorough, and more expensive, but may push options that are not a
priority for the recipient country. As noted above, there are few incentives for Bank staff to
promote time-consuming, expensive additions or changes to project design.
The ways in which the Bank's various environmental ODs are translated into projects,
as well as the extent to which NEAPs have a real impact on domestic policy priorities, echo
the Bank's experience with its EA procedures. For example, like EAs, NEAPs can
strengthen the ways in which the Bank and individual recipients prioritize and address
environmental issues, while also serving as an instrument to strengthen the capacity of
domestic environmental ministries, and a forum for facilitating networking among domestic
environmental actors and between these actors and the Bank. Yet evaluations of NEAPs by
the Bank show that their quality and efficacy are quite mixed. Some NEAPs are more
focused on specific priorities and projects than others, and even some of the more well-
written NEAPs may be ignored by recipient country policymakers.6 3
The Bank's experience with its environmental procedures and policies shows how
innovative intentions often run into obstacles in practice. Conflicting or mismatched
incentives are clearly a culprit, but weak recipient government capacity or interest can be as
well. The Bank's efforts to evaluate and revise its procedures reflect its constant efforts at
error-correction, but the results seem to unfold quite slowly.
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6 2 Ibid., p. 6.
6 3Ibid., pp. 45-62.
Porousness
The degree to which MDBs are open to the input and feedback of the public is also an
indicator of how "bank-like" and demand-driven the MDB is. Client confidentiality is sacred
to private sector banks, who feel little need to ask the public's advice on whether to make a
loan, and how to carry it out, or to provide information on how a loan is being designed.
Public accountability and transparency, instead, are goals expected more of public
institutions. After decades of secrecy, the World Bank has recently transformed itself into
the most transparent bf the three MDBs. It was the first of the three to adopt a new
information disclosure policy, in 1994, which made more Bank documents available to the
public and created a Public Information Center (PIC). The PIC makes available a variety of
documents, many of which were previously confidential, such as Staff Appraisal Reports
(produced from 1994 onwards), which describe projects and their implementation plans.
Other available information includes economic and sector reports, environmental impact
assessments, and project information documents, which may be updated.
Of the three MDBs, the World Bank has also put the greatest effort into building
relations with NGOs. As mentioned in Chapter 3, these changes were largely externally-
driven, as a result of U.S. pressure (backed by the threat of funding cuts) supported by
NGOs. These efforts have included an NGO-Bank Committee set up to expand relations and
increase cooperation between NGOs and the Bank; a 1989 Operational Directive on
"involving Nongovernmental Organizations in Bank Supported Activities," and more
recently, NGO sector studies in a variety of countries. By 1997, the Bank had placed NGO
liaison staff in 72 of its resident missions, and had launched a program to work with a global
network of NGOs to review the impact of structural adjustment lending in a set of
countries. 64 NGOs are also increasingly involved in helping to implement Bank projects,
and have occasionally been involved in project design. The Bank's efforts to publicize its
engagement with NGOs include sections on its NGO activities in various annual reports since
64 World Bank, Annual Report, (Washington DC: World Bank, 1997), pp. 14-15.
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the late 1980s, separate World Bank publications, and speeches by a number of Bank
executives. 65
Another important indication of the Bank's "porousness" to outside stakeholders is its
creation in 1995 of an independent Inspections Panel to investigate complaints from non-state
actors who feel the Bank has not conformed to its policies and procedures. The panel is the
first mechanism that enables non-state actors to hold IOs directly accountable for their
actions, and it has been forum for non-state actors who have challenged Bank actions in
countries as diverse as Nepal, Brazil, Argentina, Bangladesh, India, Tanzania, and Ethiopia.
In theory, the more open approach by the World Bank to interaction and dialogue with
NGOs and its movement to make more information publicly available might be expected to
lead to greater accountability an transparency. More openness to NGOs might also be
expected to influence the Bank's portfolio into greater activities in environmental impact,
public participation, and structural adjustment. In practice, however, the jury is still out,
given the mixed response by NGOs and scholars to the Bank's activities in this area. To
date, there are no analytical studies that seek to measure the impact of the Bank's policies on
information and NGO relations on its activities; this is perhaps no surprise, given the size and
complexity of the Bank's portfolio. However, a number of more narrow studies of the
Bank's portfolio and decision-making procedures provide some evidence that implementation
of these policies of porousness remains uneven.
Some NGOs have conceded that the Bank's public information policies and relations
with NGOs are much more developed than those found in other international institutions.
Yet they also argue that many of the changes are not as far-reaching as they might appear to
be. Bank critic Bruce Rich called the new information policy a "significant step forward" that
has made the Bank more transparent than European bilateral development agencies, not to
65 David Hunter, "The Role of the World Bank in Strengthening Governance, Civil Society, and Human
Rights," in Lending Credibility: New Mandates and Partnerships for the World Bank, ed. Peter Brossard, et al.
(Washington: World Wildlife Fund, 1996), pp. 65-80. Nelson, in The World Bank and Non-Governmental
Organizations, provides a particularly comprehensive analysis on the evolving relationship between the World
and NGOs.
150
mention EU institutions such as the EIB.6 6 However, he and other NGOs have still found
the new policy to be flawed since it does not apply to pre-1994 projects, and many NGOs in
development countries have complained that documents that are supposed to be publicly
available are nonetheless difficult to procure. In addition, many of the project documents
developed before project approval remain confidential, and NGOs argue that project
identification and design are the most important areas for public participation.
The Bank's relations with NGOs in turn, suffer from that fact that policies and
intentions of engagement often clash with more pressing incentives in the Bank to move
money while avoiding delays where possible. Bank staff have noted that public participation
can be very expensive and time consuming, and they admit that many really have "no clue
about how to do it."67 Other staff, however, have gone out their way to involve the public in
project design. 68
Paul Nelson, in his book on Bank-NGO relations, argued that the Bank's engagement
with NGOs has '"broken some new ground for international agencies," particularly since it
has been willing to "allow experiments and minor innovations to facilitate operational
engagement." 69 However, at the same time, he argued that the Bank's approach is ad hoc,
and ultimately does not influence the Bank's deeply-rooted organizational characteristics,
such as its imperative to "move money." Collaboration with NGOs, like other goals of the
Bank, does not fit well with incentives and pressures for Bank staff to bring projects to the
board in a timely fashion. Hunter notes that Bank staff often see public participation as a
necessary evil to placate the Bank's board, and therefore the quality of public participation in
Bank projects can be low.70 The picture that evolves from outside analysis of the Bank's
policies on public information disclosure and NGO relations is that the policies are more far-
6 6 Bruce Rich, "Epilogue: The Gorbachev of the World Bank?," unpublished manuscript, 1996.
6 7 Member of EMTEN staff, World Bank, interviewtwith the author, 9 January 1996.
6 8Stephen Lintner, interview with the author, World Bank, 29 March 1998.
6 9Nelson, The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations, p. 2.
7 0 Hunter, "The Role of the World Bank in Strengthening Governance, Civil Society, and Human Rights," p.
67.
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reaching than those found at other IOs and MDBs, but that implementation has been uneven
due to other pressures and incentives facing Bank staff.
The Inspections Panel has also had a mixed record in its activities and effectiveness.
NGOs have credited it for being "one of the most important opportunities for improving the
Bank's performance and accountability," and as a model for similar mechanisms created or
proposed for other development banks. 7 1 The Panel's inspection of the alleged violations at
the controversial Arun III project (mentioned in Chapter 2) was cited by Wolfensohn as a
reason why he pulled the Bank out of that project. At the same time, observers argue that the
Panel has received little support from the Bank's Board of Directors, who do not want to
embarrass major client countries, even if they are violating loan agreements. The Bank's
process of streamlining many of its operational directives into less enforceable guidelines also
may narrow the Panel's ability to rule on alleged violations. Finally, the Inspections Panel
continues to lack much autonomy in practice, because it can only investigate a complaint if it
receives approval from the Bank's board and its recommendations are non-binding. 7 2
EBRD
The EBRD can be situated between the World Bank and the EIB in terms of the ways in
which it has sought to institutionalize its environmental mandate. It is more "bank-like" than
the World Bank, with a narrower mission, fewer broad policy dictates, and less bureaucracy,
and it prefers to pay more attention to funding specific projects than in addressing big policy
reform issues. At the same time, it has gone further than the EIB in seeking to explicitly
address environmental issues in its work by attention to both "add-on" and "build-in"
techniques. In the first category, it has set up a specific unit to focus on energy efficiency
projects, and its municipal department also emphasizes environmental issues and stand-alone
projects in its largely public sector work. In the second category, the Bank's independent
environmental appraisal unit has been able to exert influence on project design.
71Ibid., p. 74.
7 2 World Bank, "Resolution No. 93-10, Resolution No. IDA 93-6, September 22, 1993: "The World Bank
Inspections Panel," in Shihata, The World Bank Inspections Panel (New York: Oxford University Press,
1994), Annex I, pp. 127-33.
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Mission
The EBRD's mission to promote economic transition in former communist countries,
with an emphasis on private sector development, immediately made it somewhat difficult for
Bank staff to pursue its early, ambitious goal of playing a "leadership role in the
environmental recovery of the region." 73 The EBRD was never intended to be a
"development" bank in the traditional sense, like other regional development banks that focus
on Third World countries. Since it was not in the business of selling broad policy changes to
recipient governments, it could be expected to have the most success in pursuing the
environmental recovery of Central and Eastern Europe in areas that complemented its
strengths as a private sector-oriented development bank, which largely meant infrastructure
projects, including transport, energy, and municipal infrastructure. The EBRD's main
activities are in areas such as strengthening the development of domestic financial
institutions, supporting the privatization of state-owned industries, and mobilizing foreign
investment in areas such as telecommunications and other areas of infrastructural
restructuring. Many of these areas in fact entail lending to central governments, with
sovereign-guarantees, but are seen as important in helping governments to develop the
private sector.
The EBRD sees itself as driven by client demand-whether private or public sector-
and is aware that its resources are limited compared with the scope of the economic problems
facing the transition countries. As a result, stand-alone environmental projects are not a
priority of the Bank except where such projects fit a country's own priorities, or overlap with
other economic restructuring goals. The EBRD, then, cannot be expected to be a "darker
green" MDB, toward the right end of the continuum presented in Table 1.2. The Bank's
mission does still give it the ability to undertake environmental due-diligence procedures, as a
means of avoiding environmental harm in its work.
Structure, Location of Environmental Staff
73 EBRD, "Environmental Management: The Bank's Policy Approach," (London: EBRD, 1992).
153
With a staff of around 750, the EBRD is much smaller than the World Bank, and has a
much less complex organizational structure. The design of the Bank has evolved over its
short life, in ways that have continued to put staff focusing on environmental issues in
discrete units. The Bank underwent a significant reorganization when Jacques de Larosiere
became its second president in 1994. The reorganization merged separate divisions for
merchant banking and development banking, and created one banking unit organized into
northern and southern regions, made up of country teams, as well as a separate set of sector
teams. These regions were in turn merged in early 1995. Under the current structure of the
Bank, there are ten country teams, which consist of 1-6 countries each, and 12 sector teams.
The sector teams cover issues such as agribusiness, financial institutions and
telecommunications, as well a municipal and environmental infrastructure, energy
efficiency, and natural resources. Projects are signed off by both country and sector staff.
Operations support units include the Bank's appraisal unit, and the Bank's research is largely
undertaken by the Chief Economist's office.
Bankers at the EBRD face the same basic incentives as those in the World Bank and
other MDBs to identify "bankable" projects and to get them out as quickly as possible. An
ideal bankable project is one that generates a revenue stream (preferably in foreign exchange);
has a significant local contribution; a sound institutional framework, and sufficient guarantee
that the loan will be repaid. Many environmental projects are relatively less "bankable"
because they do not generate short-term financial returns and rarely earn foreign currency
needed to repay MDB loans denominated in hard currency. In addition, environmental
projects are often more time consuming to develop than projects in other sectors because of
the need for intensive institution-building to make the project viable; in the environmental
sector, the banks are often dealing with weak ministries, institutional structures, and
problems not addressed in the past.
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EBRD bankers also have incentives to finance bigger projects over small projects,
because loan volume is a factor in a banker's yearly perfonmance rating.74 As a result,
EBRD staff who do focus on environmental issues tend to be found in three particular areas
of the Bank where they face extra incentives to do so: in its municipal and environmental
infrastructure team; its energy efficiency unit; and its environmental appraisal unit. Under the
broader context of the Bank's demand-driven mission, these particular units house the
EBRD's "green bankers," whose job is to provide the substance behind the Bank's
environmental mandate, and most of the Bank's environmental activities stem from these
three groups. The first two units are operational units, and their staff seek to identify and
design loans. The third has the opportunity to more deeply penetrate the Bank's operations,
as its internal watchdog on environmental issues. In addition, the Bank has an
Environmental Advisory Council, an independent body of environmental specialists who
meet twice a year and advise the Bank on environmental issues. It is also the secretariat for a
Nuclear Safety Account (NSA), a program initiated by the G-7 countries to offer Central and
Eastern Europe and former Soviet countries financing for nuclear safety improvements.
The municipal and environmental infrastructure team finances projects in areas
including water supply, sewerage and waste water treatment, district heating, and municipal
and industrial waste management. The team, which is situated within the Bank's Banking
Department, expanded significantly since it was set up-from around four bankers before
1994 (who were attached to the Bank's transport team), to a separate unit in 1995 that grew
to around 20 bankers by the late 1990s. The team's job is to support the decentralization of
municipal services and infrastructure activity through a set of bankable projects that also have
some positive environmental impact.
In some ways, the unit has behaved less like a merchant bank than other divisions in
the EBRD, because it was funding mainly public sector projects that required sovereign-
guarantees-projects that would have been seen as too risky by private banks. As
7 4 Interviews with EBRD staff, April 1995, August 1996.
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municipalities became more financially healthy, the unit has turned increasingly toward
limited recourse or non-sovereign lending. The EBRD's municipal team also tended to use
more technical funds and bilateral grant money than other Bank units.7 5 Before the 1994
Bank reorganization, the team was also more involved in policy-oriented work, such as
research on environmental standards and public participation policies, but since then it has
narrowed its focus to investments.
Indeed, some members of the Bank's senior management were averse to creating a
separate municipal infrastructure team, on the grounds that "the merchant bankers didn't see
environment and municipalities as important."7 6 The board supported the idea of a separate
municipal team, particularly the U.S., the Nordic countries and Austria.7 7 The view was that
the municipal sector was important in Central and Eastern Europe, since it had enormous
needs and municipalities play an important role in people's every day lives. Basic municipal
services such as public transport, district heating as well as water supply were seen as vitally
important in the promotion of economic development. The needs of this sector were also
tremendous; the EBRD estimated that more than 150 billion ECU would be necessary in the
municipal and environmental infrastructure sectors of its countries of operation to achieve
basic service levels. 78 In many countries in the region, the system to finance municipalities
collapsed with the end of the central government control, leaving crumbling infrastructures
that were not able to supply basic human needs like clean drinking water.
It was also possible for the EBRD to find bankable projects at the municipal level,
particularly since municipalities have some existing utilities (in water supply and waste water
treatment, for example) that can generate a cash flow if consumers pay for utilities. While
most municipalities were not strong enough to borrow money themselves (without a
7 5 For example, the municipal and environment team has worked closely with the Project Preparation
Committee (PPC), a network of bilateral donors and the MDBs that act as matchmakers to bring together
bilateral and multilateral assistance for projects that support the Regional Environmental Action Programme.
The EBRD contains the PPC's small secretariat. The PPC's handful of officers are split between the World
Bank and EBRD. The PPC is described in greater depth in Chapter 5.
7 6 Senior EBRD banker, interview with the author, 9 July 1996.
7 7 Author interviews with EBRD board members, June 1996.
78 EBRD, Annual Report, (London: EBRD, 1996), p. 30.
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sovereign guarantee), the Bank financed projects that were expected to be able to pay for their
own debt service. Municipal entities generally did not need to be built from scratch, but
rather they required restructuring and strategies and management that would allow them to
perform efficiently while earning a profit. "There is enormous demand in the region," said
one EBRD banker, "Every town in Central and Eastern Europe needs investment in waste
water, solid waste, district heating, etc."79 Moreover, the team quickly developed a niche for
its activities, working most actively of the three MDBs to develop innovative financing
mechanisms and demonstration projects that included the use of municipal credit facilities,
municipal guarantees and an emphasis in helping municipal entities corporatize themselves in
order to improve their performance and capacity to finance themselves.
The Energy Efficiency Unit (EEU) at the EBRD was set up in 1995 to focus solely on
financing small energy efficiency projects. The promotion of energy efficiency projects in
CEE is important since former Communist countries have energy intensity levels between
two and seven times average OECD levels. The EBRD's energy efficiency unit estimates that
countries could save 30-40% of their energy consumption through demand-side and energy
efficiency measures, which would equal almost the entire energy consumption of the United
Kingdom and France together. 80
The unit grew to around 9 professionals by the end of 1996, and its work emphasized
the development of energy service companies and credit facilities for projects that promote
energy efficiency. It has focused on financing ESCOs, or Energy Services Companies.
These tend to be small projects, where the Bank finances companies that in turn finance
individual ESCO projects, mainly through multi-project facilities. In a typical project, the
ESCO identifies energy savings opportunities in industrial, commercial or municipal
facilities. The ESCO makes changes in these facilities, and is paid by its clients out of the
79 Member of the EBRD's municipal team, interview with the author, 15 Feb. 1995.
80
"EBRD and energy efficiency," (London: EBRD, 1998). Again, shareholder pressure was key in the unit's
creation; in this case, the major mover behind its birth was the U.S. Executive Director at the time, Jim
Scheuer, a retired U.S. congressman (Democrat) who was keen on the promotion of energy efficiency.
Scheuer, incidentally was also involved in efforts to reform the World Bank's environmental behavior in the
1980s. See Rich, Mortgaging the Earth, pp. 121-122.
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energy savings achieved. The EEU also works on setting up energy efficiency credit lines,
whereby local financial intermediaries finance small and medium-sized energy savings
projects. 8 1
The Bank's Environmental Appraisal Unit (EAU) works as an internal watchdog to
ensure that EBRD projects comply with the Bank's environmental policies and goals. This
unit identifies all projects to assess potential environmental concerns and opportunities before
projects are initially reviewed by the Bank's management committee--OpsCom (Operations
Committee). If an EA or environmental audit is required, the EAU helps the project leader
draft terms of reference. It again reviews projects before they return to OpsCom for a final
review ahead of board consideration. The EAU also undertakes a variety of technical
assistance projects in areas that include legislation and standards development, and has been
involved in the development and revision of the Bank's environmental procedures.
Finally, the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) is a distinctly "un-bank-like" activity, since
it is financed by grant contributions from donor countries. The Bank administrates the NSA,
and prepares projects using those funds for approval to its Assembly of Contributors. The
NSA's purpose was to undertake short-term improvements of Soviet RBMK and VVER
440/230 reactors, as a prelude to their closure.82
Analysis
The structure of the EBRD has evolved over its short life to include two specific
operational units that address environmental issues in their project work, and an appraisal
unit whose job is to ensure that the Bank's environmental policies and procedures are being
followed. The staff in the first two units have special incentives to identify and finance
projects with important environmental benefits, which means one would expect the EBRD's
portfolio to include projects with significant environmental components or objectives.
However, the "green bankers" in the municipal and energy efficiency units remain in discrete
8 1EBRD, "Environments in Transition: the Environmental Bulletin of the EBRD," (London: EBRD, 1997),
pp. 2-6.
8 2 Donor pledges to the NSA totaled 257.4 million ECU by the end of 1996. EBRD, Annual Report
(London: EBRD, 1996), p. 44.
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units, and some of the Bank's other units dwarf these "green" units in their output. By the
end of 1996, for example, the EBRD had financed more than 400 million ECU worth of
energy supply projects, compared with commitments of under 150 million ECU by the
energy efficiency unit. While it is true that energy supply projects can also have significant
environmental impacts, such as in cases where existing power plants are rehabilitated and
made more energy efficient, the point is that the output of EEU-set up to directly address
energy efficiency issues-remains relatively small.
The EAU fills the gap to some extent, by addressing environmental issues for all
projects, with the opportunity to insert environmental components into the design of projects,
and to build environmental components directly into loan covenants. The EAU, however,
has no veto power when it comes to project approval. Like other support units, it can either
sign-off on a project or send a memo with reservations before the project is reviewed by
OpsCom ahead of board consideration. The EAU is also part of the Bank's Banking
division, and to date it has not been known as a leading figure in pushing the Bank to find
better ways of addressing environmental activities. The pressure for revised environmental
policies and procedures, for example, was externally driven, mainly by the U.S. In addition,
NGOs and some ED members have also long complained that the EAU has been weak in
how it screens projects, placing projects that should require a full EA under the Bank's rules,
into a category that does not.8 3 As a result, while the EAU is an important innovation in the
Bank that pushes it to be more conscious of the environmental impact and design of its
activities, there is some debate about how effectively its work is translated into action.
The existence of an Environmental Advisory Council appears to be an innovative part
of the Bank's structure, but in practice the EBRD has not yet treated the Council as an
important resource. For example, the council's input was not sought when the Bank
8 3 Two examples of this are the Maritza East Power Project and the Transit Roads Project in Bulgaria.
According to Goldberg, Bulgarian national law would also have required these projects to receive a full EIA.
The Bank's own screening categories call for thermal power plants with a heat output of 300 megawatts or
more, as well as the construction of highways and roads to receive a full EIA. Donald M. Goldberg and et. al.,
"The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: An Environmental Progress Report,"
(Washington, DC: CIEL, 1995), p. 24.
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developed its first operational policies on energy and transport. Members have also noted
that crowded agendas for brief meetings (1-2 days) make it difficult for them to make more
than cursory contributions. Council members also have had littl. impact on the Bank's actual
operalions. 84
Finally, the Nuclear Safety Account is somewhat outside of the Bank's normal
activities, and had funded four projects by the end of 1996. Chapter 5 discusses these in
greater depth, highlighting criticism that by late 1998 no high risk nuclear reactors had been
closed in the region as a result of this account.
Financial Tools
The EBRD's financial tools enhance its private sector orientation in ways that
emphasize its character as a demand-driven financial institution versus development agency,
and do not provide any special incentives for environmental lending that does not meet more
important economic restructuring or financial goals. The Bank's emphasis on private sector
lending gives it the flexibility of working without government guarantees in the majority of
its lending, and going directly to the private sector borrower. This means that government
ministries and other actors are often not even aware of the details of specific EBRD loans,
and these loans may or may not have an impact on broader government policy reform. 85
The tools themselves are more "bank-like" than the IBRD's. In addition to making
loans to clients, the EBRD can take minority equity stakes in projects, guarantee bond issues,
develop credit lines, and provide venture capital through equity funds, among other activities.
By the end of 1996, 50% of EBRD financing was in the form of private sector loans, 26% in
state loans, 20% in equity financing, and 4% in guarantees and other off-balance sheet
items. 86
8 4 Ibid., pp. xxvii-iii.
8 5 Interviews with EBRD representatives in Hungary; finance and environmental ministry officials in Hungary
and Poland, and a central bank official in Hungary, October-November 1997.
8 6 EBRD, Annual Report, (London: EBRD, 1996), p. 20.
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The Bank also limits its financing for private sector projects to 35% of the total project
costs, and its minimum loan to 5 million ECU.8 7 This provides great incentive for the Bank
to co-finance big private sector projects with large Western companies, which then tend to
reflect the demand for specific projects from foreign investors. Joint ventures in areas such
as manufacturing, hotel development and so on, do not generally reflect areas traditional to
development banks or areas with an emphasis on environmental objectives. At the same
time, the Bank can argue that its activities are encouraging the economic development of
Central and Eastern Europe by developing its private sector, and encouraging Western
investors to enter markets where they might otherwise feel the risks are too high. This way
of promoting economic development, however, generally does not hold any particular
incentives for pursuing projects with specific environmental goals other than where they
coincide with other reasons for financing a project.
Procedures
The EBRD can be situated between the World Bank and the EIB in terms of the number
of rules and procedures that must be followed in the project cycle. The overall project cycle
at the EBRD is similar to those of the other two MDBs. While there are far fewer directives
for EBRD bankers to follow than found at the World Bank, the EBRD does have its own
sectoral policies (in areas such as transport and energy, for example), which do not exist at
the EIB. In the course of its existence, the EBRD has also strengthened its policies on the
environment and developed new public information policies. The following sections
discusses the rules and procedures that are particularly important in shaping the Bank's
environmental behavior; its country strategies, EA procedures, and rules governing the
Bank's transparency and accountability.
Country Strategies/Environmental Procedures
The EBRD does have country strategies, but these do not carry the same weight as the
World Bank's Country Assistance Strategies, because the EBRD is more demand-driven and
8 7 The 5 million ECU rule appears to be flexible, however, since there are a number of projects under this
amount, particular in areas involving an EBRD equity stake.
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less interested in policy-based lending, As a result, the Bank does not engage in the type of
policy dialogues with recipient countries that the World Bank undertakes. EBRD country
strategy objectives tend to reflect the Bank's activities rather than lead it into new territory.
They might include issues such as promoting private sector projects, strengthening a
country's financial sector and infrastructure, and so on. Nonetheless, as a result of board
pressure, the Bank's revised environmental policy also calls for country strategies to contain
a section on the environmental implications of the Bank's work, which will draw on the
World Bank's National Environmental Action Plans for specific countries. This policy
forces greater attention to environmental issues, but given that these country strategy
documents do not drive lending, in itself it is not a strong incentive to shape how Bank staff
identify and design individual projects.
The EBRD's environmental procedures are more similar to the World Bank's than the
EIB's, and were strengthened in a 1996 revision. Indeed, one of the key environmental
experts who helped design the World Bank's EA procedures also helped to develop those for
the EBRD.88 The procedures are an important counterbalance to the Bank's demand-driven
character, as a sort of "quality control" mechanism to incorporate environmental mitigation or
enhancement into the Bank's operations.
Like the World Bank, the EBRD's appraisal process has a screening component,
whereby a project's potential environmental issues are identified, and a project may be placed
in categories A, B, or C, which are similar to those of the World Bank.8 9 Unlike the World
Bank, the EBRD may also undertake an environmental audit for manufacturing facilities or
sites, to determine past or present concerns, risks, liabilities, and responsibilities for specific
sites.
Under the Bank's first set of environmental policies, standards were chosen in a largely
ad hoc manner, to fit a particular project. This does not mean that the chosen standards were
8 8This was Stephen Lintner, whose role as a World Bank "green banker" is discussed in Chapter 5.
89 Category A projects require a full EA; B projects, a partial EA, and C project no EA.
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low, but rather that there was no clear policy for determining which standards to use.
Bankers preferred the flexibility to determine, on a case-by-case basis, which standards to
follow, while environmentalists and some of the more powerful executive directors offices
(such as the U.S. and Germany, for example), felt a stronger policy was necessary to ensure
that appropriate, and high standards were being met.90 "We thought they should have
standards that you can quote," said an official in the U.S. Executive Directors' office.91 The
new environmental policy was tightened up in 1996, so that projects will use EU standards
for pre-accession countries, and meet national or World Bank standards where EU standards
do not exist. For non-accession countries, EU standards provide a common term of
reference, and the Bank will follow national or World Bank standards.
Porousness
The EBRD has not emphasized the development of relationships with NGOs and the
public to degree that the World Bank has, but it has made significantly more efforts to
improve its transparency compared with the EIB. The Bank approved a new policy on
information disclosure in 1996, in response to pressure by some powerful board members,
and despite opposition from some members of senior management. 92 The U.S., in
particular. made it clear that it would not participate in the Bank's first capital increase
without this policy. 93 The underlying principle of the new policy is that information on the
Bank's activities should be made available to the public "in the absence of a compelling
reason for confidentiality." 94 This has included the creation of new Project Summary
Documents, which provide information on both public and private sector projects before they
have been approved by the board.
Analysis
9 0 Interviews with officials in U.S. Treasury MDB office, Washington DC, 28 March 1996; German ED
official, London, 16 June 1996.
9 1Official in U.S. ED office, London, interview with the author, 15 January 1997.
9 2 Some board members, including the Swiss and French, were also not in favor of greater information
disclosure. Author interviews with various ED offices, June 1996.
9 3 0fficial from U.S. Treasury' MDB office, Washington DC, interview with the author, 28 Maich 1996.
9 4
"EBRD Increases Public Access to Information," Press Release, i July 1996.
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The description of the above policies shows some of the important ways in which the
EBRD has sought to improve its environmental performance. Like the World Bank, the
EBRD has a well developed set of EA procedures, and a new public information policy. It
does not have an independent inspections panel that seeks to ensure full compliance with its
rules, and its country strategies do not carry the same weight as the World Bank's CAS
reports.
As is the case of the World Bank, the EBRD's environmental procedures and public
information procedures in theory provide incentives for the Bank to think more carefully
about the environmental implications of its work, and to avoid financing projects that might
be environmentally destructive. Interviews with Bank staff and environmentalists provide a
number of examples where project design has been enhanced by environmental
consideration. 95 While the EBRD's policies have not yet faced the type of scrutiny the
World Bank has seen, they still appear to face similar challenges and criticism; that is, the
question of how well the Bank follows its own procedures. NGOs and major board
members such as the U.S. believe the Bank's performance has been mixed.
Before the revision in environmental and public information policies, NGOs argued that
the Bank often "cut corners" in implementing its procedures, or failed to implement them at
all. 96 The case of the proposed Mochovce loan, discussed in Chapter 1, is one example
where NGOs and other actors criticized the Bank for ignoring its own environmental
procedures. Another case that stirred prompted NGO criticism was a 1993 loan the EBRD
made for investments in a new aluminum smelter in ziar nad Hronom, Slovakia. The
EBRD's $110 million loan and $15 million equity contribution was designed to build a new
smelter to replace the state-run ZSNP (Zavod Slovenskeho Narodneho Povstania) smelter
that was built in the 1950s. The old smelter was one of the largest polluters in its region,
9 5Some examples include the addition of a nature preserve as part of Bulgarian highway loan; the addition of a
PHARE-funded bicycle path as part of project in Kaunas, Lithuania, and so on. Interviews with EBRD staff,
June 1996, and NGOs in the Baltic States, May 1998.
96 Goldberg, "The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: An Environmental Progress
Report," p. ix.
164
with emissions of dust, S02, NOx and carbon monoxide well above EU standards. It also
contained what environmentalists called a "mountain" of bauxite waste, that was 45 meters
high, and covered 40 hectares. This waste leached arsenic, mercury, and cadmium into the
soil and groundwater. 97 The project had already been rejected by the World Bank on
economic grounds, given the fact that Slovakia has to import all of the bauxite it made into
aluminum, and the weak state of the world aluminum market.
Environmentalists were concerned about the plant, and favored either its closure, or its
use as for secondary aluminum production. What sparked their criticism was their perception
that the Bank did not follow its public participation procedures properly. As the Center for
International Environmental Law (CIEL) noted, "There was no formal notification of the
public; the public was not included in scoping the EA: meetings with a handful of
environmentalists were conducted on extremely short notice and with no advance information
provided." 98 CIEL has also been critical of the Bank's EAs, arguing that they regularly lack
some of the elements of a full environmental impact assessment, including an assessment of
alternatives and indirect impacts. 99
Even after the development of the new public information and environmental policies,
NGOs continued to argue that implementation is uneven. They argued that the Bank did not
follow its public participation procedures in several projects, including a Bulgarian Railway
project and a proposed project to finance the completion of two partially-built, Soviet
designed nuclear reactors at Khmelnitsky 2 and Rovno 4 (K2/1R4) in the Ukraine. 100 On the
other hand, NGOs were also increasingly involved in the development of new policies at the
Bank, with opportunities to comment and offer feedback on policy drafts. NGOs are also in
contact with EBRD resident offices in various recipient countries, although these offices do
not have specific "NGO liaison" staff or environmental staff, as do some of the World
9 7Ibid., p. 11.
9 8 Ibid., p. 12.
99Ibid., p. xii.
10 0 "K2/R4 Completion Projects," http://www.ecn.cz/k2r4/BOARD.sTM#2.2.
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Bank's offices in Central and Eastern Europe. By contrast, the EIB has no resident offices in
Central and Eastern Europe. Some environmentalists have felt the meetings they have had
with the EBRD Team Directors for their country as well as staff in the London headquarters
have been positive, and believe that access to Bank staff and documents has improved. 101
Generally, the EBRD appears to face the same struggles confronting the World Bank in this
area. While its procedures and rules call for more openness and public consultation, in
practice it has been difficult to change a culture of bankers looking to avoid processes that
slow down project development and further complicate the project cycle.
EIB
The case of the EIB is more clear cut than the other two banks. The combination of
less shareholder pressure to address environmental issues, along with the Bank's relatively
more "bank-like" mission would lead one to expect to find less evidence of strong incentives
for Bank staff to actively promote environmental issues. This expectation is borne out by the
empirical evidence. Without the impetus provided by shareholder pressure seen in the other
two MDBs, the Bank has attempted to meet its environmental goals primarily by emphasizing
project adherence to European environmental standards inside the EU, and to relevant
standards (EU, national, or international) outside of the EU. While the other two banks also
incorporate national, EU, international or World Bank standards into their projects, to a
greater degree they also seek to fund projects with environmental objectives or major
components. The World Bank in particular seeks to nest its activities in more specific policy
analyses that may preclude some of the types of loans undertaken by the EIB.102 In
1 0lPersonal E-mail communication from Bulgarian NGO, Centre for Environmental Information and
Education, 16 February 1998. Personal E-mail communication from Jozsef Feiler, Policy Coordinator, CEE
Bankwatch Network, 22 July 1998.
1 0 2 For example, the World Bank generally avoids lending for expensive end-of-the-pipe technology in Central
and Eastern Europe, such as flue-gas-desulphurization, preferring to look at other policy and project
alternatives. The EIB, in turn, will lend money for such technology. There are examples where the EIB has
been ready to fund projects the other MDBs have turned down for broader policy reasons, such as a proposed
new metro line in Budapest. The World Bank and Hungarian NGOs did not see the high costs of the metro
project as justifying the benefits, and felt other potential projects, such as maintenance of existing roads, are
greater priorities in Hungary's transport sector. Author interviews with World Bank official in Poland and
Hungarian NGOs, October 1997. There are also examples of projects offered by the World Bank or EBRD
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comparison with the other two banks, then, the EIB has not had to struggle as much to
institutionalize its environmental mandate, because to date shareholders have not had high
expectations for the Bank's activities in this area.
Mission
In terms of the Bank's mission, the EIB's dominant goal of promoting regional
development inside its own shareholder EU countries explains the Bank's historical focus on
traditional MDB infrastructure projects. Like the EBRD, the EIB can lend to both public and
private sector projects. The emphasis on infrastructure lending was further encouraged in the
1990s when the Bank was asked by the European Council to focus more attention on the
financing of trans-European networks (TENs), which consist of priority investments in
transport, energy and telecommunications projects that would encourage greater
infrastructural links among member states (as well as pre-accession countries). The Bank's
other stated lending priorities include loans to small and medium-sized enterprises, and loans
to promote the international competitiveness of European industry.
EIB projects are not accompanied by the type of policy analysis and advice found at the
World Bank, and to a lesser degree, the EBRD. The EIB has been called the EU's "house
bank," or a "wholesale bank," despite its growing geographical scope, and it spends the vast
majority of its resources and efforts in countries that are much more developed than the
typical recipient of World Bank or EBRD loans. As a result, from a policy perspective, the
EIB's primary mission has not evolved in line with the geographical scope of its lending.
In Central and Eastern Europe, it is somewhat ironic that while the EIB has been the
least policy-oriented of the three MDBs, it is poised to eventually become the most important
MDB in CEE, particularly for pre-accession countries. As CEE countries build more
healthy, developed market economies, they gain increasing access to private sector sources of
finance, including international capital markets, so their appetite will decrease for relatively
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that a recipient country had funded by the EIB instead, because there is relatively less conditionality tied to
EIB loans.
more expensive MDB loans that come with conditionality. By the mid-1990s, the World
Bank and EBRD began to move away from the more developed countries in the region and
focus greater attention on the less developed countries. Both banks also have graduation
policies, whereby they use certain criteria to "graduate" countries as loan recipients. By
contrast, EIB lending to CEE has increased, and will continue to do so for pre-accession
countries. The Bank's 1997-2000 lending mandate to the region of 3.5 billion ECU has been
augmented by an additional 3.5 billion ECU pre-accession facility for CEE countries and
Cyprus. As a result, by 1997, the EIB began the process of taking on a more prominent role
in the region. 1 0 3
Structure, Location of Environmental Staff
The EIB's organizational structure offers limited incentives for Bank staff to pursue
environmentally-oriented projects beyond the more typical infrastructure projects that have
positive environmental affects. One important reason is that the Bank is a lean operation,
with its staff of around 900 now lending more each year than the World Bank does with a
staff of 10,000. EIB staff are now organized into seven Directorates, out of which two
handle lending within the EU, and a third handles lending outside the EU. Within the latter
Directorate, there is a department that works on Central and Eastern Europe. This department
contains approximately 20 bankers who cover 11 countries. The fact that there are only
around two bankers working on each country in the region encourages these bankers to rely
on potential loan recipients coming to them with ideas, as well as encourages the EIB to
piggy-back onto projects developed by one of the other two MDBs, as a co-financier.
Given that the Bank is largely demand-driven, potential loan recipients (called "project
promoters") tend to bring their ideas to the Bank, often to one of these three lending
directorates. If the Bank chooses to pursue a project idea, appraisal is undertaken by a team
consisting of a loan officer from one of the lending directorates, and an economist and
10 3 There are also other signs that the Bank's mission is expanding. As a result of the Amsterdam Summit in
1997, the EIB drew up a program to invest in new areas of health and education, as well as to do more in the
areas of urban renewal and environmental protection.
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engineer from the Bank's Project Directorate. Appraisal teams can also include a lawyer
from the Bank's legal departments. The Projects Directorate is a product of the 1995 merger
of two separate directorates (one containing economists and the other, engineers), which is
divided into departments by sector (e.g., industry, energy and mining, infrastructure) rather
than by country. The Projects Directorate produces the appraisal report, which is used by the
Bank's Management Committee to decide whether to recommend loan approval by the
Bank's board.
The EIB has no separate environmental appraisal unit, and no specialized bankers or
division whose work emphasizes finding projects with primary environmental goals or
significant environmental objectives. There is also no real research arm in the Bank,
although a small Chief Economist's office was created in the mid- 1 990s to think specifically
about broader strategic issues affecting the Bank. There is an "Environmental Policy
Coordinator," a position in the Projects Directorate created by the Bank in 1996 to help
develop and ensure implementation of the Bank's broad environmental policy, and to
represent the Bank in various environmental fora.
As a result of this organizational structure, there is no particular community of
environmentally-oriented staff at the EIB, in the sense that there is at the other two banks.
There are individuals who end up addressing environmental issues as part of their work, but
these issues are not driving their work, or encouraging specific staff to identify particular
types of projects or policy issues. The engineers in the Bank's Project Directorate end up
being the closest thing the EIB has to "green bankers," since they address environmental
standards in their technical appraisal of a project, which is discussed in greater depth below.
A few of the Bank's economists are environmental economists and do get involved in the
Bank's work on environmental issues. Staff in the Bank's Legal Affairs Directorate also
work on ensuring the Bank is complying with EU law on environmental and other issues.
However, the EIB does not have the types of in-house environmental networks that one finds
at the World Bank, and to a lesser extent the EBRD.
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Financial tools
The ELB's financial tools enhance staff incentives to rely on projects being brought to
the Bank by potential borrowers, as well as opportunities to co-finance projects with other
MDBs. The Bank does not generally fund more than 50% of a loan project's total cost, so it
relies on projects where there are partners. Given its small staff size, the EIB has been
attracted to co-financing projects in Central and Eastern Europe with the other two MDBs,
and in such cases, the EIB does not take the lead in project development. Instead, it funds a
discrete part of a project, and tends to rely on the other two banks for the bulk of the
necessary work in project development and missions. The EIB also does not have the in-
house sources of grant funding available to the same extent available to the other two banks
to finance feasibility studies and background research for project development.
Although it is generally more "bank-like" than the other two MDBs, as is discussed
throughout the dissertation, the EIB is ironically also the most risk-averse, and seeks double
guarantees (both sovereign and EU guarantees) for loans outside of the EU. 104 This also
creates incentives for staff to look for more traditional infrastructure projects that the EIB has
historically funded, and provides a disincentive for innovation in the scope of work the Bank
has traditionally undertaken, where that work may entail new or different risks. It would be
harder, for example, for the EIB to find novel ways of undertaking municipal financing in
CEE where sovereign guarantees are no longer forthcoming.
In Central and Eastern Europe, the EIB offers the cheapest loans of the three MDBs,
with the least attached conditionality. Because it does not undertake the type of policy work
and feasibility studies undertaken by the other two banks, it tends to have lower
administrative costs. EIB loan rates are generally closer to LIBOR rates than those charged
by the other two banks, and EIB also does not charge a commitment fee on its loans which
the other two banks charge. This fee, which can be around 1-1.5% of a loan, is the MDB's
10 4EIB loans in CEE are backed by a full guarantee under the General Budget of the European Communities.
EIB, Annual Report, (Luxembourg: EIB, 1989), p. 13. The new 3.5 billion ECU accession facility,
however, is not backed by this guarantee.
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commitment to reserve capital once a project is signed. In addition to its direct project loans,
the EIB has been active in the use of "global loans," which are similar to credit lines that are
set up for financial intermediaries to on-lend for smaller projects. This is typically a good
way for the MDBs to be able to reach small and medium-sized enterprises. The use of global
loans also enhances the Bank's demand-driven character, since it does not know in advance
how the resulting loans will be spent. Financial intermediaries have no particular incentive to
seek out environmental loans or projects.
General Procedures/Environmental Procedures
Of the three MDBs, the EIB has the smallest set of bureaucratic rules and procedures
governing project development. It does not have country strategies, and given its demand-
driven nature, often does not even design or develop the projects it lends money to. Project
promoters present projects ideas to the Bank, and the Bank will evaluate projects of interest
through an appraisal procedure. Because the Bank often enters into projects that are already
developed, it can be more difficult for it to insist on changes to project design.
Environmental issues are addressed as a part of the broader routine of investment
appraisals, undertaken by the project's small appraisal team. The purpose of the appraisal
process is to evaluate whether a proposed project complies with relevant European and/or
national laws and other rules, and to evaluate the project's economic, technical, and financial
characteristics. Generally, it is the engineers who address environmental issues in the
appraisal report. Their emphasis is on ensuring that projects within the EU comply with
various EU legislation or national legislation-whichever is higher-and that non-EU
projects comply with relevant environmental legislation. Outside the EU, the Bank has more
flexibility on which standards to follow. Often it is up the EIB's engineers to decide which
standards to follow, and there are no specific guidelines at the Bank on appraisal. "Relevant"
legislation and standards can be defined as EU (in the case of accession countries), national,
or also in terms of norms of "best existing practice." This often means making sure that the
technology used in projects is likely to fulfill certain standards.
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Within the EU, whether a project is subjected to a formal environmental impact
assessment (EIA) or not is determined by the Commission's directive on EIA (85/337),
which in 1997 was amended by directive (91/11). This directive serves as a reference for the
project directorate's appraisal. Increasingly, this directive has become the norm for guidance
in pre-accession CEE countries. The EIA directive identifies types of public and private
sector investments that require an EIA. EIAs are undertaken by developers and must be
provided to public authorities, who take the information into account in deciding whether to
authorize the investments. The directive is mandatory for large projects such as building
highways, railway lines, oil refineries, and large power plants, which are called Annex 1
projects, and require public consultation. 105 And an additional set of projects (Annex 2)
requires impact studies if the member state believes it is necessary.l 0 6 The information
required under the EIA directive includes basic information on the project and the ways in
which it might affect the environment; alternative solutions to reducing this impact; and
particular measures to avoid or reduce potential negative impacts.
The ways in which environmental procedures have been institutionalized at the EIB
create incentives for staff to rely heavily on pursuing relevant environmental standards in
project design, versus other ways of evaluating environmental options, including broader
macroeconomic and sectoral analyses that might impact the strategic directions that lending
might take. 107 Such a reliance on standards could lead to situations where the EIB is using
acceptable technology or standards in projects that might not make environmental or
economic sense in a broader analysis.
10 5 Annex 1 projects include: crude oil refineries; power stations and combustion plants generating more than
300MW; installations for the storage and disposal of radioactive waste; foundries; installations for asbestos
extraction; integrated chemical installations; motorways, express roads, long distance railway lines, and
airports of a certain size; port vessels larger than 1,350 tons; and installations to dispose of waste produced by
incineration, chemical treatment, or land fill of toxic, dangerous wastes.
10 6Annex 2 projects include a broader range of investments in sectors including agriculture, energy, rubber,
metals, chemicals, food and infrastructure. Examples in the energy sector include surface storage of natural
gas, power installations not included in Annex 1, underground combustible gas storage, installations that
produce and enrich nuclear fuels, or reprocess irradiated nuclear fuels.
10 7 Senior EIB officials, interviews with the author, June 1996.
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The Bank's emphasis on standards works best when the appraisal team is working on
EU-based projects in areas where there are strong, clear environmental standards, whether
EU or national, or when engineers emphasize the use of technology that encourages energy
or natural resource conservation (at a reasonable price) that might not have been addressed
otherwise. Yet it can be problematic to apply EU standards outside the EU, where they may
not always be appropriate. Reliance on national environmental standards in non-EU
countries where compliance and enforcement may be weak can also water down the EIB's
standard-based approach.
EU environmental policy itself is weak in several respects. Many areas covered under
national environmental policies are not yet addressed at the European level, particular in the
area of industry-specific standards. In addition, EU environmental policy uses directives as
the primary legislative instrument, but these are not directly translated into domestic law.
Member states determine the forms and methods of application. Since member states' record
on implementing many environmental objectives remains poor, these environmental
directives are often criticized as weak.10 8 The EIA directive itself has been criticized by a
number of different sources for its mixed record in terms of implementation. The European
Commission itself, for examle, has argued that many member states abuse the discretionary
power given to them under the Annex 2 types of projects. 10 9
108 See, for example, Tamara Raye Crockett and Cynthia B. Schultz, "The Integration of Environmental
Policy and the European Community: Recent Problems of Implementation and Enforcement," Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law 19, no. 169 (1991), pp. 181-182; Angela Liberatore, "Problems of
Transnational Policymaking: Environmental Policy in the European Community," European Journal of
Political Research 19 (1991): 281-305; Alberta Sbragia, "EC Environmental Policy: Atypical Ambitions and
Typical Problems?," in The State of the European Community: The Maastricht Debates and Beyond, ed. Alan
W. Cafruny and Glenda G. Rosenthal (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 337-352. In terms of
weak enforcements, in 1996, the Commission registered over 600 environmental complaints and infringement
cases against member states. See "Implementing Community Environmental Law," Communication to the
Council of the European Union and the European Parliament, (Brussels: European Commission, 1996).
Beginning in 1997, the European Commission began fining member states for non-compliance with
European Court of Justice judgments on environmental law infringements.
10 90ne goal of the 1997 amendment of the EIA directive was to reduce member state wiggle-room on
addressing Annex II projects by clarifying the circumstances under which these projects are required to have an
EIA undertaken.
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In addition, and more importantly, the EIA directive is a procedural directive. This can
have a positive impact on areas where developers and planning authorities are compelled to
address environmental issues that might not have been considered otherwise, but it may be
much weaker in countries where the administrative capacity may not exist for this procedure
to be properly undertaken. While a number of CEE countries have adopted new EIA policies
in the 1990s, in many of these countries these policies are unevenly implemented or
ignored.1 lo Norms for EIA and public participation are still evolving in a region where
governments are still learning how to address openness and transparency in decisionmaking
processes. Since the EIA process is the responsibility of the government, there is little the
EIB can do if a CEE government does not have the ability (or interest) to pursue EIA
work.l 11
The way the EIA process has been institutionalized at the EIB has been criticized as too
relaxed by some Commission officials, even for EU projects. Under Article 21 of the
Bank's statute, for proposed loans in EU member states the Commission and relevant
member state provide their opinions on the project before it is submitted to the Bank's board.
The Commission's vote on the EIB's board has particular strength; if the Commission votes
against a project, the rest of the board must be unanimously in favor of the project for it to be
approved.
DGXI, the Commission's environmental directorate, has felt that information circulated
by the EIB related to EIAs has often been insufficient. For Annex 1 projects, for example,
the Commission requires the EIB to "satisfy itself that the procedures...are made."1 12 The
Commission may ask for a non-technical summary of the EIA before the EIB board approves
the loan. For Annex 2 projects, and projects not falling under the EIA directive, the
Commission still requires the Bank to assure it that the project is "acceptable" in
I 10 Barbara Connolly and Tamar Gutner, "Organizational Inertia and Innovation: Environmental Aid to
Central and Eastern Europe."
1 As EIB official Peter Carter pointed out in an April 1998 correspondence to the author, it can either walk
away from the project or request certain corrective actions.
11 2European Commission, "Working Procedures between the EIB and the Commission Services (DGXI and
XXII) in the Consultation of the Commission under Article 21 of the EIB Statute," 10/30/92.
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environmental terms, in order for the Commission to formulate a positive opinion. DGXI
officials have said that these procedures still allow for the EIB to provide the Commission
with very little information, which sometimes makes it difficult for the DGXI to approve a
project. 113 The EIB, in turn, believes DGXI should have more faith in the EIB's technical
expertise. 114
Monitoring and Porousness
For much of its existence, the EIB has not faced strong pressure to be more
transparent. In the late 1990s, NGOs in Europe and CEE were first beginning to organize
campaigns to push more strongly for greater transparency. Of the three MDBs, the EIB is
the least transparent, and most resistant to opening up channels of communication with
NGOs and other outside actors. The Bank has organized several meetings with NGOs, to
initiative an exchange of views. However, the Friends of the Earth NGO noted in 1997 that
these exchanges "have yet to yield any substantial results in terms of changed policies and
procedures." 15
The Bank first adopted rules on information disclosure in 1997, a year after the EBRD
adopted its new policy and three years after the World Bank did the same. The EJB's rules
are by far the least open. They do not specify any particular project documents automatically
be available to the public (such as, for example, the project summary documents and EIAs
available to the public from the EBRD, and a multitude of project documents and information
available from the World Bank's Public Information Center). While the information policies
of the other two banks stress circumstances under which information will be made available
the EIB's policy stresses all the reasons why it will not provide information. These include
when, "in the judgment of the Bank...(a situation) is of such a nature that its disclosure could
harm the Bank's legitimate interests," and examples of when this might occur are not
1 13 Author interviews with EIB officials, and DGXI officials, June-July 1996. For the general procedure for
the Commission's opinions on EIB operations, see the most recent version of the "Vademecum: Procedures
for the Commission's Opinion on EIB operations," European Commission, DGII.
1 14 Author interviews with EIB officials, June 1996.
1 15 James N. Barnes and Sandrine Bretonni, "An Overview of the European Investment Bank: Accountability
and Transparency," (Paris: Friends of the Earth, 1997).
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defined, The Bank, says the EIB's rules on information disclosure, "has to respect, in its
relationships with other institutions, bodies and persons both within and outside the
Community framework, the confidentiality of communications and agreements between itself
and the latter."l 16
The ways in which the EIB has institutionalized its environmental goals reflect a lack of
real pressure from its board on environmental policy issues. Given its emphasis on
following environmental standards versus a broader away of analytical tools, its small staff
size, and the absence of a stand-alone environmental appraisal unit or any other
environmentally-oriented home for "green" staff, one would predict that any
environmentally-oriented work in Central and Eastern Europe would stem from the Bank's
traditional activities in infrastructure lending, or arise from co-financing opportunities with
one of the other two MDBs. Chapter 5 shows this to be the case.
Conclusion
The chapter shows how diffuse governance structures of the three banks sometimes
make it difficult for donor policy goals to be translated into incentives facing MDB staff. As
a result, even in cases where donors have given an MDB a strong environmental mandate, its
ability to institutionalize environmental policy goals is strongly shaped by the degree to which
it is designed to emphasize its character as a financial institution versus a development
agency. In particular, the incentives facing staff to design environmentally-oriented projects,
or to incorporate environmental components into projects often do not complement other
incentives to get bankable projects approved by the board of directors without what some
bankers may see as undue delay. In other words, the incentives for staff to address issues of
sustainable development often do not match other incentives to move money.
Where an MDB has limited environmental policy goals to begin with, such as the EIB,
we would not expect institutional design to provide many incentives for Bank staff to pursue
environmentally-oriented work. This chapter has shown this to be the case. However, in
1 16 European Investment Bank. "Rules on Public Access to Documents." Adopted by the Bank's Management
Committee on 26 March 1997. 97/C 243/06.
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cases where the MDB has strong environmental policy goals, such as the World Bank and
EBRD, the incentives facing staff to translate these goals into projects and programs depend
on how "bank-like" the MDB is. The chapter has also shown areas in which it is a struggle
for the MDBs to harmonize conflicting incentives. The arguments in this chapter highlight
some of the limits of neo-realist explanations for institutional behavior and show how
important the organizational environment is in shaping institutional behavior.
Given the way the banks' environmental policies are institutionalized, what types of
outcomes might we expect to see in their portfolios of activities in Central and Eastern
Europe? First, this chapter shows that "green bankers"-MDB staff whose job specifically
requires them to focus on environmental issues-are located in specific departments in the
World Bank and EBRD, and consists of one official at the EIB. One might predict that
World Bank and EBRD projects with environmental goals or significant environmental
components could be traced to these people. A parallel prediction would be that such projects
are unlikely to be found in the EIB's portfolio, unless such environmental goals coincided
with other economic or financial goals, and/or were demanded by project promoters.
Second, in general, it is likely that the relatively more demand-driven MDBs will
emphasize as "environmental" those projects that fit their financial and economic criteria that
are demanded by governments or private investors that have some environmental benefit.
These might include energy rehabilitation projects, or water and waste water treatment
projects, as well as waste management, among others. The "green bankers" in the MDBs
would likely be the source for projects that go beyond these categories, to include projects
that are not demand-driven, and the incorporation of environmental components into projects
that do not emphasize environmental issues.
Third, and following from the previous two points, we would expect to see a greater
emphasis on projects with major environmental goals or significant environmental
components in the World Bank's activities in Central and Eastern Europe, followed by the
EBRD. The World Bank is designed to have the "darkest green" portfolio, whereas the
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EBRD has a "medium green" approach of an MDB seeking to address environmental issues
without moving too far beyond its emphasis on private sector development, despite the
ambitious environmental mandate it received from its shareholders. We would expect the
EIB's portfolio to have the fewest of these types of projects, reflecting the absence of a
strong mandate from its shareholders, and reinforced by its institutional design. The
following chapter examines these hypotheses with evidence of the three banks' activities in
Central and Eastern Europe.
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Chapter Five
MDB Environmental Policies and Practice in CEE
This chapter turns to the three MDBs' work in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and
analyzes how environmental issues are addressed in their lending and non-lending activities.
In other words, given the banks' different missions and mandates, and given the factors that
shape the ways in which their environmental behavior is institutionalized, this chapter
examines what the banks' actually set out to do in a common region. How have the banks'
environmental mandates affected their behavior and their contribution to environmental policy
development in recipient countries? An examination and analysis of the three MDBs'
activities in CEE provides evidence to support the hypotheses suggested at the end of Chapter
4. Generally, the banks' overall portfolios reflect how "bank-like" they are, in terms of the
scope of their mission, and the extent to which it is driven by recipient or investor demand.
As expected, the World Bank is undertaking the widest scope activities and projects with
significant environmental goals and components, followed by the EBRD, and with the EIB
trailing in third place.l Further, the environmental character of the banks' portfolios does
reflect the activities and output of "green bankers." The chapter also shows more explicitly
the ways in which recipient demand influences the scope of MDB activities. Even for the
World Bank, which is the least demand-driven of the three, recipient demand can reduce or
constrain the scope of its possible activities, particularly in countries that have gained access
to alternative sources of funding without conditionality attached. These institutional factors,
1it is worth pointing out that commercial banks have not played a significant role in proving environmental
financing to CEE or the former Soviet states. This is attributed to a low demand for such financing, few
attractive lending opportunities available to commercial banks, and the absence of knowledge within the banks
on how to design such financing. OECD, "Report on Environmental Financing in CEEC/NIS," Task Force
for the Implementation of the Environmental Action Programme in Central and Eastern Europe, document
CCNM/ENV/EAP (98)24/REV2, 18 May 1998, p. 11.
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and the incentives they influence, highlight some of the gaps between mandate and actions,
particularly for MDB like the World Bank and EBRD that have strong environmental policy
goals.
The chapter is divided into three sections. It begins with a brief conceptual discussion
on the challenge of measuring an MDB's environmental outputs. It then situates the banks'
activities in CEE, by describing the environmental issues facing the region since the fall of
the Iron Curtain, and the ways in which major donor agencies have responded through
environmental assistance strategies. 2 The three banks are the major international financial
institutions operating in CEE, together committing just under $25 billion to the region in
1990-96.3 In addition, the World Bank also played a particularly important intellectual
leadership role through its work on the Regional Environmental Action Programme (EAP), a
document endorsed by environmental ministers from East and West that sought to identify
priority environmental problems in the region, offered policy strategies for solving them, and
influenced a broader policy discussion among donors and recipients. Finally, the third
section more closely examines each bank's general strategies in the region, the composition
of its activities, and its approach to addressing environmental issues in its work. The
empirical evidence illustrates the dynamics of each bank's environmental behavior, and how,
in practice, their approaches differ. This section also addresses some of the issues facing the
banks in implementing their projects. While an in-depth analysis of implementation issues is
beyond the scope of this dissertation, available evidence does highlight some of the
2 The term "donors" here refers to bilateral and multilateral donors. For some aid officials, "donors" is
synonymous with bilateral agencies, and does not include the MDBs.
3 This figure includes loans, World Bank IDA no-interest loans, and EBRD equity financing and guarantees.
Dollar amounts for EBRD and EIB totals in ECU are calculated at the 31 December 1996 exchange rate of
1ECU=$1.25. See Table. 5.2 for details. In comparison, the largest single donor to the region is Germany,
which committed $19.2 billion to CEE and NIS countries, in mostly grants, between 1990-1996. Following
Germany is the U.S. SEED (Support for East European Democracy) program, which provided a total of $2.7
billion to CEE in 1990-96, and the EU's PHARE program, which provided around 5.4 billion ECU to
Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet Union. The bulk of U.S. and PHARE money has
been in the form of grants. "SEED Act Implementation Report" Fiscal Year 1997, U.S. Department of State,
February 1998, Table 1.
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challenges facing the banks, and makes the point that in practice, it is extremely difficult to be
precise about measuring the "environmental impact" of a specific project.
Defining Environmental Behavior
As noted in Chapters 1 and 3, there is no clear way to measure a bank's "environmental
behavior." One can neither precisely quantify the environmentally "good" or "bad"
components of individual projects, nor evaluate the overall environmental benefits, costs and
impact associated with an MDB's entire portfolio of activities. Instead, one must rely on
imprecise indicators, but these will still shed light on how environmental mandates affect
MDB behavior. The simple continuum laid out in Chapter 1 (Table 1.2) identified MDB
environmental commitments as falling between "lighter green," or more minimal "business-
as-usual" activities, and "darker green" more pro-active activities. This chapter repeats the
continuum in Table 5.1, but instead uses it is a way to identify the ways in which a bank's
activities will reflect its environmental actions. In other words, each bank's projects can
theoretically be placed onto the continuum. This continuum, however, has an additional
point; that is, where MDB projects essentially flunk their own environmental objectives, by
ignoring environmental consequences. Therefore, projects falling in or around the left end of
the continuum-"Not Green"-are projects that have highly negative environmental
consequences, such as the Polonoereste and Indonesia Transmigration projects discussed in
Chapter 2 that NGOs used as primary examples of the World Bank's weakness in addressing
environmental issues in the 1980s. In CEE to date, the MDBs have not funded any
environmentally disastrous projects like those that have received so much publicity in other
parts of the world.4
"Light Green" projects, in turn, are those where the bank relies on a strategy of trying
to address possible environmental harm through its due diligence procedures, particularly the
use of environmental impact assessments. It may also depend on pursuing what it considers
to be relevant environmental standards at this level. Projects in this category emphasize
4 Environmentalists, however, are critical of many of the MDB projects in CEE, and these criticisms are































minimizing environmental harm in activities designed for other purposes, and the extent to
which they reflect a "business-as-usual" approach depends on factors such as how deeply the
environmental impact assessment procedures change the project's design, or what types of
environmental standards are followed. Most of the investment projects in an MDB's
portfolio fall this category.
Moving rightward along the spectrum, the penultimate point is where projects have
significant environmental objectives, and the final point adds to that projects with primary
environmental goals, as well as a bank's involvement in policy debates, research,
information dissemination, and other process-oriented and knowledge-based contributions
that are difficult to quantify. To reiterate, in practice there is often no clear boundary between
projects that have significant environmental objectives or primary goals. For example, an
energy project aimed at using coal more efficiently could be considered to be a project with a
primary environmental goal, since it might reduce air pollution more than any alternative a
recipient might consider. At the same time, even efficient coal burning is still coal burning,
and therefore a coal efficiency project might be considered as one with a significant
environmental component rather than a primary goal.
Most MDB projects have multiple objectives, and it is often difficult to assess the
"weight" of one objective versus another. Even quantifying objectives, in terms of the share
of "environmental" costs or benefits in a specific project is not a precise science and is based
on numerous assumptions that may or may not be correct. In addition, an environmental
component may be a small component of a project, in monetary terms, but have a greater
impact on the environment. As noted in Chapter 3, the banks themselves do not have clear
definitions of what is or is not an "environmental" project, and as expected, tend to draw the
lines of definition in ways that add as many projects as possible.
The nature of the environmental components or goals of a project depends, in part, on
the sector. In the transport sector, for example, environmental components or goals may
involve the development of mass transit, traffic management strategies to reduce congestion,
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or policies that encourage higher occupancy vehicles or increased vehicle fuel efficiency.
Environmental components or goals of water projects may include water quality management;
pollution abatement, and the treatment and disposal of wastewater and sewage. Water
sanitation projects tend to be automatically considered as "environmential" projects by all three
banks, bu, whether or not a water treatment plant relies on mechanical treatment, versus
biological or chemical treatment can have a great impact on its environmental impact. Water
supply projects, however, can be more difficult to categorize, since they can be
environmentally harmful if they involve diverting rivers or draining aquifers in an
unsustainable manner. 5 Indeed, water projects are often in the ";B" categories at the World
Bank and EBRD, as projects requiring partial environmental assessments (EAs) since they
have important environmental impacts.
In the energy sector, an MDB's environmental mandate is reflected in the degree to
which its projects address supply side efficiency gains, demand-side management and
conservation, 6 the promotion of renewable or relatively cleaner energy sources, as well as the
reduction of emissions Lhrough end-of-pipe technology (such as flue gas desulfurization--or
FGD--at power plants). In forestry, a "green" project would clearly include forest protection
and conservation management components. Ultimately, because projects often have multiple
objectives and goals, any exercise in categorizing them vis-a-vis their environmental nature is
more of an art than a science.
Examining where each bank's projects fall on the continuum tells us something about
how it seeks to translate its environmental goals into tangible project or program strategies,
and reveals important variation among the banks. Since, as noted above, there are no
"disaster" projects on the scale of MDB projects most criticized by NGOs, and since many
projects in an MDB's portfolio follow due diligence procedures, the best indicator of the
extent to which an MDB has moved beyond a "business-as-usual" approach is reflected in the
5Kerstin Canby, World Bank Environmental Department, interview with the author, March 1998.
6
"Integrated resource planning" is the approach by which decisions about utility investments take both supply
and demand-side energy conservation options into account. Michael Philips, "The Least-Cost Energy Path for
Developing Countries," (Washington DC: International Institute for Energy Conservation, 1991).
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types of projects it finances with significant or primary environmental goals. Examining this
information can also tell us something about implementation, where data is available. Project
implementation by MDBs and other donor agencies is an important, but under-researched,
area. There is little data on implementation on MDB projects, outside from some self-critical
analysis done by the banks themselves and investigative work by NGOs critiquing specific
projects. This means that it is difficult to know if projects designed with an environmental
emphasis are carried out as planned, or whether projects have unanticipated, negative
environmental effects. There have been many cases, for example, where MDBs have been
accused of funding forestry projects that produced more trees for sawmills, or agricultural
projects that have depleted soils.
There is also insufficient data to be able to determine how a project's EA procedures
affect project design and implementation. In addition, the EIB does not make EA information
publicly available. 7 While this dissertation cannot determine how each project in each bank's
portfolio has been implemented, this chapter will highlight some areas where there have been
visible implementation difficulties, by surveying what evidence is available on
implementation, and adding evidence from my own primary research on project
implementation in Central and Eastern Europe.
The Environmental Context in Central and Eastern Europe
The collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe revealed enormous
environmental degradation. At the time, the dramatic state of degradation of the region's
environment was widely publicized by descriptive magazine articles, newsletters and weekly
reports on the region. These drew public attention to issues such as the death of vast
stretches of rivers, whose waters were unfit for human drinking or industrial use; irreversibly
damaged forests; and the high degree of birth defects and retarded development in a few
seriously polluted areas.8
7It is up the borrower to decide whether or not to disseminate the information.
8 For early accounts of the region's environmental context, see Richard Ackermann, "Environment in East
Central Europe: Despair or Hope," Transition 4 (1991): 9-11; Duncan Fisher, "Paradise Deferred:
Environmental Policymaking in Central and East Central Europe," (London: Royal Institute of International
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The compilation of data soon showed that much of the environmental damage in the
region was concentrated in specific areas. In Poland, for example, while some parts of the
country are relatively unspoiled, around 1/3 of the population lives in 11 % of the country's
territory that is considered an "ecological hazard," primarily in the southern and western parts
of the country, where there is a concentration of heavy industry and mining. 9 One of the
cities in this area is Katowice, where according to a 1991 World Bank report, 24-hour
ambient concentrations of black smoke were more than six times higher than European
standards.1 0 Katowice is part of a broader, regional "hot spot" called the "Black Triangle,"
which is home to many highly polluted areas in southwestern Poland, northern Bohemia in
the Czech Republic, and southeastern Germany. In northern Bohemia, for example, large
coal-burning power plants contributed to SO2 emissions that measured 20 times the national
average in the early 1990s.1 l
Elsewhere in the region, there were a number of small, old industrial areas that have
exposed their nearby populations to harmful emissions. These included places like Copsa
Mica, Romania, where two lead smelters and other badly maintained industrial facilities were
thought to be the source of respiratory problems and high exposure to lead;l 2 and
Affairs and Ecological Studies Institute, 1992); Bedrich Moldan and Jerald L. Schnoor, "Czechoslovakia:
Examining a Critically Tll Environment," Environment Science and Technology 26, no. 1 (1992); Joan
DeBardeleben, ed., To Breathe Free: East Central Europe's Environmental Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1991); Hilary F. French, "Eastern Europe's Clean Break with the Past," (Washington DC: Worldwatch,
March/April 1992); Joseph Alcamo, ed., Coping with Crisis in Eastern Europe's Environment (New York:
Parthenon Publishing Group, 1992); and Helmut Schreiber, "The Threat From Environmental Destruction in
Eastern Europe," Journal of International Affairs 44, Winter (1990): 359-391.
9 Tomasz Zylicz, "In Poland, It's Time for Economics," Environmental Impact Assessment Review 14, no.
2,3 (1994): 79-94. These areas were actually first designated as ecological hazards by the Polish Council of
Ministers in 1983. Clyde Hertzman, "Environment and Health in Central and Eastern Europe- A Report for
the Environmental Action Programme for Central and Eastern Europe," (Washington DC: The World Bank,
1995), p. 6.
1 0
"Environmental Policy in Central and Eastern Europe," World Bank document, EMTEN, November 19,
1991.
I I World Bank, "Environmental Action Programme for Central and Eastern Europe," document submitted to
the Ministerial Conference in Lucerne Switzerland (April 28-30, 1993) (Washington: World Bank, June 30,
1994), p. 9 (hereafter cited as "EAP"). Among the health problems that may be associated with
environmental degradation in northern Bohemia are: reduced life expectancy compared with the rest of the
country; and comparatively high mortality rates for lung cancer, infant mortality, respiratory and
cardiovascular diseases. Wertzman, "Environment and Health in Central and Eastern Europe: A Report for the
Environmental Action Programme for Central and Eastern Europe," p. 19.
12 Exposure to lead can be source of learning problems and "subtle brain damage" in children. Wertzman,
"Environment and Health in Central and Eastern Europe," p. 20.
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Dimitrovgrad, Bulgaria, where high hydrogen fluoride and hydrogen sulfide emissions from
one poorly located fertilizer plant were thought to be a major source of below-normal height,
weight and lung function in half of Dimitrovgrad's children. 13
Massive air pollution, which produces particulates and SO2, is widely seen as the worst
pollution problem in many parts of CEE in terms of its impact on human health. It is caused
largely by the burning of domestic hard and sft brown coal as a major fuel. Soft brown
coal, or lignite, is more prevalent than hard coal in the region, and is characterized by its
relatively high sulfur and ash content, as well as its low heating efficiency.l4 Major sources
of air pollution in the region included power plants, as well as small industry, households
and district heating plants that rely on coal. When CEE countries began the process of
political and economic transition to market economies, they had the distinction of producing
over 66% of Europe's sulfur dioxide emissions, but only 33% of its GDP.15 The health
effects resulting from coal burning in the region include high rates of chronic bronchitis and
asthma, as well as other acute and chronic respiratory diseases.1 6
Water pollution has been another serious problem in the region, although to date there
is no thorough comparative data that measure the extent of the problem throughout the
region. Data have shown an unusually high proportion of surface water is not fit for human
consumption. In Poland, this figure was put as high as 96% in the early 1990s.17
Czechoslovak government statistics for 1992 showed that around 50% of the country's
drinking water was below government purity standards, while 30% of the country's river
water was not even capable of sustaining fish.18 In addition, in many countries in the
13 EAP, p. 9. Descriptions of the health problems associated with these areas are in Wertzman, "Environment
and Health in Central and Eastern Europe," pp. 19-20.
14 "Cleaning up After Communism," Economist, February 17,1990, p. 54.
15 Penn Kemple, "East Europe: Greening of the Reds," Washington Post, December 24 1989, C3.
16 Hertzman, "Environment and Health in Central and Eastern Europe: A Report for the Environmental Action
Programme for Central and Eastern Europe," p. x.
1 7Schreiber, "The Threat From Environmental Destruction in Eastern Europe," p. 361.
18 "Environmental Policy in Central and Eastern Europe," World Bank, p. 20.
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region, only a small percentage of the population was served by waste water treatment
facilities that treat waste water to secondary levels. 19
Water quality can threaten human health through the presence of nitrates (particularly in
rural areas, due to agricultural run-off), and the discharge of heavy metals and toxic
chemicals. The main causes of water pollution in the region have included: 1) inadequate
drinking water processing systems and sewerage treatment; 2) unmonitored municipal and
industrial discharges; 3) contamination from agricultural runoff; 4) contamination from
industrial air emissions; and 5) in coal producing regions, such as Poland, discharges from
coal mining operations. Finally, for both water and air pollution in the region, at the time of
the regime changes monitoring was mostly inadequate or nonexistent and technology was out
of date. Additional environmental problems that have threatened health in the region stem
from lead contamination in soil and air due to smelting and transport, and the inadequate
disposal of toxic waste.2 0
Views on the Causes
Strategies of economic development adopted by the former, centrally planned regimes
are widely blamed for the degree of Central and Eastern Europe's environmental degradation.
The Stalinist path of economic development focused on state ownership of the means of
production, and rapid industrialization with an emphasis on heavy, resource-intensive
industry (chemicals, steel, etc.). Growth was the governing priority, with little awareness of
the significance of environmental protection. Prices were determined by the state, not the
market, and the prices of energy and other natural resources were often set at extremely low
19 Definitions for levels of treatment are not precise. Primary treatment usually refers mainly to physical
processes, such as gravity settling, to take out large particles. Secondary treatment generally adds biological
processes to reduce organic materials. Tertiary treatment adds another level of chemical, physical or biological
processes to further reduce inorganic and organic materials. I am grateful to the Association of Metropolitan
Sewerage Agencies for these definitions. As of the mid-1980s, the percentage of Eastern European countries
served by secondary treatment included around 15% for Bulgaria and Hungary, and around 20% for Romania
and Poland. These figures may be higher now, due to increased investment in this sector since the regime
changes. OECD data cited in Axel H6rhager, "An Environmental Perspective for Eastern Europe," EIB Papers
18, no. November (1992), p. 39.
2 0 For a more recent account of the environmental issues and policy responses facing the region, see Jiirg
Klarer, Bedrich Moldan, eds., The Environmental Challengefor Central European Countries in Transition
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997).
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levels, which encouraged industry's excessive and wasteful use of energy. Central plans in
the region did not include any mention of environmental protection until the 1970s, and even
then attempts to face growing pollution problems were viewed as weak.21
Another factor contributing to the level of environmental degradation in the region was
the absence of open public debate or opposition to government policy before the 1970s. In
most countries in the region, individuals had no means to oppose state action, and were not
allowed access to environmental information, the main weapon of NGOs in any political
system.2 2 Often, environmental data were considered state secrets and were suppressed.23
Curiously, many countries in the region did have strict environmental standards, but the
environmental ministries had little power to enforce them.
Environmental Reform Process
Environmental issues began to be discussed in depth throughout the region during the
1970s, as environmental degradation became more visible at the same time governments
sought legitimacy by attempting to improve living standards and allowing some areas of
public opposition to government policies. By the late 1980s, the environment had become a
rallying point for people who were seeking broad political and economic change. In
Hungary, for example, the proposed Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric dam on the
Danube triggered the creation of the country's first environmental movement, and one that
became a powerful voice calling for the end of the Communist regime.24 Public criticism of
2 1Zbigniew Bochniarz, Representative of Polish Ecological Club and Senior Fellow, Hubert H. Humphrey
Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota, hearing before Subcommittee on Transport and
Hazardous Materials of the Committee on Energy and Commerce (U.S. Environmental Initiatives in Eastern
Europe), U.S. House of Representatives 101st Congress, April 23, 1990, Serial No. 101-140.
22 Stanley J. Kabala, "Environment and Development in the New East Central Europe: Addressing the
Environmental Legacy of Central Planning," (Middlebury, VT: Geonomics Institute, 1991).
2 3 Richard N.L. Andrews, "Environmental Policy in the Czech and Slovak Republic," in Environment and
Democratic Transition: Policy and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Anna Yari, Pal Tamas,
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), 5-48.
2 4 This was a joint project between Czechoslovakia and Hungary that entailed the construction of three new
dams on the Danube (two on the Czechoslovak side and one on the Hungarian side) and two hydroelectric
power plants. The project also entailed creating a new reservoir and rerouting the Danube for 25 kilometers
via a new canal that would sharply slow the flow of the river. Hungarian environmentalists were concerned
that the project would have negative impacts on agriculture and drinking water, among other things, and with
growing vocal protest, the movement resulted in the Hungarian government agreeing to halt work on the dam
temporarily in 1981, and finally permanently, in 1989. However, Slovakia continued constructing a dam on
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the dam project was synonymous with public criticism of the government and calls for
greater political participation.
In the wake the collapse of the Communist regimes beginning in 1989, environmental
clean-up and protection emerged as one of the top policy priorities throughout the region.
There were great hopes both inside and outside government that the region's environmental
legacy would now be openly addressed, and that this was a historic opportunity to
incorporate environmental protection into the new economic order. The environmental lobby
organized around the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam dispute, for example, immediately
achieved its goals when the newly elected Hungarian government suspended construction on
the Hungarian side.
New environmental ministries were set up, or old ones restructured, and they were
given the mandate of establishing basic environmental priorities. Most countries in the region
have now enacted framework legislation on the environment, which contain principles such
as polluter pays, prevention and precautionary action, and public participation. Countries are
also in the process of establishing or revising environmental standards, often with the goal of
bringing them in line with European standards. A number of CEE countries have established
environmental funds, which collect environmental fees and fines that are used to finance
grants or low-interest loans for environmental purposes. Yet, as economic restructuring
goals assumed prominence, the initial enthusiasm toward environmental restructuring and
reform faded.
Currently, progress on environmental policy reform and clean-up is mixed. While
governments have initiated numerous new policies and set up stronger legal frameworks,
environmental management institutions in many countries in the region remain weak. This
reflects the lack of sufficient financial resources available to most of these ministries,
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its side of the border. See Judit Galambos, "Political Aspects of an Environmental Conflict: The Case of the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam System," in Perspectives on Environmental Conflict and International Relations,
ed. Jyrki Kakonen (London: Printer Publishers, 1992), 72-95.
relatively weak administrative capacity, and the fact that environmental ministries tend to be
less politically powerful compared with other ministries.
At the same time, in many parts of the region some important pollution problems have
declined. For example, air quality has improved substantially in many areas, reflecting a
downturn in industrial production, higher energy prices, and the restructuring,
modernization, or closure of some old industrial polluters. Some countries, such as
Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, have made significant progress in
reducing the use of leaded gasoline.25 In countries such as Poland and Hungary, there are
even signs that a return to economic growth has not resulted in increased sulphur dioxide and
carbon dioxide emissions.2 6 The quality of the region's rivers and lakes has also slowly
improved in some areas where industrial discharges have fallen, although residue from
previous emissions can remain a source of pollution.2 7 The drive by ten countries in the
region to join the European Union (EU) has become an increasingly powerful force
influencing further government action in meeting European environmental standards.
Role of Donor Institutions: Regional Overview
The activities of MDBs are an important component of the broader picture of donor
environmental assistance to the region. As environmental concerns became a relatively less
important policy priority in CEE, donor institutions acted as a powerful countervailing force
to catalyze environmental reform and clean-up in the region. Bilateral and multilateral donors
have influenced policy development by altering the costs of options available to domestic
policymakers through the provision of policy and project ideas backed by technical expertise
and financial resources in domestic contexts characterized by weak institutional capacity and
insufficient financial resources.28 Donors have influenced the policy development process
25 Gordon Hughes, "Is the Environment Getting Cleaner in Central and Eastern Europe?" Selected Evidence
for Air Pollution and Drinking Water Contamination," (Washington DC: The World Bank, 1995), p. 5.
2 60ECD, "Environmentai Indicators: A Review of Selected Central and Eastern European Countries," (Paris:
OECD, 1996).
2 7 Hughes, "Is the Environment Getting Cleaner in Central and Eastern Europe?" p. 11. He uses as an
example discharges of arsenic in Bulgaria's Maritza River basin. Discharges of arsenic from copper smelters
have declined, but this is not reflected in the levels of arsenic in parts of the river near these smelters.
28 Schreiber, "The Threat From Environmental Destruction in Eastern Europe."
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directly, by providing resources and ideas for specific environmental projects that
governments would be unlikely to fund on their own. Indirectly, these actors have helped to
shape the parameters of policy debates, assisted with legislation development, and supported
environmental interest groups.
Donors and recipients concur that the costs of cleaning up various environmental
problems in the region and meeting European environmental standards are enormous, and
that donor aid will contribute only a small portion of the total cost. Indeed, one estimate of
the cost to 300 municipalities in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary to meet
European waste water treatment standards is more than $50 billion.29 The European
Commission, in turn, estimated that it will ultimately cost $130 billion for the ten CEE
accession countries to bring their environmental standards up to European norms.3 0
Totals for donor aid are dramatically smaller than cost estimates. There is no source of
precise data that provides aggregate amounts of environmental aid. The only current source
is compiled by the OECD, but it does not show its methodology for deriving its figures,
which seem to be on the low end.31 It calculates that between 1991-97, major bilateral
donors and the three MDBs committed around 2.5 billion ECU (or approximately $2.7
billion) for investment in projects with primary or significant environmental components, as
well as policy development and technical assistance. 32 My own data, analyzed in this
chapter, shows that the three MDBs alone provided around $2.4 billion in financing for
projects with significant or primary environmental goals, and this figure does not include
money spent on technical assistance. The point is that there is an enormous gap between
financing needs and assistance levels. Given this gap, donors have realized that they must be
careful to leverage their assistance in order to it to be effective, and since 1991 they have
made conscious attempts to work more closely together and with recipient country actors to
2 9 EAP, p. 2.
3 0 Gillian Handyside, "EU Hopefuls Face $130 Billion Environmental Bill," Reuters Ltd., September 10,
1997.
3 1 It appears it left it up to donors to classify their commitments. OECD. "Environmental Financing in
CEEC/NIS," http://www.mem.dk/aarhus-conference/issues/Finance/ececep50.htm, June 1998.
3 2 Ibid.
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address the region's environmental problems. Donors have also sought to use aid to catalyze
more effective environmental management in the region and to encourage a long-term process
of environmental reform.
In 1991, what is now referred to as the "Environment for Europe" process was
launched in response to early failures in aid coordination and prioritization. 33 These early
failures were characterized by numerous feasibility studies that did not lead to investments,
low absorption rates for assistance, and duplication and overlap in donor activities. Donor
environmental assistance has been driven by factors that include concern for transboundary
pollution, a desire to provide humanitarian aid, and an interest in promoting exports. Yet in
many cases, attempts at cooperation have conflicted with individual donor agendas. For
example, as Connolly and I have noted, bilateral aid:
...features some of the most blatant examples of 'solutions chasing problems,' where
donors... seek out collections of problems that allow them to export goods, employ
their own consultants, mitigate transboundary environmental problems affecting their
own borders, or focus on particular sectors in which they have substantial experience
at home. Recipients, in turn, have their own set of interests that may not fit well with
donor interests. This can be seen in recipient preferences for environmental
assistance in grant form, since they generally are not deeply interested in taking out
sovereign loans for environmental purposes unless such loans also meet economic
goals. However, pressure to harmonize to European environmental standards may
increase the attractiveness of loans.34
The Environment for Europe process is a loose set of institutional initiatives and
regional meetings of environmental ministers, donor officials, and other interested actors
from East and West that has become a broad political framework for cooperation on
environmental protection in Europe.3 5 Its strength and contribution lie in its role in creating
3 3 Ibid. For a comprehensive account and analysis of the Environment for Europe process, see Barbara
Connolly and Tamar Gutner, "Organizational Inertia and Innovation: Environmental Aid to Central and
Eastern Europe."
34 Ibid.
3 5 Ibid., p. 1. The Environment for Europe process grew out of a campaign in the early 1990s by Josef
Vavrousek, then the Czechoslovak federal environment minister, to set up a permanent Council of European
Environmental Ministers who would hold regular conferences, set action plans and targets, and formulate
strategies and targets to implement them. Vavrousek found that his counterparts in Western Europe were not
eager to create new institutions, but they were willing to meet occasionally to discuss East-West
environmental issues, with an emphasis on managing environmental aid and developing environmental
policy.
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an international policy community of government officials, donors and NGOs that have
increased the linkages and interactions among donors and recipients, while diffusing a set of
ideas about how environmental priorities for the region should be set, and encouraging
convergence around a specific policy processes, such as the use of environmental action
plans, environmental impact assessments, and national environmental funds.36 At the same
time, the ideas and processes espoused by this policy community are unevenly implemented
within donor and recipient institutions, given the existence of divergent interests and weak
institutional capacity, particularly within some recipient institutions. Donor institutions may
work more closely together, and increase their opportunities for cooperation, but the
Environment for Europe process has not led them to dramatically change their aid strategies.
The World Bank and the EBRD have been involved with the Environment for Europe
process directly in important ways, while the FIB has only been a marginal player. First, the
World Bank was the lead actor in organizing and writing the Environmental Action
Programme for Central and Eastern Europe (EAP), which was one of the most important and
visible outcomes of the Environment for Europe process.37 It contains a set of guidelines,
principles, and priority areas for environmental management in the region, and its goal was to
be considered as a process and guide for policy development among Eastern and Western
countries and multilateral institutions. The document was endorsed by the second meeting of
Eastern and Western environment ministers and officials from international organizations at
the 1993 Environment for Europe conference in Lucerne, Switzerland. Its main ideas are
discussed below in the section on the World Bank.
36 "Policy community," sometimes called "policy network" or "policy subsystem," has been defined by a
number of political scientists as clusters of public and private actors who organize around particular topics to
pursue their policy goals. See, for example, Paul A. Sabatier, "An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy
Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein," Policy Sciences 21 (1988), p. 131. For a deeper
analysis of the argument on how these have worked in the area of environmental issues in CEE, see Connolly
and Gutner, "Organizational Inertia and Innovation: Environmental Aid to Central and Eastern Europe."
3 7Following the first "Environment for Europe" meeting in 1991, European environmental ministers asked
the World Bank and OECD to draft a broad framework that identifies priorities for environmental reform and
expenditures in CEE. The OECD assisted the Bank in producing the document, which included input from a
variety of donor and recipient governments, as well as a number of supporting studies undertaken by
consultants.
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In addition, the World Bank and the EBRD are involved in one of the two micro-
institutions created by the Environment for Europe process to facilitate the implementation of
the EAP: the Project Preparation Committee (ppC).38 The PPC is a network of bilateral
donors and the MDBs that acts as a matchmaker to bring together bilateral and multilateral
assistance for projects that support the goals of the EAP. Its staff consists of a handful of
officers at the World Bank and EB3RD, and a small secretariat at the latter.39
The PPC has helped to catalyze environmental assistance to CEE by promoting projects
that blend (MDB) loan and (bilateral) grant aid in ways that are attractive to both these
institutions and recipients. Recipients are more likely to agree to an MDB loan if its
sweetened by a grant component. Likewise, MLDBs find they can more easily sell loan-based
projects that include grant money. Bila:eral donors, in turn, are pleased to link their activities
with larger investment projects, and can more easily counter criticism that they have funded
studies that have lead nowhere. At the same time, however, the PPC has only changed
donor priorities on the margin. Most of the PPC projects consist of bilateral funding being
added to MDB projects that were already in the banks' project pipeline. As a result, the PPC
tends to fund projects that would have existed without it, although it does speed up the
identification, evaluation, and implementation of specific projects. The following section
turns to the specific activities of each MDB in the region.
MDB Activities in CEE
Table 5.2 summarizes the three banks' lending commitments to CEE during 1990-96,
and reveals the basic details of their activities. Commitments reflect loans that have been
approved by an MDB's board, and are signed by both the bank and the loan recipient. As
3 8The Task Force, based at the OECD, is a small secretariat whose goal is to help CEE states implement
policy and institutional aspects of the EAP. Its members include representatives from both donor and
recipient countries, as well as international organizations and several NGOs. The Task Force's job is to help
recipient countries adapt EAP recommendations to local conditions through the development of national
environmental action programs (NEAPs). It also coordinates efforts with the PPC in assisting countries to
better mobilize financial resources to address important environmental problems. The Task Force also hosts
meetings for recipients, workshops on specific topics of environmental management and other activities that
bring donors and recipients together.
3 9
"PPC Report to the Third Ministerial Conference 'Environment for Europe' in Sofia," (London: Project
Preparation Committee Secretariat, 1995), p. 5.
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such, they are mainly useful as a reflection of a bank's intentions. At the same time, this
measure is weak in the sense that it does not reflect disbursements, a key indicator of the
flow of funding, nor does it reflect loans that were canceled before or after board approval.4 0
Lending commitment data are therefore most useful as an indicator of the strategies and
interests of each bank.
The table shows that World Bank had the highest overall level of commitments,
standing at $11.6 billion in IBRD and IDA funding, compared with $7.3 billion for the
EBRD and $6 billion for the EIB. Poland and Hungary were the top two recipients for
World Bank and EBRD funding, and ranked first and third, respectively, for the EIB.
Romania was also a major recipient of MDB lending, ranking second for the World Bank,
third for the EBRD and fourth for the EIB. The data also show that the World Bank was the
leading lender in three countries-Bulgaria, Poland and Romania. However, the EBRD had
the highest lending volume in Slovenia, and the EIB had the highest lending volume in the
Czech Republic. Indeed, although the EIB has the smallest staff of the three banks, it still
also managed to rank second in commitments among the three banks in Bulgaria, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia. At the same time, unlike the other two banks, it was not authorized
to lend money to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and FYR Macedonia.
While it is difficult to be precise about the number of projects each bank has committed to
undertaking, the EBRD is undertaking the largest number of projects in most countries in the
region.41 In countries like Poland, for example, although the EBRD ranks third out of the
three banks in total loan commitments, it is undertaking twice as many projects as the World
Bank and three times as many projects as the EIB.
40 Of the three banks, only the World Bank makes loan cancellation data publicly available.
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The Bank's approach to CEE since 1990 reflects its broader mission of nesting lending
and other policy activities into broad policy dialogues with recipient governments. Its
lending program reflects a substantial amount of economic and sector work, which includes
country economic memoranda, trade analyses, financial sector assessments, social sector
analysis, as well as energy and environmental studies for various countries in the region. As
such, it is seen as a largely "top-down" strategy, with lending going to governments in the
former of project lending or policy-based lending that is conditioned on macroeconomic
policy reform.4 2
Many of the Bank's earliest loans to most countries in the region consisted of baiance-
of-payments support through structural adjustment loans (SALs), which helped countries
deal with hyperinflation or balance-of payments deficits, and sought to address some of the
basic issues involved in transforming centrally-planned economies to market-based
economies. Other early loans focused on sectoral reform for the financial, agricultural and
energy sectors. Yet beneath this broad strategy, the Bank has sought to tailor its assistance to
the particular circumstances of individual countries, since the process of economic reform has
varied greatly from country to country.
For countries in the earlier stages of economic restructuring, the Bank has supported
liberalization, privatization, and public enterprise restructuring, in addition to supporting the
reform process in a variety of sectors. In these countries, the Bank continues to support
major fiscal adjustments through structural adjustment lending, and loans that help to develop
basic social services and safety nets. For countries further along in the transition process that
have begun to attract significant private capital flows, the Bank has adjusted its strategy to
4 2 The relationship between the Bank and many of the countries in the region pre-dates the regime changes of
the early 1990s. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were among the founding members of the Bank,
although Poland and Czechoslovakia pulled out a few years later. Romania has been a member of the World
Bank and IMF since 1972, although its Communist leadership stopped borrowing in 1982. Hungary joined
the Bank in 1982, and Poland rejoined the Bank in 1986. Other countries in the region are more recent
members.
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focus on support for eventual EU membership, which includes helping countries adapt to EU
standards in a number of areas, including agriculture, industry, the environment and social
sectors.43 For this group of recipients, as demand for World Bank loans declines, the Bank
emphasizes its policy advice and guarantees.
The World Bank's Portfolio of Activities
Table 5.3 shows the sectoral breakdown of the World Bank's commitments to CEE in
the period 1990-96.44 It is important to note that this table, as well as comparable tables for
the other two banks, incorporate projects with environmental objectives into broader sectoral
categories where possible, (i.e., putting wastewater treatment projects in the "water sector,"
or energy conservation projects into "energy sector") since the banks do not have a
consistent, comparable way of defining what is or is not an "environmental" project.
Therefore, the Miscellaneous Environment category for Table 5.3 only includes those World
Bank projects that cannot easily be encompassed in a broader category, such as the Bank's
forestry management and environmental capacity building projects. I will separate
"environmental projects" in sections of this chapter that focus specifically on these projects.
The table highlights the ways in which the World Bank's portfolio reflects its broader
strategies and mission, that is an emphasis on lending to government with a strong
component of broad sectoral reforms and policy-based lending conditioned on
macroeconomic reform. Almost one-quarter of the Bank's loan commitments are for multi-
sectoral and related lending, of which the vast majority are SALs and loans for basic
economic restructuring and reform.4 5 Loans supporting financial and industrial reform
account for an additional 20% of the Bank's portfolio. These include a series of "enterprise
4 3Various annual reports; "The World Bank Streamlines its Strategy for Transition Economies," Transition
(Washington DC: The World Bank, February 1997).
4 4 Appendix 1 contains a complete listing of the Bank's projects in CEE from 1991-96.
4 5 Loans that fall under "miscellaneous" include those that provide foreign exchange for imports, landmine
clearance and soldier demobilization in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The categorization of MDB projects by
sector is an imperfect art, which allows for a great deal of discretion. A number of financial sector loans, for
example, reflect financing for agricultural reform, but are not included in the agriculture category, while some
urban development loans support transport or water supply and sanitation, but are not included in separate
categories.
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Table 5.3: World Bank CEE Commitments by Sector, 1990-96
millions $1
Sector Sector Total %of
portfolio
Multisector and Misc. 2900 24.6
Finance and Industry 2360 20
Energy: 1717 14.6
Power Generation 1440
Oil and Gas 176




General Transport Sector 412
Other (includes port rehabilitation, urban transport) 105
Agriculture 999 8.5




Urban Development 261 2.2
Misc. Env. (env. management/forests) 220 1.9
Water 195 1.7
Social Sector 52 .4
TOTAL 11.7 billion2 99.33
Sources: World Bank Annual Reports, 1990-1996.
'Includes IBRD, IDA resources, as well as Trust Fund financing for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2 Discrepancy with Table 5.2 due to rounding.
3 Discrepancy due to rounding.
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and financial sector adjustment" loans for almost all countries in the region to support
government programs c.r enterprise and banking reform. Energy and transport are major
areas of lending, which is also the case with the other two MDBs. In the energy sector, the
bulk of the Bank's activity is focused on power generation. The Bank's character as the least
"bank-like" MDB is also reflected in loans it makes for social sector, health care and
population issues, and education, which are not undertaken by either of the other two MDBs.
Approach to Addressing Environmental Issues
The Bank's strategy for addressing environmental issues in the region has two main
components-its work in policy advice and reform, and its work in project lending. Policy
work focusing directly on environmental issues undertaken before the Bank's mid-1997
reorganization tended to reflect the activities of staff in the central environmental department
and the regional technical department. Project work emphasizing environmental goals, in
turn, has also reflected the involvement of these staff, in addition to individual task managers
(re-named in mid-1997 to "task team leaders") who specialized in the development of projects
with significant environmental goals.
In terms of its policy work, some of the Bank's more traditional economic restructuring
policy advice has addressed environmental issues where it coincided with economic policy
changes. An example would be the Bank's efforts to persuade countries in the region to
remove energy subsidies through its SALs, which would encourage a more sustainable use
of resources.
More directly related to environmental policy reform are the Bank's efforts to help
countries formulate environmental policy reform strategies. This has been accomplished
through the Bank's assistance in the development of national environmental action plans
(NEAPs), and through its leadership in the development of the Regional Environmental
Action Programme (EAP).
The EAP argued that a mismatch between the high costs of environmental restructuring
and the limits of Western aid requires donors and recipients to identify the highest priority
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environmental problems and to look for cost-effective ways of solving them. In other
words, the needs of environmental aid and reform must be balanced against the costs of
different reform options. Arguing that the level of damage to human health should be the
main criterion driving the prioritization of environmental problems, it listed the region's
major environmental priorities as: airborne dust caused by coal-burning; lead found in air and
soil, caused by transport and smelting; and sulfur dioxide and other gases, emitted primarily
by the burning of high-sulfur coal or fuel oil. The EAP emphasized that air pollution is
probably the greatest short-to-medium term environmental problem in terms of its impact on
human health, but also recommended addressing nitrates found in water, and drinking water
contaminated by poor disposal of hazardous and nuclear waste. The problems identified as
highest priority issues were thus primarily local, and not transboundary problems.
The EAP argued that policy prioritization should be based on four criteria: (1)
policymakers should support "win-win" economic refoim policies that also have
environmental benefits, such as liberalizing energy prices; (2) environmental policies should
be targeted and should establish a framework of institutions and incentives to discourage
emissions of pollutants and biodiversity loss in a cost-effective manner; (3) environmental
spending should go to projects with the highest benefit-cost ratios; and (4) "modest"
expenditures should be set aside for programs that have a long lead time from start to finish
but still have high benefit-cost ratios.46 The underlying message of the document was that
problem prioritization, policy reform, institutional strengthening, capacity building, and
investment are the areas recipient governments as well as donors should emphasize. The key
to environmental improvement in the region is thus not donor financing, but recipient policy
reform.
The EAP report disappointed governments in the region, who had hoped the effort
would bring about additional donor funding targeted toward specific projects. It is also
unclear to what extent the EAP was ever "implemented," given the patchy diffusion in the
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4 6 EAP, p. 1-26.
region of processes that donors and recipients have agreed upon. Still, the EAP was
important as a systematic attempt to set regional environmental priorities, and offer policy
options to address them.
In addition to its policy work on the EAP and on NEAPs, the Bank has been actively
involved-sometimes playing a leading role-in a number of other multi-country or multi-
actor regional initiatives involving transboundary water issues. These include action
programs for the Danube River, the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean, as well as the Aral Sea,
the Black Sea, and the Caspian Sea. These often involve the development of action plans, in
which the Bank tends to be centrally involved, and these plans lead to the financing of
discrete projects by the donor community as well as recipient countries.
In ternms of project lending, Table 5.4 lists loans made by the Bank for projects with
primary environmental goals or significant environmental objectives, which correspond to the
"Dark Green" point on Table 5.1. In addition, the Bank has been responsible for carrying
out an additional $67.2m GEF grant projects, which are also listed separately in Table 5.5.47
The 19 projects in Table 5.4 total $1.2 billion, or 12% of the Bank's total commitments to
the region. Out of this amount, the lion's share--eight projects totaling $1.1 billion and
comprising almost 80% of these loans-was devoted to energy-related projects, which
emphasized energy efficiency and the reduction of air pollution. Four loans, totaling $19.2
million, consist of projects in the water sector in the three Baltic states, which focus on
reducing water pollution in the Baltic Sea by rehabilitating water and waste-water systems,
and also contain components for the environmentally sustainable management of coastal zone
areas. The Bank is also involved in sustainable forestry loans in Albania, Croatia and
Poland. In addition, it has funded an environmental management project in Poland-the
Bank's first project in CEE following the regime changes-to strengthen domestic
environmental institutions.
4 7The dissertation does not analyze GEF projects in depth, since the GEF is not a purely World Bank
activity, but rather a separate facility involving the World Bank, UNDP and UNEP that operates with grant
funding. While worth mentioning as an important component of the World Bank's environmental activity, it












o C C -E ac





















































































































































































































































































































c co c'Oo .-00CO)0Ccn (U
c





._ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0
















































, 0E O0 30 Ca






























































































































































































































Given the fact that nearly all MDB projects have multiple objectives, what
distinguishes the projects in Table 5.4 from others the Bank undertakes? Investments to
improve infrastructure are important to all countries in the region, and MDB "environmental"
projects tend to revolve around water and energy infrastructure rehabilitation. In this sense,
virtually all of the MDB "environmental" projects might be considered to be "business-as-
usual" investments. Yet, a closer look at the projects in Table 5.4, (as well as the comparable
table for the other two MDBs), reveals qualitative difference in project objectives between
these and other projects in the banks' broader portfolio of projects. In terms of the energy
projects on this list, as noted above, some important indicators of an emphasis on
environmental objectives in energy lending include the extent to which a project address
supply-side efficiency or demand side management and conservation issues. This moves
projects beyond more traditional MDB power lending for building or rehabilitating power
plants, or expanding transmission and distribution systems.
The Bank's more "green" energy lending in CEE consists of both sector loans and
project loans. The sector loans, such as the Poland Energy Resource Development, tend to
involve broader sectoral restructuring and policy reform. The main goals of the Polish loan,
for example, were to: increase the country's output of natural gas through investments to
improve gas recovery from existing gas fields, as well as to evaluate other potential gas
fields; to encourage greater domestic use of gas versus hard coal, which provides the vast
majority of Poland's energy supply; and to encourage energy conservation through the
support of energy price reform. The project's designers expected that gas produced under
the project would have an impact on reducing the amount of hard coal used for household
heating, which in turn would reduce emissions of ash, sulfur dioxide, carbon dioxide and
nitrogen oxide.4 8
48 The project predicted it would reduce air pollution in the country, on an annual basis from 1995-2010 by
240,000 tons of ash, 50,000 tons of SO2 , 8,000 tons of carbon monoxide, 20,000 tons of nitrogen oxide, and
3.1 million tons of carbon dioxide. World Bank, "Staff Appraisal Report: Poland Energy Resource
Development Project," (Washington DC: The World Bank, 1990).
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The other energy projects on this list also include specific environmental goals or
components. The Czech "Power and Environmental Improvement" project, produced out of
the Bank's "Energy and Environment" division in the country department addressing the
Czech and Slovak republics49 was designed to improve the efficiency of power plants in
northern Bohemia in order to reduce energy costs as well as significantly reduce air pollution
in that area.50 This $246 million loan, to the state-owned Czech Power Enterprise (Ceske
Energeticke Zavody, or CEZ) was one of the largest project loans undertaken by the Bank in
the region (in contrast with SAL or sector loans).51 The largest investment components of
the project (almost 70%) were related to pollution control, including the installation of FGD
equipment, dust control equipment, as well as other operational improvements to reduce
lignite consumption. 52
Several of the Bank's "green" energy projects involved improving the energy
conservation and efficiency of district heating systems, which are major sources of local air
pollution in the winter heating season, since they typically rely on often inefficient boilers that
burn fuels such as heavy fuel oil, coal, natural gas, shale oil and other fuels such as wood or
peat.53 These projects tend to be part of broader Bank involvement in energy sector reform,
and also support the recommendations of the EAP. The Estonia project, for example, was
set up to improve the efficiency of district heating in several cities to help the country reduce
fuel costs and to improve the environmental conditions in affected areas. More specifically, it
involved: a small boiler conversion and replacement program in a number of municipalities
4 9The project was designed before Czechoslovakia split up, and subsequently belonged to the Czech Republic.
5 0 The staff appraisal report estimated that the project would save $20-$40 million a year in energy costs,
while reducing SO 2 emissions in northern Bohemia by 20%, or about 10% for the Czech Republic. World
Bank, "Staff Appraisal Report: Czech and Slovak Republic Power and Environmental Improvement Project,"
(Washington DC: World Bank, 1992).
5 1 C'EZ is the largest company in the Czech Republic, with 12,000 employees, and it generates around 80%
of the country's electricity. European Investment Bank, "C'EZ Power Plant Improvement," (Luxembourg:
European Investment Bank, 1995).
5 2 The wet limestone FGD equipment was installed at the Prunerov II power plant, which was the single
largest source of SO 2 in the country. Ibid., pp. 32, 35.
5 3 District heating systems consist of boilerhouses that heat water, which is piped out to recipients, such as
households.
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across the country, to help them switch to local fuels in order to reduce heat production costs;
efficiency improvements in Tallinn, Tartu and Parnu that included equipment and boiler
rehabilitation, as well as the installation of other equipment to improve efficiency (such as
meters, variable speed pumps, new substations, etc.); and institutional support for relevant
Estonian agencies, including training, equipment, and software for project management.54
The Siovenia Environment Project also focused in part on making heating systems
more efficient, but with an even "greener" slant. One of the project's two main goals was to
reduce air pollution by providing loans to around 6,500 households and 65 boilerhouse
operators to cover 80% of the cost of converting their fuel or heating systems from polluting
fuels (such as coal, wood, other solid fuels, etc.) to cleaner fuels (natural gas, solar energy).
The Bank lent money to Slovenia's EcoFund for on-lending to residents of six cities,
following a pilot phase in Maribor, Slovenia's second largest city, which decided in 1992 to
begin converting all of its heating systems to cleaner fuels. The project's second objective
was to assist the government in developing a national Geographical Information Center
within the environment ministry, which, in turn, would manage a Geographical Information
System (GIS).5 5 The task manager for this project was one of the "green task managers"
working on energy and environmental projects in the region. 56
Other "green" energy projects include district heating projects in Poland and Latvia, as
well as one in Lithuania that focuses on using low-temperature geothermal water as a
renewable energy source. The geothermal project was seen as a "demonstration" project to
determine the feasibility of providing renewable eniergy to help reduce Klaipeda's district
54 World Bank, "Staff Appraisal Report: Estonia District Heating Rehabilitation Project," (Washington DC:
World Bank, 1994).
55 The GIS is the source of databases with geographic, geologic, economic and other information to help in land-
use planning and environmental protection issues.
5 6 Helmut Schrei-er was the environmental coordinator for EC2, the country department working on Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. After the mid-
1997 reorganization, he was a team leader for Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia for
environmental projects.
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heating utility's use of oil to heat its water. 57 These projects ultimately emphasized
environmental issues more than the broader portfolio of World Bank energy projects in
Central and Eastern Europe. The broader energy portfolio includes a project in Poland to
modernize high voltage electricity transmission lines and substations; a Bulgarian project to
reduce the operating costs and improve the efficiency of the national electricity company; and
a project in Lithuania to rehabilitate two thermal power plants to improve safety and flexibility
of the transmission system.
Turning to the water projects on the list, the four Baltic projects can be distinguished
from more typical MDB projects in water sanitation or supply by the fact they are all designed
to address environmental management of "hot spots" that were identified by the 1992 Joint
Comprehensive Environmental Action Programme (JCP) for the Baltic Sea as priorities for
environmental clean-up. 58 All four projects contain water sanitation and supply components,
largely funded by Bank loans, as well as specific "environmental management components"
(EMC), funded mostly by bilateral grant money. These EMCs focus on issues specifically
related to the environment, such as coastal zone management. The goals of all four projects
are to reduce the discharge of waste water into the Baltic Sea through the improvement of
waste water and water supply services, while also supporting the development of
management plans for the sustainable development of nearby coastal areas and wetlands.
The task manager for three of the four Baltic projects was a senior environmental specialist at
the Bank, and the World Bank's coordinator for the regional Baltic Sea Environmental
Programme. He led a small Bank team that works on Baltic water projects. 59
57 The heat from the geothermal water is used to preheat the district heating water, which reduces the heating
plant's need to use oil. Official of UAB Geoterma, Klaipeda, Lithuania, interview with the author, May 25,
1998.
58The three Baltic states are signatories of the 1974 "Convention on the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area" (the Helsinki Convention), which requires them to address marine
pollution and to implement a number of other recommendations developed by the HETCOM, the Helsinki
Commission. The JCP grew out of this Convention. The World Bank played an important role in the
development of the JCP, which was signed by environmental ministers of tlhe Baltic Sea region.
5 9Stephen Lintner was also a key actor in devising the EIA policies of the World Bank and the EBRD. In
addition, he also helped to draft the JCP for the Baltic Sea.
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In comparison to these projects, other World Bank water projects in Central and
Eastern Europe do not have the same emphasis on environmental components, although they
may also have environmental benefits. As an example, the $98 million Water Companies
Restructuring and Modernization project in Bulgaria was designed primarily to help a set of
municipal water companies gain autonomy from the central government, in the process
becoming more accountable to local authorities, more commercially oriented, and more
financially sound. The project supported the Bank's goal of strengthening Bulgaria's
infrastructure. It also had environmental benefits, since, if implemented properly, it would
encourage a more efficient use of water, and a reduction of pollution from waste water.
However, these components were not major factors driving the project forward. Unlike the
Baltic projects, this project was developed within the Bank's infrastructure division within
the country department that addressed Bulgaria.
In addition to the individual energy and water-related projects, the Bank also funded an
innovative environmental management project in Poland, designed to strengthen the capacity
of Poland's environmental institutions in the analysis and design of policy, regulations, and
investment actions to improve environmental quality, as well as fund specific investments in
air quality management and river basin management in priority areas. This project, the
Bank's first in CEE, sought to help the country's environmental ministry implement a
management information system and improved administrative procedure for budgeting and
work programs. Other project sub-components focused on improving government policy
and information on a variety of environmental issues, including issues such as environmental
health, municipal solid and hazardous waste, air quality and water resource management.
The project created a Project Implementation Unit within the environment ministry, to
coordinate the project as well as environmental assistance from other donor institutions. This
project was also developed by staff from the Bank's central and regional environmental
departments. 6 0
6 0A key official for this project was Richard Ackermann, who was also a leading player in drafting the EAP.
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To summarize, the Bank's "environmental" portfolio in Central and Eastern Europe
emphasized-at least on paper- environmental goals or issues more strongly than other
projects the Bank undertakes in the energy and water sectors. These particular projects are
usually developed by the Bank's "green bankers," or people whose job focuses on
identifying environmental investments or policy exercises, as discussed in Chapter 4.
Role of Recipient Demand
The analysis of how the Bank's "environmental" projects in the region have been
identified shows how the World Bank is the least demand-driven of the three MDBs, but also
how recipient demand still affects the Bank's ability to sell investment projects in the region.
The further along the transition process a recipient country is, the more alternatives the
government will have in its quest for development financing, and the less pressure it has to
accept funding with policy conditionality attached to it. As a result, in Central and Eastern
Europe, the World Bank has been more successful in selling environmental conditionality to
countries earlier on in the transition process, or project where recipients are specifically
interested in World Bank expertise. The Czech Republic, for example, has only three World
Bank projects, and has not borrowed from the Bank since 1993 because its government was
not interested in increasing public sector debt with sovereign-guaranteed loans. The World
Bank's attempt to do an environmental capacity building loan there, similar to the Polish
loan, did not succeed.
In the more developed countries such as Poland and Hungary, there are also examples
of environmental projects developed by the Bank that the countries chose to finance through
other institutions, or projects the Bank turned down on environmental grounds that other
MDBs have snapped up. One result of this is that the Bank has had to adjust its strategies for
working in these countries, and by the mid-1990s began to emphasize policy advice for the
wealthier countries seeking to join the European Union. The World Bank's darker green
environmental objectives can become a disadvantage in markets that have become more
competitive.
213
At the same time, where recipients are receptive to the Bank's work, the Bank often has
much power to influence the specific shape that projects take. Slovenia, for example, wanted
to buy FGD equipment to reduce air pollution from its power plants. Bank officials argued
that this was not cost effective vis-a-vis other options, and proposed a coal-to-gas conversion
project that the Slovenians agreed to, which evolved into the Slovenia Environment project
discussed above. "Countries often come in with ill-conceived ideas," noted one senior
World Bank environmental economist, who added that the Bank "gently persuades" them to
adopt more "sensible" policies or projects.6 1 The Bank also turns down projects of interest
to recipients that do not meet the Bank's own interests or standards (whether economic,
environmental or other), such as dam projects in Slovenia and Croatia, an aluminum smelter
in Slovakia, and a proposed metro expansion in Budapest. The EBRD, in turn, took on the
Slovakian project rejected by the World Bank, and the EIB funded the Budapest metro
project.
The four Baltic water projects provide an instructive illustration in how the Bank can
influence what recipients agree to do.62 In these cases, the Baltic municipalities were mainly
interested in local issues, such as improving very poor waste water treatment and/or drinking
water supply, as well as improving tourism by cleaning up nearby coasts. The broader issue
of cleaning up the Baltic Sea as a whole was not as much a priority to the municipalities as it
was to the Bank and other (particularly Scandinavian) donors. The environmental
management components of the projects were generally not a priority to these local
governments, and as a result, the Bank "sold" them to recipients not as loans that would have
to be repaid, but as grant components supplied by bilateral donors. There was therefore no
cost to recipients for agreeing to projects that included EMCs. These EMCs were also very
6 1Senior World Bank environmental economist, interview with the author, February 1995.
62 This section is based on personal interviews with municipal water company officials, Bank project
implementation units, and municipal officials in Haapsalu, Estonia; Liepaja, Latvia; and Siauliai and
Klaipeda, Lithuania; as well as environmentalists and environmental ministry officials in all three Baltic
states, June 1998.
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small. For example, for the $23 million Siauliai project, the EMC totaled $1.4 million, and
for the $21 million Liepaja project, it totaled $1.5 million.
At the same time, the water projects designed by the Bank almost always went beyond
what the municipalities initially had in mind, as the World Bank tacked on additional
components to pursue a broader watershed approach. The Bank had particular leverage to do
so with these projects, because most could not find alternative sources of financing at the
time they were designed, often even from other MDBs. The World ank also brought
bilateral donors into financing parts of the waste water and drinking water components of the
loans as well.
To illustrate the Bank's leverage and influence, in Haapsalu, Estonia, for example, the
municipality hoped to complete construction on a biological waste water treatment plant to
replace the existing mechanical treatment plant. Construction on the plant began before
Estonia achieved independence in 1991, and after that, the Estonians did not want to
complete construction on the Soviet-designed plant with Russian technology. Estonia was
unable to secure financing for the project from the Swedish aid agency or the EBRD. The
World Bank, however, expressed an interest in financing the project if it included an EMC
that focused on nearby Matsalu Bay, which itself was on the HELCOM list of priority "hot-
spots" as an important wetland and nature reserve63
The municipality of Siauliai, Lithuania, in turn, was keen on finishing its partially
constructed waste water treatment plan, and addressing the problem it faced by its inadequate
capacity to handle sludge.64 Siauliai is the fourth largest city in Lithuania, one of its main
industrial centers, and home-before Lithuania's independence-to the largest Soviet
military airport in Eastern Europe. Like the other cities, it had a partly constructed Soviet-
63 Official of Haapsalu Water Works, Haapsalu, Estonia, interview with the author, 15 May 1998. "Staff
Appraisal Report: Republic of Estonia: Haapsalu and Matsalu Bays Environment Project," World Bank,
March 15, 1995.
64 The city's sludge is pumped directly into lagoons, which were largely filled by 1996, and sludge was not
distributed according to levels of toxicity. World Bank, "Staff Appraisal Renort: Republic of Lithuania
Siauliai Environment Project," World Bank, 1995, p. 10.
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style plant to replace an older plant that no longer met the city's needs.65 However, the
design of the unfinished plant was too big for the city.
The World Bank project, however, instead of confining itself to the completion of the
municipality's waste water treatment plant, added onto the project a number of additional
environmental components. These included the EMC that would organize bilateral funding
for, training, technical assistance and other support for a Lielupe River Commission set up
by Lithuania and Latvia in 1993 to cooperate on issues concerning management and clean-up
of the river.66 This component would also provide technical support, equipment and training
for two Lithuanian regional environmental protection offices; assistance in the development
of procedures to monitor discharge; a plan for sludge management; and a large study
complemented by demonstration activities aimed at improving the practices of large local pig
farms in managing agricultural run-off.6 7 The Bank argued that better practices by local pig
farmers would greatly enhance the project's benefits in terms of reducing pollution to the
Baltic Sea.68
In sum, while recipient demand determines the countries or sectors in which the Bank
can work, the Bank remains proactive and influential in pursuing particular project goals and
designs, particularly in cases where alternative financing sources-with less conditionality
attached-are available.
On Implementation
Project implementation for any MDB rarely occurs as it is suppor -d to on paper.
Delays can arise at any level, estimates and projections that underlie the project may prove to
6 5The old sewage treatment plant could only process 60% of daily collected water, which meant a daily
discharge of around 10 tons of polluted water directly into the Kulpe River, which flows directly into the
Baltic Sea. The sewage is highly contaminated with heavy metals, which also means that the sludge removed
from the plant cannot be used for agriculture. "Ecological Problems of Siauliai," Siauliai Municipality
Environmental Affairs Department, 1994, pp. 12, 15.
66 In fact, Siauliai is the source of most of the pollutant load discharged into the Lielupe. Pollution sources
on Latvia's portion of the river tend to be small.
67 Ibid.
6 8According the project's task manager, two of the big pig farms, with 20,000 pigs each, contribute more
waste than the entire city of Siauliai. World Bank project manager, interview with the author, April 30,
1998.
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be overly optimistic or pessimistic, and unanticipated technical and political problems are not
uncommon. Projects can stall or even fail at any MDB for myriad reasons, including
changes in governments, weaker-than-expected domestic institutions, over-optimistic
implementation schedules, poor project management, changing external economic conditions,
or the absence of clearly specified requirements. The World Bank's Quality Assurance
Group, for example, lists 12 different criteria for "projects at risk," that include: slow
disbursements, country risks, poor economic management, risky subsector, poor
environmental/resettlement performance, poor compliance with legal covenants, project
management problems, procurements problems, and poor financial performance, among
other factors. 69
Project performance is also shaped by how strict the performance objectives are.
Loosely defined projects can appear to be complying better than projects with more complex
goals and conditionality, even thought they might have less development impact. As Albert
Hirschman noted 30 years ago, in studying a set of World Bank investments, "It quickly
became apparent to me that all projects are problem-ridden; the only valid distinction appears
to be between those that are more or less successful in overcoming their troubles and those
that are not."70 As noted above, the data necessary to evaluate each MDB project is not
readily available, often even within the banks themselves. 71 This section draws on data that
is available on World Bank projects in CEE, as well as interviews with NGOs, World Bank
officials, and recipient country officials, to sketch out at least part of the implementation
picture.
Of the three MDBs, the World Bank provides the most information on implementation,
as discussed in Chapter 4. It provides cancellation data, although the data does not state the
69 World Bank Quality Assurance Group, Draft synthesis document, April 24, 1997, p. 5, (hereafter cited as
"QAG Report").
70 Albert O. Hirschmann, Development Projects Observed (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967),
PP 1-3.
1In July 1998, for example, the World Bank hired outside auditors to investigate what it called "alarming
information" about possible fraud in the form of embezzlement and kickbacks. Lorraine Adams, "World Bank
Hires Auditors to Probe its Own Spending," The Washington Post, July 16 1998, Al, 21.
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reasons for cancellation. None of the projects in Table 5.4 have been completely canceled,
while some have faced problems or partial cancellation, and others have been praised inside
and outside the Bank for doing a good job in achieving their goals. In terms of cancellation,
among the projects discussed in the previous section, three have had portions canceled.
These include: the $98 million Bulgarian water companies restructuring project was reduced
by $41 million; the Polish forestry project, reduced by $42 million; and the Polish Heat
Supply Restructuring project, reduced by $75 million.
A 1997 in-house review of 14 World Bank sectors by the Bank' Quality Assurance
Group highlighted a handful of problematic projects in CEE. These included seven projects
in "extended problem status," and projects scheduled to close by mid-1997. None of these
were projects whose main objectives were environmental, or were problem projects because
of environmental issues.7 2
Sometimes World Bank evaluations highlight projects that are doing particularly well.
The Hungary Energy Development project was praised with respect to a broader set of oil
and gas projects for thorough project preparation, solid sector studies, well defined
objectives, and clear government commitment. 73 The small $18 million Polish
environmental capacity building project also received a "highly satisfactory" review in its
implementation report. According to the report, the project "achieved its major objectives,
exceeded its physical objectives and is likely to achieve sustainable development results
without major shortcomings."7 4
72 Projects in extended problem status included: in Bulgaria, a 1993 technical assistance project, a 1994
agricultural development project; and the 1994 water company restructuring project (which, as noted above,
had positive environmental impacts); in Hungary, a 1992 project for highway rehabilitation, a 1993 project in
health service intervention and training, and a 1993 project to reform social insurance; and in Poland, a 1992
housing and urban development project. Prem Garg, Office Memorandum, May 13, 1997, "Portfolio
Monitoring Report."
7 3 QAG Report, section on Oil and Gas, p. i.
7 4 The physical objectives referred to project-supported equipment, almost of all of which was installed and
operating by the time the report was written. These objectives were exceeded due to cost savings and
additional funding from other domestic actors and bilateral donors. World Bank, "Implementation Completion
Report: Poland Environment Management Project," (Washington DC: World Bank, May 30, 1997).
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A more coherent picture of the Bank's performance in one country emerges from an in-
depth analysis by the Bank's Operations Evaluation Department 1997 review of the Bank's
activities in Poland. According to the review, the Bank's strategy in Poland between 1986-
96 was "highly relevant," while its efficacy was "satisfactory" and its efficiency only
"marginally satisfactory." 75 The report argued that in the early years of the Bank's activities
in post-Communist Poland, its advice, intellectual assistance and technical inputs were
pivotal in assisting the government in the design of economic reform, while its project loans
were often relatively less valuable. For example, much of the Bank's initial lending to
Poland was made through financial intermediaries, which were supposed to on-lend the
funds to the final beneficiaries. However, these Polish intermediaries were generally weak,
and did not have the institutional capacity to adequately perform their on-lending tasks.76 In
addition, the report argued that the Bank's Polish team faced pressure to lend during the first
two years of lending, which meant that projects were not always well prepared.
Implementation was often slow in these years, which also reflected the country's
changing political and economic context. As the report noted for the 1992-93 period:
It became apparent that some projects were too large and complicated, involving
several ministries or agencies that did not always share the same objectives. The
turnover of government personnel also revealed some gaps in the Bank's institution-
building efforts. New officials had difficulty learning the Bank's language and
procedures. Communications between Polish officials and Bank staff were not
always smooth. Lack of continuity in Bank staff sent from headquarters also
contributed to implementation delays.77
The result was that the Bank ultimately restructured its portfolio in Poland, dropping
some unsuccessful activities. The Bank's strengths were in areas of institution building such
as foreign debt management and the improvement of public sector management practices. It
was less effective in its attempts to push the government to sustain the pace of privatization,
or bring down inflation. The report tended to praise projects that were designed in a
75 Luis Landau and Julius Gwyer, "Poland Country Assistance Review: Partnership in a Transition
Economy," (Washington DC: World Bank, 1997), p. 11. This is the only such comprehensive report
undertaken to date in the region.
76Ibid., p. 2.
7 7 Ibid., p. 4.
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participatory framework where Polish officials interacted with Bank officials in project
design. It also praised the Bank's activities in working with other donors to put together a
debt and debt-service reduction package on Poland's large private sector debt, which helped
Poland improve its creditworthiness in international markets. Finally, it noted that since
Poland's impending accession to the European Union would reduce the Bank's leverage in
the country, the Bank's strategy in Poland had shifted to focus more on policy advice and
institution building than resource transfers.
Turning to the Bank's activities in specific sectors, the report's findings were mixed.
In the energy sector, for example, the report argued that both the government and Bank were
"overoptimistic about reforming the sector." 78 Tariff increases were slower than agreed
upon, the passage of new energy legislation was also slower than expected, while the
government was hesitant to open up areas of the energy sector (such as power generation) to
private sector involvement. 79 In addition many reform issues associated with this sector-
such as demonopolization and commercialization-were politically sensitive and subject to
widespread debate as resistance to change from those who would be hurt by the reforms
(such as the coal sector's unionized labor force).
In terms of the Bank's environmental activities, the OED report praised the Bank's
Polish team's work on institution building, which strengthened the Ministry of
Environment's ability to coordinate and manage foreign aid. It also noted the Bank's
unwillingness to fund investments in energy, mining and other sectors unless they complied
with environmental guidelines. However, the report also pointed out that the government's
commitment to environmental management was the "driving force behind the establishment
of funding mechanisms that led to a high level of investment in pollution abatement." 80 The
Bank's role was clearly supportive, although its direct contribution to a decline in various
measures of pollution is more difficult to assess.
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7 8 Ibid., p. 95.
79Ibid.
8 0 Ibid., p. 98.
Interviews with environmental groups and government officials in the region generally
support the main themes of the Polish report, with respect to the Bank's work in the region
as a whole-that is, the Bank's main contribution in providing intellectual and policy support
in the area of government policy reform. 81 Portfolio performance tended to be more mixed
in countries struggling to a greater degree with the transition process, such as Bulgaria and
Albania, and individual projects in each country are also the source of criticism or praise.
There are no environmentally disastrous World Bank projects in CEE, in the same way that
projects in Asia or Latin American have galvanized NGOs.
Interviews with ministry officials and NGOs in CEE revealed, however, that MDB
projects in the implementation stage are often not closely monitored by government actors
and NGOs. Government ministries in the countries do not have the staff or technical capacity
to carefully monitor MDB projects. Central banks involved in disbursements of funding, for
example, will often rely on reports done by the projects, and look more closely at a project if
there appears to be problems. The major environmental groups, in turn, tend to focus on
projects in the preparation stage, or early implementation stage, to try to influence project
design and act as watchdogs against environmentally unsustainable projects. They also do
not have the capacity to follow projects through implementation.
In terms of the projects in Table 5.4, responses were mostly positive, but some project
problems were also pointed out. Among the positive responses, Polish environmental
officials credited the Environmental Management project with exposing the Polish
environmental policy community to the World Bank's ways of thinking and working, and
setting up a Project Implementation Unit at the ministry that helped to implement donor
8 1In the fall of 1997 and spring of 1998, I interviewed: In Poland, officials from the finance ministry,
environmental ministry, National Fund, World Bank and EBRD resident missions, Institute of Sustainable
Development, and CEE Bankwatch; in Hungary, I interviewed officials from the central bank, environmental
ministry, finance ministry, World Bank and EBRD environmental missions, a former environmental policy
official from Slovenia who is director of the Budapest-based Regional Environmental Center (REC); other
officials from REC; World Bank and EBRD environmental officials; environmentalists from the Clean Air
Action Group, Energy Club, and CEE Bankwatch; in the three Baltic states, I also interviewed officials from
finance and environmental ministries; resident MDB mission officials, CEE Bankwatch and local NGOs, as
well as municipal officials, project managers and other project officials for the three MDBs' water projects and
many of their energy projects.
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projects more broadly, while training a group of policymakers. In terms of project
problems, World Bank officials noted in interviews that the 1990 Polish Energy Resource
Development project did not fully meet its goals, since it resulted in increased gas imports,
rather than increased gas production. Conditionality related to the privatization of the Polish
Oil and Gas Company was also not met, according to officials involved in project
implementation.8 2 The Bank's Klaipeda Geothermal Demonstration project, in turn, fell
behind by more than a year due to the fact that once well-drilling began, the geothermal
company financed by the Bank learned that the water temperature was not as hot as expected,
which would require it to drill an extra well. 83 Environmentalists also criticized the project
for not including a component to reduce the high levels of energy wasted in Klaipeda's
district inefficient heating system, to which the project was providing energy.84
Also in the Baltic states, the Bank's water projects faced some problems common to
other MDB water projects in the region, but also some particular implementation problems as
well. MDB water projects throughout the region have faced the difficulty of increasing tariffs
to rates called for in the project document. Tariffs are the major source of revenue for the
water utilities, and therefore also the source of financial resources used to repay the MDB
loans. In the Baltic states, all of the MDB-financed water utilities faced sharper-than-
expected declines in water demand, which in turn, reduced expected revenues that can be
collected from tariffs. It was also politically difficult for some municipal governments to
agree to increase water tariffs as required under the loans. As a result, many of the MDB
water projects are not performing as well as expected.
In terms of the World Bank's Baltic water projects in particular, one weakness has been
that the projects' small environmental management components, funded by bilateral donors,
have had mostly small, if any, tangible results. They produced some studies that may or may
not be useful in future policy development, such as an integrated coastal zone management
8 2 Official of World Bank's Warsaw office, interview with the author, 15 October 1997.
8 3 Official of UAB Geoterma, Klaipeda, Lithuania, interview with the author, 25 May 1998.
84 Linas Vainius, Lithuania Green Movement, Vilnius, Lithuania, interview with the author, 20 May 1998.
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plans in Lithuania and Latvia. Some EMC studies funded by PHARE, in turn, were
criticized by government officials and Bank officials as being slow, or delayed by
bureaucratic snafus, such as lost paperwork.8 5 The Bank canceled the EMC for Siauliai
concerning the Lielupe River Commission, due to lack of local interest, plus the fact that
PHARE was interested in funding this on its own. At the same time, a few components of
the EMCs have been viewed as successful. One is the pig farm study in Siauliai, which
produced recommendations on practices that were adopted by Lithuania's pig breeders'
association. Another is the EMC for the Liepaja project, which included the purchase of a
reed harvester for Latvia's Lake Pape, a large coastal wetland that is part of the coastal
wildlife habitat. The harvester allowed the local municipality to harvest reed that clog up the
lake, and sell them in Denmark and Lithuania, where they are used for roof material.
While the Bank's projects in Latvia and Estonia performed largely as expected, the
projects in Lithuania faced relatively more challenges. Some of the problems were outside of
the Bank's control, such as a rapidly changing group of Lithuanian policymakers (including
three different environmental ministers in the space of six years). The Klaipeda project was
delayed due to slow procurement tendering after the Ministry of Environment insisted on a
re-tendering in order to involve mole Lithuanian firms. Shifting government requirements on
waste effluents delayed the project for another 12 months. Disagreements between the Bank
and the Lithuanian environment ministry has also delayed the water projects. One particular
debate was over whether or not the waste water plants needed spare pieces of certain
equipment (such as pumps, or piping,) which was required under the old regime (and by old
Soviet standards) to be used as back-ups, since equipment often broke down. Such
additional equipment adds to project costs, and is generally not required in Western-style
plants.
In some cases, disagreements between the Bank and municipalities were about issues
where the Bank's stance would reduce the possible environmental benefits of the project.
85 Interviews with World Bank officials in Washington and Vilnius, Ministry of environment official in
Riga, PHARE official in Vilnius, May, June 1998.
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For example, both Klaipeda and Siauliai municipalities were interested in waste water plants
that included processes for removing nitrogen and phosphorus, which the World Bank
argued was too expensive for them to undertake as part of the projects. The Bank determines
what it thinks the capacity of the municipality is to take on debt, which Bank officials said
results in projects that do not contain "all the bells and whistles" the municipality might
expect. 8 6
In Siauliai, in particular, there were mail disagreements between the Bank and the
municipality, and the project eventually stalled. Some municipal officials were angry that the
Bank designed the project with what they perceived to be non-priority components, while it
lacked some major municipal priorities, such as sludge management or nitrogen and
phosphorus removal. The Bank's view was that such components were not least-cost, and
were more expensive than the municipality could afford at the time. The Bank also argued
that after the project was signed, the municipality decided it wanted duplicate equipment that
would raise project costs. The Bank believed this equipment was unnecessary, and reflected
old Soviet standards, and it refused to increase the project loan size. Finally, both sides
realized that the Bank project overlooked the inclusion of a very expensive ($1 million),
important piece of equipment-the transformer to connect the water utility to the power
grid. 8 7
These anecdotes illustrate the fact that even projects that look right on paper may
encounter many different kinds of political, economic and technical problems in practice.
The World Bank has had to push harder than the other two to sell particular environmental
projects to recipients, but even after these projec:s are agreed, it is difficult to know exactly
what impact they have on environmental improvement. Many potentially important
contributions, such as advice, technical assistance, and research, are the most difficult to
measure.
8 6 World Bank official, Vilnius, Lithuania, interview with the author, 29 May 1998.
8 7The World Bank agreed to help the Lithuanians find funding to pay for a transformer. World Bank official,




The Bank's portfolio clearly reflects its mission of promoting private sector
development in CEE, primarily by emphasizing privatization, financial sector restructuring,
infrastructure development, and the promotion of foreign investment. (See Appendix 2 for a
complete listing of projects). As Table 5.6 shows, a quarter of the Bank's commitments of
loans and equity investments in CEE is targeted to financial institutions, largely for
developing the institutions themselves and for providing funding to be on-lent for the
development of private sector investments, mainly for small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs). Many of these loans actually benefit other categories in the table, such as credit
lines for agribusiness, manufacturing and energy efficiency. An additional 500 million ECU,
in turn, is used to finance regional funds, multi-project facilities, and equity lines. While the
World Bank emphasizes capacity building through government agencies, the EBRD focuses
more an strengthening the activities of financial institutions.
An additional 20% of the EBRD's portfolio supports joint ventures and domestically-
owned businesses, and includes projects such as the construction of a Coca-Cola bottling
facility in Albania, the establishment of a wholesale market system in Bulgaria, the
construction of a brewery in Croatia, and the modernization of a paper and pulp facility in
Poland. Transport is the third largest area of Bank commitments, where the majority of the
EBRD's projects have emphasized highway construction or rehabilitation, often designed as
toll roads.
As the private sector evolves in CEE, an increasing percentage of the EBRD's portfolio
is directed to private sector actors and activities. In Hungary and Poland, for example,
around 90% of the Bank's commitments are made to private enterprises or state-owned
enterprises in the process of being privatized. The Bank's 1996 medium-term strategy for
Poland, for example, was to continue helping to develop the ability of Polish financial
intermediaries to finance private sector investments, to help mobilize investment capital more
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Table 5.6: EBRD CEE Commitments
millions ECU
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TOTAL CEE 5.4 billion ECU 99.9
Regional Multi-Project Facilities (MPF), Funds, Equity Lines, etc. (These may be used in the
former Soviet Union as well, and often include shares only, or a combination of shares and loans).








TOTAL REGIONAL PLUS CEE: 5.96 billion ECU1
Sources: EBRD information sheets, Annual Reports (1990-1996), EBRD web site
(www.ebrd.com/opera/country/).










generally, and to participate in structural reform of the country's steel, chemicals, oil and gas,
shipbuilding, and agribusiness sectors. 8 8 In Hungary, the focus is similar, with financial
sector development, private sector infrastructure financing, capital market capacity
strengthening, seen as the most important areas to pursue. 89 In countries that have made less
progress in the transition process, such as Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania, the Bank's
strategy focuses more on sovereign-guaranteed investments in infrastructure, financial sector
restructuring, and support for privatization efforts.
As noted in the World Bank section, project commitments do not reflect cancellations or
delays, so actual disbursements vary from the picture painted by commitments. Unlike the
World Bank, the EBRD does not provide data on cancellations and disbursement for
individual projects, and in documents where it lists its "signed projects," it somewhat
misleadingly excludes projects approved by the board and signed that were subsequently
canceled.9 0 In terms of projects that have some type of environmental focus, discussed in
greater depth in the following section, Bank staff have reported that only 13m ECU has been
disbursed of the 40m ECU Bulgarian Maritza East Power Project, which was approved in
1992. No disbursements had been made by mid-1997 on Albania's Drin River Rehabilitation
project, which was approved in 1994. Small amounts of the Latvian energy sector
emergency loan were also canceled.
Approach to Addressing Environmental Issues
The EBRD's approach to addressing environmental issues is less comprehensive than
the World Bank's, but "greener" than the EIB's. This reflects the argument made in Chapter
4, that is, the EBRD is more demand-driven and private-sector oriented than the World Bank,
88
"EBRD activities in Poland," http://www.ebrd.com/english/opera/country/polafact.htm.
89
"EBRD activities in Hungary," http://www.ebrd.com/english/opera/country/hungact.htm.
9 0This is the case in the description of individual country portfolios at the EBRD's web site. Annual reports
do list disbursements for the overall portfolio. In 1996, net disbursements totaled 1.2 billion ECU, compared
with 2.2 billion ECU commitments. For 1995, the totals are 988 million ECU in net disbursements,
compared with 2.0 billion ECU committed; for 1994, 591 million ECU net disbursements, against 2.4
billion ECU in committed; for 1993, 435 million ECU net disbursements, against 2.3 billion ECU
committed; and 1992, 126 million ECU net disbursements out of 1.2 billion ECU committed. EBRD,
Annual Report, (London: EBRD, 1996), p. 3.
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while it still contains environmentally-oriented staff that do not exist at the EIB, namely in its
environmental assessment, municipal infrastructure, and energy efficiency units.
The Bank has been involved in a handful of policy-related exercises, but over time has
focused most of its attention on project lending. For example, it sponsored a research project
on implications of the harmonization of CEE environmental standards with the EU's, as well
as institutional changes needed to improve environmental monitoring and enforcement, in
part to assist local and foreign investors in making investment decisions. In addition, the
Bank initiated a research project to help CEE countries adopt better public participation
policies, responding to long-standing NGO pressure for the MDBs to better involve the
affected public in their project decisions. 91 The EBRD's role as secretariat of the
Environment for Europe process' Project Preparation Committee (PPC) has also involved it
in some research activities, such as a report on enhancing environmental project financing in
the region, and other work on green equity financing.
Turning to project lending, Table 5.7 highlights EBRD projects with primary
environmental goals or significant environmental objectives. It includes both investment
projects in the region, as well as a number of regional multi-project credit facilities that in turn
finance smaller projects both in CEE as well as the other former Soviet countries. The total
of CEE projects and regional MPFs in Table 5.7 is 648 million ECU, or just under 1 1% of
the Bank's total portfolio of projects and regional credit lines in CEE. 92 The two biggest,
categories of projects in this list are credit facilities for energy efficiency projects, which
comprise 32.6% of the total, and water projects, which account for 31 %. These are followed
by other energy supply projects (21%), transport (9.5%), and non-ESCO-related credit lines
and funds (6.4%). Generally, the projects on this list come out of the Bank's municipal and
environmental infrastructure unit, which finance district heating projects and water and
9 1 EBRD, "Environments in Transition: the environmental bulletin of the EBRD," (London: EBRD, 1993).






































































































































































































































































EB. 00 X~c C
0.- -
































































































































































































































































I IIIIIII II ~ IIIIII IIIIIII IIII IIIII I - l--





environment projects; and its energy efficiency unit, which finances the ESCO projects in the
region. The Bank's energy sector team, in turn, tends to finance the larger power sector
projects, such as those rehabilitating thermal power plants and transmission systems.
The EBRD's energy efficiency projects, designed by the Bank's energy efficiency unit,
emphasize the development of ESCOs and the use of credit lines for energy efficiency. Thiss
differs from the World Bank's approach to energy efficiency which has emphasized broader
sectoral restructuring and policy reform. By the end of 1996, the EBPJ) had signed three
Multi-Project Facilities (MPFs) with Western companies to set up ESCO companies in CEE.
Typically, these are loans to companies like France's Compagnie G6nerale de Chauffe
(CGC) or the U.S. Honeywell, which have expertise in energy controls and related
environmental services. These companies, in turn, finance individual ESCOs in CEE, in
which the EBRD takes a minority share.9 3 The ESCOs provide energy saving services to
clients that may include hospitals, district heating companies, and other institutions.9 4
The Bank has also financed a handful of other credit facilities for energy efficiency and
municipal projects, which has allowed it to finance projects that would be too small for a
normal EBRD loan. One example is the 14.5m DM credit line the EBRD extended to
Priemyselna Banka Kosice (PBK) in Slovakia, which was enhanced by an additional 3.8m
ECU interest-free lgrant from the EU. Two sub-projects were financed through this by the
end of 1996: a 1.4m DM loan to a privatized district heating company to replace old boilers
with more energy efficient systems; and another small loan to allow an industrial company to
replace its old air compressors, and to purchase an electrical load management system.
Among the other energy projects in Table 5.7, energy conservation is a component of
the broader project. For example, the Bank's 1993 project in Macedonia had several main
goals aimed at helping the government restructure and strengthen its power sector. One
93 For example, under the 70m ECU facility the EBRD financed with the Swiss company, Landis & Gyr (Europe)
Corp., the EBRD provides 35% of the financing for each ESCO set up by Landis & Gyr, which in turn provides
the balance and takes a majority stake in the ESCO.
9 4 :"East European Energy Wastage to be Tackled by EBRD and Landis & Gyr Partnership," Press Release
(London: EBRD, 18 December 1996).
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major goal was to construct a new transmission line to help the capital city, Skopje, achieve a
more reliable supply of energy, which reduces the demand for electricity imports and saves
scarce foreign exchange. Another goal emphasized energy conservation, by supporting the
Government's Energy Conservation Programme. In particular, this involved the EBRD
helping enterprises preparing for privatization to reduce their energy costs, in part to enhance
their attractiveness to future investors. 95 The project also financed an Energy Conservation
Unit in the Ministry of Economy, to help implement energy efficiency plans.
Other non-ESCO projects include the Romanian Energy Conservation project, which
provided financing for the rehabilitation of district hearing systems in five different cities, and
the three Baltic emergency energy sctor loans, were driven by the need for these countries to
cope with sharply reduced fuel imports from Russia. All three loans contained energy
efficiency components, as well as other energy supply components. The Estonian loan, for
example, financed stations to meter gas imports from Russia, to help set up trade with Russia
on a normal, commercialized basis; the completion of facilities to import and store heavy fuel
oil to help Estonia meet its needs for several winters; spare parts to restore electricity and
power output for power generation and heat production; and measures to improve energy
efficiency in industry, residences and energy utilities. 9 6
The EBRD's water projects, in turn, are produced by the Municipal and Environmental
Infrastructure Unit. The EBRD's six water projects in Table 5.7 resemble those of the World
Bank, in the sense that their goals are to improve waste water collection and treatment, as
well as drinking water and quality. In particular, the projects in the Baltic states, like the
World Bank's, are in areas that were deemed to be "hot spots" by the 1992 JCP. The
Romanian projects, while not sought out by the Bank as a means to clean up tributaries to the
9 5 This would include the reconstruction of boilers to burn more energy efficient fuels, to use geothermal
energy for heating purposes, to manufacture briquettes from waste wood, and so on. EBRD, "Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Power Sub-Sector Project," Report to Board of Directors, BDS93-157, 30
November 1993.
9 6 This included financing for insulation for 300,000 apartments, hospitals and schools; refurbishing district
heating substations in five cities and towns, by installing heat controls and meters; purchasing spare parts,
insulation material, and various instruments to improve energy efficiency. EBRD, "Estonia Energy Sector
Emergency Investment Project," Report to Board of Directors, EDS92-124 9 November 1992.
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Danube River, are nonetheless in areas where the quality of water and waste water services
was very poor.
The EBRD's water projects differ from the World Bank's in two ways. First, they do
not include the additional, small "environmental management component" found in the World
Bank's projects. The approach of the EBRD projects tends to be narrower, relatively more
demand-driven, and with a greater emphasis on the corporatization of the municipal entity.
Second, another distinction between the EBRD and World Bank projects is in terms of loan
size; the average EBRD loan for water projects is around 24 million ECU ($30 million),
versus $5 million for the World Bank. This difference in loan size reflects the fact that the
EBRD is less willing to make individual, small loans, which has led it in some cases to make
one loan that is in turn provided to a number of separate municipalities.
Finally, in the transportation sector, the Budapest Public Transport loan financed the
4 purchase of 270 new buses, and the upgrade of 500 bus engines, which the Bank estimated
would reduce bus emission levels in the city by around 25%. The project also sought to
reduce traffic congestion, air pollution and noise by using technical cooperation funds from
donors to introduce new parking schemes to deter traffic from the city center, and assisting in
the restructuring of public transport fares.
Generally, the projects in Table 5.7 are distinctly more "bank-like" than the World
Bank's portfolio, in the sense that they do not include the scope of environmental
management and capacity building components of the World Bank's projects, nor do they
cover areas such as forestry, or the broader category of sector loans that emphasize more
macroeconomic policy changes such as the removal of energy subsidies. Yet, since most of
the EBRD's projects are the work of specific "green" units within the Bank, they do reflect
the Bank's desire to pursue activities that other bankers-within the EBRD, or in private
sector banks-may not pursue. For example, in developing a niche in ESCO financing, the
EBRD is designing projects that are typically much smaller than the average MDB loan, and
the ESCO sector is not one that commercial banks have much experience in. The water
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projects, in turn, do not emphasize a broader watershed management approach, as do the
World Bank's projects. Yet a few of them-namely, the Baltic Sea projects-do address
regional "hot spots" identified by regional countries as areas where reducing water pollution
is a priority for environmental reasons.
As is the case of the World Bank, the projects in this portfolio emphasize environmental
issues relatively more than other projects in the same sector. For example, the EBRD's
broader set of energy projects includes loans to rehabilitate thermal power plants, to construct
or reconstruct electricity networks, develop gas storage and distribution, and finance the
modernization of gas station networks. As is the case with the other two banks, some of the
energy projects in the broader portfolio have environmental benefits, but these are not the
primary components or goals of the projects. The modernization and rehabilitation of power
facilities, for example, tend to result in energy savings and can also avoid the need for
additional power plants. 4
Role of Recipient Demand
Given its private sector emphasis, often EBRD projects are initiated when Western
companies or CEE countries or cities contact the Bank with a suggestion for a project.
However, the EBRD still differs significantly from a private sector bank in the degree to
which it builds policy conditionality into all of its loans, and requires private sector
borrowers to address certain environmental issues or standards. For example, a loan to
EGIS Pharmaceuticals in Hungary contains environmental covenants to monitor
implementation of the company's environmental compliance plan to reduce its waste water
discharge, volatile organic compounds emissions, and soil and groundwater contamination.
This is the area where the work of the Bank's environmental appraisal unit often shows up,
since it can add environmental conditionality into loan covenants.
The Bank's environmental portfolio is probably relatively less demand-driven than
other areas of Bank lending. For example, many municipal institutions or private enterprises
in Central and Eastern Europe are unfamiliar with the concept of ESCOs, which must be sold
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to them by the EBRD, or the energy companies it finances. Even the Western companies
setting up the ESCOs in CEE had to be persuaded to move into the Eastern European market
and to contribute some of their own finance to the projects.97
In addition, the municipal infrastructure projects also use sovereign guarantees to a
greater degree than other departments at the Bank. Sovereign-guaranteed loans give Bank
staff more leverage to build conditionality requiring policy changes than they have with
private sector loans. Such policy changes, however, are "bottom-up"-often at the
municipal, utility, or company level-versus the central government. Examples of this
would be conditions requiring municipalities to raise tariff levels as part of a water and waste
water treatment project, or requiring towns to penalize companies not meeting pollution
emission standards.
Finally, loans developed in the municipal sector initially had much longer lead times
and higher preparation costs than loans developed in other areas of the bank, particularly in
first years of lending for municipalities. This reflected the challenges the Bank faced in
devising loans for municipal agencies first gaining their autonomy from central governments,
and with little experience in borrowing, or operating their agencies on a market basis. More
"bank-like" financial institutions would stay clear of such challenges, particularly given the
fact that most municipalities were not creditworthy enough to borrow on their own. Given
that this sector of lending also had more of a development angle than the EBRD's work in
other areas, it also attracted a great deal of bilateral grant financing, and other forms of donor
assistance, often through the Project Preparation Committee. 98
On Implementation
Neither the EBRD nor the EIB provide the depth of information available on project
implementation from the World Bank. As a result, assessing the implementation of EBRD
9 7 Member of EBRD energy efficiency team, interview with the author, June 12, 1996.
9 8 The Municipal and Environmental Infrastructure Unit at the Bank is also one of the top users of the Bank's
technical cooperation funds, bilateral pots of grant money provided to the Bank to fund technical cooperation
activities, including project preparation, project implementation, advisory services, sector studies, and
training. Head of EBRD Municipal and Environmental Infrastructure Unit, interview with the author, July
1996.
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and EIB projects is difficult. This section draws mainly on interviews with central and
municipal government officials, MDB staff, environmentalists, and visits to various CEE
projects to meet with the project leaders. This research has shown while-as in the case of
the World Bank-there are no projects that are considered to be major environmental
disasters, implementation of the projects is often not exactly as planned, and there are specific
projects that concern NGO watchdog organizations.
The main environmental group in the region that acts as a watchdog for MDB activities
is CEE Bankwatch Network, whose members represent domestic environmental groups, and
sometimes international NGOs such as Friends of the Earth.9 9 CEE Bankwatch has been
supportive of some of the EBRD's activities, particularly work done by the Bank's Energy
Efficiency Unit. Peter Hlobil, CEE Bankwatch Network's Energy Project Coordinator
noted, "Only the EBRD has adopted a progressive approach toward energy efficiency; it
actively supports energy service companies and credit facilities for energy-efficiency
projects. "10 0
At the same time, looking at the broader EBRD portfolio, as noted above,
environmentalists are sometimes critical of the choice of projects considered or funded by the
EBRD, such as the Mochovce nuclear plant, and the ZSNP smelter (mentioned in Chapter 4).
In terms of implementation issues, environmentalists have been most critical of the inability
of the EBRD's Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) to result in the closure of any high risk
nuclear reactors in the region. After organizing to fight against passage of the 1995 proposed
Mochovce loan discussed in Chapter 1, environmentalists have also fought against a later
proposal to finance the Rivne and Khmelnitsky partially-built 1000 MW VVER nuclear plants
in the Ukraine. The Ukrainian government hoped to complete these partially-built, Soviet-
designed reactors to replace two units at the Chernobyl nuclear plant, which was slated to
9 9CEE Bankwatch was founded in 1995 in Poland. Its members include environmentalists throughout the
region. Its goal is specifically to monitor the MDBs, while raising public awareness of MDB activities, and
promoting public participation MDB decision-making. "The CEE Bankwatch Network for Monitoring
International Financial Institutions," Krakow, March 4, 1997.
100 "E-note", International Institute for Energy Conservation, August. 1997.
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close in 2000. However, in February 1997, an Independent Panel commissioned by EBRD
concluded that project was not a least-cost option, given declining demand for energy in
Ukraine and significant scope for energy conservation and demand-side management.
Nonetheless, the Bank moved forward in the loan process, while environmentalists argued
that the Bank should stop financing this project, given serious concerns about the nuclear
plants' safety.
In Bulgaria and Lithuania, in turn, NSA-supported financing aimed at providing short-
term improvements to nuclear plants in return for the plants' closure, has resulted in
government maneuvers to instead extend the life of particular plants beyond dates desired by
the EBRD and donor countries. In Bulgaria, while a 1993 agreement between the country
and EBRD called for the government to shut dowr two of its Kozloduy nuclear reactors by
the end of 1998, and an additional two by 2000, the government reneged, and decided to
extend the closure dates to 2005 and 2010, respectively. Bulgaria received $26 million to
upgrade its reactors for the limited extension of their lives, but instead it stretched the
extension, a move that may hurt its negotiations to accede to the EU. 101 CEE Bankwatch
environmentalists have called for the EBRD to require immediate closure of Units 1 and 2
and require the government to agree to legally binding closure dates for Units 3 and 4 by
2000.
The situation was somewhat similar in Lithuania, where an agreement was signed with
the NSA in 1994. Under the agreement, the government agreed not to extend the life of
Ignalina nuclear plant's two units beyond the time when their fuel panels would need to be
replaced. 102 However, under a safety assessment that was part of the agreement, a panel of
independent safety experts commissioned by the Bank and the Lithuanian government
recommended that the plant's two units should not be restarted after a 1997 shutdown for
maintenance, until numerous safety issues were resolved in its operation and design. While
101"Is Nuclear Safety Account Going to Fail?" Press Release, CEE Bankwatch, March 1998.
10 2 EBRD, "Independent Safety Panel's Recommendations on Ignalina NPP Released by Nuclear Safety
Account," http://www.ebrd.com/english/opera/nucsafe/prelease/18mar21.htm, 21 March 1997.
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the EBRD has pressured Lithuania to close Ignalina, the government has balked and by mid-
1998 had not produced a decommissioning plan. 10 3
Turning to the projects in the Bank's environmental portfolio, to date there has been
little assessment of credit-line related-activities, but other investment projects appeared to be
performing reasonably well, despite the existence of various implementation difficulties. In
the water sector, for example, the EBRD's projects face some of the challenges seen by
World Bank's, in terms of municipal water companies struggling to make profits (and repay
loans) given sharp declines in water consumption. Like the World Bank's projects, the
EBRD water companies have had a difficult time in raising tariff levels, particularly in cities
or towns facing increasing levels of unemployment and poverty. Nonetheless, the EBRD's
projects were generally performing without major difficulties, and without criticism from
local environmental groups. 104 However, these projects also faced their share of various--
often small--implementation problems.
The Tallinn Water and Environment Project, for example, was generally seen as
successful in reducing the discharge of untreated waste water into the Baltic, and cleaning up
drinking water. The project financed rehabilitation of Tallinn's water treatment plant,
existing ground water wells, the booster stations and network, and old sewerage pumping
stations. It also financed the replacement of old consumer water meters as well as the
installation of new meters, and upgraded the city's activated sludge treatment plant to meet
HELCOM recommendations. 105 However, it did face unexpected delays when slow
Parliamentary approval of the project put the project 9 months behind schedule. Also, the
costs of investments and upgrading planned by the project were higher than anticipated, but
the Tallinn Water Company was able to raise the additional funds from local banks.
According to Tallinn water officials, treated waste water going into the Baltic Sea was by
10 3 The EU may ultimately have more leverage to push for the closure of Ignalina, because the plant's
operation is unacceptable to Brussels in accession negotiations with Lithuania.
104 Friends of the Earth official in Tallinn, Estonia, interview with the author, 13 May 1998.
10 5EBRD, "Estonia: Tallinn Water and Environment Project," Report to Board of Directors, BDS94-93, 24
June 1994.
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1998 now 2-3 times better than in 1993. Drinking water was also significantly cleaner after
treatment, but further investments were needed in the water network to get the higher quality
water to the consumer. 10 6
In Kaunas, Lithuania, the EBRD's project was applauded by environmentalists, who
had lobbied hard for the construction of a waste water treatment plant in the late 1980s.
Kaunas is the second largest city in Lithuania, with a population of around 403,000, and
before the EBRD project it had no waste water treatment and was responsible for around
90% of the untreated waste water discharged in Lithuania. As such, Kaunas was one of the
"hot spots" identified under the 1992 Baltic sea Environmental Action Programme. 10 7 The
project financed the first phase of the construction of a waste water plant that included
mechanical treatment with chemical flocculation, while biological treatment of waste water
was planned for the medium-term. 10 8 It also financed new pumping stations, and a new
sewer network, among other components. Finally, the project, like most other MDB water
projects, "twinned" Kaunas Water with a Western water company (in this case Stockholm
Water Company), to help improve its management and implementation.
The Kaunas project had a slow start, and was delayed for over a year, mainly due to
difficulty in meeting covenants on tariff increases. The initial project design, inherited from
the Soviets, was also determined to be too big, after assumptions about water consumption
were seen as too high. One actor involved in the project also noted that the central
government was slow in transferring its share of project financing, while others complained
that some of the bilateral actors involved in components of the project (such as PHARE)
provided poor consultants, and that some delays were caused by constant political changes in
the city, reflected by the fact that there were 8 different mayors from the time the project was
1 0 6 Official of Tallinn Water, interview with the author, May 14, 1998.
10 7 EBRD, "Lithuania: Kaunas Water and Environment Project," Memorandum to Board of Directors, BDS95-
99, 30 June 1995.
10 8 The projects coals were to reduce heavy metals by 70%, total nitrogen by 10%, total phosphorus by 85%,
BOD by 60% and suspended solids by 33%. Ibid., Annex 5.
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agreed to mid-1998. 10 9 As in other municipalities, tariff increases proved too painful to be
implemented as planned. The municipality also decided not to implement the planned
construction of a potable water treatment plant, because it was too expensive. 10
EIB
General approach:
The EIB's entry into CEE is a product of the desire by the EU and EU member states to
"respond cohesively and effectively to the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern
Europe and to prepare to extend is membership to include some...of its former Comecon
neighbors." 111 The EIB was "invited" by the European Council to initiate lending to Poland
and Hungary in October 1989, and the money began to flow the following year. The Bank
had a mandate to lend 1.7 billion ECU to the region in 1990-93; 3.0 billion ECU in 1994-96;
and another 3.0 billion ECU for 1997-2000. In the latter period, as noted above, the Bank
also set up an additional 3.5 billion ECU pre-accession lending facility for CEE countries and
Cyprus to help to help these countries prepare for integration into the EU. The facility was
set up to assist pre-accession countries in their adoption of EU legislation (acquis
communitaire), particularly in the areas of infrastructure, industry, employment, regional
cooperation and environmental protection.l 12
During the first period, lending was authorized to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (later
separated into the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Lending
was expanded to include Albania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, while lending to Slovenia
began in 1993 under a separate financial protocol with the EC. In the first three years of
activities in CEE, just over half of the Bank's loans went to Poland and Hungary. Around
30% of the total loans focused on transportation projects, including road rehabilitation, air
1 09 Author interviews with Linas Vainius, Lithuania Green Movement, 20 May 1998; official from Kaunas
Water Project Implementation Unit, 20 May, 1998; and official from EBRD resident office in Riga, Latvia,
22 May, 1998.
110 Kaunas Water official, interview with the author, 20 May 1998.
1 11 Jackie Gower, "EC Relations with Central and Eastern Europe," in The European Community and the
Challenge of the Future, ed. Juliet Lodge (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 283.
1 12These are loans, but do not require the extra EU member state guarantee.
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traffic control system upgrading, and railway modernization. 13 In general, the Bank's
lending in CEE has emphasized infrastructure work, particularly in the area of trans-
European networks, or projects that better link the region to Western Europe. (See Appendix
3 for complete listing of projects).
The EIB's Portfolio of Activities
As Table 5.8 reveals, the Bank's portfolio reflects its emphasis on infrastructure
projects. The single largest sector of lending is transport, with 38% of total commitments.
Global loans, credit lines, and other loans for financial sector reform account for 20% of
lending, as does infrastructure lending in the energy sector. The EIB tends to undertake
similar types of projects in different countries. For example, in most countries in the region,
it is involved in air traffic modernization, highway construction, and telecommunications
modernization. All countries in the region have also received global loans for financial
intermediaries to on-lend to small and medium-sized enterprises, in areas that may include
energy efficiency or environmental protection, as well as tourism.
In some respects the EIB's portfolio is similar to the other two banks', where lending
for transport, energy, and financial sector reform are also among the top areas of lending. In
fact, the EIB lends far more to the transport sector than the other two banks, and ranks
second behind the World Bank in energy lending. Within the energy sector, the EIB is to
date the largest provider of loans for in the oil and gas sector, followed by the EBRD. The
EIB is also the leading source of telecommunications financing of the three banks.
However, there are also differences between the EIB's portfolio in CEE, and the other
two banks'. The most important difference is that, as the commitment tables show, the EIB
does not engage in the scope of lending undertaken by the other two. The EIB concentrates
in five main areas of lending (transport, financial sector, manufacturing, energy, and
telecommunications). The World Bank's work, by contrast, extends to areas such as
agriculture, health and population, urban development, education, and public sector
11 3
"EIB Financing in Central and Eastern Europe," EIB document, 27 February 1995.
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Table 5.8: European Investrlent Bank CEE Commitments
by Sector, 1990-96
millions ECU






Other (includes port rehabilitation, metro) 89
Banks (global loans, credit lines,
financial sector reform) 1000 20
Energy: 1000 20
Power Generation 488





Misc. Env. (forests) 13 .3
Water 60 1
TOTAL 49031 100.32
Sources: EIB, "Summary of Signed Operations in Central and Eastern Europe," June 1996;
EIB press releases, various dates, EIB Annual Reports, 1990-1996.
1Discrepancy with Table 5.2 due to rounding.
2 Discrepancy due to rounding.
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management, while the EBRD focuses much more on financing joint venture and
manufacturing projects, as well as hotels, agricultural, real estate/construction, and
insurance. Given the EIB3's mandate and institutional set-up, as one would expect, it
emphasizes more traditional MDB infrastructure projects.
Even in common sectors, such as transport, there are differences among the three
banks' emphasis. The EIB and EBRD, for example, have financed more projects to
construct new highways and road in the region, while the World Bank emphasizes road
maintenance versus new construction. Environmentalists, as discussed below, have been
highly critical of the EIB's work in road construction, arguing that an sustainable
development approach would warrant a greater emphasis on public transport, such as
railroads. The EIB's work in road construction, in turn, does reflects the EU desire to
finance "Trans-European Networks".
Approach to Addressing Environmental ssues
Chapter 4 has shown that the ways in which environmental issue have been
institutionalized at the Bank offer limited incentives for Bank staff to pursue environmentally-
oriented projects beyond traditional infrastructure projects that have environmental
components. Put into the language of Table 5.1, the EIB's activities largely fall in the
"lighter green/minimal activity" area. A handful of energy and water projects can be argued
as belonging to the category of projects that go beyond minimal environmental actions and
have significant but not primary environmental objectives. A single project has a primary
environmental goal; that is a 13m ECU loan to help finance re-forestation of abandoned state-
owned agricultural land in Poland. The EIB co-financed this project with the World Bank,
which took the lead in project development.
Unlike the other two MDBs, the EIB has spent little time and effort on broader
environmental policy issues. As the Bank has noted, "The EIB has no role, of course, in the
broad political choice of investment priorities (e.g. the arguments for investments in rail as
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against road, nuclear as against other power stations, etc,)." l1 4 The EIB has been a
peripheral player in the policy networks that have developed around the Environment for
Europe process, However, it has been relatively more active in regional efforts to address
environment degradation of the Baltic and Mediterranean seas. Since the late 1980s, the
Bank has worked with the World Bank, EU, and UNDP, as well as recipient countries, to
address common environmental problems in the Mediterranean region. 11 5 It worked with the
World Bank to set up in 1988 the "Mediterranean Environmental Technical Assistance
Programme," which carried out priority investments in the area. In 1992 it also began to
participate in the Baltic Sea Joint Comprehensive Action Programme, under which it has
financed two waste water treatment projects in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as several
others in northern Gennany and Sweden. 1 16
Table 5.9 lists EIB loans for projects that have significant environmental components,
which total 325 million ECU of lending for 6 projects. While the Bank describes a number
of its global loans as being used to finance projects that have goals of energy savings or
environmental protection, it does not release information on how the global loans are on-lent,
so there is no way to know what percentage of those loans are actually used for "green"
projects. The projects in Table 5.9 account for around 7% of the Bank's total lending for the
region. Around 60% of this amount is for the CEZ I project in the Czech Republic, which
involves the purchase of expensive desulphurization equipment for six Czech power plants.
The Bank's energy project in Bulgaria also finances the purchase of FGD equipment for a
power plant (in this case the Maritsa East II plant), and is part of a larger EBRD project there.
These projects have environmental benefits because they will result in a reduction of
S02 emissions. The EIB's CEZ project is similar to that of the World Bank's in its emphasis
on installing FGD equipment in power plants in northern Bohemia. The EIB project financed
1 14
"Environlnental Protection and EIB Finance," Information May 1982, 2-3.
115 "METAP: Helping to Preserve and Manage a Shared Resource in the Mediterranean," Information no. 88
(1996): 1 1.
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the installation of this equipment at six power plants, and estimated that S02 from these
plants would drop by 93% and particles would decline by 50% as a result. It also notes that
the equipment bought by the project complies with Czech laws on S02 emissions from
power plants as well as the EC's Directive for large combustion power plants. The Bulgaria
project, in turn, involves co-finance with the EBRD the completion of the Maritsa East II
plant, including retrofitting with FGD, expanding the plant's ash disposal pond,
rehabilitating its waters supply system, and purchasing equipment to measure air quality.
The EIB provided 40% of the project's finance, and the EBRD provided 35%. The EIB
project documents, unlike similar project documents from the other two banks, do not stress
environmental issues in its rationale for funding. In the case of the Bulgarian project, for
example, it emphasized the importance of increasing the safety and efficiency of Bulgaria's
electricity capacity in order to provide more electricity.
Three of the other projects in this table are co-financed with one of the two other
MDBs. These are cases where the projects were largely developed by either the World Bank
or EBRD, and the EIB came on board to finance a particular part of the project. The Estonia
district heating project, for example, was undertaken as part of the World Bank's District
Heating Rehabilitation Program in Estonia. The EIB project focused on rehabilitating the
district heating system in the city of Pnimu, although it also included a small component for
rehabilitating the district heating system in Tallinn. The goal of the EIB's project is to reduce
fuel costs to the company through fuel substitution and other energy savings measure, as a
way to help Parnu's district heating enterprise improve its performance in the face of
declining demand and higher energy costs. The result would be significantly lower
emissions of S02, NOx and C02, although it would also result in a minor increase in
particulates emissions. The EIB's loan financed a series of studies, equipment,
implementation and operation of facilities that converted two stoker grid boilers to be able to
burn peat and woodchip burning with better combustion conditions. The "new fuels" are
cheaper than the heavy fuel oil normally used in these facilities.
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The EIB's component of the World Bank-designed Polish forestry project entailed a
loan to Poland's environment ministry to help finance the planting of trees on abandoned
State-owned agricultural land throughout Poland. It was part of a five-year program,
supported by the World Bank, to rebuild and extend damaged forests, in part to ensure
supplies for the country's wood processing industry. The Riga water project, in turn, co-
financed the upgrading and rehabilitation of water and waste water systems in the Riga area
as part of a larger EBRD project. This project was one of the "hot spots" identified by the
Baltic Sea Joint Comprehensive Environmental Action Program. Finally, the EIB's waste
water project in Warsaw was also being undertaken under the auspices of the Baltic Sea
program, as another hot spot requiring urgent action. This project and the CEZ project are
the only two in Table 5.9 that the EIB was undertaking on its own, without co-financing.
Role of Recipient Demand, and Implementation
The EIB is widely acknowledged by government officials, environmentalists, and
project managers in CEE to be the most demand-driven of the three MDBs. In addition, its
loans contain the least conditionality and offer the cheapest rates, without the up-front fees
charged by the other MDBs. The expectations developed in Chapter 4 are borne out by
analysis of the Bank's work in CEE; that is, the absence of any "green bankers," the small
size of the EIB staff, and the dearth of Bank-sponsored policy work, results in the Bank
having a less proactive approach to project identification than the other banks. Also, as
previously noted, there are a number of examples of projects turned down by the other two
MDBs for economic or environmental reasons that the EIB has decided to finance. In
addition, four of the six "environmental" projects in Table 5.9 are projects that the EIB co-
financed with either the World Bank or the EBRD. In those cases, the World Bank and
EBRD played a bigger role in project design and analysis, and the EIB contributed a smaller
component of the project.
Of the three MDBs, the EIB is also the most impenetrable on the issue of project
implementation. As noted above, even for the global loans, which account for around 20%
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of EIB lending, the Bank does not even provide information on the types of activities
financial intermediaries on-lend the money for. 17
NGOs following the Bank's activities in CEE have been particularly critical of the
EIB's work in the transport sector, its largest portfolio of lending in the region. The EIB
focuses on building new roads, versus rehabilitating and maintaining old roads (which is the
World Bank's focus). NGOs argued that the Bank would be more sensitive about promoting
sustainable development if it focused on public transport, versus roads that are likely to
increase road traffic versus rail transport.
They launched a campaign to fight the EIB's M3 toll road in Hungary, which extends
from Budapest to the Ukrainian border, passing through a relatively underdeveloped region
of Hungary. 118 NGOs questioned the need to build a new toll road in an area where traffic
levels are low, and where there was no connecting road on the Ukrainian side of the border.
The extension of the M3 seemed to be a road going nowhere. Hungarian environmentalists
argued that financing would be better spent in road maintenance. Indeed, the World Bank
was first approached to finance this project, but it refused, arguing that Hungary's road
maintenance expenditures were only 25% of the total needed to prevent further road
deterioration, and that Hungary should spend more on maintenance and less on new
roads. 11 9 Even the EBRD had noted that the far eastern sections of the road were not
commercially viable as a toll road, given its location in a poor area of Hungary. The EIB,
however, argued that the short section of the M3 that is covered by its loan was in fact,
economically justifiable. 120
The project itself has been supported as a major link in the planned "Trans-European
Network" extension, as part of a Triest-Ljubljana-Budapest-Lvov-Kiev corridor that was
1 17 James N. Barnes and Sandrine Bretonni, "An Overview of the European Investment Bank: Accountability
and Transparency," (Paris: Friends of the Earth, 1997).
11 8This loan, for 95 million ECU, was signed in 1996. Its goal is to upgrade the M3 toll highway linking
Budapest to Gyongyos.
1 1 9World Bank Transport Sector Project Completion Report No. 15445, cited in Walter Hook, Andras
Lukacs, "The European Investment Bank's Loan to Hungary's M3 Highway: A Case Study," Document from
Hungary's Clean Air Action Group, 1997.
12 0However, the economic appraisal was not available for public scrutiny.
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identified at the March 1994 Second Pan-European Transport Conference held in Crete.
Pressure for the NM3 road has also stemmed from members of parliament from Eastern
Hungary (mainly 40 Socialist members of Parliament), Hungary's trade ministry, and a
"concrete-lobby" of construction firms, trade unions, local mayors and Socialist Party
groups. 121
In terms of other projects on the list, as of late 1997, the Warsaw water project (signed
in 1994) was stalled, and implementation had not begun. The project met with difficulties in
terms of the ownership of land where the new waste water treatment plant would be built,
since property rights of the proposed sight were contested. 12 2 If it eventually moves
forward, the plant will play an important role in cleaning up the Vistula River, into which
most of Warsaw's sewerage flows, untreated.
Conclusion
The MDBs are major donors in CEE and the ways in which they address environmental
issues in their work can have an important impact on policy reform and infrastructural
development in the region. This chapter has described the MDBs activities in CEE, and the
ways in which those activities reflect how demand-driven and "bank-like" each institution is.
The World Bank, the least bank-like of the three, has had the flexibility to undertake a
broader away of "environmental" projects and policy activities compared with the other two
banks, which in part reflects the activities of its internal network of "green bankers." Its role
in the GEF also gives it an additional portfolio of projects not found at the other two banks.
The EBRD, in turn, with its three "environmental" units, has created a niche for itself in
environmental financing in the areas of energy efficiency and municipal infrastructure.
Finally, the EIB's portfolio shows the least evidence of a proactive pursuit of projects with
significant or primary environmental components or goals. The EIB's "environmental
1 2 1Hook and Lukacs, "The European Investment Bank's Loan to Hungary's M3 Highway: A Case Study."
12 2EIB project official, interview with the author, July 1996; Polish Finance Ministry official, interview
with the author, October 1997.
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projects" reflect more its position as a co-financier of projects largely designed by the other
two banks, rather than great initiative to search for such projects.
The chapter has shown that the more demand driven the bank, the less likely it will be
involved in efforts to help governments reform their policies in ways that impact the
environment. The catch, however, is that the more creditworthy a country is, the more
options it has in finding capital for infrastructure and other activities, and the less leverage the
MDB has. Therefore, there is an inverse relationship between an MDB's leverage and a
country's economic health.
The chapter has also highlighted the fact that the "greenest" projects tend to be designed
by bankers or units who have the specific task of looking for such projects. Environmental
impact assessment units, in turn, tend to work as the banks' internal environmental
watchdogs. While banks like the World Bank and EBRD have become more
environmentally conscious over time, the fact is that the pace and process of "mainstreaming"
these ideas remains slow.
The chapter also examined some of the challenges facing the MDBs in project
implementation, which shows how difficult it is to know the ways in which a project
ultimately affects the environment. Ultimately, while an MDB's broad environmental
objectives may reflect the interests of its major shareholder countries, a focus on shareholder
preferences is not sufficient to explain and understand the institution's actual work, and the




Summary of the Argument
The ability of international institutions to take on new policy issues is highly significant
in an age when patterns of global governance are becoming both more complex and diffuse.
International institutions are being scrutinized by some as loyal servants of states who
continue to remain the dominant actors on the international scene, and by others as
independent actors who can shape state interests and sometimes even tell them what to do.
This dissertation shows that institutional behavior is not an "either-or" issue with respect to
how an international institution's actions reflect member state interest versus the institution's
own interests and capacity, but rather, a "when and how" issue. Further, the layering on of
new mandates can either help or hinder international institutions in accomplishing either of
these two goals, depending on how the institution is able to translate the new goals into
action, and whether or not these new goals conflict with pre-existing aspects of institutional
design and incentive systems. These issues therefore have important policy implications in
debates about how international institutions should be designed and what types of factors can
improve their performance in a more interdependent world.
This study shows the ways in which MDBs react to new environmental mandates are
significantly shaped by the interaction between shareholder preferences, organizational
dynamics and recipient demand. It argues that attempts to understand the "environmental
behavior" of these institutions requires an analysis of what happens at three different stages
of the policy process, since any one of these can be a source of innovation or inertia. An
understanding of how the institution receives new policy objectives, how it institutionalizes
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them, and how its translates these ideas into specific activities provides a clearer
understanding of the ways in which external politics and internal organizational
characteristics and incentives interact to produce outcomes.
New mandates tend to come into the lMDBs through external channels, reflecting the
interests of major board members. In the case of the World Bank, environmental NGOs
played a significant role in how the U.S. defined its interests with respect to the environment.
In the case of the EBRD, the interests of major donors were enhanced rather than directly
driven by NGO support. The dissertation also shows how all three banks share the
characteristic of diffuse governance structures. This makes it difficult for new mandates to
"infect" the institution, and therefore new policy demands are constrained by organizational
mission, design, financial tools, and a variety of other factors. Added together, these factors
tend to reflect how demand-driven or "bank-like" the MDB is, which highly influences its
ability to translate new policy goals that differ from more traditional MDB attention to
economic development issues.
I have argued that attempts to understand the environmental behavior of the World
Bank, EBRD and EIB in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) must start from a recognition of
the importance of shareholder commitment to the institution's environmental character, but
also depends on the ways in which the institution itself is able to translate those ideas, given
the factors that shape the incentives of its officials to take on new policy goals. Finally, even
if the institution is able to offer a certain set of "green" activities, its ability to sell them to
recipients depends on recipient demand for these activities and the leverage the MDB has to
influence the borrower's choice of projects and programs.
At an MDB like the EIB, the story essentially stops at the first stage of the policy
process. Weak donor commitment to the Bank's environmental activities results in
essentially few if any organizational innovations to improve the incentives of its staff to
proactively seek out projects for environmental reasons. While the Bank will seek to apply
European Union environmental standards in its lending, the dissertation has shown that
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oversight and transparency are weak within the Bank, and that these standards themselves
can be of mixed strength.
The World Bank and EBRD, in turn, face the challenge of how to institutionalize and
implement the strong environmental mandates given to them as a result of pressure from
major shareholders backed by environmental NGOs. For the EBRD, this means squaring its
environmental mandate with its private sector emphasis, since the more demand-driven an
MDB is, the less ability it has to seek out projects with environmental goals that are not of
interest to recipients. It has tackled this challenge through its environmental procedures, and
through a few discrete units set up within the bank with a goal of designing projects that
emphasize environmental goals. The World Bank has more flexibility than the EBRD in
many ways, given that its mission and institutional design have made it the least demand-
driven of the MDBs and the most oriented toward influencing recipient governments to adopt
projects that come with conditionality effecting broader policy changes.
Yet, the dissertation has also shown there are limits to being a "darker green" MDB.
An MDB has most leverage in selling certain types of policy ideas through its work either
when the recipient does not have alternative sources of financing that require less policy
conditionality, or where the goals of the Bank and client overlap. The World Bank has been
most influential in CEE countries in the earlier stages of the transition process. As CEE
countries grow economically stronger and have access to international capital markets, they
have less incentive to agree to World Bank loans. In countries such as Poland, Hungary,
and other pre-accession countries, the World Bank's role will continue to turn increasingly
toward advice and technical assistance, versus projects and structural adjustment lending.
In evaluating outcomes, in terms of whether projects are implemented as planned, the
dissertation highlights the importance of analyzing implementation issues in greater depth.
Actually doing so for a significant set of the 500 plus projects the three banks have
undertaken in CEE between 1991-96 is well beyond the scope of the dissertation, and clearly
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a job for a team of researchers. However, the projects analyzed in the dissertation do
illustrate why project documents are essentially guides that are rarely followed as written, as
well as some of the different types of unanticipated obstacles or delays projects can face in
the implementation process. Thus, determining the actual environmental impact of a project,
such as its affect on reducing emissions of pollutants, or determining the impact of programs,
policy studies and technical assistance on recipient country policy reform, is no easy task.
An examination of the environmental management components of the World Bank's
Baltic water projects, for example, showed how some components fizzled out, while
others--such as the pig farm study in Siauliai, Lithuania, discussed in Chapter 5-may have
a significant impact on the amount of pollutants entering local water sources. An analysis of
available data, backed by interviews with more than 100 MDB officials, environmentalists,
donor and recipient government officials, and other actors, showed that there were no
environmentally disastrous MDB projects in CEE, compared with the types of projects in
other parts of the world that fueled the NGO campaign against the World Bank in the 1980s.
At the same time, however, there are projects in CEE where the banks have not properly
followed their environmental procedures, or projects whose goals are questionable in light of
the banks' environmental policy objectives.
Finally, I argue that the definition of "environmental behavior" can encompass behavior
ranging from a minimal response emphasizing mitigation measures for projects seeking to
promote other-possibly conflicting-goals, to a more proactive response that specifically
aims to achieve an environmental end. The boundaries between the two can be grey, and it is
often impossible to quantify or delineate specific environmental benefits. This is an
important point because it focuses attention on the types of projects international financial
institutions are set up to do, given how "bank-like" their design and mission are. In other
words, if an MDB is designed to be demand-driven, it is unrealistic to expect its staff to
spend time identifying and designing environmentally-oriented projects that are not demanded
by its clients. We should, instead, expect bank officials, at minimum, to follow a clear set of
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environmental due diligence procedures to avoid financing environmentally destructive
projects, and to improve project design to reduce potential negative environmental effects.
In addition, there is a set of more traditional MDB activities that happily meet the dual
objectives of environmental improvement and economic development-for example, projects
that seek to modernize or build more efficient energy facilities, or sectoral restructuring and
structural adjustment work that calls for a reduction in energy subsidies. An MDB's
recategorization of traditional activities as new "environmental" activities is what Ernst Haas
would label and example of institutional adaptation, versus real learning.1
The dissertation has shown that in Central and Eastern Europe, the largest sectors of
MDB financing are in more traditional areas of MDB activity-in the financial, energy and
transport sectors. For the most part, the relatively "darker green" projects reflected greater
attention to environmental issues in energy and water projects, projects MDBs have always
financed. However, as Chapter 5 has shown, even in these areas there were a number of
projects with significant environmental components or primary environmental goals, which
were distinguished from more traditional types of project design. Many of the other
environmental contributions of the World Bank, and to a lesser degree the EBRD, are
difficult to quantify because they have to do with contributing to policy development and
sectoral reform through non-lending activities such as technical assistance and agenda-setting
exercises. The benefits of capacity building, policy prioritizing and training can be highly
important but impossible to measure. The EIB has made the smallest environmental
contribution of the three MDBs to date, but it is likely to face increasing pressure over time to
improve its environmental performance. In particular, it will have to help accession countries
comply with the EU's environmental acquis communautaire, in support of the accession
process.
Theoretical Implications
1 As noted in Chapter 2, learning entails a cognitive evolution Adaptation, in turn, involves behavioral
change that does not entail a re-examination of underlying values or changes in the dynamics of
decisionmaking. See Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International
Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
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The arguments made here challenge different schools of thought that seek to explain the
behavior of international institutions. It joins the ranks of Historical Institutionalists in
pointing out how neorealist and even neoliberal institutionalist theories of institutional
behavior can be static and not work well in accounting for what happens when institutions
are given somewhat conflicting demands by their member state owners. It also provides
evidence for Historical Institutionalist arguments that the behavior of institutions can be
"sticky;" that is, even if member state preferences change over time, institutional structures,
procedures and incentives may adapt more slowly or not at all. In addition, this dissertation
argues for the importance of looking more closely inside the institutions to determine the
ways in which their organizational design and incentive systems shape behavior. Put
differently, this is an argument for bringing back some of the lessons of organizational theory
into the study of international institutions.
Finally, the arguments made here also serve as a critique for constructivist approaches
that posit the ways in which new mandates affect an organization's mission, behavior or
goals reflect the actions of epistemic communities. If this were the case, we would expect the
actions of epistemic communities promoting greater environmental accountability at the
MDBs to influence the actions of all three banks, and therefore we would see less variation in
the banks' attempts to address environmental actions in their work. It is also important to
pay closer attention to the ways in which organizational mechanisms can shape knowledge
entering international institutions.
Generally, existing theories on international institutions tend to focus on one of the
three stages of the policy process. My argument calls for a better integration of international
relations theories emphasizing the importance of shareholder politics and preferences in
shaping institutional behavior with organizational and institutionalist theories that focus
attention on how what happens inside the black box of the institution can shape behavior.




Three sets of policy implications arise from these arguments. First, NOOs and other
actors that seek to change the behavior of M)DBs will be most effective when they attempt to
influence the MDBs' boards of directors. There is little evidence that the institutions
themselves are sources of significant change in environmental behavior, although institutional
actors have been important in shaping how the broader mandates are translated into policies
and procedures, e.g., through the development of environmental assessment procedures. In
the three MDBs examined here, the major policy changes have external sources.
The problem with this approach, however, is the diffuse governance structures of the
three MDBs. It is difficult to imagine, for example, that strong lobbying of the EIB's
member state board members would easily translate into stronger environmental policies at
the EIB. This is because the Bank has a non-resident board that consists of minister-level
economics officials as well as some private sector members who are not directly accountable
to anyone. A better tactic might be to pressure the environmental directorate at the European
Commission, since the Commission has veto power on the EIB board. A related lesson is
that member states have more leverage in pressuring an MDB to change its policy goals
during times of capital replenishment. NGOs who pointed out disastrous World Bank
projects to U.S. Congressional officials in the 1980s gave those officials greater power to
insist on policy changes at the Bank during capital replenishment discussions. A number of
other important policy changes at the World Bank, and to a lesser extent, the EBRD, also
occurred through the process of capital replenishment negotiations.
A second major policy lesson is that there are limits to MDB leverage. First, the World
Bank's ability to impose policy conditionality declines as a recipient country gains access to
other sources of funding. Policy leverage is also a function of how "demand-driven" an
MDB is. If an MDB tends to wait for clients to approach it with partially or fully designed
funding proposals, the MDB has less ability to influence a project. Ironically, attempts by
MDBs to gain leverage can also backfire and result in more potentially dangerous projects
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than would otherwise have existed. This is lesson one can take from the failed Mochovce
loan at the EBRD. Pressure for the EBRD to attach conditionality to this loan resulting in a
safer nuclear plant was one of the reasons the Slovaks chose to finance the completion of the
plant through other sources, which is likely to result in less safeguards than would have
existed under an EBRD loan.
Finally, while a policy argument can be made that there may be synergy in the sense
that the three banks' activities complement each other, I would argue that more attention must
be paid to examples when one MDB undercuts another. In other words, donors should seek
to avoid situations when the EIB is in a position to undermine World Bank conditionality by
offering a similar loan for a project that is cheaper and contains fewer demands for policy
changes. Recipient governments should not be able to play the banks against each other for
the lowest level of conditionality.
It is particularly important to strengthen the environmental behavior of the EIB, because
ultimately it will be the only one of the three MDBs to remain in CEE. Both the EBRD and
World Bank have "graduation" policies, whereby countries reaching a certain level of
development are no longer eligible to receive their loans. Indeed, if the EBRD is successful
in its work to promote private sector development in CEE and the former Soviet Union,
theoretically it should make itself extinct. Its closure would be the sign of its success. The
presence of the EIB in Central and Eastern European countries planning to join the EU, by
contrast, is growing ad will continue to grow.
The world has changed considerably since the first MDB-the World Bank-was
established in 1944 at Bretton Woods as a sort of afterthought to delegates' main goal of
establishing the International Monetary Fund to help create a stable global economic order.
When Harry Dexter White first wrote a draft proposal for an international bank in early 1942,
he made no mention of development, but instead emphasized the importance of a new
institution to supply the huge amount of capital needed for post-war reconstruction and
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economic recovery. 2 The roles of the World Bank and other MDBs have evolved
considerably since those days, as conceptions of what "development" means continues to
expand to encompass an increasing array of meanings. MDBs will always struggle to
varying degrees with their dual roles as financial institutions and development agencies. The
ways in which they harmonize or prioritize sometimes conflicting goals reflect the extent to
which there is value to their work beyond what a private sector bank can offer.
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2Rich, Mortgaging the Earth, p. 53.
APPENDIX I
Summary of World Bank projects in Central and Eastern Europe 1990-19961
Millions of dollars
Fiscal Year Project /Sector Bank mS TPC mS2
Descrilption
Albania
96 IDA National Roads Project 25m 66m
Rehabilitate and construct national roads.
96 IDA Forestry Project 8m 21.6m
Restore degraded state-owned forest and pasture areas; promote sustainable use
96 IDA Power Transmission and Distribution 29.Sm I 17m
Improve standard, reliability, efficiency of country's electricity transmission and distribution systems.
95 IDA Agroprocessing Development 6m 7. Im
Develop agroprocessing sector, improve marketing of farm products, thereby improving income of poorer
farmers and increasing availability of food products to consumers.
95 IDA Urban Works and Microenterprise Pilot Project
4m 4.4m
Fund five-year program to boost employment and develop small-scale activity in urban areas.
95 IDA Rural Development 6m 12m
Promote small farm and off-farm activities, repair basic rural infrastructure, create employment for rural
population.
95 IDA Rural Roads Project 15m 33.6m
Rehabilitate rural roads, which are in poor condition, by using labor-intensive methods that will generate
12,000 man-year jobs, especially benefiting poor and unemployed, over three year period.
95 IDA Power Loss Reduction Project 5m 8.7m
Implement action plan to reduce non technical power system losses.
94 IDA Health Services Rehab. Project 12.4m 16m
Prevent further deterioration of basic health services in poorer regions.
94 IDA Agriculture lom 44. I m
Increase agricultural production by raising farm productivity through rapid rehabilitation of existing irrigation
and drainage infrastructure. Expected to benefit more than 50,000 families.
94 IDA Enterprise and Financial Sector Adjustment Credit
15m
Support for development of banking system, continued privatization in industrial sector, downsizing or
liquidation of state enterprises.
94 IDA Tax Administration Modernization Project
4m 4.4m
1Sources: World Bank Annual Reports, 1990-96. The World Bank fiscal year is July -June 30. This list
uses calendar year information, so that it is comparable with the other two banks, which have fiscal years
based on the calendar year. Thus, this chart is based on date of approval. Dates found in the annual reports
are adjusted to calendar year information obtained from the World Bank computer data base.
2Total project costs, if greater than World Bank contribution.
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Develop, implement procedures in tax and customs administration, as well as value-added tax system.
94 IDA Water Supply, Sewerage I 11.6m 19.5m
Eliminate water shortages and associated health risks in district of Durres, develop strong local institutional
framework for provision of water supply and sewerage services.
94 IDA Education 9.6m 11.3m
Rehabilitate damaged, dilapidated primary school facilities. Also strengthen Ministry of Education's ability to
better use fiscal resources.
93 IDA Social Sector 5.5m 6.2m
Assist government in reforming systems of social protection of vulnerable, while configuring them in ways
that make them compatible with market-oriented economy.
93 IDA Urban Development 15m 40m
To help develop first steps in market-based housing sector, completion of construction of 4500 apartments,
which will be sold to individual households under mortgage and condominium arrangements. Cofinancing
expected from USAID, other bilaterals.
93 IDA Social Sector 5.4m 6m
Support government's labor market-development program, designed to meet needs of unemployed anu facilitate
their return to employment. Supported through technical assistance, fellowships, training, training materials
and equipment.
93 IDA Agriculture Sector Loan 20m 47m
Support government's agricultural reform program for 18 months, and provide credit line to government for
onlending to rural entrepreneurs through a new Agricultural Bank. Co-financing expected from OECD,
PHARE and Netherlands.
93 IDA Poverty Alleviation Program 2.4m 4.8m
Finance year-long pilot phase of government's rural poverty alleviation program. Local infrastructure will be
repaired and rehabilitated, and small-scale credit provided to farmers, rural micro entrepreneurs. Co-financing
from EC and UNDP.
93 IDA Transport Project 18m 27m
Rehabilitate, maintain, construct roads, repair quays and port surfaces at Durres, and provide technical training
and assistance. Cofinancing from the KFAED.
93 IDA Technical Assistance Project for Economic Reform 4m 4.6
Help government's ability to formulate, implement reforms in macroeconomic management enterprise
restructuring and privatization, and financial sector reform
92 IDA Nonproject 41.lm 55.3m
For importing and distributing critical imports in order to maintain or increase capacity utilization and
production. Co-financing expected from Switzerland.
TOTAL 272.5m
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Trust Fund
96 Emergency Education Reconstruction Project 5m 32.8m
Program of primary school rehabilitation and textbook printing, distribution. Additional 5m in IDA funds as
well.
96 War Victims Rehabilitation Project 5m 30m
Integrate people with war-related disabilities into productive life through community-based rehabilitation and
orthopedic and reconstructive surgery.
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95-96 Transportation 35m 152m
Urgent high priority links, services in transport system will be reconstructed and repaired.
95-96 Multisector 45m 160m
Rehabilitate severely damaged productive capacity and infrastructure facilities to initiate production and
economic activities.
95-96 District Heating 20m 58m
Restore district heating in Sarajevo by reconstructing district heat supply system.
95-96 Water 20m 70m
Restore water, sanitation, solid waste service to mitigate public health risk in priority areas.
96 IDA Emergency Industrial Re-Start Project 10m 350m
Support industry and production.
96 IDA Local Initiatives Project 7m
Microenterprises will provide employment and help restart economy, local institutions. NGOs providing
services to self-employed and microenterprises will be strengthened.
96 IDA Essential Hospital Services Project 15m 33.5m
Support modern, cost-effective, fiscally sustainable hospital service to reduce burden of disease and suffering
for people most affected by war.
96 IDA Transition Assistance Credit 90m
Support economic growth, political stability through measures to develop new government structures on state
and federation levels, reintegrate economic system, reorganize public finance, create employment.
96 IDA Emergency Housing Repair 15m 50m
Repair around 20,000 war-damaged homes, enabling displaced people to return to their communities.
96 IDA Emergency Electric Power Reconstruction Project 35.6m 196.4m
Restore electricity services in major cities and vital industries.
96 IDA Emergency Public Works and Employment Project 10 Om 45m
Create labor-intensive employment to help those unemployed by war to clear war damage, rehabilitate small-
scale public infrastructure.
96 IDA Emergency Land mines Clearance Project 7.5m 67m
Clear land mines tp make way for urgent reconstruction and recovery priorities.
96 IDA Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project 7.5m 20m
Reintegrate demobilized soldiers, returning refugees into productive jobs in civilian economy.
TOTAL: 327.6m
Bulgaria
96 Health Sector Restructuring Project 26m 47.1 m
Restructure health sector.
96 Social Insurance Administration Project 24.3 32.3m
Support government's reform of social insurance program, to lay groundwork for guaranteeing old-age income
security.
96 Rehabilitation Loan 30m
Support government stabilization and reform program, and strengthen social safety nets.
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95 Railway Rehabilitation Project 95m 126m
Support and deepen restructuring process begun by Bulgarian State Railways and government by financing
investments in line with restructuring.
94 Agricultural development 50m 63.4m
Private sector gets access to credit for investment in agriculture and agribusiness,
94 Water Companies Restructuring and 98m 131 m
Modernization Project-- Increase autonomy, commercialization of the country's 29 regional water and sewerage
cos. and make management more accountable to local authorities. Rehabilitate and upgrade selected water and
sewerage facilities.
94 Debt and Debt Service Reduction Program. 125m
Finances a portion of the upfront costs of the recent debt and debt service reduction agreement on the
restructuring o public external debt.
93 Energy 93m 126m
A first energy project seeks to increase efficiency of NEK, national electricity co., reduce its generating costs,
improve dam safety, etc.
93 Industry 55m 110m
Investment/export credits for private sector, and technical assistance for financial intermediaries.
93 Telecommunications 30m 339.8m
Support government reform in telecommunications. Cofinancing expected from EIB and EBRD.
91 SAL for economic reform program 250m
91 Technical Assistance 17m 33.5m
Support government implementation of economic reform program through provision of technical assistance
in private sector development, bank reform, energy sector reform, etc.
TOTAL 893.3m
Croatia
96 Coastal Forest Reconstruction and Protection 42m 67.3m
Restore and protect coastal forests destroyed by war,
96 Emergency Transport and Mine Clearing 102m 122.3m
Repair and reconstruct transport networks within Croatia and between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Clear land mines.
96 Capital Markets Development Project 9.5m 20.6m
Strengthen regulatory, policy framework of capital markets.
96 Technical Assistance Project 5.0rnm 6.2m
Studies and advisory services to help design, implement reforms supported by Enterprise and Financial Sector
Adjustment Loan.
96 Farmer Support Services 17.0 30m
Support technology-related services, to improve farmer income and increase agricultural productivity.
95 Health 40m 54m
Support government's health care reform program, which concentrates on providing primary health care to
underserved areas.
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95 Transport 80m 567.8m
Support and accelerate modernization and transformation of transport sector, with special emphasis on the
main road network and the Croatian Roads Authority. Co-financed with EBRD.
94 Emergency Reconstruction Project 128m 205.3m
Reconstruct basic infrastructure destroyed by war, replace vital agricultural assets, help to reconstruct destroyed
housing, provide supporting infrastructure.
TOTAL 423.5m
Czech Republic
93 Telecommunications 80m 891.5m
Expand, strengthen international/national phone networks. Co-financing from EBRD, EIB.
92 Power and Environmental Improvement 246m 557.5m
Improve efficiency at Prunerov II power plant in northern Bohemia through installation of equipment and
operational improvements that will result in reduced lignite consumption and reduced emissions of sulfur
dioxide and dust, thereby improving environment and health of local citizens. In addition, loan will modernize
transmission system of Czech Power Enterprise (CEZ), as well as facilitate interconnection of CEZ and
German power grids.
91 Nonproject 300m
First phase of country's rapid transition to market economy will be supported. Co-financing expected from
Export Import Bank of Japan.
TOTAL 626m
Estonia
96 Agriculture Project 15.3 30.9m
Increase rural income and stimulate rural economy through privatization or rural lands, selected infrastructure,
introduction of new farming technologies.
95 Haapsalu and Matsalu Bays 2m 8.4m
Reduction of pollution in Haapsalu bay and Matsalu bay catchment area will be reduced through support for
decentralization of environmental management responsibilities.
95 Health Project 18m 34.5m
Emphasize health promotion and disease prevention programs, enhance efficiency and quality of health
services, develop sector human resources.
94 Financial Institutions Development Banks 10m 31.8m
Support implementation of reforms in the financial and enterprise sectors.
94 Highway Maintenance 12m 25m
Two year program of maintenance work financed. Cofinancing expected from Denmark, Finland, Sweden.
94 District Heating 38.4m 64.5m
Rehab. and improve heating systems in 3 of 5 largest cities. reduce fuel costs. capacity building assist.
included. Co-financed with EIB.
92 Nonproject/rehabilitation loan 30m




96 Public Finance Management 7.75m 10.7m
Develop central treasury system and optimize budgeting and debt-management processes to reduce government
borrowing needs and borrowing costs.
95 Budapest Urban Transport Project 38m 67.1 m
Support urban transport reforms undertaken by Budapest Transport Co, and city of Budapest.
94 Oil and gas. energy and Environment 100m 242.5m
Next investment (construction of gas-fired combined cycle cogeneration unit) in national least cost power
generation program, designed to improve energy efficiency, environmental conditions at major power stations
93 Tax Administration Modernization Project 29m 55.6m
Strengthen tax management by program of institutional development, development and implementation of
new information technology system, and training in development and use of applications systems.
93 Population/Health/Nutrition 91m 132.6m
Health service interventions, training
93 Public Sector Management 132m 201.3
Reforms in social insurance system supported.
92 Agricultural Credit 100m 254.5
Financial and technical assistance to help pricing/operational efficiency of product markets, improving
business env.
92 Roads Project 90m 161. m
Address back log of highway rehabilitation works, and implement road safety project. Project also provides
technical assistance to improve effectiveness of roads administration and expenditure.
92 Enterprise Reform Program 200m
Support enterprise reform program aimed at accelerating privatization, restructuring state-enterprise sector.
91 Education (human resources) 150m 340m
Help government alleviate unemployment impact of restructuring and to invest in human resources to help
promote economic and technological competitiveness.
91 Second Structural Adjustment Loan 250m
Government's medium-term economic reform program supported by this second structural adjustment loan.
90 Second Telecoms 150m 1400m
A second telecom project part of Hungarian telecoms Company's investment program, etc. Cofinancing
expected from EIB.
90 Agriculture Support Export Project 100m 274m
Credit line to enable agricultural enterprises (public/private) to improve operations, reduce production costs,
increase export orientation. Technical assistance, training from OECD donor agencies.
90 Financial System Modernization 66m 143.4m
Modernization and strengthening of financial system supported. Borrower or guarantor is National Bank of
Hungary.
90 Structural Adjustment Loan 200m
Structural adjustment program, aimed at establishing competitive market economy, restoring reasonable rate




96 Structural Adjustment Loan 60m
Support government's efforts to promote private sector development, improve public sector management.
95 Jelgava District Heating Rehab. Project 14.0m 18.2m
Rehabilitate district heating system in city of Jelgava.
95 Urban Development 27.3m 45.4m
Rehabilitate Riga's urban transport system, and water and wastewater-treatment plan in Daugavpils. Also,
through financing of Municipal Development Fund, channel money to number of small-scale investments in
municipal services elsewhere in the country.
94 Liepaja Environment Project 4.0m 21.2m
Improve water and wastewater services in Liepaja, in context of country's legal obligations to protect the
Baltic sea from ecological degradation.
94 Enterprise and Financial Sector Restructuring Project 35m 114m
Accelerate reforms in enterprise and financial sectors.
94 Agricultural development project 25m 45.1m
Support private agricultural development by providing credits to new private farmers, and expanding/upgrading
private agro-industries and forest-based industries. Cofinancing from PHARE and BITS.
92 Multisector 45m
Forex for imports, technical assistance to support government stabilization/reform program.
TOTAL 210.3m
Lithuania
96 Structural Adjustment Loan 80m
Support government reforms to continue transition toward market economy.
96 Highway Project 19m 45m
Preserve road network, improve road maintenance.
96 Energy Efficiency/Housing Pilot l0m 20.6m
Improve energy efficiency in residential and public buildings, and support privatization of housing sector.
96 Klaipeda Geothermal Demonstration 5.9 18m
Demonstrate feasibility of using low-temperature geothermal water as renewable indigenous energy resource
for use in district heating systems.
96 Private Agriculture Development 30m 54.8m
Assist government in developing viable, private agricultural sector, help those hurt by dramatic decline in
rural employment to start their own businesses through increased access to credit.
95 Liepaja Environment 6.2m 22.9m
Take first steps toward reducing pollution from the Upper Lielupe river basin, a major water-pollution source
into the Gulf of Riga portion of the Baltic Sea.
95 Enterprise and Financial Sector Assistance Project 25m 50.3m
Channel credit through selected participating banks to help finance investment and related permanent working
capital needs of private and privatized enterprises.
94 Klaipeda Environment Project 7m 23.1m
Improve water and wastewater services in Klaipeda, in context of country's legal obligations to protect Baltic
sea from ecological degradation.
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94 Energy--Power Rehabilitation Project 26.4m 32.9m
Rehabilitate two thermal power plants, improve safety, reliability, flexibility of electricity transmission
system, Includes capacity-building assistance,
92 Nonproject 60m
Provides foreign exchange to finance critically needed imports. Co-financing by PHARE and Sweden.
TOTAL 269.5m
FYR Macedonia
96 IDA Health Sector Transition Project 16.9m l .4m
Invest in primary health care and disease prevention.
96 Private Sector Development 12m
Provides private sector finance to private enterprises, farmers to improve profitability and agricultural output.
96 IDA Private Farmer Support 7.9m 10.2m
Provides technology-related services to private farmers to improve production and income.
95 IDA Social Reform and Technical Assistance Project 14m 17.1 m
Support labor redeployment in communities affected by enterprise restructuring, and develop program to better
target social assistance to poor.
95 IDA Financial and Enterprise Sector Adjustment 85m
Support implementation of major reforms in enterprise and banking sectors. Strengthen social safety
program's ability to provide more equitable protection against poverty.
95 Transit Facilitation Project 24.0m 38.7m
Address transit crisis, caused by closing of Serbian and Greek borders to transport of goods, by upgrading east-
west transit corridors.
94 Multisector Economic Recovery Loan 40m
Structural reforms to help government restore growth supported.
94 IDA Multisector Economic Recovery Loan 40m
Structural reforms to help government restore growth supported.
TOTAL 239.8m
Poland
96 Port Access and Mgmt 67m 145.6m
Improve access to ports of Gdansk, Gdynia and Szczecin-Swinoujscie.
96 Bielsko-Biala Water and Wastewater 21.5m 35.4m
Rehabilitate and expand Bielsko-Biala's water and wastewater systems, providing consumers with more
reliable, safer, better-quality services.
95 Power Transmission 160m 275.7m
Investments in rehabilitation and upgrading of key substations, as well as modernization of high-voltage
transmission lines.
94 Katowice Heat Supply and Conservation Project 45m 92.9m
Provide funds to Katowice District Heating Enterprise to help finance investments in energy conservation and
efficiency, asset-life extension, and reduction of air pollution.
94 Debt and Debt Service Reduction Loan 170m
Finance part of the costs incurred in implementation of a debt and debt-service reduction operations.
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93 Forest Development Support Project 146m 335.4m
Improve government's forest management practices, expand forest eco capital, accommodate sustainable
forestry, Cofinancing from EIB.
93 Agriculture Sector Adjustment Loan 300m
Assist government agricultural sector adjustment program.
93 Nonproject (enterprise and financial sector adjustment) 450m
Governme't's Enterprise and Bank Restructuring and Privatization Program supported.
93 Road project 150m 296.8m
Finance portion of investment program of General Directorate of Public Roads. Institution-building assistance
included.
92 Population, Health, Nutrition 130m 227m
Support government's health sector reform plan. Project designed to strengthen health promotion programs,
support first steps in sectoral restructuring by shifting focus from institutional to primary care, strengthen
sectoral institutional capacity, ensure sustainability of service by controlling costs.
92 Small Scale Enterprises 60m 187.2m
Create new private business by providing financing for efficient investment in private enterprises. Tech assist.
also for private sector development.
92 Urban Development/Housing 200m 677m
Support government's first steps moving toward market based system for housing production through
provision of credit lines for mortgages and construction, as well as technical assistance. Expect EBRD co-
financing.
91 Agriculture Development Project o100m 180.2m
Private farmers supported and other private sector activities in rural areas promoted, mainly through
restructuring high-priority rural cooperatives.
91 Privatization and Restructuring Project 280m 915m
Support privatization program, implement restructuring across major share of industry. Co-financing expected
from EIB and others.
91 Financial Institutions Development 200m
Action program on policy, regulatory, institutional fronts to extend financial sector reform. Institution
building assistance included.
91 Employment Promotion and Services Project o100m 142.2m
Assist government in developing improved employment policies, institutions, programs to mitigate impact
of adjustment on labor force.
91 Heat Supply Restructuring and Conservation Project 340m 619.3m
Implementation of comprehensive energy-sector restructuring, along with commercialization and privatization
of restructured enterprises and petroleum exploration and production activities. Extends life of existing heating
assets through rehabilitation and introduction of modem technologies and materials, thereby significantly
reducing capital expenditures. Cofinancing expected from EBRD.
91 Telecommunications 120m 379m
First telecommunications project seeks to strengthen trunks network, carry out selected improvements. Co-
financing expected from EIB.
90 Structural Adjustment Loan 300m
Government's unprecedented economic transformation program supported.
90 Agriculture o100m 154m
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Rehabilitation, modernization, expansion of agroprocessing industries. Also funds import of around 100,000
tons of livestock feed.
90 Energy Resource Development Energy 250m 616m
Support government's program of energy conservation, environmental improvement through energy pricing
reform and fuel-switching from coal to gas through investment in materials and equipment to increase
production, distribution of natural gas. Preparation of studies on sector restructuring, gas development,
encouragement of private sector participation in oil and gas sector, and tech assistance are included.
Cofinancing expected from EIB.
90 Industrial Export Development Project 260m 455m
Direct foreign exchange costs of needed physical improvements made available to enterprises undertaking high
priority, high return investments to expand exports to convertible currency markets. Also technical assistance
for enterprise restructuring.
90 First Transport Project (railways) 153m 216.5m
Support government's transport-sector restructuring program, which emphasizes increased cost recovery,
improved efficiency, increased market responsiveness. investments in railway system will be financed;
activities of Highways Admin. supported. Co-financing from EIB expected.
90 Water supply and sewerage (environmental management) 18m 27.3m
Technical assistance provided to help Poland strengthen its ability to analyze and design a series of policy,
regulatory, institutional and investment actions it plans to undertake to improve environmental quality.
TOTAL 4.12b
Romania
96 Reform of Higher Education 50m 84m
Reform higher education system to provide skilled managers, technical professionals, entrepreneurs and
societal leaders necessary to sustain transition to market economy.
96 Bucharest Water Supply 25m 50m
Rehabilitate Bucharest's water supply system.
96 Financial and Enterprise Sector Adjustment Loan 280m
Provides balance of payments support to help government pursue its stabilization and structural reform
program.
96 Railway Rehabilitation Project 120m 383m
Support restructuring of Romanian National Railways.
95 Power Sector Rehab. and Modernization 110m 363.9m
Support government's power sector reform program, and rehabilitate around 1,445 mw of existing thermal
generating capacity. Co-financing from EIB/EBRD.
95 Employment and Social Protection Project 55.4m 95.2m
Implement reforms in social insurance and assistance programs, strengthen capacity of labor office to
administer claims for unemployment benefits, and develop adult training system.
94 Industrial Development Project 175m 334m
On-lent to private enterprises. to improve competitiveness, expand exports.
94 Petroleum Sector Rehabilitation Project 175.6m 345.6m
Supports government petroleum sector restructuring strategy, designed to promote private sector investments.
strengthen institutional capabilities, establish suitable regulatory framework to facilitate development of
efficient, commercially oriented petroleum sector. Co-financing expected from EIB and PHARE.
94 Education Reform Project 50m 73.5m
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Improve quality of basic and secondary education by strengthening curriculum and teacher training, assessment
and examinations and textbook quality. Also increase efficiency in management of public resources for
education.
93 Roads Project 120m 405m
More than 1000 km of roads will be rehabilitated. Material, equipment, technical assistance and training
provided. Co-financing by EBRD and EIB.
92 Private Farmer and Enterprise Support o100m 164.7m
Private sector development in agriculture will be supported through project that finances credit to private
business to improve input supply, food processing, marketing, distribution.
92 Structural adjustment loan 400m
Support government reform program.
91 Health Rehabilitation Project 150m 207.5m
Rehabilitate, upgrade primarily health care system, first phase implementation of health sector financing
restructuring.
91 Technical Assistance 180m 262.4m
Make foreign exchange available for critical imports of spare parts. Cofinancing expected from EIB.
TOTAL 2.0b
Slovakia
93 Economic Recovery LoaL.--multisector 80m
Support government reform program by financing many one-time costs associated with restructuring and
breakup of CSFR, including social sector reforms and funding social safety net for vulnerable groups.
93 Telecommunications project 55m 462.3m
Expand, strengthen phone networks. Cofinancing expected from EIB and EBRD.
91 Nonproject 150m
First phase of country's rapid transition to market economy will be supported. Co-financing expected from
Export Import Bank of Japan.
TOTAL 285m
Slovenia
96 Investment Recovery 49.3m
Support investment needs of emerging private sector by making long-term financing available through three
borrowing banks.
96 Environment Project 23.9m
Focuses on mitigation of air pollution and institutional strengthening. It will include the expansion of
existing and/or the building of new district gas-heating networks and institutional strengthening.
93 Enterprise and Financial Sector Adjustment loan 80m
Help privatization, accelerate development of financial sector, support more effective labor-market policies and




Summary of EBRD projects in Central and Eastern Europe, by country, 1990-19961
Millions of ECU
Year Project Bank mECU 2 TPC mECU 3
Description.
Albania
96 Euromerchant Albania Fund 2.8m shares 8.1 m
Venture capital fund to invest in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
95 Power Transmission/Distribution Project 10.m 90.7m
To improve power supply efficiency by reducing power losses Supports sector restructuring and
commercialization. To KESH (Albanian Power Corporation). Co-financed with World Bank.
94 Rogner Hotel
Construction of new quality hotel business center.
11.6m loan and
shares
94 Drin River Cascade Rehabilitation 12.8m 46.6m
To KESH for rehabilitation and modernization of Albania's main power plants. Goal is to allow Albania to
export more electricity, provide reliable domestic supply. Modernization of equipment reduces health risks to
personnel and makes dam safer. Advanced flood warning system to be established.
94 Banca Italo-Albanese
Development of first commercial private bank in Albania.
93 Tirana Hotel
Refurbish and operate as business hotel. Private sector project.
93 Coca-Cola Tirana





92 Albania Telecommunications 7.9m 32.3m
Modernization and expansion of the telecommunications system. First phase of long-term program aimed at
setting up filly digital, profitable network by end of century. Support from Norwegian Telecom, Swiss and
Italian governments. Technical assistance from PHARE.
60.4mTOTAL EBRD loans and shares
Bosnia and Herzegovina
96 Emergency Transport Reconstruction Project
Road reconstruction and improvements to airport.
26.3m 76.0m
96 Equity investment in Hrvatska Banka
For on-lending to local enterprises.




96 Astera OOD 8.1m
Support privatization and modernization of personal care products company.
14.3m
1Sources: EBRD information sheets, annual reports, web site (www.ebrd.com/opera/country/).
2Financing in loans, unless otherwise noted.





96 Danone MPF--Serdika Capital Incrcase
96 Storco
Update, modernize fruit and vegetable processing plant.
96 First Investment Bank Ltd.





95 Railway Restructuring Project 35.7m 233.9m
To Bulgarian State Railways (BDZ) for track repairs, safety/efficiency investments. Co-financed with World
Bank.
27.8m95 Bulgaria Wholesale Markets Project
Establish integrated wholesale market system.
66.6m
95 Bulgarian Investment Bank-Capital Increase Banks 2.9m shares 4.7m
Pro-rata participation in capital increase in BIB to meet new minimum capital requirements.
95 BNP-Dresdner Bulgaria Capital Increase 0.7m shares
Pro-rata participation in capital increase to meet new minimum capital requirements.
3.3m
94 Danone-Serdika SA 1.2m shares 8.6m
Upgrade and modernize product line at leading yoghurt maker.
94 BNP-Dresdner 1.3m shares 7.8m
Investment in fully licensed bank to be created in Bulgaria.
94 Caresbac 3.2m shares 9.5m
Equity in non-profit investment company financing Bulgarian SMEs.
94 General Insurance Co. 0.7m shares 3.5m
Provide non-life insurance to local and foreign corporations in Bulgaria.
94 EuroMerchant Balkan Fund 6.6m shares 22.3m
To establish venture capital fund investing primarily in Bulgaria.
94 Delta Dairy 2.6m shares
Improve production of ice cream and construction of cold storage facilities.
13.2m
93 Bulgarial Transit Roads 34.1m 83.8m
Road development and maintenance project, including completion of 32 km section of Trans-European
motorway between Plovdiv and Orizovo, plus improvements to 800 km of primary roads serving both
regional and long-distance traffic. Co-financed with EIB.
93 Bulgarian Investment Bank .0m shares 4.6m
To new private sector banking group for investments and advisory services.
92 Maritza East II Power Project 40.2m 41.4m
Finance for completion of construction of a unit of the power plant and to help finance retrofitting of
desulphurization unit. Co-financed with EIB.
92 Eurovision-Bulgaria .8m
Loan to help finance design, supply and installation of earth stations to link to Eurovision network by
satellite.
92 Bulgarian Telecommunications 32m 187m
Developing national network by digitalization, line renewal and expansion, short-term measures. Co-financed





TOTAL EBRD loans and shares
Croatia
96 Framework for SME Financing 25.9m 25.9m
Develop SME financing, particularly for Trgovacka Banka.
96 Tourism Credit Line 25.9m 25.9m
First long-term funding of Croatia's tourism industry to help repair and upgrade hotels and other facilities
along coast and on islands.
96 Varazdinska Banka 12.Om loan and 12.Om
For loans to industrial sector to aid privatization. shares
96 Alpe Jadran Banka 5.2m 5.2m
Bank-to-bank loan for on-lending.
96 Bank Austria Croatia 3. lm shares 11.8m
Investment in new commercial bank.
96 Dalmatinska Banka Credit Line Extension 10.4m 10.4m
Provide medium and long-term funding to SME investment projects.
96 Municipal Environmental Infrastructure Invest. Prog. (Env.) 54.4m 164.5m
Extension and improvement of sewerage, waste-water treatment and water supply systems for several towns
along Adriatic coast. Addresses severe pollution in Kastela Bay and the sea off Pula, and restores quality of
bathing water, which will also boost tourism.
96 Hypo Banka Croatia 2.7m shares 10.8m
Capitalize new financial intermediary to increase competition in banking sector.
96 Panonska Pivovara d.o.o 17.1m 62.9m
Finance construction of new brewing facility.
95 Highway Reconstruction 38.3m 190.9m
Assist completion or route improvement, finance road and pavement upgrade. Completes major road between
Zagreb and Adriatic coast. Designed with road user charges. Co-financed with World Bank.
95 Electricity Network Reconstruction 34.1 m 57.3m
Restore power to war-affected areas and extend supply.
95 Zagrebacka Banka IT Loan 3.2m 3.2m
To enable bank to buy IT equipment.
95 Zagrebacka Banka Loan Facility 27.0m 27.0m
Enable bank to on-lend to SMEs and individuals.
95 Agribus. Credit Line-Dalmatinska Banka 10.8m 10.8m
For SMEs in agribusiness sector.
95 Agribus. Credit Line-Agro-Obrtnicka Banka 5.4m 5.4m
95 Pliva dd 48.3m 95.2m
Build plant to produce Azithromycin and similar antibiotic drugs.
94 Air Navigation Rehabilitation 17.4m 20.8m
Assist with replacement of civilian radar and other air navigation facilities destroyed or damaged during war.
Co-financed with World Bank.
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211,3m
TOTAL EBRD loans and shares
Czech Republic
96 Fornasari Textile Holdings
Support expansion, improve environmental conditions at facility.
96 Czech PPF
Wholesale equity operation involving high-risk equity.
96 Rema 1000
Establish grocery franchise chain.
95 Technolen WF a.s.
Upgrade company's capital asset base.
95 Skoda Loverny s.r.o
Invest in metal forger to support machinery modernization.
95 Investicni a Postovni Banka






95 Sepap Steti a.s. 60.1m
For paper company to increase production of environmentally friendly pulp.
95 Ceske Drahy-Czech Railway Corridor 42.5m
Modernize Corridor to internationally accepted performance and safety standards.
94 TFP Komercni Banka 11.9m 
Provide credits to largest commercial bank to support export growth.
94 Karosa-Renault
Enable Karosa to modernize its bus and coach manufacturing plant.
94 Kabel Net













8.6m shares 32. lm
loan and guarantee
94 Tesla-YS 5.9m
Update plant, add new technology for producer of ceramics for semiconductors.
10.6m
93 CZ-Cagiva 8.7m 40.8m
Financing restructuring rf existing motorcycle, components and engine manufacturing plant in Strakonice.
93 Thurn Taxis Dorovice
To major sugar-producing company for expansion and modernization.
93 ING Bank (CEAL) CES-Uniweb
financing small and medium-sized enterprises.
93 ING Bank (CEAL) Tatrarex spol sro
Financing small and medium-sized enterprises.
4.lm shares 23.9m
1.6m line of credit 11 .7m
0.9m line of credit 2.2m
93 SPT Telecom 69.8m 299.3m
Install digital overlay backbone network and improve telecoms systems in major cities. Co-financed with
EIB.
92 CokolAdovny 23.3m shares





92 Ceskoslovenske Aerolinie (CSA) 23.9m shares 23.9m
Co-financing of company's fleet replacement and modernization program,
92 Czech Slovak Investment Corp. 7.3m 43.5m
Finance small and medium-sized enterprises.
92 Eurotel Praha 8.7m 79.9m
Construction of cellular network and public switched packed data network.
TOTAL EBRD loans and shares 431.9m
Estonia
96 AS Hansapank Housing Loan (their sp.) 6.2m 6.2m
Bank to bank loan, corporate credit line for housing finance facility.
96 AS Hansapank 6.2m 6.2m
Housing finance facility in form of bank-to-bank loan, corporate credit line.
96 AS Tallinna Pank Credit Line 6.2m 6.2m
To develop bank's corporate loan portfolio.
96 AS Eesti Forekspank 6.2m 6.2m
Credit line for financing private enterprise projects.
95 AS Hansapank 7.9m 7.9m
Enable bank to remove cash collateral deposits from international correspondent banks.
95 AS Eesti Holupank (Loan) 3.5m 7.0m
Credit line for financing SME projects.
95 AS Eesti Holupank (Equity) 1.9m shares 2.4m
Equity participation to assist the privatization of Holupank.
95 Eesti Uhispank 9.3m 9.3m
Credit line for financing SMEs.
95 Small Municipalities Environment Project 10.8m 46m
Short-term water services investments in municipalities other than Tallinn.
94 Tallinn Airport Rehabilitation 11.3m 13.7m
Upgrade facilities and install new runways, taxiways, approach lights.
94 Estonian Investment Bank 4.0m 8m
Provide SMEs with easier access to credit resources.
94 Tallinn Water and Environment 24.0m 47.9m
Improve water and waste-water services in Tallinn. Loan improves existing water supply and waste-water
system, develops new ground water wells, expand waste-water treatment. Improves reliability of water supply
services, quality of drinking water, reduces waterborne pollution in Gulf of Finland and Baltic Sea.
94 Hansapank 4.6m I 9.2m
Credit line to allow bank access to medium-term funds to build loan portfolio.
94 Estonian Investment Bank 1.5m shares 4.5m
Equity as part of capital increase of bank, which provides funds for private sector.
93 Estline Marine Co. 21.2m 47.5m
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Joint venture for partial financing of ferry between Stockholm and Tallinn.
92 Eurovision- .7m
Loan to help finance design, supply and installation of earth stations to link to Eurovision network by
satellite.
92 Energy Sector Emergency Investment 34.9m 34.9m
Enable urgent repairs to power and heating supply and improve energy efficiency.
TOTAL EBRD loans and shares 160.4m
Hungary
96 Digitel 2002 Rt. 18.5m loan and 102.3m
Development of telecoms networks in two regions north of Budapest. shares
96 Szikra Lapnyomda Rt. 6.6m loan and 14.4m
Enable company to improve color printing facilities and productivity. shares
96 Goldsun II 1.lm shares l.lm
Fruit and vegetable freezing, processing operation.
96 Hungarian Equity Partners 6.8m shares 36.2m
Venture capital fund for medium-sized enterprises.
96 General Purpose Credit Line for EBRD-PHARE Env. and Energy Efficiency Co-funding Scheme
30m loan 47.5m
Finance viable private sector projects with environmental and energy benefits.
96 Hungarian Special Restructuring Program 30.0m shares 30.4m
Support restructuring, turnaround of viable, under-performing companies.
96 OTP Subordinated Loan 40.3m 40.3m
Improve capitalization, expand business activities including private sector loans.
96 Hungarian Bank for Investment and Development 15.9m 15.9m
8-year funding line for medium-sized investment projects.
96 Agricultural Restructuring Project 31.7m 31.7m
Kereskedelmi-Bank Extension. Extend credit line to finance agribusiness investments.
96 BorsodChem Rt. Privatization 23.7m shares 79.3m
Subscribe to capital increase, to finance capital expenditure program.
95 Hungarian Capital Fund 16.0m shares 48.6m
Acquire controlling participations in companies needing restructuring.
95 Cofinec SA (Kner) 4.2m shares 10.1
Modernize and expand printers of packaging materials.
95 Graboplast Rt 2.4m shares 8.3m
Equity investment in home improvement company to develop production of floor coverings.
95 Investel Syndicated Loan Facility 55.5m 809m
For expansion and modernization of MATAV's telecom network.
95 ARP-Budapest Bank-Extension 11.9m 1 1.9m
Extension of credit line to bank as part of existing agricultural restructuring project.
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95 Magyar Kulkereskedelmi Bank (MKB) 19.8m guarantee 39.7m
Trade Facilitation Agreement-Strengthen and develop MKB's intraregional trade promotion service.
95 M5 Toll Motorway 19,1 m loan/guar. 368.3m
First phase of motorway to be built and operated by private, special purpose company.
95 Budapest Bank Privatization
Assist privatization of major state-owned bank.
36.6m shares 38.2m
95 Prometheus ESCO Financing 3.9m 3.9m
For company to expand its activities in energy installation renovation to reduce fuel costs.
95 Ddltdv Rt 30. In loan/shares 166.6m
Help finance telecommunications company's capital expenditure program.
95 EMITEL Rt
Expand and develop local telecommunication networks in three regions.
94 Budapest Wholesale Market




Upgrade and enlarge a chemical plant, improving environmental performance.
94 ARP-Magyar Hitel Bank
Medium and long-term financing to SMEs in agricultural sector.
24.6in line of
credit
94 Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank 20.3m shares
Increase bank's capital base, helping it to become leading financial institution.
94 OTP Bank 39.7mn







94 Central Business Center
Develop modem, mixed-use building in Budapest.
94 MOL-Zsana Gas Storage
to MOL, Hungarian oil and gas company, for underground gas storage.
6. lm loan and
shares
19.8m
93 Kner Nyqmda Rt 5.4m loan and
Modernization and expansion program at printers of packaging materials. shares
93 Eurocorp 0. Im shares
Aid initial capitalization of investment bank that will provide corporate finance advice.
93 PCA-Budafok Kft 5.6m
Enable producer of recycled paperboard to refurbish and upgrade facilities.
8.1m93 Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank
Funding of medium-term lending.
93 RZB/CEAL Magyar Hotec
Loan through regional multi-sector agency line co-financed by RZB.
93 ARP-Budapest Bank
Medium- and long-term financing to SMEs in agricultural sector.
93 ARP-Kereskedelmi
0.9m line of credit3.5m
6.3m line of credit 6.3m








Medium- and long-term financing to SMEs in agricultural sector.
93 ARP-OTP 20.2m line of credit 20.5m
Medium- and long-term financing to SMEs in agricultural sector.
93 Budapest Public Transportation Rehabilitation 61.9m 173.5m
Rehabilitate city's public transport system.
93 Goldsun 4.3m I 17,8m
Modernization of deep-freeze capacity of food company.
93 Hungary Telecommunications Co. 50.9m shares 256.6m
To finance HTC's Physical Investment Programme to improve telecoms services.
93 Accor/Pannonia 6.3m shares 45.6m
For privatization and development of leading hotel group.
93 EGIS Gyogyszergyar 37.8m shares 56m
To help privatize and fund development program, including environmental mitigation and improved marketing
activities.
93 Ml-M15 Toll Motorways 109m loan and 329.6m
shares
Construct 43kmn motorway from Gyor to Austrian border and 15 km motorway toward Bratislava, to be run as
toll roads.
92 Hungarian telecom 54.1m 207.6m
Support Hungarian Telecoms ongoing modernization and expansion program.
92 Westel Radiotelefon KFT 7.9m 7.9m
Expand national mobile cellular telecommunications system
92 Fusion Investment Co. LTD. 3m shares 19.4m
Development of food catering in joint ventures with local operators.
92 Raba/General Motors 32.4m 235.9m
Partial financing of installation of an advanced engine manufacturing and car assembly plant.
92 Budapest Orbital Motorway 21m 108.8m
partial financing of construction of part of road network, and consultancy services.
92 Columbian Tiszai Koromgyarto Kft 7.1m 44.2m
Construction, commission, operation of greenfield carbon black facility.
91 Petofi Nyomda Rt 5.4m 13m
Finance modernization of packaging material manufacturing company.
TOTAL EBRD loans and shares 1.1 billion
Latvia
96 A/S Latvijas Unibanka (Equity Investment) 7.7m shares 8. Im
Assist in privatization of bank, strengthen its capital base and corporate governance.
96 Riga Water and Environment Project 18.1m 97.5
To reduce levels of raw sewage in the Daugava River and improve water supplies. Co-financed with EIB.
96 SIA Vainionpaa 7.2m 21.8m
Construction of modern full-scale saw mill in Taurkalne.
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96 Rigas Komercbanka Equity Investment 5.6m shares 5.6m
Improve corporate governance and capitalization of bank.
96 Valdlemara Centre SIA 5.4m 15.7m
Construct first international-standard business center in Baltics.
96 Special Restructuring Program 15.0m shares 15.0m
SRP fund to invest in state-owned enterprises and facilitate privatization.
95 Latvijas Zemes Banka 1.8m shares 2.2m
Credit line for LZB to strengthen capital base, increase operations.
95 Deutsch Lettische Bank 4.0m 9.5m
Credit line for on-lending to SMEs.
95 A/S Latvijas Unibanka 15.9m 15.9m
Credit line to finance projects in SME sector.
94 Investment Bank of Latvia 1.4m shares 8.3m
Fund bank's loan portfolio, to mobilize hard currency resources for SMEs. Co-financed with EIB.
94 Daugava Hotel 9.5m 33.3m
Finance extension and renovation of Riga hotel.
94 Road Projcct 8.2m 21.3m
To assist with rehabilitation and improvement of road transport infrastructure.
94 Riga International Airport Enterprise 9.6w 10.5m
To rehabilitate runway, taxiways, airfield lighting system.
92 Eurovision .7m
Loan to help finance design, supply and installation of earth stations to link to Eurovision network by
satellite.
92 Energy Sector Emergency Investment 31.6m 37m
For urgent repairs to energy supply facilities to improve supply and end-use efficiencies.
TOTAL EBRD loans and shares 141.7m
Lithuania
96 Lithuanian Development Bank Credit Line 5.3m 5.3m
To fund on-lending and investment activity for SMEs.
96 Post Privatization Fund 15.0m shares 15.0m
Assistance to enable privatized companies to progress in post-transition market economy.
96 Via Baltica and Lithuania Road Project 18.7m 94.3m
Create improved road transport infrastructure.
95 Paroc Silikatas 5.7m 15.6m
Purchase equipment to upgrade production of mineral rockwool insulation material.
95 Viniaus Bankas 8.4m 8.4m
Medium to long-term credit line for on-lending to SMEs.
95 Kaunas Water and Environment Project 11.9m 80.5m
To improve water and waste-water services in Lithuania's second largest city.
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95 Bankas Hermis (Credit Line)
Fund bank's medium-, long-term investments in SMEs.
95 Bankas Hermis (Equity)
Equity investment via new share subscription.
94 Lithuanian Development Bank
Provide medium and long-term funds to Lithuanian private sector.
2.5m shares 2.5m
1.8m shares 5.0m
94 Ignalina Nuclear Plant 35m grant
Grant from Nuclear Safety Account funded by donors and EC, administered by EBRD.
94 Transport Project 15m 36.9m
Finance improvement of rail services from eastern border to Baltic coast, and implement improvements on
major road network.
94 Telecom Development International
Improve and restructure telecoms sector.
19.8m
92 Energy Sector Emergency Investment 32 m
To enable urgent repairs to power and heating supply and improve energy efficiency.






For on-lending to local SMEs.
7.8m loan and
shares
96 Gas Distribution Project
Construct low-pressure piped gas distribution system.
95 Macedonian Telecommunications
Develop international, long distance and local phone network.
95 SME Credit Line Framework
Loan to participating banks to fund local SMEs.
SME Credit Line-Sopanska Banka
SME Credit Line-Makedonska Banka
SME Credit Line-Export-Import Banka
SME Credit Line-Almako Banka
95 Skopje Airport Rehabilitation
Rehabilitate runway and associated equipment improving airport safety.
94 Komercijaina Banka
Trade facility to guarantee correspondent banks against non-payment.
94 Air Navigation System Upgrading












93 Elektrostopanstvo na Makedonija 25.1 m
Construct transmission line and support Energy Conservation Programme.

















89.2m loan, shares 307.6m
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guaranatee
Finance construction of 350,000-line local telecoms network in 10 areas.
96 Kredyt Bank 6.4m shares/guarantees 6.4m
Help provide increased capital for Polish banking sector.
96 Kujawy and RMC 27.4m shares 72.3m
To construct, operate manufacturing facilities, under Lafarge multi-project facility.
96 KZP 9.7m 42.0m
Additional loan to enable paper company to complete restructuring and to increase investments.
96 Warsaw Financial Center 22.9m 92.6m
Finance construction of largest private sector office development in region.
96 Waresco 7.6m 29.9m
Fund construction and operation of Sienna commercial office building in Warsaw.
96 Krotoszyn Equity Investment 6.2m shares 29.8m
Equity investment to manufacturer or auto cylinder liners under MPP Equity Facility
96 Railway Modernization Project 50m 487m
Modernize main rail artery, which is Poland's principal link with the EU and is part of the Trans-European
Network. Co-financed with EIB.
96 Srubena 3. lm 6.2m
Investment in Poland's leading manufacturer of industrial fasteners.
96 Rolimpex 13.0m shares 79.3m
Support final stages of privatization.
96 Rolimpex 16. lm 32.2m
On lending to SMEs.
96 Polish Enterprise Fund 24.2m shares 120.8m
Make equity, equity-related investments in private, privatizing SMEs.
96 Warsaw Wholesale Market 12.1m 31.0m
Construction of a new market to provide modern infrastructure for trade in food products.
96 FM Forte S.A. 9.1m shares 20.2m
Equity investment in furniture manufacturing company.
96 Air Liquide-Huta Katowice 13.5m 30.7m
On-site air separation plant for Huta Katowice.
95 BTUiR Heros 1.4m shares 3.0m
Investment in one of Poland's largest private sector insurers to finance expansion.
95 Polsko-Amerykanski Bank Kipoteczny S.A 11.9m Guaran. 11.9m
Guarantee facility to PABH to finance larger multi-unit residential developments.
95 Metalplast 6.2m shares 27.6m
Privatize producer of building panels, with investment to improve quality standards.
95 Warsaw Distribution Park Sp. z.o.o. 4.2m 10.4m
Help develop first international-standard industrial park in Poland.
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95 Polski Fundusz Leasingowy 0.3m shares 1.5m
Equity investment in company leasing industrial equipment to Polish-based companies.
95 Faure & Machet Logistics 7.9m loans/shares 22.7m
Invest in warehousing and distribution at greenfield site near Warsaw.
95 Bank Rozwoju Eksportu SA 23.8m 23.8m
Revolving Credit Facility--Fund and co-finance BRE's credit activities supporting Polish exports. (canceled).
94 Kronospan Szczeclnek 16.2m 56.8m
Install medium density fibreboard production line and resin plant.
94 Fiat Auto Poland 72.5m shares 918.1 m
and loan
Increase car-making capacity, modernize and improve environmental performance of seven manufacturing
sites.
94 Polish Development Bank 23.8m 23.8m
Finance private sector companies.
94 Azur Ostoja 1.5m shares 3.6m
Provide non-life insurance services to rural communities.
94 Polish Power Grid Co. 32.4m 96.4m
Upgrade, extend transmission system and complete heat/power plant.
94 Atrium Business Centre 4.2m 28.4m
Build a 20,000 m2 business center in Warsaw.
94 Kwidzyn Paper Mill 27m 264.9m
Modernize existing pulp and paper production facility in Kwidzyn.
94 Schooner Capital 13.7m shares 79.3m
make investments in established Polish businesses, primarily through privatization.
94 Farm Frites Poland 7.9m 27.7m
Help construct facilities for potato storage and processing.
94 National Investment Funds 33m 33m
94 Pioneer Poland Fund 1.4m shares 43.6m
Providing equity investment to private and privatizing companies. Some canceled.
94 Bank Przemyslowo-Handlowy 34.2m shares 33.9m
Stand-by share purchase commitment in privatization of this Krakow bank.
94 Azur Zycle 1.2m shares 2.7m
Life insurance to rural communities in Poland.
93 Huta Ssandomierz-Pilkington 4m shares and 138.1 m
loan
Joint venture to privatize Poland's largest sheet glass manufacturer and to construct float glass plant
93 Wielkopolski Bank Kredytowy SA 10.4m shares 22.9m
Investment in first privatization of Polish regional commercial bank.
93 Huta Warszawa-Lucchini 30m 239.2m
Modernization of existing steel plant, new equipment and working capital.
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93 Fabryka Papieru Malta Decor 4.3m 10.2m
To Polish chipboard manufacturer for modernization and expansion of Polspan and upgrading of paper mill.
93 Polspan So. z.o.o. 10.8m 44.8m
To Polish chipboard manufacturer for modernization and expansion of Polspan and upgrading of paper mill.
93 Rockwool Polans Sp z.o.o. 6.5m 19.6m
JV company--loan will finance modernization of production lines.
93 Caresbac Polska 4. lm shares 9.8m
For risk capital investment in Polish private sector SMEs.
93 RZB/CEAL Agora Gazeta 3.2m line of credit 9.4m
Loan through regional multi-sector agency line co-financed by RZB.
93 AmerBank 4m 4m
To fund investment and loan projects in Polish SMEs (canceled).
93 Trebruk/Kostrzyn 12.2 m 45.1m
Paper mill disposed of to Swedish investors by company in process of reconstruction and modernization.
93 Motorway Development Project 45m 83.6m
Complete motorway construction projects, introduce highway tolls, develop strategy for national road
network.
93 Huta Szkia Jaroslaw SA 11.9m 54.6m
Rehabilitate company's capacity to manufacture glass containers.
93 Lodoml 1.7m 11.4m
Polish JV created to build and operate cold storage facility in Szczecin.
92 Polska Telefonia Komorkowa (PTK) 31.7m 142.8m
Polish joint venture created to build and run countrywide cellular telephone network.
92 Janofrost 1.9m 5.1 m
Polish joint venture set up to build and run food processing and cold storage facilities.
92 Krespol 2m 5.1 m
Polish joint venture set up to build and run food processing and cold storage facilities.
92 Kujawy-Frost 1.9m 5.2m
Polish joint venture set up to build and run food processing and cold storage facilities.
92 Polish Private Equity Fund 40. lm shares 119. Im
To invest in Polish unquoted companies with growth potential, particularly SME privatization and
restructuring.
92 ABB Dolmel 5.2m 14.8m
Expand facility producing generators for power generation equipment industry.
92 Ringnes/PUBREX (BCCB Ltd.) 5.9m 18.7m
Joint venture between Norwegian beverage co. and Polish construction co. to develop retail distribution
network.
92 Poland Housing Project 21.4m line of credit 270.5m
Loan to finance residential construction projects by private and public developers.
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91 WBK Poznan 16,3m 48m
For on-lending to implement comprehensive heating sector restructuring and rehabilitation,
TOTAL EBRD loans and shares 874.2m
Romania
96 Prompt SA 8.6m loan and 17.0m
Expansion of company's knitware and other garment production capacity. shares
96 Railway Rehabilitation 58.5m 338.2m
Rehabilitation of traction and rolling stock.
96 United Romanian Breweries 15.3m 44.3m
Construct new brewery and develop modern distribution system.
96 Danube Holding Ltd. 4.8m shares 24.2m
Fund to invest in SMEs in Romania and Moldova.
96 Post Privatizatiorn Fund 25.0m shares 50
Invest in privatized and new private enterprises.
96 Energy Conservation and SME Credit Line 8.1m 13.2m
Invest in general and energy conservation projects.
96 Bucharest-Pitesti Motorway Upgrading 42.8m 83.3
Finance upgrading of 96 kilometers of highway to motorway standards.
96 Regional Water and Environment Project 20.1 m 42.4m
Provide Jiu Valley with constant supply of drinking water.
96 NAR Restructuring and Road Rehab. Proj. 69.2m 483.2,
Support for commercialization, privatization of National Roads Administration.
96 Rompak S.R.L 5.9m 15.8m
Factory on greenfield site to produce high quality baker's yeast.
95 Municipal Utilities Development Prog. 22.2m 49.7m
Rehabilitate and improve municipal water services in five cities.
95 Leventis ,Timisoara Bottling Plant 7.5m 17.8m
Assist in purchase of equipment for four soft drink and juice bottling lines.
95 Commercial Bank Ion Tiriac Stand-by loan 15.9m 15.9m
Three-year revolving loan to enable bank to increase MT lending to SMEs.
95 Power Sector Operational Efficiency 78.lm 184.6m
Improvement Project--rehabilitate four thermal power plant units, upgrade transmission system.
95 Banca Agricola Extension of Credit Line 39.7m 39.7m
Extension of credit line for private sector agribusiness investments.
94 Romanian Bank for Development 6.3m 6.3m
94 Romanian Bank for Development 39.2m 39.2m
To support business plans contributing to the bank's institutional development.
94 Bucharest Wholesale Market 19.8m I 38.9m
Establish wholesale fruit and vegetable market for private traders, upgrade and interlink five retail markets.
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94 Athdn6 Palace
To help refurbish prestigious hotel to international standards,
94 Banca Agricola IT Loan
Improved information technology for part-privatized bank.
94 Banca de Credit Cooperatist
To finance SME investment projects.
93 Commercial Bank "Ion Tiriac" SA 7
Institutional development to aid development of financial services sector.
93 European Roads Rehabilitation Project 6
Improve road network serving regional and inter-regional traffic.
93 Capital SA 1
Establish financial advisory and investment institution in Bucharest.
.O0m shares 26.2m
13.5m 317.3m
.7m shares 21. lm
93 Bank of Bucharest 2m shares
Investment in new commercial bank, to be controlled and managed by Credit Bank SA
93 Coca-Cola Bihor & Iasi 4.0m
To two new joint venture companies for bottling plants, marketing and distribution.
93 Virolite Functional Polymers SA
Construction and operation of greenfield ion exchange resin plant.
11.8m loan and
shares
93 Emcom-Siemens 38.4m shares
Installation of plant to manufacture digital telecoms switching equipment.
92 Romanian Telecom 142.0m
Construct long-distance overlay digital network and rehabilitate local facilities.
92 Banca Agricola
Bank will make subloans to private sector companies in agribusiness.
55.5m line cf credit 55.5m
92 Eurovision- 92 .8m
Loan to help finance design, supply and installation of earth stations to link to Eurovision network by
satellite.
92 Petroleum Pilot Modernization 21.7m
Improve oil production operations, lay basis for restructuring and modernize R&D.





Modernize smelting furnaces and aid privatization.






96 CGC Thermotech ESCO
Under the regional CGC Thermotech ESCO.
3.6m loan and
shares
96 Heatco District Heating Project 3.2m loan and
















96 Tatra Banka Subordinated Debt 13.0m
Subordinated loan to private sector bank.
96 Pol'nobanka II (Formerly Slovenska Pol'nohospodarska Bank) 3.0m shares
For IT and branch network investment to strengthen capital base.
96 PBK General Purpose and Energy Efficiency Credit Facility 14.9m
Expand lending operations and finance dedica'ed to energy conservation projects
95 Slovenska Polnohospodarska Banka Co-financing Facility (food)
14.4m
SPB-Co-financing facility-Miva 0.6m
95 Tatra Bank Credit Line 16.2m
Finance medium- and long-term funding to SMEs.
95 Advent International 7.9m shares
Additional financing for existing Advent Fund.
95 Slovnaft Equity 44.2m shares
part-fund construction of residue upgrader to convert heavy oil to lighter products.
95 Slovenska Polnohospodarska Banka 1.9m shares
Part of capital increase to maintain EBRD's 20% shareholding in SPB.
95 Istrobanka SA 16.2m
Finance medium- and long-term private sector investment projects.
94 Sloveca JV 8.1 m
Finance construction of state-of-the-art ethoxylation plant.
94 ZSNP 30.8m loans/
Complete construction of smelter meeting EU standards. 99. Im
94 Slovnaft 23.8m
Expand and modernize retail petrol service station network.
93 Slovak Telecommunications 44m
Install digital overlay backbone network, with modernization, expansion of telecoms
93 International Road Corridor 15m
Improve condition of European road network.
93 Slovenska Polnohospodarska Banka 4.7m shares
Continued development of SPB's commercial banking service.
92 Eurotel Bratislava 6.3m
Construction of cellular network and public switched packed data network.
TOTAL EBRD loans and shares 426.80m
Slovenia
96 Poslovni sistem Mercator 31.1m
Construction, refurbishment, modernization of retail chain.
96 Yulon 2 dd 5.2m shares























95 Slovenian Capital Development Fund 5.8m shares 19.5m
Investment in private sector and privatizing companies.
95 Slovene SRP-Eurofin 8.0m shares 8.0m
Special Restructuring Program to finance stabilization, restructuring, privatization of enterprises.
95 Slovene SRP-Druzba 22,0m shares 22.0m
Special Restructuring Program to finance stabilization, restructuring, privatization of enterprises.
95 Slovenski Plinovodi-Retail gas Combustion 8.lm 29.7m
To private sector co. to build, operate retail gas distribution systems.
95 Yulon d.d. 17.3m 57. I n
partial finance for company privatization, modernization of nylon production.
94 SKB Banka Ljubljana 27m 27m
Loans to SMEs in private sector.
94 Slovenske Zeleznice 44.7m 86.1m
Improve productivity of railway system, support its restructuring. Co-financed with EIB.
94 Company for Motorways (DARS) 25.5m 50.8m
Support investments to remove bottlenecks in main east-west corridor.
94 National Roads Administration 23.8m 71.5m
Improve road system and support newly established motorway company.
94 Aquasava d.o.o 4.9m 14.lm
Establish modern textile processing operation in Kranj.
94 Horizonte Fund 1.0m shares 11.5m
Invest in venture capital fund to provide capital, mgmt. assistance to new private companies.
94 SKB Banka-Equity 14.9m shares 31.1m
Aid bank's business plan of expansion and increased profitability.
94 Papirnica Kolicevo d.o.o Equity 2.7m shares 35.9m
Finance restructuring, capital expenditure and working capital of cartonboard manufacturer.
94 Papirnica Kolicevo d.o.o Loan 10.6m 35.9m
Finale restructuring, capital expenditure and working capital of paper company.
93 Drava River Hydroelectric Power Project 77.1 m 135.1 m
Refurbishment, replacing turbines and network transformers, to improve costs and safety and to reduce
pollution.
92 Eurovision .8m
Loan to help finance design, supply and installation of earth stations to link to Eurovision network by
satellite.
TOTAL EBRD loans and shares 330.5m
Regional Projects
96 New Europe Insurance Ventures Fund 20.1m shares 80.5m
Co-investment with Regional Fund
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96 Landis & Gyr Multi-Project Facility 70m loan and 190m
Multi-project facility to support expansion of energy service companies shares
96 Municipal Services Multi-Project Facility 33.7m loan and 103.6m
RWE Entsorgung Framework Agreement shares
Finance investments in private provision of muni and environmental services.
96 CGC ESCO Multi-Project Facility 36.7m loan and 108. m
Multi project facility to finance energy service companies. shares
96 FGG Municipal Services Multi-Project Facility 41m loan and 129.4m
Encourage private provision and financing of muni and env. services. shares
96 Risk-sharing Agreement with EGAP 25m 25m
Agreement with Czech Export Credity Agency (EGAP).
96 Carlsberg MPF Equity Line 75m 200m
Modernization of existing breweries and limited new greenfield operations.
96 Environmental Investment Fund 8m shares 40m
To finance manufacturing, services, development in infrastructure sector.
96 Multi-Project Facility: Lafarge 45m shares 209.6
Acquire, modernize, construct, operate manufacturing facilities for building materials.
96 Honeywell Multi-Project Facility 20m shares 123m
Establish energy service companies to implement energy efficiency projects.
95 MBA Loan Project 9.2m Guarantee 18.2m
Enable students from region to attending leading Western business schools.
95 East European Food Fund 15.7m shares 79.3m
Establish regional fund focusing on investments in food and beverage industry.
95 Baltic Venture Fund 6.0m shares 23.0m
To achieve LT growth through equity investment in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.
95 International Black Sea Bank 11.9m 34.5m
Multi-Project Facility--Framework agreement with the Commercial Bank of Greece to support banks in four
countries.
95 Winterthus Schweizerische Versicheringungs 28.8m 100.3m
Gesellschaft Multi-Project Facility--for investment project in life insurance and pension sectors in five
countries.
95 Co-financing Facility for the 10 Fund 20m shares/loan 20m
Co-finance SME projects created with fund sponsored by Danish Government.
94 Alliance ScanEast Fund 2.7m shares 38.lm
94 Advent Fund 12.5m shares 11 m
Provide capital and mgmt. help to private companies in Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.
94 First NIS Regional Fund 15.6m shares 142.8m
Investment in newly established Fund.
93 New Europe East Investment Fund 25.3m shares 100.7m
Fund to invest in large enterprises throughout the region
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93 Dun and Bradstreet (C&EE) Holdings 2,4m shares 4.7m
Investment in information service companies in Hungary, Czech Republic, and Poland.
93 Renaissance Fund 8m shares 31.7m
Capital and management assistance to new and recently established companies in Czech Republic, Poland,
Slovak Republic.
TOTAL regional projects: 517m
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APPENDIX 3
Summary of EIB Projects in Central and Eastern Europe, 1990-19961
Millions of ECU
Year Project, Bank mECU2
Description
Albania
95 APEX Global Loan 5m
For small and medium sized industrial, agro-industrial, tourism and related services, environmental protection,
energy savings.
95 Ferry Terminal in Port of Durrds 5m
Expansion of existing ferry terminal and priority repairs of quays and storage areas
95 East-West Road Corridor 24m
Loan to Republic of Albania to help General Roads Directorate of the Ministry of Construction and Tourism
to finance rehabilitation and improvement of around 94km of roads along main East-West road corridor. Will
help link country with Trans-European Networks (TENs).
96 Energy 12m
Rehabilitate, upgrade electricity grid.
TOTAL 46m
Bulgaria
95 Transit Roads II 60m
Rehabilitation and reconstruction of some 900km of main transit roads.
94 Bulgaria Air Traffic Services (ATS)-B 30m
Modernization and upgrading of air traffic control facilities.
93 Bulgaria Air Traffic Services (ATS)-A 30m
Modernization and upgrading of air traffic control facilities.
93 Transit Roads 21m
Rehabilitation and completion of major transit roads and motorways. Co-financed with EBRD.
93 BNB Apex Global Loan 30m
Loan to Republic of Bulgaria through Bulgarian National Bank, which will onlend to commercial banks
operating at local level, to finance small and medium-scale manufacturing and tourism enterprises, as well as
energy saving and environmental protection schemes.
92 Energy I 45m
Help finance completion of 210 MW lignite fired generator fitted with flue gas desulphurization equipment at
Maritsa East II power station in southeastern Bulgaria Plant. Total project estimated at 114m ECU, co-
financed with EBRD (40m), and Bulgarian government, which has requested grant aid from PHARE.
92 PT Telecommunications 70m
17-year loan to Bulgarian Post and Telecommunications company to expand, modernize existing network.
Works are part of a three-year priority investment program elaborated by EIB with support of PHARE and
cooperation with EBRD and World Bank, which also provide financing.
1Sources: EIB, "Summary of Signed Operations in Central and Eastern Europe," June 1996; EIB Press
Releases, various dates; EIB Annual Reports 1990-1996.





96 Energy project 55m
Replacement of VW/Skoda's lignite-fired combined heat and power plant in Mlada Boleslav by coal-fired plant
of same type.
95 Czech E Roads 60m
Improvement of road network.
95 C'EZ I (Power Plant Improvements) 200m
Installation of desulphurization equipment at six thermal power stations. Investments will bring the largest
lignite-fired power stations into compliance with international standards. The FGDs will reduce S02
emissions by more than 90% and have a major impact on air quality in the 'Black Triangle' region where
nearly half of the electricity for the Czech Republic is generated with benefits across the border in Germany
and Poland.
94 Ceshe Telecommunicatie 30m
Telecommunications 1-B, 15-year loan to state-owned SPT TELECOM to modernize, expand existing
network.
94 Rail Corridor Berlin-Prague-Vienna 125m
To Czech state railway co. to upgrade the Czech section of this railway line.
94 MERO CR IKL Oil Pipeline 100m
Construction of oil pipeline linking TAL at Ingolstadt (Germany) and Druzhba pipeline (from Russia) at
Kralupy (Czech Republic). Also includes pumping stations, storage faLilities, telecommunications and safety
equipment.
93 Ceske Telecommunicatie 65m
Telecommunications I-A, 15-year loan to SPT TELECOM to modernize, expand existing network. Total
investment estimated at 700m ECU, with financing from EBRD, World Bank, export credits and SPTs own
funds.
93 Skoda/Volkswagen 100m
Modernization andexpansion of car plant.
92 CNB Apex Global Loan 57m




Rehabilitate and upgrade sections of Tallinn-Narva main railway line.
95 Estonian Investment Bank-B 5m
Second global loan to EstIB to finance small and medium-sized enterprises in industry, tourism and services
related to industry, as well as energy saving and environmental protection schemes.
94 Estonia District Heating Rehabilitation 7m
To Republic of Estonia for Municipality of Parnu and to a smaller extent to the Municipality of Tallinn to
improve reliability of district heating system and reduce fuel costs and oil imports. Investment comprise
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TOTAL 286m
equipment for conversion of oil-fired boilers to wood and peat, pumping stations, water treatment facilities
and pipe insulation.
94 Port of Muuga: Bulk Terminal 15m
Loan to state-owned Port of Tallinn to construct new dry bulk terminal at deep sea Port of Muuga. Investment
comprises two 15 meter deep quays, storage shed, bulk loading equipment.
94 Upgrading of Air Traffic Services (ATS) 20m
Loan to Republic of Estonia for onlending to its Civil Aviation Admin. to finance new control center with
radar, radio coverage for whole country, air navigation instruments, air traffic information service.
93 Estonian Investment Bank-A 5m
Loan through Central Bank of Estonia for EstIB to finance small and medium-sized enterprises in industry,
tourism and related services. EstIB set up in 1992 with support of EBRD and NIB under Baltic Investment
Programme, as well as with grant aid from PHARE.
TOTAL 68m
Hungary
96 Motorway upgrade 95m
Upgrade M3 toll motorway linking Budapest to Gy6ngy6s.
96 Global loan 40m
Finance small and medium-sized ventures.
95 Telecommunications II-B 50m
17 year loan provided under a ten year investment program launched in 1990 to expand and modernize national
telecoms network. The loan will help install 1 million new lines by 1996, increasing telephone density from
14 to 26 lines per 100 inhabitants.
95 Financial Sector Global Loan 150m
Loan to two Hungarian banks (K & H Bank and OTP Bank) and to four Hungarian affiliates of Austrian,
Italian and Dutch banks to help project promoters bridge needs for long-term funds and scarce local supply of
resources.
94 Telecommunications II loo100m
Loan to Republic of Hungary to expand and modernize telecoms network. Part of 10 year program launched in
1990 to upgrade Hungarian telephone network.
94 Hungary Electricity Board (MVMT) Phase 2Energy trans. 20m
Improvement of Power Grid, Phase 2. Investments comprise computer controlled signaling devices and
receivers at point of consumption, as well as auxiliary equipment. Works will lead to more rational use of
energy and benefit environment through retirement of obsolete and polluting generating facilities.
94 Hungary Roads II 72m
Loan to Republic of Hungary to help finance 34 km two lane urban by-pass and rehabilitation and
improvement of around 350km of primary transit roads.
94 Municipal Infrastructure Global Loans 40m
For financing municipal infrastructure capital investments in energy, environment, roads, telecoms, urban
rehabilitation, transport, water supply and sewerage through OTP Bank.
92 Hungary Roads I 50m
Rehabilitation of road system and construction of urban by-passes.
92 Hungary Air Traffic Services (ATS) 20m
Rehabilitation and upgrading of air traffic services facilities.
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91 Hungary Kelenfold Rehabilitation 35m
Modernization of heat and power plant.
91 Hungary APEX Line of Credit 80m
Line of credit for Industrial Projects.
90 Hungary Electricity Board (MVMT) Phase I 15m
Improvement of Power Grid, Phase I and Phase 2.
90 Inter-Europa Bank (IEB) 25m
Line of credit for small and medium scale industrial projects. Bank owned by group of Hungarian companies
and Istituto Bancario San Paolo di To,;no of Italy.
90 Telecommunications Project (MTV) 80m
15-year loan toward first phase of 10 year program to upgrade national telecoms system. First phase, due to be
completed by end 1993, is also supported by World Bank.
TOTAL 872m
Latvia
94 Investment Bank of Latvia 5m
For financing SMEs in industry, tourism, related services, and environmental protection and energy-saving
projects. LIB is new institution set up under Baltic Investment Programme with support of the Nordic
Investment Bank and the EBRD.
96 Riga Water 15m
Upgrade and rehab. water supply and sewerage systems ii. and around Riga.
96 Hydroelectric 6m
Rehabilitate works and dam safety improvements at hydroelectric plants.
96 Global loan to Investment Bank of Latvia 5m
Financing for small and medium-scale enterprises.
TOTAL: 31 m
Lithuania
96 Gas Distribution 10m




Upgra.e, rehabilitate selected sections of Via Baltica road corridor.
96 Telecommunications 15m
Construct, operate first phase of mobile telecoms network.
96 Global loan 5m
Financing for small and medium-scale ventures.
95 Lithuanian Development Bank Global Loan 5m
Loan to Lithuanian Development Bank for financing small and medium-sized enterprises in industry, tourism
and related services. LDB is new institution set under Baltic Investment Programme with support of Nordic
Investment Bank and EBRD.
.293
95 Port of Klaipeda 14m
Construction of small container terminal and upgrading of existing ferry terminal. PHARE is co-financing.
94 Upgrading of Vilnius Airport 10m
Loan to Republic of Lithuania for Vilnius Airport State Enterprise to finance renovation and strengthening of




96 Polish gas 180m
Convert depleted Wierzchowice gas field, western Poland, into underground storage facility. Polish Oil and
Gas Co.
96 Telecommunications 100m
Extension, modernization of telecoms network.
96 Highways 100m
Upgrade motorway between Bielany and Nogawczyce via Prady. Republic of Poland.
95 Financial Sector Global Loan OO1m
Funds for Polish affiliates of EU banks: ABN AMRO Bank (Polska), Bank Creditanstalt, Internationale
Nederlanden Bank (Warsaw Branch) and Raiffeisen Centrobank. Later on Deutsche Bank Polska gained access
to these funds, which are to be onlent for financing industry, tourism and infrastructure projects
95 Polish Railways III 40m
Rehabilitate, upgrade first section of Warsaw-Terspol TEN railway line.
94 Export Development Bank (EDB) II 13m
Global Loan--to state-owned bank for financing small and medium-sized enterprises.
94 Polish Telecommunications II 150m
Expansion, modernization of Polish telecoms network. Co-financed with WB and PHARE.
94 Warsaw Sewage Treatment Plant 45m
Construction of new sewage treatment plant to process some of the capital's waste water.
94 Poland Highways 125m
Upgrading motorway standards of A4 highway between Bielany and Nogawczyce, Polish sections of TENs.
93 Forestry Development 13m
20-year loan to Republic of Poland made available to Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural
Resources and Forestiy to help finance the planting of some 17,000 ha between 1993-95. Investment part of
extensive 5-year program, supported by WB, for safeguarding and extending Polish forests, which have
suffered extensive environmental damage.
93 Polish Railways II 200m
Loan to national railway company to modernize Polish section of E2- Berlin/Warsaw railway line. Funds for
track renewal, embankments, platforms, signaling equipment, optic fiber telecoms cables and power systems.
PHARE involved. Berlin-Warsaw line is crucial link in Trans-European rail network.
93 Polish Development Bank II Global Loan 50m
Line of credit for industrial projects.
92 Warsaw Airport Modernization 50m
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Modernize and upgrade Warsaw airport. Investments consist of new terminal building, rehabilitation of
runways, installation of lighting and de-icing facilities, as well as access roads and various environmental
measures.
91 Polish Telecommunications (TPSA) 70m
Expansion of existing network.
91 Polish Development Bank Apex (PDB) 75m
Line of credit for Industrial Projects. PDB set up following recommendations of a study financed by EC.
Additional financing from World Bank.
90 Polish Railways 20m
Toward first phase of program to modernize State railway.
90 Polish Oil and Gas Co (PGNG) 50m
To modernize domestic gas industry, increase gas production; reduce air pollution. Co-financed by World
Bank.
90 Export Development Bank (EDB) 25m




Rehabilitate sections of E81 and E60 European road corridors. Romania for National Administration of Roads.
96 Metro rehab. 20m
Renew rolling stock, complete network infrastructure on Bucharest metro.
95 Romania Telecommunications 80m
Expansion and modernization of Romanian telecoms network. Loan is part of three -year program launched in
1994.
95 Heat and Power Rehabilitation 60m
Loan to Romania on-lent to RENEL-Regia Autonoma de Electricitate for upgrading heat and power generation
and electricity transmission and distribution network. 15-year loan will rehabilitate Bucharest South heat and
power plant, and electricity transmission and distribution sub-stations in Rosiori, Smirdan and Brasov. It will
also fund construction of a new sub-station in Bucharest.
95 Constanta Port Rehabilitation 35m
20-year loan to help repair storm and accident damage to the Northern breakwater and complete all breakwaters
of the port, which is on the Black Sea. Constanta is Romania's principal sea port, the Eastern gateway to the
Rhine-Main-Danube waterway. Its efficiency is important for development of TENs.
94 Romania Air Traffic Services 16m
Modernization and upgrading of air traffic control facilities.
94 Romgaz Rehabilitation and Modernization 50m
Loan to state-owned gas co. to modernize natural gas transmission and distribution network. Replaces 1000
km of steel pipes by polyethylene pipes, installation of modern control and telecoms system to improve
safety and efficiency. Project is part of larger oil and gas investment program co-financed by World Bank.
93 Roads I 65m
Rehabilitation of key transit European roads in Romania. Part of 1993-95 road rehabilitation and pavement
program co-financed by EIB, EBRD and World Bank.
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93 Apex Global Loan 30m
Line of credit for industrial, productive-sector, services and tourism projects.
93 Romania Air Traffic Services (ATS)-A 24m
Loan to country's air traffic control administration to modernize, upgrade air traffic control facilities.
91 RENEL 25m
Help finance rehabilitation of four 330 MW coal-fired generation units at Rovinari and Turceni power stations
in south-central Romania. Project is co-financed with World Bank, which will also fund improvements in coal




Rehabilitate Vojany I coal-fired power station.
96 Energy 30m
Modernize, expand international gas transit network.
95 SPP Gas Transmission Project -A 30m
Modernization and extension of Slovak international pipeline transporting Russian gas through Slovakia to
western Europe. Part of EIB's promotion of TENs.
95 National Bank Apex Global Loan II 50m
Second global loan to National Bank of Slovakia for financing term credit operations in industry, tourism and
related services, and environmental protection and energy saving.
94 Slovenske Telekomunikacie 20mr
Telecommunications 1-B--Loan to state-owned telecoms utility to modernize and expand existing network.
94 Air Traffic Services 15m
To Slovak Republic for on-lending to air traffic control administration to finance new control center with radar
coverage for whole country, air navigation instruments, communication system linking Bratislava airport and
regional airports, as well as aeronautic information service.
93 European Roads 10m
Finance urgently needed road overlays and an urban by-pass at Sered, in western Slovakia, a region with heavy
transit traffic to the EC. Investment in line with objectives of the Edinburgh Declaration of European Heads
of State and Government set December 1992, inviting EIB to accelerate financing of TENs in Community and
also in CEEC. EBRD providing a parallel loan for road improvement in Slovakia.
93 Slovenske Telekomunikacie- 45m
Telecommunications -A--Modernize and expand existing network.
93 Lab 4 Gas Storage 55m
Expansion of underground gas storage reservoir to be used by Slovak, Czech, EU and Austrian gas companies.
92 NBS Apex Global Loan 28m




Construct three sections on Ljubljana-Celje east-west corridor.
95 Slovenia Highways -B 32m
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Loan to DARS, a company set up for financing, building and managing motol ways. Loan will help finance
the upgrading to motorway standards of around 55 km of secondary road of the Lubljana bypass and the
Lubljana-Celje corridor.
94 Slovenia Railways II 13m
Partial rehabilitation and upgrading of East-West trunk railway line.
94 Slovenia Highways-A 28m
Construction of 55.4 km of motorway on three sections of East-West axis road.
93 Slovenia Railways 47m
20 year loan, with 2% interest rate subsidy funded from Community budget to rehabilitate sections of trunk
rail system. EBRD is co-financing.
TOTAL: 150m
CEE TOTAL 4.8 billion ECU
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